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Analyzing North Korea is essential for examining international relations in East Asia as a whole, but North Korea's tight control over information makes this difficult. Another factor complicating analysis of North Korea is its "special relationship" with China. The aim of this paper is to examine four factors contributing to the "special relationship" between China and North Korea, how that relationship came about, and how it functions within the context of international politics today. This paper is a structural analysis of China–North Korea relations that describes four factors behind their "special relationship." It continues by analyzing China–North Korea relations under Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un up to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. The "special relationship" between China and North Korea is based on four factors. What is distinctive about these factors is that they can bring the two sides together but also push them apart. In terms of national security issues, the force bringing them together has ultimately prevailed. Socialist ideology issues have surfaced much less frequently now and have lost their capacity to both bring the two together and push them apart. In the area of traditional ties, the two leaders are attempting to use their personal relationship to have closer relations, but this is not having much lasting effect. Where economic relations are concerned, Beijing and Pyongyang have become even more dependent on each other and this is a strong force pushing them closer together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWhile human rights are an integral part of liberal democratic rule, the extent to which public opinion in democracies prioritises human rights in other countries relative to other competing foreign policy priorities is not clear. This is particularly the case when a country that systematically breaches human rights also poses a serious security threat and there are incentives to improve relations with the regime in power. To assess whether and how the public values human rights vis-à-vis national security in foreign affairs, this paper utilises survey questions that capture the public’s relative preferences between the two in South Korean public opinion regarding relations with North Korea. It provides evidence that when a democratic government attempts to improve relations with a regime committing grave human rights violations, public opinion in the democracy deprioritises human rights in favour of reducing military tension. The findings shed light on the trade-off that exists in attempts to improve relations with a regime that is both a security threat and a systematic violator of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on what has come to be known as a 'charm offensive,' a diplomatic technique countries may use to shift their international image through strategic public relations campaigns utilizing personal magnetism. The charm of the selected representative is meant to appeal to a broad international audience with the hope of improving the country's brand. The paper examines the concept and practice of a charm offensive through two case studies. The first is the Iranian charm offensive during the 2015 negotiations of the nuclear deal with the United States, when Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif aimed to improve his country's controversial international image through gentle, diplomatic communication and an aura of civility. The second case study is the charm offensive of North Korea from the 2018 Winter Olympics until the historic meeting of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald J. Trump in June 2018. Both case studies analyze the media representations of the particular charm offensive in two countries, the United States and a regionally more proximate, and therefore likely more directly affected country: Israel and South Korea, respectively. I argue that quick image-transformations often characterize contemporary, highly mediatized international diplomatic communication. Unlike classical cases of soft power, the temporary alliances forged through charm offensives are not built on shared values, but on momentary appearances, and sometimes on deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A person trapped in a building engulfed in a raging fire, a person dealing with severe chronic disease, people dealing with a virus pandemic, and people fighting in a protracted war may appear dissimilar but are fundamentally in a similar situation and their behaviors follow a predictable and similar pattern. In this paper, the behaviors of rational people dealing with a significant persistent unpleasant, or dangerous stimulus that is inescapable are elucidated. The unique modulatory effects of stimulus persistence on human behavior as well as the role of means and interest are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts from the assumption that geostrategic and security interests alone are not sufficient to explain China’s foreign policy choices. It argues that ideas about what China’s role as an actor in the increasingly globalised international system should be, and about world order in general, have a deep influence on China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Taking the North Korean issue as a case study, the paper postulates that China is currently engaged in a search for a ‘new’ identity as a global player. China’s actor identity is composed of various partly contradictory role conceptions. National roles derived from China’s internal system structures and its historical past lead to continuity in foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global power require an adaptation of its foreign policy principles. In the case of its relationship with North Korea, China’s foreign policy is oscillating between the two roles of ‘socialist power’ – as thus comrade-in-arms with its socialist neighbour – and ‘responsible great power’, which leads to it being expected to comply with international norms, and thus to condemn North Korea’s nuclear provocations and related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

North Korea, often described as a "hermit kingdom," has been widely demonized as irrational and barbaric. On the other hand, North Koreans are portrayed as passive victims subject to state violence. Within this simplistic dichotomy, it is hard to grasp the complex reality of North Korea where lives are intertwined with the regime, but at the same time daily life operates in different spaces with completely different meanings and resistance to the regime. A lack of understanding on North Korea and its people tackles the further development of the peace building process and the possible integration among Koreans. Therefore, this special section aims to provide new perspectives on both North Korea in relation to the context of division and possible unification of the Korean Peninsula through the "question of culture"; in particular, the everyday cultural practices of North Koreans. The rise of active agency, the widespread of technology, the increase of consumeristic desire and the reorganization of everyday life in North Korea are important aspects to be unpacked. By doing so, the papers in this section examine the potential changes that might occur in the future of North Korea and the division/unification of the North and South by inter-referencing comparable experiences of Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union and Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the emotions-policy nexus within the EU's foreign policy, specifically focusing on the EU's human rights sanctions against China and North Korea. By embedding the discussion within an extended framework of analysis that underscores the emotional dimensions of the EU's foreign policy, the article scrutinizes how policy decisions, unfolding through a series of actions, reactions and third-party responses, shape, and are shaped by, emotional chains via its enabling and constraining mechanisms. While the case study of China illustrates the two mechanisms via exploring the EU-China investment negotiations, human rights sanctions as well as China's retaliatory measures and the EU's response, the case of North Korea, using the same sanctions, shows a divergent policy response and absence of emotions albeit within a similar rhetoric. The conclusion ponders over the efficacy of sanctions policies, suggesting that the integration of emotional awareness into policy-making can foster a more holistic approach in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts remain sharply divided on the underlying motivations behind North Korea's ballistic missile program, more than two years after Pyongyang startled the world by test firing its Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998. In the aftermath of the historic South-North summit meeting in June and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright's path-breaking trip to Pyongyang in October, proponents of the engagement school argue that with a mixture of patience and inducements, North Korea will ultimately negotiate away its missiles. They point to the 1994 Agreed Framework as a key reminder that North Korea uses its weapons of mass destruction capability as a bargaining chip. Conversely, countervailing arguments point out that North Korea's ballistic missile program serves multiple purposes such as shifting the correlation of forces to its favor, supporting the military's modernization goals, and as the primary symbol of military prowess and that, as a result, a negotiated settlement is unlikely. This paper assesses North Korea's potential reasons for pursuing a robust ballistic missile program over the past two decades and the broader strategic consequences of North Korea's missile arsenal, particularly if it succeeds in developing intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. In addition, it also analyzes South Korea's political and military responses to North Korea's accelerated ballistic missile program including South Korea's own ballistic missile modernization goals. The paper also reviews the problems associated with trilateral policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Finally, policy options are analyzed but none appear to be able to satisfy the seemingly contradictory objectives of the key players in the ongoing North Korean missile saga. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Inherent to the United States' approach toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the second North Korean nuclear issue emerged in the early fall of 2002 has been a policy predisposition that has coexisted with little tangible movement in the direction of resolving this very serious regional and global problem. Indeed, since its inception, overall this problem has become worse. That the DPRK has detonated three nuclear bombs hardly makes the security environment in Northeast Asia more stable, contrary to Pyongyang's claims that its nuclear deterrent force does just that, or brings the North Korean nuclear issue any closer to resolution. For sure, major missteps by Pyongyang have exacerbated the nuclear issue. Moreover, because the Bush and Obama administrations have maintained this predisposition embedded in U.S. ideology, which like any belief system, including the DPRK's juche (self reliance) idea, begets emotion 1 accompanied by both self-deception and deception on the part of state officials, 2 policies implemented by Washington in response to the North's perceived provocations have produced few successes. Policies built on faulty foundations, specifically those that exude the animus of the Cold War, are more likely to fail than not. This paper concludes by providing a practical solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, which should be attractive to both Washington and Pyongyang: a conditional peace treaty that rather quickly leads to the DPRK's denuclearization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Apart from North Korea, no state's nuclear program in the twenty-first century has raised more concern to international security than Iran's. While Iran insists that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purpose in line with Article IV of non-proliferation treaty, the USA and its allies insist that Iran has military intentions and called for sanctions. The failure of sanctions to deter Iran from its nuclear agenda had made many scholars and policy-makers call for a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Situated within this debate, this paper positions itself as an antagonist to the preemptive airstrike option and argues that involving India in a possible nuclear “iron curtain” against Iran – a move known as technical isolation – remains the best option to the current nuclear crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea looms large as a challenge for the United States and China. US-China cooperation in working to deal with the challenge of North Korea is often held up as an example of constructive engagement between Washington and Beijing. Nevertheless, North Korea has the potential to generate discord or even conflict between the United States and China. This paper considers several possible scenarios for North Korea and evaluates the implications of each for the US-China relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common view is that China is North Korea's ally. The two countries share a similar political system and considerable strategic interest in regional international relations. Indeed, this is true to a large extent. This paper, however, analyses the problems in the bilateral relations that are gradually eroding the strategic ties the two countries formed 50 years ago. Its central argument is that, in reality, beneath the surface of the alliance relations the two countries share very few common interests. In fact, the two countries can hardly agree to any matters between them, be it historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programs, or diplomatic interactions. This heralds an uncertain future for the bilateral relations and thus may further complicate the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The South Korean public debate on the country's future nuclear options has recently extended beyond the usual pro-nuclear, conservative fringe voices of the past. The threat from North Korea's nuclear weapons capability has grown substantially, and more questions have been raised among South Koreans about the reliability of US security assurances to its key Asian ally, driven largely by what they see as US President Donald Trump's leadership style. Still, South Korea's opposition to nuclear weapons remains strong. But Seoul's nuclear abstinence must not be taken for granted. American administrations can prevent Seoul from crossing the nuclear threshold by keeping North Korea at the top of their foreign policy priorities and taking steps to assure South Koreans that the United States will always come to its defense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctions are widely used foreign policy tools in reaction to crises in world politics. Accordingly, literature on sanction effectiveness—their intended consequences—is abundant. Yet, fewer studies address the unintended consequences of restrictive measures. This is remarkable given that negative externalities are well documented. Our article explores this phenomenon by asking under which conditions sanctions yield negative externalities. We develop a theoretical conceptualization and explanatory framework for studying the unintended consequences of UN sanctions. Empirically, we draw on data from the rich, but scarcely used Targeted Sanctions Consortium and apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine negative externalities of UN sanctions, complemented by illustrations from the cases Haiti and North Korea. The results document the existence of multiple pathways toward unintended consequences, highlighting the negative impact of comprehensive and long-lasting sanctions, as well as the ability of autocratic targets with economic means to persist unscathed from sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper examines Russia's strategic interests related to the regional security dilemma surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Based on two basic principles—a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and political resolution of the crisis—the Putin administration has attempted to represent itself as an even-handed broker striving to normalize the situation. Peaceful resolution of the crisis would benefit not only Russia and but the entire region; however, Putin's efforts have not been instrumental toward these ends, notwithstanding his close contact with the North Korean leader. Russia has produced no policy suggestions capable of accommodating the conflicting interests of the United States and North Korea. Despite a lack of progress, Russia continues to desire multilateral talks since the meetings forestall unilateral actions by the two countries that would be detrimental to Russian interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents insights on the relation of North Korean elite's threat perceptions to the compromises they might be willing to make as they face negotiations to reduce their nuclear threat. Topics discussed include the behavior of North Korean leaders, the concern of the North Korean political class on survival, the three major policies that the North Korean state is likely to adhere to, and the goals of North Korea's nuclear project.

North Korea's strategic weapons innovation system is exemplary of an authoritarian mobilization model. The top leadership prioritizes the program and mobilizes the country's science, technology, and heavy industrial resources around key programs. Key to success are investments in a defense industrial infrastructure that runs from basic research and development to applied R&D, product development, and linked production capability. Although foreign borrowing is important, the country's nuclear and missile programs would not have gelled in the absence of complementary domestic investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan will roll around on August 15, 2015, no doubt eliciting a hailstorm of commentary—and speculation that North Korea will collapse and the two Koreas reunify. But pundits have been saying that these rosy scenarios will occur for many decades (sometimes while simultaneously calling for military action to hurry up that collapse and reunification) and the regime still remains in place. The evidence shows that the bipartisan strategy in Washington founded on the North’s coming collapse has been wrong for at least a quarter-century, and it is time to deal with the country as it is instead of dealing with it based upon our own false assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite ongoing political tensions and sanctions, North Korea and South Korea have made some progress in forestry cooperation. To explain the persistence of this cooperation, we draw upon a local approach to environmental peacebuilding. By tracing inter-Korean forestry cooperation from 2000 to 2018, this study finds that cooperation persists because of a North Korean desire for cooperation specifically on the environment, and because non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with close ties to the South Korean government provided an alternative way to implement inter-Korean forestry cooperation through periods of tension. Our findings also highlight the benefits of using environmental cooperation as a way to engage with North Korea in a depoliticised and sanction-free context. This finding has far-reaching implications for environmental peacebuilding. First, NGOs can pave the way for engaging conflict parties even in the face of ongoing hostility. Second, environmental cooperation provides an opportunity for a win–win strategy for conflict parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What has driven China's policy toward United Nations (UN) sanctions on North Korea? While insisting on a peaceful settlement of North Korean nuclear issues via diplomatic dialogues, China has gradually loosened its protective stance regarding UN sanctions on North Korea. This article examines the factors that have pushed China to take a tougher position toward North Korea: North Korea's increasingly aggressive nuclear policy, the influence of the United States on Chinese foreign policy, and the changing perception of North Korea in China. Through close examination of China's domestic discussions on North Korea, this article concludes that, besides the external factors, a growing negative perception of North Korea has played an increasingly important role in changing China's official stance. The findings suggest that closer attention should be paid to the changes in the domestic political environment of China to understand its current and future approach toward North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Without direct fieldwork access, one can nevertheless imagine what possible changes can happen in the everyday life of North Koreans, by references with conditions elsewhere in East Asia which resonates with current conditions in North Korea. First, the division between North and South Korea can be referenced with the other instances of nations divided by a communist and a capitalist regime; namely, the present China and Taiwan and the previous North and South Vietnam. In contrast to these references to possible routes to reunification, it also can be referenced to instances of peaceful separations, such as the case of Malaysia and Singapore. Second, now that a nascent private market economy has been introduced, the experiences of Vietnam and China in marketizing their respective centrally planned economy can serve as references to imagine the possible economic transformation of North Korea. Third, the penetration of imported media/popular cultures into North Korean media consumption may stimulate new aspirations of local population for a different material future, as it has done in other parts of East Asia. Drawing on the experiences of other East Asian nations as reference points, potential and possible changes in the everyday life in North Korea can be imagined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study advances the protest paradigm as a transnational theory by examining how ideological affiliations within and across national borders influence the framing of a protest movement. Our empirical focus is the coverage of the 2016–17 South Korean 'candlelight' protests to oust conservative President Park Gyun-hye in Korean and US newspapers. Content analysis of 6 months of coverage suggests that liberal publications in both nations (Kyunghyang Shinmun and New York Times) were supportive of the movement, framing the protests as large yet peaceful and relying on protesters for information. In contrast, the conservative press in the US (Wall Street Journal) was closer in its coverage to Korea's conservative publication (Chosun Ilbo), which was defensive of Park and her supporters. We argue that ideological affinities can operate beyond national boundaries – what we term 'ideological parallelism' – to make news organizations sympathetic or hostile toward a social movement. But nationalist sentiments also remain significant to the extent that a foreign (Korean) social movement affects a nation's (US) foreign policy. We identify a novel framing device – Gaze – under which the coverage of both US newspapers converged and considered the adverse implications of candlelight protests for America's relations with South Korea and its containment of North Korea and China. We also show how the US media's Gaze recursively shapes South Korean press coverage, indicating that transnational protest frames impact local perceptions of social movements and can potentially influence their legitimacy and outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has started choking off the flow of financial resources entering North Korea by blocking North Korea's export of natural resources and other industrial products since early 2017. What has pushed Beijing to enforce sanctions strictly, in contrast with its loose administration of sanctions in the past? By employing principal-agent theory, this article shows that Beijing's conformity to sanctions depends on China's own need and the degree of pressure from Washington for sanctions enforcement. Until the end of the Obama administration, China did not act meaningfully for sanctions enforcement, as the pressure from Washington was weak and North Korea's nuclear capabilities remained limited. Now, international contexts have dramatically changed. Beijing feels a need to discipline Pyongyang with sanctions as Pyongyang has become a de facto nuclear weapon state. The new Trump administration in Washington has also pushed Beijing to do more to rein in Pyongyang's weapon programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While interest in the friendship between North Korea and Myanmar has intensified in recent months, theirs is a partnership that dates back to the early 1960s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the United States (US) wind power technology brought to North Korea. Impact of energy crisis on agriculture; Construction of wind turbine towers; Equipment installation in the powerhouse; Survey of energy use in the village of Unhari; Role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in North Korea.

Relates how former United States President Jimmy Carter made a deal with North Korea regarding their freezing of their nuclear program under the monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Criticisms on the history of American nuclear diplomacy with North Korea; Diplomatic relationship of the United States and North Korea; Implications of the Carter-Kim II Sung deal.

Using the unique survey data involving 138 Chinese firms, this study examines the determinants of the performance of the Chinese firms doing businesses with North Korea. The business ties between the Chinese firms and their North Korean counterparts affiliated with the army are positively correlated with the former’s performance. This finding suggests that North Korea’s “Military First” policy acts as a guiding principle of the resource allocation in the country’s export sector. We also found that South Korean sanctions against North Korea were ineffective in banning North Korean goods from gaining access to the South Korean market possibly because of the circumvention of Chinese firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates South Korean views on how to deal with the two major security issues regarding North Korea: its nuclear threat and regime instability. In this Special Section, the article analyzes the ongoing debate in South Korea over the government's policy toward North Korea in regard to these two issues. It argues that uncertainties about these two major issues are shaping the regional order in East Asia. In particular, the different levels of cooperation between South Korea and the United States may affect the regional security order in East Asia. In analyzing policy options available to South Korea, the riskiest option would be to employ early preemptive attacks and accelerate the collapse of North Korea given the security dilemma-driven action‒reaction in East Asia. Given that the role of China has become the most crucial factor in dealing with North Korea, the most promising strategy would be to reinforce guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence and prompt a soft-landing unification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Beijing has repeatedly signed up to multilateral sanctions against North Korea, it is widely regarded as having failed to enforce them. Indeed, China's deepening economic engagement with the country has led observers to debate the causes of this seemingly duplicitous approach. Constructivist and realist approaches have relied on state-centric frameworks that serve to reduce Sino-North Korean relations to the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang diplomacy in the context of broader geopolitical dynamics. This article argues that such approaches pay insufficient attention to the profound rescaling of the Chinese state in recent years and the implications this process has for bilateral relations. This article sheds light on how Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by actors at multiple scales and by a multitude of objectives as a result of decentralisation and marketisation alongside increasing geographical unevenness within China and new challenges to continued capital accumulation. North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic recovery in the northeastern border regions through serving as spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital. These new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggest an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but in considerable flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the maritime territorial dispute between North and South Korea. Topics include the strategic challenge that North Korea poses to the U.S. and its allies if it has an operational nuclear weapons capability, the history of the maritime dispute in the Yellow Sea, and several measures that may reduce tension. Also discussed are North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's advancement of their nuclear weapons program, the U.S.' alliance with South Korea, and the unwillingness of North and South Korea and the U.S. to risk war.

China’s tough response to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 raised expectations in the US, South Korea and Japan that Beijing might align its North Korea policy with the international community. Similar expectations were raised (and unmet) following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010, a third nuclear test in 2013, numerous missile tests and military provocations in 2014–2015, and a fourth nuclear test and long-range missile test in early 2016. Many scholars and policymakers maintain that Beijing’s rationales for supporting Pyongyang are crumbling. This article argues that Chinese traditional worldviews and strategic thought remain motivating concepts for Beijing’s policy on North Korea. China’s norms in its near abroad—beliefs about stability, siege mentality, due deference and Confucian reciprocity—explain phases in Beijing’s policy on North Korea and why the Chinese approach does not change as much as external observers hope or expect. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the report produced by the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2014 which concluded that atrocities in North Korea do not have any parallel in the contemporary world. Topics covered include some of the atrocities reported in the country such as forced labor, forced abortion and infanticides, and the report's recommendation of embracing human rights as an effective tool in reducing North Korea's security threat.

Since North Korea’s third nuclear test and the purge of Jang Sung-taek in 2013, there have been strong debates on the future of the Sino-North Korean alliance, on whether it will be maintained or terminated. The definite answer will be obtained in 2021, when the Sino-North Korean alliance treaty is due to be renewed. Based on the structure of great power relations and the history surrounding the Korean peninsula, Xi Jinping is not expected to give up the Sino-North Korean alliance from a strategic point of view. The structure of Sino-North Korean relations can be defined as ‘the Strained Alliance’, in which the tension is in constant existence in the midst of cooperation or ‘the Alliance despite Antagonism or the Adversarial Alliance’. The Chinese policy towards North Korea during the Cold War retained strategic characteristics to adjust great power relations, while North Korean policy towards China searched for security assurance and economic cooperation, taking advantage of balanced power relations among great powers. Both countries, in the frame of great power relations, are obliged to maintain an adversarial alliance based on the compromise between North Korea’s system maintenance and China’s enhancement of its status quo. Xi’s global policy and Sino-American relations aim to form a new type of great power relations. This is in the process of realization through the stabilization policy involving the maintenance of Kim Jong-un’s leadership system in the Korean peninsula, including the Sino-North Korean alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented concerning the significance of the arms trade between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) prior to the Korean War. It discusses the quality of Soviet military aid to the DPRK, particularly the obsolescence of captured Japanese arms from World War II that the Soviets initially gave the DPRK, the increase of orders for Soviet-manufactured arms from DPRK leader Kim Il Sung, and the assistance of the Soviet Union of a creation of a military industry in the DPRK. It also discusses Soviet importation of food from the DPRK.

Given North Korea’s desire to maintain nuclear weapons—and barring its unexpected collapse—how can the US and its allies establish and maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia? Current US policy alternatives do not offer an effective means for removing North Korean nuclear weapons without creating many more serious problems that jeopardize a stable future for Northeast Asia. However, by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) through North Korea’s special economic zones, the United States and other nations can engage North Koreans at all levels of society and build a future environment of cooperation and stability. Such a long-term engagement policy will prove more successful than isolation, sanctions, or military force, and will bolster regional actors’ efforts to develop additional stability-inducing policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1990s, China established 'strategic cooperative relations' with North Korea, which mixed elements of alliance and practical cooperative relations, in the process of dismantling the Cold War. However, in the summer of 2009, that is, in the wake of the second nuclear test and the serious illness of Kim Jong Il, this relations changed into 'new strategic cooperative relations' with 'increased elements of alliance.' This new relations between the two countries were characterized by the strengthened bond in politics and security and by the establishment of systematic economic connections. Due to this new relation, the future of North Korea is less likely to follow the scenario envisaged by some in the Western countries who have anticipated the 'collapse of the North Korean regime.' This new relations will render the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea rather useless, thus having a great influence on the effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. And the West will find it more difficult to resort to economic sanctions. The expansion of the economic cooperation between China and North Korea created an ironic situation where South Korea's sanctions against North Korea make it lose its share of North Korean market. To conclude, the new relations between China and North Korea have made it unavoidable for the West and South Korea to modify their respective North Korea policy to adjust to the changing policy environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Japan surrendered in August 1945, both the GMD and the CCP initially recognized Koreans as foreigners. However, with the change of CCP's strategy toward Northeast China from sole occupation to guerrilla warfare, the CCP began to encourage local Koreans to recognize themselves as an ethnic minority to help win the civil war. The CCP successively reduced the criteria for obtaining Chinese citizenship, completing the legalization of the ethnic Korean ethnic minority in China in 1960 with no smooth emotional transition. However, after the generational shift from the first and second to third and fourth immigrated generation and termination of exchanges between China and North Korea during the Cultural Revolution, the Korean ethnic minority became a legal and emotional reality in China. North Korea, considering its own security and safety, proactively assisted the CCP in China's civil war, providing ammunitions and persuading ethnic Koreans to participate in Chinese (Communist) Revolution. The interdependence between North Korea and the CCP during the Chinese civil war led to the creation of the ethnic Koreans in the People?s Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Mongolia's and North Korea's bargaining with the People's Republic of China to provide insight into Northeast Asian regional dynamics and weak state bargaining behavior. The article demonstrates how both Mongolia and North Korea (which it demonstrates are weak states) employ a variety of tactics within the categories of capitulation, neutrality and confrontation when managing their respective relations with China. The article also argues the applica'bility of the two case studies to a better understanding of the diplomatic challenges China faces as it continues its development and to China's relations with the various weak states on its periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the territorial practices and strategies of China for the North Korea. It mentions that the new strategy follows the geopolitical security of China from the North Korea for the economic development, and improvement in the scalar politics of for the North Korea, and the increment of trade between both the nations. Also mentioned is that Chinese Communist Party has been focusing on the geopolitical relation with North Korea.

This article discusses how and why South Korea tried to develop its own nuclear programme in order to safeguard its national security after the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia in 1975 and 1976. Because Washington did not want nuclear proliferation in East Asia, the South Korean leadership decided to use its fledgling nuclear programme as a trump card in negotiations with the US. This article will demonstrate the process in which the client states of the US came to understand how to negotiate with Washington in order to further their own national interests in the Cold War era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study is based upon two premises: (1) the available literature, though voluminous, fails to provide systematic understandings of the complex and evolving relations between China and North Korea; and (2) China and North Korea had been short of being trusted allies bound in blood and belief even before the launch of post-Mao reforms and the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations. This article dissects this curious relationship into four questions: (1) What does history inform us about China's relations with (North) Korea? (2) Has China communicated effectively with North Korea? (3) Have China and North Korea been ‘trusted allies’? (4) How effective has China been in inducing North Korea to comply with its demands over the years? The authors argue that, geo-strategically, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an adversarial position. Furthermore, residues of the Factional Incident of 1956 and North Korea's deep-rooted suspicion of China still linger on. These have been the sources of Beijing's dilemma in consistently opting for ‘soft’ measures despite that North Korea's provocative acts and nuclear weapons programs have negatively affected China's interests. From the outset, China and North Korea had been more uncertain allies who had to cooperate with each other under the ideological and geopolitical imperatives of the difficult times. The authors also suggest that it would be misleading to put Sino–North Korean dynamics in a usual category of big power–small nation relations where power asymmetry generally works against the latter. North Korea has undoubtedly been an atypical ‘small nation’. It is due to these limitations that China's pressurizing has not been always effective and that Beijing's reactions have been continuously cyclical. This cyclical trend is not likely to be broken since the upcoming drama of Sino–American rivalry is bound to close the window of such opportunities for China, which will nevertheless regard North Korea increasingly as a liability, if not uncomfortable neighbor. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China reacted very differently to the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis: engaging in passive and ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy in the first and choosing more proactive and ‘stage-managing’ diplomacy in the second. This article has sought to explain this striking contrast in China's foreign behavior. Though most studies tend to rely on Chinese strategic and security interests in explaining China's proactive diplomacy as demonstrated in the six-party talks, those strategic and security interests do not explain directly the contrasting foreign behavior of China. China faced basically equal strategic and security concerns and equally dangerous potential military conflict between the US and North Korea through the first and the second nuclear crises. This article, then, argues that ‘same interests, but different behaviors’ should be explained not by China's external interest calculus but by internal changes within China itself. By the turn of the new millennium, China had undergone an evolutionary change of state identity from a cautious accommodator to an active constructor, or from a state of ‘taoguang yanghui’ to a state of ‘fuzeren daguo’. The contrasting foreign behaviors in the first and second nuclear crises are profoundly reflective of this identity shift of China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]