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The politics of international finance for coal power plants have intensified since the 2015 Paris climate agreement was negotiated. Over the past few years, Japan and South Korea have signaled their intent not to fund new coal projects overseas, leaving China and its Belt and Road Initiative as the 'financier of last resort.' In September 2021, China too announced its intent to stop providing finance for overseas coal projects. What accounts for their decision to cease financing overseas coal projects despite prominent differences in political systems, degree of internationalization of their financial systems, and economic size? Drawing on datasets of coal projects and financing supplemented by case material and interviews, this paper explores the dynamics of coal export finance and how the combination of international reputational pressures and declining demand for coal finance diminished the domestic support for incumbent coal exporters in all three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the U.S.-China strategic rivalry has intensified, Washington has looked to its close allies and partners to counter Chinese clout in global technology leadership. With the Huawei ban as a proxy for the U.S.-China competition, the paper focuses on the concept of the alliance halo and analyzes how the three key U.S. allies in Asia—Australia, Japan, and South Korea—responded to Washington's expectations of mutual support on the decoupling of Chinese technology companies from global supply chains. We argue that given that the Huawei ban is about future risks associated with China's economy, as opposed to demonstrated military threats, it was more challenging to establish allied reliability within the U.S. alliance network as a whole. Our comparative analysis shows that Australia's reactions have been the most direct, banning Huawei before the United States, showing a contrast with South Korea's relatively muted responses. Japan's decision to ban Huawei was as decisive as Australia's but Tokyo sought to keep a low profile. Rather than the diplomatic pressure from the Trump administration, these allies' varied responses resulted from their own assessments of security risks associated with Huawei. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues the perceptions of relations between two nations involve not only the institutionalized national-boundary but also the perspectives of multiple symbolic boundaries. Based on a qualitative study, this paper aims to explain how different symbolic boundaries impact Japanese experts' perception of interrelations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The paper includes an analysis of opinion surveys, 20 semi-structured interviews with experts, and three focus group interviews with university students of Peace Studies Departments conducted throughout June and July of 2018 in Tokyo, Japan. These results advance existing scholarship by showing that Japanese experts use the following four symbolic boundaries to comprehend relations between Japan and South Korea: boundaries between (1) victims and perpetrators; (2) 'the West' and the Asian cultural and political space; (3) nationalistic and peaceful countries; and (4) a state and people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the striking similarities in strategic environment of Japan and South Korea, US deterrence through nonproliferation policy toward the two allies varied in terms of its measures applied: reward-based deterrence and threat-based deterrence. Using the critical junctures framework, this paper argues that 1) domestic structural circumstances of divided with idealist bias or unified with realist bias in two allies led to different local responses to US policy that signalled the level of credibility of US security guarantee; 2) intermediaries that played a critical role in promoting mutual trust and confidence have influenced the credibility and confidence on intra-alliance level; 3) this credibility and confidence had shaped the direction of the US deterrence strategy of reward-based deterrence for Japan and threat-based deterrence for South Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the normative function of historic narratives using the example of South Korean perceptions of twentieth-century history. The exploration of how relations between South Korea and Japan are perceived is based on 32 semi-structured interviews with academics, representatives of non-government organizations, and government officials in South Korea. The paper posits that the normative function of historical narratives is based on four mechanisms: (1) recognition: identifying problems in society that are associated with the aggressive and vicious actions of an outgroup in the past; (2) assessment: framing these problems as injustices; (3) connotation: establishing a specific meaning of national identity that promotes motivations for actions and agency (with specific duties and obligations); and (4) prescription: defining explicit strategies and tactics for action. An analysis of these mechanisms, which comprise the structure of historical narratives, reveals that in the case of South Korea, perceptions of the relations between South Korea and Japan have been shaped by Japan's brutal colonization of South Korea, the absence of Japanese accountability for this period, and a need for a South Korean identity premised on uniqueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift of manufacturing industry from Japan, the first industrializing nation in East Asia, to neighbouring South Korea and China saw the emergence of restructuring problems and policies in traditional industries and regional economies depending on them. Based on a literature review on this topic in East Asia, this paper draws three conclusions. First, the resource endowments of the three countries differ greatly and consequently also the magnitude of restructuring problems. Second, governments in all three countries strongly affect restructuring processes, albeit with different policies and at different spatial scales. Third, although many studies have a strongly applied, policy-oriented character, recent research, particularly in China, has started to use evolutionary theories and to engage with debates of mainstream economic geography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referring to the short-term survival of new progressive governments, ‘progressive setback’ has been a remarkable political phenomenon in many East Asian countries during the recent decades. Regarding this phenomenon's background, this paper investigates why and how urban citizens challenged their progressive governments in Thailand, South Korea, and Japan. First, this paper argues that the progressive setback across East Asia reflects the difficulty progressive governments faced in overcoming the legacy of longstanding conservative regimes, which had locked urban citizens into specific modes of subsistence. The progressives invoked the protest of urban populations as their new socioeconomic policies undermined these populations’ traditional basis of subsistence. Second, an investigation of the primary modes of urban subsistence in each country makes the cross-national comparison of progressive setback possible. Urban middle classes in Thailand, as an exclusive group incorporated into the mainstream political economy, engaged in a fierce contest with a progressive government that denied their privileged status in Thai society. In Korea, the self-employed turned to the conservative party since market restructuring programs of the progressive government made it difficult for these self-employed to maintain profits and sustain their livelihood. Finally, Japan's urban workers could not welcome the welfare expansion of the new labor-friendly government, because this class was too dependent upon wage incomes to agree with the consumption tax hike that welfare expansion required as its precondition. This paper implies that the old habits of urban citizens are an important hurdle for East Asia's progressives to overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite different pathways and approaches to housing and public provision, considerations of East Asian developmental regimes have tended to categorise Japan and South Korea as different versions of a similar type of welfare regime. This paper addresses the roles housing systems and policies have played in these two societies in both the global context of neo-liberalisation and the regional context of developmental states. In the last decade Japanese and Korean governments have reacted strongly to shifts in global conditions, but ostensibly in contradictory ways. While Japan has deregulated or dissolved housing subsidy frameworks and marketised housing practices, Korea has embarked on a programme of public housing construction and increasingly applied market adjustment measures. This paper evaluates these transformations, and the implications for understanding divergence and the developing role of housing in East Asian contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A Tokyo-based economist and a noted western economic geographer, both specializing in the hydrocarbon resources of Russia, apply the framework of governance studies in an effort to gain a deeper understanding of the recent changes in the country's energy policy-making. The authors argue that, unlike the international relations paradigm prevailing in studies of Russia's energy policy, the country's multiple roles in the international energy arena (as producer, consumer, exporter, importer, and transit state) warrant a more nuanced approach, reflecting Russian energy policy's flexibility over time and diversity across space. This paper endeavors, therefore, to apply a political economy and governance perspective to an understanding of the significant changes in Russia's energy policy-making regarding its dynamic energy relations with the Northeast Asia (NEA; China, Japan, and South Korea). In exploring the complex interactions between Russia's internal energy policy-making and its emerging energy relations in NEA, the authors addresses three key questions, namely: (1) how Russia's Asian energy policy corresponds to its domestic needs, (2) how much coherence in energy governance and cooperation exists between Russia and the Northeast Asian states at the institutional and organizational levels, and (3) the extent to which Russia's expectations for increased energy cooperation with the Northeast Asian states are likely to materialize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wireless telecommunications markets of both Japan and South Korea developed rapidly, offering extremely sophisticated and advanced wireless services. Yet, their fortunes in international markets diverged significantly: while Japanese handset manufacturers retreated to become virtual nonplayers. Korean firms gained global prominence. This paper argues that the politics of standard-setting and liberalization, set in motion by differences in initial conditions that created distinct domestic market dynamics, are critical in explaining this divergence. The Korean government, seeking independence from foreign equipment, actively sought to build domestic technological capacities through a standard that would advantage domestic firms in international markets. In contrast, the Japanese government, independent from foreign technology, was not initially focused on international markets, making it difficult later on to shift the terms of market competition away from an exclusive focus on the domestic market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]