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How does the notion of state security inform national approaches to managing cross-border in-migration in the increasingly interconnected but volatile Northeast Asian region? This paper explores this question by focusing on the intermestic politics of labor importation. Specifically, it theorizes the multidimensionality and multifunctionality of security fears that inform Japan's and Taiwan's approaches to the admission of low-skilled foreign workers. The paper proposes a comprehensive conceptual framework that explicates these relationships and argues that Northeast Asian labor importation regimes were formed at the intersection of a threefold logic of state security. Whereas economic security acted as an enabling (inclusionary) factor in both Japan and Taiwan and motivated the acceptance of foreign workers, internal security in Japan and external security in Taiwan acted as constraining (exclusionary) factors, which directly and distinctively conditioned the resulting policies. Moreover, ever since their inception in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the divergent policy regimes have been interlocked in these economic-internal and economic-external dynamics of state security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Escalation of great power rivalry resulting from China's rise and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted Japan to align its foreign and security policies more closely. This paper analyzes how ODA policy, which the Japanese government regards as a crucial diplomatic instrument, has been modified in the face of these changes. The most significant transformation is the securitization of ODA, or the deployment of ODA to advance Japan's national security interests. This trend is evident in the emergence of a new type of ODA that aims to contribute to Japan's security interests by strengthening the deterrence capabilities of developing countries involved in territorial disputes with China. Notably, Japan is justifying this new ODA trend in the name of upholding the universal value of the international rule of law. In other words, Japan is shifting the focus of assistance away from domestic issues of democracy and human rights in each recipient country toward the rule of law in international relations. This is a manifestation of Japan's effort to strike a careful balance between upholding universal values and avoiding the risk of offending incumbent governments in recipient countries with questionable domestic governance records. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent domestic constructivist studies characterize Japanese security policy as a serious anomaly to realism and a crucial case vindicating their approach to the larger study of world politics. The present paper challenges this view. It advances a postclassical realist interpretation of Japan's core security policy in the past quarter century. Japan's military doctrine expressed in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is consistent with postclassical realism's predictions, as opposed to neorealism's predictions, which focus on the dynamics of the regional security dilemma and the question of financial burden resulting from military build-up. In addition, postclassical realism offers a more compelling theoretical guide for understanding Japan's core security policy than defensive realism or mercantile realism. This paper backs up its argument with the empirical evidence that Takuya Kubo, the author of the NDPO, himself intentionally based the NDPO on a postclassical realist line of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does America's greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration's new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America's new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the post-war period Australian Prime Ministers have played a proactive role in formulating foreign policy towards Japan. This paper explores the role of executive leadership towards Japan and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The Howard period and current Rudd-led initiatives on whaling, nuclear disarmament, climate change and regional architecture are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on Japan, this paper explores whether powers and competences in the political system are likely to be recalibrated in favour of the executive when the environment is perceived as increasingly threatening. It shows that the executive has been significantly strengthened during the past two decades of political reforms, though a closer look reveals that only the most recent efforts are motivated by security concerns. Case studies on military deployments and arms exports do not expose any clear trend towards curbing parliament’s formal control powers, but they indicate two related mechanisms that affect executive‒legislative relations. Firstly, the executive has sought to ensure faster decision-making in security policy, which may limit the Diet’s ability to scrutinise policies in depth. Secondly, the level of contestation over security policy issues has been decreasing, especially given the securitisation of North Korea and China. This provides the executive with more leeway in devising policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Former Prime Minister of Japan Nakasone Yasuhiro advocated autonomous defense throughout the post-WWII period. Nakasone's concept of autonomous defense (jishu boei) went beyond the idea of enhancing national defense capabilities—it was accompanied by a rich and varied internationalism that strove toward assuaging neighboring countries' concerns toward Japan's remilitarization. Nakasone also actively engaged major western powers in the global debate over nuclear issues during his term as prime minister, and it went beyond the confines of Japan's bilateral security relationship with the United States. Thus, Nakasone's autonomous defense concept reflected both the development of postwar Japan and the many turbulent changes in the postwar global security landscape. This essay follows the evolution of Nakasone's autonomous defense concept during his political career from 1950 to the end of his premiership in 1988 and concludes with an overall assessment of his initiatives regarding Japanese security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the evolution of Japan-Southeast Asia security relations over the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It makes two main points. First, Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia is slowly overcoming its traditional aversion of security affairs in defining its relations with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. Japan has moved beyond economics to gradually carve out a more proactive role in the security affairs of Southeast Asia in the areas of multilateral security dialogues, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief provision, combating piracy, and others. Second, Southeast Asian states have become more amenable to Japan assuming a security role in the region. Not only have the new security roles contributed to enhanced trust and confidence between Japan and Southeast Asia, but Japan has also achieved the status of being a core security actor in Southeast Asian affairs. This role will continue to flourish in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'human security' was created by the UNDP in 1994 when the international community became aware of emerging transnational threats following the Cold War. Since then, the Canadian government has developed the idea into an emerging norm of 'responsibility to protect' which requires the international community to rethink traditional notions of state sovereignty and seriously consider guidelines that encourage humanitarian intervention, an approach that has been widely endorsed. The Japanese government, in contrast, has promoted the idea of human security as poverty reduction and human empowerment. This paper examines the limits of Japan's human security policy by examining its background in the geopolitics of the Asian region and its consequent grounding in the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. It concludes by suggesting that the success of Canada's human security policy reflects the transformation of the security paradigm after the Cold War and that Japan has not yet become fully aware of this profound transformation in its own security considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1990s Japan's defense policy has been under incremental significant change, revealed mainly in the legislative field. This paper explores the extent to which Japan's defense policy is changing in military terms. Analysis of Japan's latest security posture in Iraq (2003-2006) brings to light changes in Japan's overall defense policy in terms of defense priorities and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the transformation of postwar Japanese “one-country pacificism” toward development into diplomacy based on the concept of human security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period after 9/11 has been labeled the new post Cold War or 'post post Cold War': 1 an era of increased asymmetrical threats and terrorism, deeper global cooperation concerning counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), growing US unilateralism as well as isolation and the birth of the Bush Doctrine. Beyond 9/11, what is the meaning of the new post Cold War for the US-Japan alliance? This paper will address this question from the perspectives of both the United States and Japan in this new era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan announced its new space security blueprint in June 2023. The new blueprint lays down a ten-year roadmap for the country to enhance the utilization of space for its military. While the announcement has been widely perceived as a 'first', it is in fact a crystallization of Japan's space security strategies over the last few decades. This article interprets the blueprint in light of Japan's counterstrike doctrine. It traces Japan's rise as a military space power since the 1970s and analyses its evolving approach to space security. Continuities and changes in the 2023 blueprint are assessed against Japan's historic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced "Japan's New Plan for a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).'" Prior to this, in December 2022, the Kishida Cabinet revised the National Security Strategy and adopted the National Defense Strategy. The new National Security Strategy officially positioned the FOIP as a fundamental component of Japan's security strategy. Furthermore, the Kishida Cabinet has presented the New Plan as the first comprehensive outline of the specific policies that Japan will pursue under the initiative. The New Plan contains "four pillars of cooperation" with a total of 51 policies. Despite the expanded scope of security policies, the Kishida Cabinet emphasizes the diplomatic nature of the initiative, highlighting various agendas for cooperation in the region. This article illustrates how Prime Minister Kishida silently maintains and refines the strategic nature of the initiative with the New Plan in response to the growing presence and influence of China in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

18 Ministry of Defense, Japan, "National Security Strategy of Japan", 20. 19 Hiroyuki Akita, " I Aragau Ukuraina, Nihon ni kyokun "mizukara tasukuru" sonae isoge i [From Ukraine's Fight, Japan Must Quickly Learn to Help Itself]", I Nikkei-shimbun, i April 25, 2022. As one observer remarked: "The question is whether the United States will really protect Japan if it finds itself in a situation like that of Ukraine."[11] And as Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) Lieutenant General (ret.) Hirotaka Yamashita noted, there are "growing concerns among those involved in Japanese national security that the US might not actually come to help Japan when it comes down to it." 8 Ministry of Defense, Japan, "National Security Strategy of Japan", December 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/pdf/security%5fstrategy%5fen.pdf, 22. 9 Hiroyuki Akita, " I Aragau Ukuraina, Nihon ni yokun "mizukara tasukuru" sonae isoge i [From Ukraine's Fight, Japan Must Quickly Learn to Help Itself,]" I Nikkei-shimbun i , April 25, 2022. At the 2022 Shangri--La Dialogue, Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned defense ministers from across the Indo-Pacific region that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.". [Extracted from the article]

In December 2022, Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio announced a new defense posture of Japan and published the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. He startled many by declaring that Japan would double its defense budget. It will make Japan's defense budget the biggest in the world only after the United States and China. He also announced that Japan will acquire serious counter offensive capabilities, namely intermediate range missiles. This big shift was not a choice, but a necessity, seeing China's tremendous and surprisingly speedy military buildup. China, oppressing not only Uighurs, Tibetans, and inner Mongolians domestically, but also suppressing freedom in Hong Kong and changing the status quo in the East and China Seas, took on the US allies by taking Scarborough Reef from the Philippines and sending Haijing patrol boats regularly to violate the territorial sea of the Senkaku Islands of Japan in 2012. This article explains the main points and background of the new Japanese strategic thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following a series of shocks that rocked Japan's confidence in its cyber-security provisions, in April 2014 the Japanese Ministry of Defense will finally set up a unified command to deal with cyber-security threats. However, many issues, including the role of Japan's military in the protection of critical national infrastructure and the nation's cyber-warfare doctrine, have yet to be finalised. Paul Kallender examines recent policy and posture changes by the Ministry of Defense as it tries to get to grips with new and changing cyber-security challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores changes in Japan's conception of and policy toward security multilateralism 1 in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War with special reference to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It makes the observation that notwithstanding Japan's active role behind the establishment of the ARF in the early 1990s and continuing public expression of strong support for Asia-Pacific security multilateralism since that time, in actuality, Japan's enthusiasm for it has dwindled from the late 1990s onwards. This article argues that this has been due primarily to Japan's disappointing experiences in the ARF, evinced by its abortive efforts to promote meaningful cooperative security measures and the failings of multilateral security diplomacy in addressing its security concerns. Consequently, Japan's conception of regional security multilateralism has shifted from an optimistic liberal to a more pessimistic realist perspective from which the ARF can, at best, be seen as a venue contributing only to a minimal level of confidence building among regional countries or, to put it more cynically, ‘a talking shop’. This has made Japan's ARF policy more tentative and less energetic. Japan's enthusiasm has also been diluted by a number of internal and external constraints on ARF policy, including US misgivings about Japan's tilt toward regional security multilateralism, its domestic organizational limitations, growing dissent within the Japanese government over the value of security multilateralism, the lack of political support for bureaucratic initiatives and the unexpected frictions between bilateral and multilateral security approaches in Japan's overall security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though the opposition CDPJ is not very popular, it is likely to increase its own tally in Japan's upcoming elections because of its alliance strategy of tie-up with smaller opposition parties amid growing anti-incumbency feeling vis-à-vis the LDP. The meeting called by the LDP "ended without reaching a conclusion".[26] Second, it will also depend on the strength of the pro-revision parties in the Diet and mustering two-thirds support in favour of the Amendment by the LDP. The passage of the revised National Referendum Law by the Japanese Diet on 11 June 2021 has generated renewed optimism in Japanese pro-amendment circles over the possibility of key revisions in the US-drafted post-war Constitution, 75 years after its promulgation.[1] Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has inched closer to realizing its long-cherished goal of the revising post-war Japanese Constitution adopted in 1947 during US occupation. [Extracted from the article]

In the new millennium, Japan's strategy for outer space has strengthened with growing concerns about North Korea's launching of ballistic missiles and China's enhanced space capabilities. The main aim of this research is to examine Japan's foreign and security policy in outer space and explore strategic implications in relation to China. The article argues that outer space has assumed an increasingly important position in the Japan-US alliance as Japan is playing an auxiliary role in enhancing the guarantee of the US mission assurance against China's space capabilities. It also contends that Japan has engaged in regional community-building through a multilateral space forum with open and horizontal character, which challenges China's aspiration to lead regional cooperation in outer space. Furthermore, this article offers the prospect of the extension of the quadrilateral security dialogue to the space field and the deepening of community-building through more commitments to human resources development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abe Shinzō's long duration in office brought to Japan strategic vision, international respect, and a forward-leaning commitment to strengthen Japan's defenses and uphold the major tenants of the international order. This article examines Abe's achievements in the security and foreign policy domains. Specifically, it examines his domestic achievements in establishing the National Security Strategy and National Security Council, reinterpreting Japan's ability to exercise its right to collective self-defense, passing a suite of security legislation, and strengthening of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. It also examines Abe's foreign policy achievements of increasing Japan's international presence and global role, expanding Japans' strategic ties, creating and exporting a strategic framing vision called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and helping to establish the grouping of four maritime democracies called the Quad. The article argues that Abe's desire for Japan to play a larger, more proactive role helped leave Japan—and the region—in a stronger place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S.-Japan relationship under changing international relations. This paper focuses on the importance of maintaining the alliance between the United States and Japan for it assures both nation of prosperity and security. The relationship of these two nations have a great impact to global stability. It is deemed very important that both nations allow themselves the same perceptions on international trends thereby fostering common goals and interest with different responsibilites.

After digesting lessons from US operations during the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, the White House National Security Council staff created several interagency working groups to examine procedural issues associated with responding to international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. What emerged were best practices and lessons learned designed to transform data to decisions across the many levels of government during an international CBRN incident for those people making life-saving and life-sustaining choices. Actions at both the strategic and operational levels are needed to enable a country to more effectively transfer its domestic response capabilities and infrastructure to an international consequence management response. International complications include varying organizational relationships and legal authorities; resource limitations in overseas jurisdictions; nonstandard sources and formats of information; differing public health and protection standards; and language barriers. The technical data needed for emergency personnel to safely and effectively respond to CBRN incidents are especially difficult to obtain, require specialized analytical tools to process, and demand particular procedures for sharing in an international context. Without addressing these issues up front, any country responding to a CBRN event beyond its borders may struggle to effectively respond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has Japan shifted towards a more active security posture since the end of the Cold War? Japan's security policy under Prime Minister Abe has triggered numerous discussions on the changing nature of Japan as a security actor. This article identifies two independent variables—the balance of power calculations and secure access to the maritime commons—that informs Japan's security policy trajectory. It argues that Japanese strategy is best described as 'maritime realism', a posture in which liberal internationalist and realist elements draw upon principles of maritime strategy to fuse together. Japan has not only actively facilitated US commitment to maritime Asia but also focused on expanding its role in maritime security as the maritime space in the Indo-Pacific has increasingly become a contested space. While Tokyo's security policy corresponds with structural realist predictions, they have also been frequently expressed in liberal internationalist language given the peculiar nature of the role of navies. This article's findings advance theoretical debates on alliance politics and great power competition by integrating international relations and concepts in strategic studies. It also contains significant explanatory power in assessing the trajectory of Japan's defence policy since the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I further develop the Copenhagen School's securitization theory in a causal direction, by emphasizing the explanatory family of mechanisms, mediators and moderators. In the first half of this article, I present two models for conceptualizing the causal maps that securitization is part of. Next, I define five epistemological and methodological dimensions that are important for modelling securitization with causal power. The proposed approach is then put into practice by two most-similar case studies in the second half of the article: securitization attempts in Japan in 2006-07 and in 2012-15. By comparing his securitization efforts in 2006 and in 2012-15 respectively, I identify why PM Abe was successful in his securitization attempt in the latter period. Furthermore, I propose an explanatory set that together with securitization enabled certain effects to take place in Japan, namely the introduction of collective self-defense in 2014/15. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's security discourse – despite accelerating shifts in its security stance over the last two decades, and more recently, under the Abe administration – remains dominated by views of essential continuity and maintenance of the "Yoshida Doctrine." The case of Japan's militarization of space is used to create a framework for systematically dismantling default assumptions about the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine. The militarization of space serves as a driver of broader trends in Japan's security policy manifested in the procurement of dual-use assets in launch systems, communications and intelligence satellites, and counterspace capabilities necessary for active internal and external balancing with the US–Japan alliance; the strengthening domestically of security policymaking institutions; and the jettisoning of anti-militaristic norms. Japan's increasingly assertive military stance, bolstering of the US–Japan alliance and cessation of hedging, facing down of China's rise, and departure from the Yoshida Doctrine as grand strategy are thus revealed as hiding in plain sight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative form of alignment represents an effort by Tokyo, and other US-allies, to ‘decenter’ their respective security policies from their erstwhile over-dependence on Washington. By examining the nature, purpose, and dynamics of strategic partnerships more closely, and investigating the empirical case of Australia, we can gain a greater appreciation of their significance both to Japan's evolving security policy and the broader role they play in the Asia Pacific security landscape. The article argues that Australia has been the most significant and successful of Japan's new strategic partnerships to date, has therefore come to represent the template for other new alignments, and hence provides a yardstick against which their effectiveness can be measured. It concludes that while the strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy - ostensibly independent of the US-alliance - closer inspection reveals how this relationship remains fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the cold war the United States was overwhelmingly central in Japan's security policy. Japan hosted US bases and the Self-Defense Forces held joint exercises with the US military, even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan essentially refused even to discuss security with its neighbors. Special exceptions were made for the United States in otherwise sweeping policies, such as the exception for the United States in Tokyo's ban on weapons exports and co-development. Since the end of the cold war, Japan's security policy has undergone a little noticed transformation: it has steadily moved away from being centered on the United States as its sole security partner. Tokyo has initiated bilateral security dialogues with its Asian neighbors and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as a supplement to the US alliance. Japan has begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. Paradoxically these changes have occurred even as the US-Japan alliance has strengthened. The articles in this special issue examine these new security ties with states and multilateral organizations, and other changes in policy that have made the United States less ‘special,’ such as by allowing arms exports to other actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After 60 years maintaining Self-Defense Forces rather than a normal military, Japan is moving towards exercising collective self-defence, long restricted by interpretations of its 1945 Peace Constitution. The merits of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's 'proactive pacifism' are intensely debated by those welcoming greater international contributions from Japan and others suspicious of Japanese 'remilitarisation'. A nation's defence posture can theoretically be hijacked by aggressive nationalists, shift to pacifist isolationism, or rely on non-military internationalism or multilateral security cooperation. This article assesses competing explanations about the post-war trajectory of Japan's defence posture by charting variation in military doctrine and capabilities. The analysis finds that Tokyo has made incremental policy adjustments under domestic and international constraints, and is not aggressively remilitarising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconsiders the postwar democracy in Japan in terms of a certain involvement between universalism and colonialism. Recently, some scholars have criticized the legislation of a new national security law in Japan as destroying the legacy of the postwar democracy. It seems, however, not to be allowed to regard this legislation as a fundamental turnover of the basic position in international policy of postwar Japan. As is well known, the Japanese government in the postwar era has kept its pacifism, whose ideal is explicitly expressed and realized by article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Although the security law legislated in 2015 could be seen as breaking this ideal of pacifism, the Japanese government’s official statement declared that the new security law inherited pacifism under the name of “provocative contribution to peace.” This article tries to reinterpret the postwar democracy from this point. By critically reading ongoing debates regarding the issue of wartime comfort women and Nambara Shigeru’s democratic thoughts, it seems a certain war, which has been a fundamental root of the postwar democracy in Japan – that is, “a war against the enemy of all” – has sustained itself in an interwoven relation between universalism and colonialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To an observer, Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons can appear confused and contradictory. The only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons is variously described as a pacifist and non-nuclear nation and as a proliferation threat. These widely varied and conflicting conclusions are understandable given that conflicting messages are sent by senior figures. However Japan’s stance is in fact a coherent, if not uncomplicated, response both to its security needs and to domestic public opinion. However, the security provided by US extended nuclear deterrence underlines and enables this approach. The key policies and decisions were taken in both Washington and Tokyo between China’s first nuclear test (1964) and Japan’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1976). How the United States came to offer this additional security guarantee to Japan and how Japan came to rely upon it underscore this complex stance and are crucial to understanding a longstanding and ongoing security arrangement and source of stability and security in northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's cabinet commenced a historic transformation of post-war Japan's security policy by overturning previous interpretations of the constitution's pacifist clause, Article 9. The Cabinet Decision on the Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People stated that collective self-defence was consistent with the constitution and, consequently, Japan would immediately develop a more proactive and less constrained security policy. But while this outcome may seem sensible and overdue from a realist perspective of Japan's standing as a mature democratic nation in an increasingly difficult geopolitical situation, the manner in which it is being enacted may seriously undermine the normative legitimacy of Japan's new security identity. In this article, the author examines how Shinzō Abe's administration has attempted to shape the norms surrounding security policy revision in Japan, and how these norms, in turn, have affected or constrained Abe's agency. This is done with specific reference to the external contexts of the USA's ‘rebalance’ policy and the deepening of Japan's security relationship with Australia, with a view to anticipating how normative turmoil might impact on the potential of this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In Japan, two political issues came to the forefront in the year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. While usually dealt with separately, the Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, issued on August 14, 2015, and the security legislation based on the concept of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” both relate to the question of how we view Japan's place in international society. This article examines how both these issues support Japan's commitment to maintaining its identity as a peace-loving nation and its responsibility to contribute to international peace and prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the military dimension of the US-Japan relationship remained the central point of reference for Japanese foreign relations, despite the demise of the Soviet Union? Why has Japan, deepening economic interdependence notwithstanding, remained politically distant from East Asia? Based on analysis of statements by Japanese and US political elites and academics regarding the US-Japan alliance, this article argues that the rise of China, coterminous with the rise of ‘Asia’, challenges the notion of the ‘West’ as, according to standards of industrial modernity, a superior social and political order. These moving ideational boundaries question Japan’s position as the most advanced Asian nation and member of the (Western) international society of states. Therefore, the US-Japan alliance has since the mid-1990s become increasingly important for securing Japan in the ‘West’ and the ‘West’s boundaries in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945, the United States (US) has served as a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism. Both sides argued that the US was an arrogant hegemon that unjustly robbed Japan of its autonomy, and prevented Japan from achieving its own ideal national identity. Both sides frequently demanded that Japan should be more ‘resolute’ and resist unfair demands emanating from the US. In recent years, however, both camps are increasingly using the same rhetoric to criticise the Japanese government's China policy. China is also being depicted as an overbearing state that unfairly browbeats Japan into making diplomatic concessions. Given the similarities between the portrayal of China and the US, has China now become a nationalist focal point forboththe Japanese Left and Right? Utilising constructivist insights, this article seeks to shed light on this question, by examining how the Japanese Right and Left portray China, and explores the implications for Japan's China policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After Kim Jong-il's confession in 2002 that North Korean agents had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea has become the most detested country in Japan, and the normalisation of bilateral relations has been put on the back burner. The abduction issue has taken precedence in Japan even over North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. It has also grossly overshadowed the atrocities for which Imperial Japan was responsible in the 20th century. Why has there been such strong emphasis on an issue that could be disregarded as comparatively ‘less important’? This article understands the ascendency of the abduction issue as the epitome of an identity shift under way in Japan – from the identity of a curiously ‘peaceful’ and inherently ‘abnormal’ state, to that of a more ‘normal’ one. The differentiation of North Korea as ‘abnormal’ emphasises Japan's own (claim to) ‘normality’. Indeed, by incarnating the perils of Japan's own ‘pacifist’ ‘abnormality’, which has been so central to the collective sense of Japanese ‘Self’ in the post-war period, the abduction issue has become a very emotional argument for Japan's ‘normalisation’ in security and defence terms. The transformation from ‘abnormal’ to ‘normal’ is further enabled by Japan trading places with North Korea in the discourse, so that Japan is defined as ‘victim’ (rather than former aggressor) and North Korea as ‘aggressor’ (rather than former victim). What is at stake here is the question whether Japan is ‘normalising’ or ‘remilitarising’, and the role of the abduction issue discourse in enabling such foreign and security policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Asia is narrated in Japanese foreign policy pronouncements as an opportunity as well as a threat. Despite the purported transformation from militarism to pacifism since August 1945, the reified images of Asia as an ‘entity out there’ remain resilient. The image of a dangerous Asia prompted Japan to engage in its programme of colonialism before the War and compels policy makers to address territorial disputes with Asian neighbours today. Simultaneously, Asia persistently symbolises an opportunity for Tokyo to exploit. Hence, despite the psychological rupture of August 1945, reified Asia remains a reality in Japanese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Two approaches to identity have been employed to explore issues in Japan's international relations. One views identity as constituted by domestic norms and culture, and as constitutive of interests, which in turn cause behaviour. Proponents view Japan's ‘pacifist’ and ‘antimilitarist’ identity as inherently stable and likely to change only as a result of material factors. In the other approach, ‘Japan’ emerges and changes through processes of differentiation vis-à-vis ‘Others’. Neither ‘domestic’ nor ‘material’ factors can exist outside of such identity constructions. We argue that the second, relational, approach is more theoretically sound, but begs three questions. First, how can different identity constructions in relation to numerous Others be synthesised and understood comprehensively? Second, how can continuity and change be handled in the same relational framework? Third, what is the point of analysing identity in relational terms? This article addresses the first two questions by introducing an analytical framework consisting of three mutually interacting layers of identity construction. Based on the articles in this special issue, we argue that identity entrepreneurs and emotions are particularly likely to contribute to change within this model. We address the third question by stressing common ground with the first approach: identity enables and constrains behaviour. In the case of Japan, changes in identity construction highlighted by the articles in this special issue forebode a political agenda centred on strengthening Japan militarily. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the inauguration of the second Abe cabinet in December 2012, there have been many important developments in the area of security policy. This article examines each new policy and how it fits in to the National Security Strategy principles of a “proactive contribution to peace” and international cooperation. It concludes with a comparison of the new policies with those of other major world powers and a discussion of the main source of opposition to Japan's security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan has shown three distinct strategic cultures since its emergence as a modern state in the 19th century: isolationist and non-military, militarist, and post-World War II strategic culture characterized by great reluctance to use military power abroad, even in collective self-defence. This article examines Japan's strategic culture and the potential for a fourth distinct strategic culture through the broader framework of security identity, arguing that this is evolving but has not changed as much as one might expect due to institutionalized antimilitarism and political support for the security practices it has engendered. Contemporary Japanese strategic culture can be understood through debates over recent Japanese security policy as well as actual changes in security practice. Domestic politics and a changing international environment are likely to lead Japan to a somewhat more active military role in the near term, but an analysis based on the dynamics of Japan's dominant security identity suggests that its strategic culture will continue to show a reluctance to use or develop military power beyond very limited scenarios, despite vocal efforts by some political actors to increase military activity abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]