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This paper contrasts agricultural protection of Japan and Korea with the West and identifies major differences between them. It characterizes agricultural protection of Japan and Korea (net heavy food importers) as "tariff-based and scarcity-sensitive" aimed at promoting survival and the West (net food exporters) as "subsidy-based and surplus-inducing" aimed at enhancing farm income. We then identify factors underlying the coevolution and divergence in the extent of agricultural trade liberalization between Japan and Korea since the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Korea accepted deep cuts in agricultural tariffs in bilateral FTAs with the US and EU during the 2000s while Japan continued to protect farm interests by concluding low levels of FTAs with politically sensitive products excluded from tariff concessions. The two countries' stances reversed since 2013 with Japan becoming proactive in pursuing high levels of FTAs with major agricultural exporting countries and Korea decelerating its opening of agricultural markets. To explain such divergences, this paper develops a political economy framework in which the incumbent political leadership would consider both national interests and sectoral (farm as import competing industries and business/manufacturing as exporting industries) special interests. Our analysis shows that President Roh (2002–2007)'s embracing of neoliberal paradigm in formulating foreign trade policies that would promote national interests underlies the unprecedented level of agricultural trade liberalization in Korea during the 2000s, while Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's determination not to be outcompeted by the rising China and Korea's ambitious FTA strategies underlies Japan's proactive bilateral and mega-FTA drives since 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The politics of international finance for coal power plants have intensified since the 2015 Paris climate agreement was negotiated. Over the past few years, Japan and South Korea have signaled their intent not to fund new coal projects overseas, leaving China and its Belt and Road Initiative as the 'financier of last resort.' In September 2021, China too announced its intent to stop providing finance for overseas coal projects. What accounts for their decision to cease financing overseas coal projects despite prominent differences in political systems, degree of internationalization of their financial systems, and economic size? Drawing on datasets of coal projects and financing supplemented by case material and interviews, this paper explores the dynamics of coal export finance and how the combination of international reputational pressures and declining demand for coal finance diminished the domestic support for incumbent coal exporters in all three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues the perceptions of relations between two nations involve not only the institutionalized national-boundary but also the perspectives of multiple symbolic boundaries. Based on a qualitative study, this paper aims to explain how different symbolic boundaries impact Japanese experts' perception of interrelations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The paper includes an analysis of opinion surveys, 20 semi-structured interviews with experts, and three focus group interviews with university students of Peace Studies Departments conducted throughout June and July of 2018 in Tokyo, Japan. These results advance existing scholarship by showing that Japanese experts use the following four symbolic boundaries to comprehend relations between Japan and South Korea: boundaries between (1) victims and perpetrators; (2) 'the West' and the Asian cultural and political space; (3) nationalistic and peaceful countries; and (4) a state and people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the striking similarities in strategic environment of Japan and South Korea, US deterrence through nonproliferation policy toward the two allies varied in terms of its measures applied: reward-based deterrence and threat-based deterrence. Using the critical junctures framework, this paper argues that 1) domestic structural circumstances of divided with idealist bias or unified with realist bias in two allies led to different local responses to US policy that signalled the level of credibility of US security guarantee; 2) intermediaries that played a critical role in promoting mutual trust and confidence have influenced the credibility and confidence on intra-alliance level; 3) this credibility and confidence had shaped the direction of the US deterrence strategy of reward-based deterrence for Japan and threat-based deterrence for South Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-regional free trade agreements (FTAs) have flourished in East Asia since the late 1990s. Japan and Korea were at the forefront of this trend. Nevertheless, most policymakers' preferences orbited around region-oriented FTAs out of reluctance to make a sudden policy shift away from their conventional emphasis on World Trade Organization-based multilateral negotiations. The trend continued in Japan throughout the 2000s. In contrast, Korea took a sharp turn toward a cross-regional strategy in 2003. By the mid-2010s, this had created a significant gap in the two countries' overall FTA partner choices. What caused policymakers' ideas in the two countries to diverge from their initial focus on region-oriented FTAs? This paper focuses on the conditions that enabled policymakers' ideas to explain the divergence by developing the contextual‒dynamic framework of FTA policies. At the dynamic level, individuals are more likely to emerge with new ideas when their expertise comes from outside the decision-making body, accompanied by their social qualities and power. Contextual conditions should also be met: the trade policy environment should reciprocate agent-level qualities to create a supportive atmosphere for policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite different pathways and approaches to housing and public provision, considerations of East Asian developmental regimes have tended to categorise Japan and South Korea as different versions of a similar type of welfare regime. This paper addresses the roles housing systems and policies have played in these two societies in both the global context of neo-liberalisation and the regional context of developmental states. In the last decade Japanese and Korean governments have reacted strongly to shifts in global conditions, but ostensibly in contradictory ways. While Japan has deregulated or dissolved housing subsidy frameworks and marketised housing practices, Korea has embarked on a programme of public housing construction and increasingly applied market adjustment measures. This paper evaluates these transformations, and the implications for understanding divergence and the developing role of housing in East Asian contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wireless telecommunications markets of both Japan and South Korea developed rapidly, offering extremely sophisticated and advanced wireless services. Yet, their fortunes in international markets diverged significantly: while Japanese handset manufacturers retreated to become virtual nonplayers. Korean firms gained global prominence. This paper argues that the politics of standard-setting and liberalization, set in motion by differences in initial conditions that created distinct domestic market dynamics, are critical in explaining this divergence. The Korean government, seeking independence from foreign equipment, actively sought to build domestic technological capacities through a standard that would advantage domestic firms in international markets. In contrast, the Japanese government, independent from foreign technology, was not initially focused on international markets, making it difficult later on to shift the terms of market competition away from an exclusive focus on the domestic market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]