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Kazimierz Twardowski’s article „On clear and unclear philosophical style” (O jasnym niejasnym stylu filozoficznym) is considered as one of his manifests of the Lvov-Warsaw School: clarity of expressing thoughts was one of methodological determinants of this school. Because of some passages in this article, Twardowski is often considered as a philosopher who believed that we may only think in words. In the article, Twardowski’s views on the relation between language and speech are analyzed through the prism of the less known Twardowski’s writings with application of some theoretical distinctions.

The purpose of the present paper is to analyse the problem of cost generated by the performance of a duty to rescue. The authors consider three distinct views of this problem by confronting a scenario in which one party decides to rescue another, where providing such assistance seems to involve an infringement upon the property rights of the third party. For example, A rescues drowning B but in the process of doing so A apparently trespasses upon C’s land. The question that the authors pose is: Assuming that there is a duty to rescue, who should be charged with the cost of what seems to be an infringement upon the third party’s property rights? The paper analyses the following possibilities: the cost should be borne by (a) the victim of the emer- gency, (b) the rescuer, (c) the third party whose rights seem to have been encroached upon. Even though the authors begin with a pronouncedly libertarian assumption about the third party’s absolute property rights, in the course of the discussion they come to the conclusion that it is exactly this assumption that should be further probed and ultimately relaxed in order to reach the most plausible solution to the present dilemma.

This paper presents an overview of my work in philosophy from my first book on Friedrich Schiller and the political sublime to my most recent project on listening to traumatic forms of violence. Starting with a reflection on the autobiographical character of philosophy, I propose to take up the question of an aesthetic dimension of philosophical critique, where aesthetics is understood as an always already embodied perspective on the world, on truth, and on philosophical activity, as well as an always already political realm, where the distribution of sense pre-determines our approach and articulation of experience. Departing from aesthetics understood and deployed as critique, the paper moves on to ask about the specific frameworks of sense or grammars that determine in advance the conditions of audibility in the realms of memory-building and history-making—particularly in those contexts where historical, political, and institutional forms of violence produce silencing and erasure. Putting in dialogue the latter with decolonial studies, I (re)interpret “traumatic violence” as a colonizing form of violence, understanding that one of its central aspects is that it is not only an assault on life but on the conditions of production of sense that make life legible as such. In this context, my project on grammars of listening seeks to carefully unpack these complex intersections while also explaining why I believe that a radical form of listening is an essential subversive/imaginative strategy against traumatic/colonial violence.

This paper analyzes the innovative way of doing critical philosophy that María del Rosario Acosta López proposes in her aesthetics of resistance and grammars of the unheard. The paper examines the contributions of two sets of conversations with Acosta López’s critical philosophy. In the first place, staging a dialogue between Acosta López and Black feminist philosophy, the article offers a defence of reconceptualizing philosophy in the 21st Century through a dialogue with the voices and perspectives of the excluded and silenced—a reconceptualization that reimagines the critical role of philosophy. In the second place, the paper calls attention to the crucial significance of Acosta López’s aesthetics of resistance for contemporary debates in contemporary political epistemology, putting in conversation her grammars of the unheard with my epistemology of resist- ance and María Lugones’s concept of complex communication. This second conversation also underscores a new way of understanding the critical and transformative function of philosophy by centering the voices and perspectives of the excluded and silenced.

We conceive of ourselves as capable of acting in response to normative reasons. Given that normative reasons are facts, this self-conception entails that we are capable of acting in response to facts. Arguments from error cases might seem to force us to deflate this self-conception, for they seem to show that to act in light of a fact must simply be a way of acting in light of a belief. The starting point of this paper is the rejection of this deflationary view. In order to reject the argument from error cases, we should adopt a disjunctive view of motivating reasons. According to this view there are two distinct ways of acting in light of a consideration: acting in light of a fact and acting in light of a belief. Disjunctivism about motivating reasons, however, is the target of a skeptical challenge grounded in a cognitivist account of the mind. According to this account, cognition is to explained in terms of the manipulation of representations and there is no meaningful difference between acting in light of a fact and acting in light of a belief: in both cases, one decides in light of a representation. The goal of this paper is to defend disjunctivism from this objection. In order to do so I appeal to Gibson’s ecological psychology. I argue that the ecological account of perception allows us to hold that in the case of actions guided by perception we act in light of the facts themselves (not representations of those facts) and that the same approach can be extended to cover cases in which we act in light of sensorily unavailable facts.

In this paper I address the relationship between Hegel and Heidegger from the perspective of the dialectic between end and beginning. After the introduction, in the second part of the paper I analyze Hegel’s position in the history of being as the beginning of the end of metaphysics. Afterwards I address Heidegger’s interpretation of the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, showing how the essential beginning is the end of the completed system. In the fourth part of the text, I discuss how Heidegger wants to position himself in relation to Hegel, mainly examining their different interpretation of negativity and initiality. I will argue that the key word for understanding their different positions is “event”. Whereas Hegel’s system leaves no room for any beginning as event, but every beginning is reabsorbed by the finished and concluded system, for Heidegger thought must time and time again make itself initial and evential.

The subject of this paper is Heidegger's understanding of world and world-formation [Weltbildung] in his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (GA 29/30) and his references to the idealistic philosophy of Schelling, such as the ancient thought of Aristotle and Heraclitus. I will put forward the following thesis: World is prevailing and, as this prevailing, it is the being of beings as such as whole in the projection of world that lets it prevail. In this paper, I will clarify how the world prevails, how Dasein forms the world, and the significance of physis, logos and as-structure in this context. I will also show that Heidegger's concept of world-formation, which is less discussed in research, can be thought together with his concepts of being-in-the-world and worldhood. Finally, I will discuss some of the difficulties of Heidegger's understanding of the world and propose some solutions.

The present paper concerns the Wittgenstein ontology project: an attempt to create a Semantic Web representation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The project has been in development since 2006, and its current state enables users to search for information about Wittgenstein-related documents and the documents themselves. However, the developers have much more ambitious goals: they attempt to provide a philosophical subject matter knowledge base that would comprise the claims and concepts formulated by the philosopher. The current knowledge representation technology is not well-suited for this task, and a non-standard approach is required. The creators of the Wittgenstein ontology project are aware of this fact; recently, they have been discussing conceptual devices adjusting the technology to their needs. The main goal of this paper is to present examples of a representation of philosophical content that make use of both the devices already proposed and some new inventions. The represented content comes from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; more specifically, its theses concerning the problems in philosophy of mathematics.

The functions of new metaphors in early tantric Buddhism are analysed in the paper. Two models of religious practice are concerned. According to both of them, the goal of tantric practice is permanent modification of the practitioner’s cognitive activity. That modification can be understood as willingness to implement particular metaphors spontaneously into the process of perceptive data interpretation. Those metaphorical concepts are closely related to the conception of Buddha nature. Religious practice of Vajrayâna can be seen as striving for experiential substantiation for the main of those metaphors (mind is mandala). Special act of visualization in ritual context is expected to be such substantiation. Six types of metaphors important in the soteriology of the early Vajrayâna can be distinguished. All of them are discussed in the paper.

The present paper argues that libertarians (e.g. Murray Rothbard, Stephan Kinsella) who subscribe the proportionality principle while embracing the view that to have a right to property is to have a right to defend it run into what we call the Property Defense Dilemma. For if the only way to defend property is to defend it disproportionately, then a private property right – contrary to what these thinkers claim – is not accompanied by a right to defend it. The most plausible way out of the dilemma – the present paper argues – is to conceive of private property rights as only weakly absolute, to use Matthew H. Kramer’s illuminating distinction. On the other hand, libertarians who as Walter Block would like to escape the dilemma by replacing the proportionality standard with the gentleness principle run into other sorts of problems (moral implausibility, incoherence) which also shows that it is the libertarian view on rights as infinitely stringent side constraints that calls for revision and attenuation.

The paper aims to reevaluate the Kierkegaardian reception of the Platonic work, a reevaluation based on the question pertinent to the use of the myth. Although Kierkegaard presents several criticisms and reservations to Plato, his considerations about the use of myth in relation to the dialectical limits of thought allowed the Danish philosopher to develop an argumentative technique that served his claim to overcome the limits of understanding imposed by the dialectical reason from post-Kantian philosophy. Based on the concept of metaphor, the paper starts from the Kierkegaardian analysis of the Platonic use of myth. The paper advances to an analysis of the relationship between myth and dialectic in Platonic texts and finally develops a reflection on the way in which Kierkegaard appropriated the Platonic teaching in the development of his own reflections, with emphasis on the presence in works where the authors were pseudonyms.

The division of the problems about Meaning in an extensional and an intensional theory was accused of unnecessarily duplicating the theoretical problems involved in the knowledge of Meaning. The result was either 1. an aggressive rejection of the intensional part of the problem or 2. the adoption of non-classical semantics to account for intensions. This paper suggests a reading of Frege's theory of Meaning that preserves the contribution of the intensional aspect of the question without sacrificing the benefits of the classical insights. For this, however, we need to expand his theory to cases of semantic values which are not directly assertive, that is, what Micheal Dummett called ingredient value. This solution preserves the direct and intuitive insights of classical semantics, expanding it to cases where the designation of truth or falsehood does not have a unified interpretation: speculative, modal, ambiguous, relative cases or cases in which theories disputing Meaning is not straightforwardly mapped to the truth or the not-truth. The paper is a contribution to support the pragmatic interpretation of Frege's legacy by Micheal Dummett.

This paper explores the interconnections between philosophical wisdom and bioethical expertise, arguing that the latter can be enlightened by the former. First, it analyses the arguments of those who think that philosophy has nothing to say to bioethics, and afterwards, it shows that philosophical wisdom has an irreducible ethical component, which in turn helps bioethics to reach its aims. Thus, this paper shows that some Wittgensteinian commentators (e.g., Paul Johnston) did not grasp the contributions the author of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and even his later work made to ethics (and potentially to bioethics as a subfield) as an autonomous domain of investigation independent of logic, the empirical sciences, and metaphysics.

The aim of the present paper is to follow the reasons for which Heidegger, in his lectures from 1929/30 The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (world – finitude – solitude) repeats the project of Being and Time of an analysis of the human existence and of a description of his existential crises as central for the possibilities of a historical mobilization of the world now no longer from a simply ontological mood, but rather from a so called factical mood, i.e., a mood that possesses a structural connection with our historical world. From that, the paper analyses the figures of boredom going through the most superficial one to the deep boredom, while also exposing what once more hinders Heidegger’s attempt to think in a consistent way about the fundamental event of singularization as a key path into the temporality of Being as such, which implies a new failure of the project of fundamental ontology in its essential liaison with existential analytics.

This paper is an introduction to Domenico Jervolino’s Discurso Filosófico e Existência em Ricoeur: Filosofar após Kierkegaard that we have translated to Portuguese. The paper is divided into three main sections: firstly, we reflect upon the reception of Paul Ricoeur's thought in Brazil, especially with the translation by/interpretation of Hilton Japiassu; secondly, we analyze some aspects of Domenico Jervolino's work and the interpretive horizon that it left for the reflection upon of Ricoeurian thought; finally, we seek to think about the place that Discurso Filosófico e Existência em Ricoeur: Filosofar após Kierkegaard occupies in Jervolino's work and in the context of Brazilian tradition on Ricoeur's thought.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept of the interdisciplinary problem using the categories of the logic of questions. The problem is seen in a logical and epistemic sense: the problem is a meaning of the question, and the question is a formulation of the problem in a particular language. Demonstrating that the interdisciplinarity of an interdisciplinary problem is understood in terms of a particular kind of complexity, I indicate the places where it is realized in the structure of the problem-question, in the problem’s solution-answer to the question, and in the cognitive context of the problem solving - answering to the question. The paper also displays how an interdisciplinary problem is situated within the broader structure of an interdisciplinary research process. Thus, the paper provides not only a metatheoretical characterization of the interdisciplinary problem but also a general methodological tool for analyzing particular interdisciplinary problems.

The purpose of the presented paper is to showcase the links between Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s libertarian argumentation ethics and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics with a special reference to the consensus theory of truth proposed by the latter thinker. More specifically, the author contends that Hoppe’s theory is logically contingent on Apel’s views on truth in that some crucial gaps in Hoppe’s grounding of the so-called “a priori of communication and argumentation” are filled by Apel’s original arguments. Additionally, the paper provides a case for interpreting Hoppe's ethics as a theory of rational conflict-freedom, which seems to cohere best with the transcendental-pragmatist approach. Finally, the author offers a few remarks on how the most common objections against Hoppe's theory can be overcome on the basis of the transcendental pragmatics and the conflict-freedom principle.

The paper revises the idea of speech as a fundamental political faculty in response to the challenges of the Anthropocene. First, it is argued that, rather than as a subsystem of language, speech should be conceptualised as the expression of the embodied capacity of voice (in this respect, the paper follows Adriana Cavarero’s [2005] argument). Secondly, vocality is linked to the faculty of taste (understood as in Arendt’s reading of Kant) to locate politics in the broader order of materiality (physis).

The paper analyses the concept of equality in theoretical, philosophical, and practical context, as it appears in the programs of the Polish political parties. Inquiries regard the concept of equality for the LGBTQ community (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) in the context of human rights. The concept of human rights is discussed within the vertical and horizontal approach. The following questions are addressed: How do political parties relate to the concept of equality? Does equality appear in the political programs, and if it does, then in relation to which social groups? Do political parties engage in the problem of equality with regard to the LGBTQ community? The aim of the paper is to indicate significant differences in this respect between political parties.

This paper hypothesis is that despite Heidegger’s acknowledgment on the relevance of intentionality, he subordinates it to the notion of transcendence, while displacing its justification to the formal-transcendental ontological realm. Considering this, I investigate the scope of a more radical intentionality, as announced by Heidegger, inasmuch as he situates it in the structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. The paper concludes with an analysis of transcendence and intentionality from the vantage point of foundation and dependence relations.

In Nascimento (2015) I criticized the thesis defended in Irwin (1983) according to which two of the most famous characters in Euripides’ plays. In that article, I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order to justify my disagreement. I also suggested that, although there was no reason why we should stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior in Euripides’ plays, that should not be the only kind of irrational behavior we ought to be interested in finding there. In this paper, I argue that Medea actually instantiates a form of irrational behavior that is different from akratic behavior. The argument that follows is divided in four parts. After a brief introduction (section I), I clarify what sort of irrationality I believe to be instantiated by Medea’s behavior using Michael Bratman’s theory of plan stability (section II). Then, I analyze Euripides’ text in order to show why I think we should say that Medea does display that kind of irrationality (section III). The paper concludes with a brief summary of the argument (section IV). --- Original in English.

The paper explores the relation between collective memory and social theory, trying in particular to show the key role that the notion of collective memory plays in understanding the dynamics of the social process (structuration, genesis of social structure). It does it by means of a series of reinterpretations of classical authors. Investigating the phenomenon of forgetting as covering up the traces of social change (M. Halbwachs), problematized in the contemporary context (P. Bourdieu), leads us to unraveling the problematic character of social change as such in a vain effort of annulment of memory (A. Touraine), and finally to rediscovering of social memory at a deeper level, as a profound structure of social processes. This discovery points to the necessity of introducing a new, yet undeveloped method of studying the social unconscious (A. Giddens, J. Assmann, and in particular J. Alexander). Jeffrey Alexander overtly postulates such a development, identifying his major project of cultural sociology with a kind of social psychoanalysis. The paper ends with a question – where such a postulate leads us to? Perhaps we need a new kind of art of benevolent interpretation that brings along with new understanding also some kind of soothing the pain of misery, deeply inscribed in social existence.

Congenital aphantasia, or the complete absence of mental imagery, is a topic that has recently aroused the interest of researchers in many fields including philosophy, psychology and cognitive sciences. While it is generally supposed that we all have rich mental lives full of imaged representations, estimates suggest 2-3% of the population may have never formed an image or seen ‘in the mind’s eye.’ This paper aims to address the scepticism surrounding aphantasia, the challenges in communicating about mental imagery, and the research methods used in cognitive sciences today through the lens of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The paper argues that 1) communicating about mental imagery involves language games that persons with aphantasia may not be able to play (i.e., makes reference to expressions and concepts that are meaningless for them, such as ‘visualise,’ ‘form an image,’ etc.); 2) that as a consequence aphantasia, in present research, is only describable negatively (as lack or incapacity); 3) that rather than a cognitive or a psychological issue, aphantasia should be understood as a grammatical one; and 4) that we need to invent new language games in order to come to a better understanding of conditions such as aphantasia, and to be able to appreciate the rich diversity and variability of human experience.

The article analyses the concept of posthuman from a philosophical perspective. The paper aims to present and determine the meaning of the notion of posthuman. The considerations are based on the assumption that posthumanist philosophy can be distinguished within posthumanism. The subject matter of posthumanist philosophy is human being and human situation in the changing world due to the development of science and technology. The starting point for the analysis is the posthumanist postulate of ‘working-through’ the humanist tradition, which results in a non-essentialist and non-anthropocentric concept of posthuman. The article presents the process of shaping this concept in reference to works of D. Haraway and N.K. Hayles. Then the paper analyses the standpoint of R. Braidotti in order to show that posthumanism was inspired by feminism and deconstructivism (these inspirations had a significant impact on the vision of posthumanity). The characteristics of posthuman are presented in reference to Braidotti’s conception of relational subjectivity. The article elucidates why the posthuman subject is materialistically embedded in order to explain the thesis about significant role of human embodiment. The paper shows how the abolition of the opposition between body and thinking leads to a post-dualistic conception of human being.

The questions concerning control over the environment are becoming increasingly more significant. From ecology to medicine, from bioethics to transhumanism, there are many different issues reflected and acted upon, which have an important common element, namely underlying premises about the relationship between the natural biosphere and humans. Hans Jonas, in his book The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search for an Ethics for the Technological Age, first published over 40 years ago in German as Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, proposed philosophical and ethical foundations for understanding this relationship. One of the underestimated Hans Jonas’ reflections concerns the characteristic of power. The paper analyzes the concept of power presented along with the imperative of responsibility, as well as three different degrees of power characteristic for Jonas’ approach to the notion of power. The paper presents this structure of power and the underlying philosophical considerations that constitute a basis for it. It also provides an argument that these considerations may be used as a framework for understanding many contemporary challenges and ethical responsibility in the technological age.

The paper deals with a possible interdependence between bioethics and transhumanism. It seems that nowadays transhumanism is a separate discipline and we can say at most about bioethical aspects of that. However, a more in-depth investigation reveals that transhumanism is a rival of the contemporary bioethics and tends to take control over it. So, this paper tried to prove that this is not a necessity. There are still vital differences between bioethics and transhumanism and they justify keeping the former separate. The main difference concerns the object of investigation: bioethics is about ethical enquiry of the existing, bodily human being, whereas transhumanism is directed toward a future creature called posthuman. Thus, although there are attempts within transhumanism to replace bioethics, they are still two separate fields of investigation and hence the former is not a new and fully-fledged face of the latter.

This paper tries to rethink the notion of human rights and to evaluate whether we should redefine them in light of the main challenges presented by advances in technoscience (genetic engineering, robotics, nanotechnology etc.). It claims that there are basic, intrinsic rights to personhood, which, on the one hand, allow us to justify a moral claim to a posthuman existence (should it become possible) and to attribute rights to artificial agents, while, on the other hand, granting the moral entitlement to remain human. This shows that the notion of human rights is far from becoming obsolete, as claimed by some scholars. The paper is divided into five parts. It (1) presents reasons for rethinking the notion of “a right” in order to apply it to beings other than humans (e.g., nonhuman animals, robots etc.); (2) discusses the metaethical problem concerning the meaning of “a right”; (3) presents a basic system of rights that are intrinsic to personhood and that can be attributed to different kinds of agents (human or not); (4) analyzes whether there is a right to a posthuman existence or a right to remain human; and finally, (5) presents some reasons to justify such a system of rights.

The aim of the article is to show the existential themes of filmmaking by Ingmar Bergman, one of the greatest European directors. The paper emphasizes that the matters undertaken by Bergman focus on such issues as loneliness, anxiety, uncertainty and transience of human fate, death, man’s relationship with God and the searching for meaning of life. On the one hand, the paper refers to Bergman’s poetics (especially from The Seventh Seal and the “religious trilogy”). On the other hand, it discusses the recognition of existential philosophers. Existential interpretation of Bergman’s films allows to consider the director as the leading existential artist and emphasizes a universal, timeless character of his films.

The aim of this paper is to present and analyze different formulations of human beings ultimate goal in Ayn Rand’s philosophy. I offer an analysis of Rand’s own formulations, namely that the ultimate goal is (i) one’s own life, (ii) one’s survival qua man, and (iii) one’s own happiness. The remainder of the paper is focused on two other possible formulations of the ultimate goal from an Objectivist perspective: (iv) one’s own flourishing and (v) happy life. My thesis is that all these formulations – both Rand’s and the two others – are not only compatible with each other but also complementary.

In our paper we present and analyze the case of Ashley X and the treatment she underwent as an example of invasive medical procedures performed on children. The case still remains controversial, and the treatment consisting of growth attenuation, hysterectomy, appendectomy and breast buds removal has both its opponents and proponents. In our paper we have a closer look at some arguments important for ethical analysis of Ashley’s case and treatment. First, for a better understanding of the case we present her medical condition. Secondly, we refer to the classification of therapeutic versus non-therapeutic medical procedures. Thirdly, we examine the issue of surrogate decisions for incompetent patients. Finally, we analyze two vital ethical arguments: a) the right to the open future and b) the criterion of best-interest.

The aim of this paper is to advance, within the framework of enactivism, towards a more radically embodied and situated theory of emotions and, in general, of affectivity. Its starting point is that of discussing the well-established notion of bodily resonance (Fuchs 2013, Fuchs & Koch 2014, Fuchs 2018) and the primordial affectivity approach (Colombetti 2014). I will incorporate John Dewey’s theory of emotions, and recent models and empirical finding from cognitive science on the relation between perception and bodily activity (Azzalini, Rebollo & Tallon-Baudry 2019; Allen et al. 2019). The novel element proposed in this paper is taking into consideration the role of bodily oscillatory activity in the perceptual side of cognition through phenomena of relative coordination. This concept from dynamical systems theory allows for an enactivist view of emotions as temporal episodes triggered by a tension that affects the rhythmic interaction between brain, body, and environment. By defending the importance of this enacted rhythm, the body emerges as a truly active agent, gating and modulating affectivity during all the stages of the sensorimotor circuit from perception to action.

This paper shows that in the philosophy of Sánchez Vázquez the basis for creative praxis is not innovation but the activity of practical consciousness, to which that Marxist philosopher describes as dialectical unity of the subjective and the objective. Furthermore, the paper argues that, in the sense of such unity and mutatis mutandi, creation has a place in non-practical human activity.

In this paper I accomplish two goals: first, I briefly reconstruct Hans-Georg Gadamer’s views on language, included foremost in Truth and Method. I discuss if and how can we analyse language in the hermeneutic way; what is Gadamer’s view on philosophy of language and linguistics; what is the hermeneutic priority of the question and why choosing the logic of question may lead to a conflict between philosophical hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. Then, on such base I show correlations, which can be traced between hermeneutic philosophy and other contemporary language research disciplines – generally understood linguistics, analytic philosophy of language and interdisciplinary discourse research. Taking a closer look at each of the mentioned disciplines I focus on trying to answer the question regarding their ideological and methodological connections with the hermeneutic way of thinking. The article ends with a conclusion, that interdisciplinary discourse analysis produces the highest hopes to analyse language in a non-objective matter, which is the way that Gadamer favoured.

The paper is devoted is to the problem of philosophical method in the late writings of Nikolai Berdyaev, in which he began to criticize ontology for rationalising concrete existence. Berdyaev calls his new project “phenomenology of spiritual experience”, and his works of that period betray a growing interest in Hegelian philosophy as a first philosophy of spirit and a new, more dynamic way of philosophising. Because of it, I aim to compare both philosophical projects. In the first part of the text, I reconstruct Hegel’s description of dialectics and phenomenology; in the second, I confront them with Berdyaev’s conceptualisation of new, existential philosophy, rooted in his epistemology. As I argue, Berdyaev puts emphasis on symbolical character of philosophy, and the main features of the new philosophical method he stresses are not directly inspired by Hegel, but rather by far less known phenomenological project by Henri-Frédéric Amiel.

In my paper, I attempt a phenomenological analysis of the lived experience of intersexuality, which I view from the perspective of the problem of indeterminacy concerning the horizon of the givenness of homeworld founded on the broader basis of the pre-givenness of lifeworld. These horizons define the structure of the sedimentation of subjective experience, as well as the layers of cultural meanings sedimented in the lifeworld. The sedimented layers of self-experience and of the shared lifeworld function as a sphere of indeterminacy, that is the horizons of constituted phenomena. In this sense all intentional acts have the nature of horizontal indeterminacy, the layers of which are revealed in the genetic question (Rückfrage) directed toward them. Horizontal indeterminacy also accounts for the distinction between homeworld and alienworld, which appears as something unobvious and unexpected against the obviousness of the homeworld, at the same time thematizing the latter. One of the elements of the sedimented conceptual system, functioning as the horizon of indeterminacy of both self-experience and the pre-reflective life-world, is the notion of human corporeality as given in the binary sexuality/gender. A unique opportunity for phenomenological insight into the constitution of the phenomenon of sex/gender is provided by Hida Viloria's lived experience of intersexuality. Her lived body, originally experienced pre-reflectively as a transparent medium and a perfectly handy tool of undisturbed intentionality, unproblematized also in the sexual activities, gradually undergoes alienation under the objectifying gaze determined by the binary pattern of sexuality. Becoming an alienated object, her body loses its transparency. Viloria begins to experience her corporeality and identity in a way determined by the sedimented "ideology" of sex and gender, trying on the "constructs" of masculine and feminine identities, eventually overcoming alienation and, in a process of secondary self-identification, reclaiming her lived body in its intersexuality and her identity in its non-binary gender fluidity.

The subject of this paper is the relationship between religion and sport. The aim of my considerations is to criticise the position presented by the American philosopher Eric Bain-Selbo, according to which sporting experiences may quite rightly be described as religious experiences. In the first part of the article, I reconstruct Wayne Proudfoot’s concept of religious experience that underlies Bain-Selbo’s analysis. I then discuss the research conducted by Bain-Selbo and the conclusions he draws from it. In the next part of the article, referring to Charles Taylor’s hermeneutical approach, I show that Proudfoot’s and Bain-Selbo’s methodology leads to a theoretically unjustified reductionism. I argue that an in-depth articulation of individual self-interpretation allows for an insight into the dynamics of sporting and religious experiences, and thus to see the differences that separate them. In the last part of the article, I invoke the considerations of William James, John Hick and Robert Roberts and try to show that, given the moral consequences of our experiences and their phenomenological description (intentionality), the experiences evoked by sport and religion can by no means be identified with each other.

In this paper, I argue that the concept of culture industry developed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno had a decisive influence on Jean Godefroy Bidima’s critique of black African modernity. Drawing on some of his writings, I seek to demonstrate how Bidima’s philosophical endeavor inherits the concept of culture industry and applies it to the modern context of black Africa, where it is transformed into the concept of colonial industry. In both cases, the same critical perspective is at play, namely to formulate a broad critique of how cultural products (artworks in Horkheimer and Adorno, and philosophy in Bidima) are deprived of their substance to align with the mystification of the masses. The critique of the culture industry, which serves in Adorno as a fundamental criticism of the production of modern art and its decadence into mass production serves, revisited in Bidima, as a critique of the modern black African philosophical discourse. With the light provided by this connection, I propose a rereading of Bidima’s critique of Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, the latter being presented as a promoter of a “discourse of mastery” in black African modern philosophy.

The aim of this paper is to explain the connection between discursive rules and moral norms in the frame of discourse ethics. The paper begins with an analysis of the difference between action and operation and with a reconstruction of the concept of discourse. After that, the difference and the relationship between law and obligation are presented. The conclusion is that the connection between action and possible discourse is implicit in the notion of moral responsibility.

The aim of this paper is to present the core of Kant´s critique of traditional metaphysics and ontology as a transcendental semantics that allows reformulating the problem about the objects and their reality. In order to achieve this purpose, we propound a paper divided in two parts: 1. A brief justification of Kant’s semantics interpretation; 2. A work program based on a semantics comprehended as a fundamental part of a method of resolution of philosophical problems. Basically, we can state that the critical position against traditional metaphysics and ontology leads to the question upon: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? This question leads to its conditions of possibility, that is: sensible representations; intellectual representations; syntactic rules; semantic rules (or referential rules, on the relation between intellectual representations and some sort of sensibility or affection); the operator of the syntactic and semantic rules (subject, man, human nature, gender, people etc.). This is what we call the core of Kant’s critique and with which we may begin to solve philosophical problems even beyond those presented by our philosopher. As such, we are briefly going to observe the following steps: 1. From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects; 2. A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics; 3. Criticism as semantics; 4. The semantic project and the kinds of judgments; 5. Human nature and the theory of judgment; 6. The work program within Kant’s own work; 7. Subsequent results of Kant’s project

This paper sketches three principles in thinking about withholding and withdrawing lifesaving treatments from an ethical perspective: 1) the principle of ordinary and extraordinary means, 2) the principle of respect for patient autonomy and 3) the principle of futility. These principles can be employed to provide normative direction on where the obligation might lie when deciding to use or forego treatment. However, each principle sets forth different obligations. Hence conflicts can arise, and the question of which principle should take precedence becomes pressing. After outlining well-established approaches to deciding between ethical principles, Veatch’s mixed strategy of balancing and lexical ordering is applied to the principles of ordinary and extraordinary means, respect for patient autonomy and futility. Although finding a resolution between conflicting principles is never easy, the position of this paper is that this mixed strategy of balancing and lexical ranking provides a useful approach to navigate and advance discussions regarding the ethical obligations regarding withholding and withdrawing lifesaving treatments.

El artículo se propone dibujar una historia de los fracasos de la metaforología del diálogo como una categoría triunfante del pensamiento desde la modernidad a la actualidad, con especial atención a autores como Hölderlin y Celan. Se toman como hilo conductor del planteamiento diversos trabajos publicados desde los años 80 por el pensador español, Félix Duque, que delimitan una concepción del lenguaje y del acuerdo que se muestra siempre sensible a la presencia de otro, que funciona como elemento indomeñable, como resto y exceso con respecto a las razones del sujeto forjado en la modernidad.Palabras clave: Diálogo, resto, el otro, Hegel, Hölderlin, Celan, Bernhard, DuqueAbstractThis paper aims at outlining a history of the failures experienced by the metaphorology of dialogue as a triumphant theoretical category from Modernity to the present, specially focusing on authors as Hölderlin and Celan. I base most of my arguments in the thesis that the Spanish thinker, Félix Duque, claimed in different papers he published since the ’80, which argue for a conception of language and agreement always committed to the presence and reasons of the other one, who fulfils the role of an unconquerable element that acts as remainder and excess with regard to the reasons of a subject stemming from Modernity.Keywords: Dialogue, remainder, the Other, Hegel, Hölderlin, Celan, Bernhard, Duque

This paper focuses on the psychological realism requirement which should be met by any ethical theory. Even if one should not make normative conclusions out of descriptive presumptions, there are still some limitations resulting from our nature about which one should remember when formulating moral ideals. One should not impose moral ideals which may require of people more than they would ever be able to bear. The paper’s aim is to emphasize how important it is to ethics to pay attention to the empirical research carried out within psychology which show that a large part of our thought and volitional processes is automatic or semi-automatic. This means that ethicists cannot exclusively concentrate on regulating reflective processes which underlie consciously made decisions. If ethics is to avoid marginalization, ethicists must also focus on those automatic processes which control human thinking and action, especially in the circumstances of a total “ego-depletion”, e.g. when we are tired, hungry, or under a strong influence of unstable emotions. The paper shows that virtue ethics is this kind of ethical approach which meets the psychological realism condition most successfully.

One of the most common visions in respect to introspection is represented by the so-called inner-sense (or inner-perception) model. But there are some good reasons to consider this model unsuitable. However, nowadays there are a few scholars (e.g. Armstrong) who defend it still. In this paper, I mention also other approaches to introspection (first of all, such as self-fulfillment, self-shaping, and self-expression approaches). But the primary goal of the paper is to defend a pluralist approach to introspection that allows us to examine introspection as involving many mental processes. In this model, a historical context and a phenomenological experience are engaged, too. It is not a quite new position. I discuss some (re)presentations of the pluralist approach. For instance, I reject Schwitzgebel’s solution as too radical and I support the direction proposed by Prinz.

This paper explores the usage of the concept of myth in Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. First three parts of the paper are devoted to analysis of lectures in which Feyerabend, following Karl Popper, contrasts two philosophical attitudes: mythical dogmatism and criticism of pre-socratics. The next two parts cover Popper’s and Feyerabend’s anti-dogmatic remedies – criticism and humanism. It is shown that, although their critiques of the dogmatic form of life bear many similarities, they differ substantially on the axiological level. While Popper considers rational criticism to be the best way of opposing dangerous myths, Feyerabend uses critical rationalism as a tool that may serve this function but is not effective universally. The final part of the paper shows how Feyerabend’s usage of the concept of myth shifted in his late, more pluralistic and pragmatic works, where he regarded every human practice as a form of nature- and value-dependent myth.

The purpose of this paper is to expose the function of the culture and thought of the Far East, expressed in Japanese Zen Buddhism and Chinese Chan (as well as, in general, in Chinese philosophy and culture), within the thought of Byung-Chul Han. This dimension of the Korean's work has not been sufficiently deepened in the analyses that are made of him. This error leads to mistakes such as stating that there is no emancipation proposal in Han or that his work is limited to a pessimistic description of the world. Thus, the investigation that follows the bibliographic-documental research method is divided into three moments; the first exposes the foundations of the philosophy of Zen-chan Buddhism developed by Han; the second delineates the ontology of Hanian falsification and; the third, analyzes the theses on the East within Han's theoretical project.

The purpose of the paper is to cast doubt on the alleged intuitive or natural character of the skeptical argument about the external world. In §1, we examine a version of the skeptical argument based on the epistemic closure principle and the indifference principle. In §2, in order to deepen the view defended by Michael Williams, we offer a novel examination of the Cartesian skeptical argumentation to show that it is clear that the alleged naturalness claimed by the skeptic is nowhere to be found in two arguments which can be found in such argumentative strategy; moreover, to reach her conclusion, the skeptic needs to commit to epistemological realism, namely, the claim that each of our beliefs belongs to an epistemological hierarchy based solely on its content. In §3, based on arguments inspired by Wittgenstein, contra epistemological realism, we show how each belief has a justificatory role based on its context.

The Kantian approach to the sublime in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is based on an antagonism between two faculties, Imagination and Reason. In order to understand this conflict under new conceptual coordinates, and pursuing a triple exegetical, aesthetical and political interest, the aim of the present paper is to develop the brutal character proper to the conceptual dynamics deployed in such an approach. Reconstructing this mouvement from the incidences of the term Gewalt, under a brutalism of the sublime, we focus on the inquiry of the violence that the Imagination experiences in its mathematical determination and, on the other hand, of the power that Reason holds according to the dynamic determination of the sublime. Thus, under such a perspective, violence, power and subjective impotence will appear as constitutive characters of the genesis of the feeling of the sublime within the horizon of transcendental philosophy.

Many of contemporary philosophers argue against metaphysics putting forward a thesis that metaphysical claims are deflationary. This way of thinking seems to be not only persuasive but above all it rightly expresses a main difficulty of metaphysical inquires. In this paper I am trying to shed a little light on the problem of deflation of metaphysical judgments. In the first section I refer to some Wittgenstein's ideas from Tractatus logico-philosophicus and I focus on the phenomenon of manifestation as a possible source of deflation of metaphysics. The second section is devoted to the Wittgenstein's concepts of language games on the one hand and rules on the other; both of them are a key to understanding of the deepest dimensions of deflationary metaphysics. The third section is an elaboration of three models of deflation of metaphysical expressions: 1. deflation in regard to the informative status of metaphysical judgments; 2. deflation in regard to the metasemantic properties of judgments about the world, and 3. deflation in regard to the semantic ground of ontological judgments. The fourth and last part of the paper is an exposition of two crucial problems which metaphysics has to face with. I call the first of them 'a problem with conceptualization of the metaphysical experience', whereas the second one is labeled 'a problem with semantic inclusion of metaphysical expressions into judgments about facts'.

This paper discusses some aspects of the ontological problem of bioartifacts in order to develop, within the vocabulary of philosophy of technical artifacts, a deflationed notion of bioartifact capable of revealing a meaningful distinction between those processes arisen from a natural dynamics not intentionally intervened, and those arisen from intentional intervention. With this purpose two ways of interpreting the nature of these entities (intentionalism and reproductivism) are reconstructed and evaluated. Finally this paper collects the previous arguments and tries to make explicit the levels of intentional intervention and the conditions to be a bioartifact.

The article is devoted to chronological logic and its applications in the analysis of legal reasoning. In Part I of the paper, there is given that time plays an important role in statutory law, in language of the law and in legal language appear many time expressions, and formal logic provides tools to logical analysis of reasoning performed in everyday discourse and in various sciences, also in legal discourse and in legal sciences. There are presented also conditions that temporal systems should satisfy to be used in an analysis of legal reasoning. In Part II of the paper, the origins and the profile of chronological logic are presented. Part III, the last part of the article, presents examples of formalization of some sentences of legal language containing at the time phrase, and of legal reasoning composed of such sentences, by means of symbols occurring in chronological logic. The position presented in the article says that some temporal logic could be used in a logical analysis such legal reasoning that would contain references to time. The main task of chronological logic would be then providing formal language to more precise express statements of legal language containing given time expression (exactly at the time phrase) and to model legal reasoning containing such expression; and also giving tools to evaluate formal correctness of these inferences.