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The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the importance of non-state actors in international relations is now widely acknowledged, formal state-to-state ties remain an essential measure of a state's strength in the international community. When traditional components of sovereignty are eroded, what options remain open to states seeking to forestall international isolation? Drawing on a case study of Taiwan, this paper explores the potential and the pitfalls of using paradiplomacy as a substitute for traditional diplomacy. I argue that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy for three primary purposes: as a 'hedge' against weakness in the central-level US-Taiwan relationship; as a tool for developing long-term relationships with rising political stars; and as a performative strategy for asserting Taiwan's statehood by showing others that it acts like a state. While paradiplomacy enables Taiwan to strengthen ties to US policymakers, these efforts have become increasingly complicated as mainland Chinese influence on local US politics increases. This paper thus sheds light on paradiplomacy in the US-Taiwan relationship, but also on the ways in which American federalism can complicate US foreign policy toward East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Area Development & Policy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Employing insights provided by the theory of monopolistic markets in economics and Great Power behaviour in the discipline of international relations, this paper aims to provide an alternative understanding of India's refusal to join the BRI beyond the immediate bilateral security, domestic politics, and economic considerations in Sino-Indian relations. We argue that BRI is an effort by China to position itself as the leading firm in the market for international development – a space for long dominated by Western development providers. The paper argues that India's efforts to contest the BRI can be seen as a natural outcome of other rising powers resisting China's efforts to monopolize the development market. In doing so, it provides a template of why rising powers compete with each other in providing developmental aid even when cooperation may create mutual benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a conceptual and analytical framework of states' legitimacy-seeking to comprehensively investigate the motivation behind China's climate and environment policy. While previous research has largely overlooked political factors that underlie China's climate policy, this paper argues that these factors are crucial in understanding China's policy changes, which are evident at both domestic and international levels. By examining sources such as government documents, leaders' speeches and authoritative literature, this study contends that China's climate change initiatives are part of a broader effort to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. The issue of climate change has become highly politicised in China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and it serves as a crucial test of the ruling party and the state's capacity to govern effectively. As such, legitimacy-seeking is the key driver that links China's domestic measures and international commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper comprehensively illustrates how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Australia is reflected in the broad literature. By utilising a systematic literature review, this research divides literature into four groups: 1. The BRI narratives in the Australian media; 2. Economic opportunities and political influence of the BRI in Australia; 3. Exploring why Australia has refused the BRI; and 4. The growing China threat rhetoric. This paper not only fills in the literature gaps by offering an exhaustive knowledge of the BRI in Australia, but also, to some extent, contributes to a broader understanding of China in Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing China's 2006 and 2015 Africa policies, this article reveals how China's political discourse has become more confident, practical, and depoliticised. In particular, this paper shows how education is allocated, promised, and embedded in China's 'shared' agenda, which is centred on development co-operation and mutual learning. It then reflects on the extent to which China may move towards traditional donors. This paper concludes that, despite fragmented convergences in the discourse and an increased recognition of a Chinese model, China maintains its distinctive role and position in the post-2015 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking a spatially sensitive approach to evaluating China's quest of soft power, this paper conducted a media discourse analysis of European countries' perceptions of China's growing international influence in general, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in particular. Preliminary analysis reveals regional diversity in media coverage of the BRI that was partially caused by a country's position as a 'discourse leader', 'discourse responder' or 'discourse follower'. In terms of the contents, this paper noticed a huge discrepancy among the European countries towards the potential impacts of the BRI and China's rise in international affairs, and recorded a shift from a rather positive to a cautious attitude among the European Union's leaders. It is suggested that China's spatially blind approach to using soft power to promote BRI in Europe may be partly to blame for its limited success so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China grows in international importance and influence, more and more countries worry about how it will behave, and are preoccupied with the hard question of how to tame it. As a middle power Australia has sought ways to influence the thinking and behaviour of Chinese policymakers. The Australian approach to taming China represents an academically puzzling and politically intriguing case, which, unfortunately, has not been studied in detail. The paper has argued that the concept of taming offers significant intellectual advantages in its reconsideration of Australia's China policy and has called for Australian scholars and policymakers, to critically rethink unspoken and understudied Australia's taming practices and policies. To this end, this paper has proposed an experience-based theory of taming as a key research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some observers expected a drastic change in the Philippines' diplomacy toward China when Rodrigo Duterte said goodbye to the United States in 2016. However, after six years, the Philippines has remained an allied partner of the United States. The Philippines' defense establishment bolstered its maritime domain awareness capacity thanks to financial and technical support from the United States. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) maintained the award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) favoring the Philippines over China. This paper sheds light on the Philippines' policymaking process by framing the politics of grand strategy in an emerging state. The grand strategy is an intellectual architecture to clarify the general direction of foreign policy shaped by multiple state actors who are not limited by the foreign affairs office. Neither asymmetrical power relations nor presidential power can dominate the direction of the Philippines' diplomacy. The president, the DFA, and the defense establishment have developed institutional foundations to craft particular policies. Once they designed the grand strategy in the 1990s, successive policymakers did not remove it but rather incrementally changed it, especially in the 2010s, when they faced a series of assertive actions from China. In an emerging state with limited state capacity, Filipino policymakers do not always coordinate well with each other but still maintain a certain level of autonomy to create particular policies. Against the dominant framework of the weak state, this paper argues that Filipino policymakers demonstrate the state's capacity to achieve their policy goals, even with limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that China and Türkiye are direct successors of former empires, i.e., the Qing and Ottoman Empires, they share common feelings of century-long Western humiliation, constrained maritime space, and unfinished territorial unification in modern times. However, the two countries chose divergent paths of modern national building, which result in their turbulent bilateral relations in the 20th century. While the old structural disagreements are not completely fading away, China and Türkiye have tended to build a more cooperative relations in 21st century as both of them struggle to adapt to the common challenges of neoliberal world order, which leads to more convergences than divergences in their second nation building process. Based on this historical comparison, this paper suggests that the nation building processes and its reflections on foreign affairs are the structural factor in China-Türkiye relations, which defined potential issues of cooperation and division between the two countries in different times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between South Africa and China has not reached its full potential but has gathered great impetus and simultaneously stirred up controversy. Two important issues that have arisen concerning this relationship are whether the engagements between the two countries are mutually beneficial or asymmetrically favour one country over the other. This paper interrogates South Africa-China relations between 2009 and 2019, an epoch in which the relationship between the two nations became convoluted as much for what it entailed as for what it excluded. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 participants, and the information that was gathered was supplemented with a review of the literature within the context of the relationship. We found that South Africa-China relations go beyond the issues of minerals and other related natural resources. We also found that while there are elements of asymmetry in this relationship in economic terms, this asymmetry is somewhat exaggerated. We, therefore, recommend that regardless of this exaggeration, South Africa must place itself in a position to define terms of engagement with China and put in place measures to demarcate such perceived asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing evidence from existing archives, parliamentary proceedings, presidential speeches, newspaper reports and oral testimonies, this paper demonstrates the extent to which Malawi sustained diplomatic relations with Taiwan and China from 1961 to 2014, within the broader context of southern Africa. While trade dictated the diplomatic choice of the so-called 'two Chinas', individual leadership styles as well as domestic politics remained the decisive factors. However, the paper argues that the process was dynamic, complex and highly contested – and that the broader idiographic context of southern Africa mattered. For while local circumstances created the need for diplomatic relations, it was the international political economy that acted as the impetus behind the establishment and shifting sustenance of the relationships. In making this argument, the study draws attention to how global forces interacted historically with local political economies within southern Africa to shape discourses of diplomacy as well as how economic challenges forced states to make compromises – including undermining human rights – in the making of these diplomatic relations over the last two generations in post-independence Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental changes in the Arctic region attract global attention. China, with its growing power, has been steadily increasing its presence in the region and in January 2018 published its first Arctic policy paper. At the same time, there are numerous actors within China that are interested in the Arctic and have the capacity to influence China's Arctic decision-making process. However, what is less clear, is how China's Arctic policy is being formulated across the Chinese government and what role different subnational actors play in its formulation and implementation. This research seeks to fill this gap. Drawing on fieldwork and Chinese texts, this study aspires to further develop our understanding of the workings behind Chinese state policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to undertake a systematic comparative analysis of how regional economic organizations (REOs) in the wider Eurasian region have strategically responded to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. The theoretical framework is based on the external actorness literature, comparative regionalism, and foreign policy analysis. The analysis links the distinctive features of the REOs to the shape and impact of their strategic responses to the Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, it shows the extent to which REOs play a functional role vis-à-vis their member states and large firms in a macro-regional strategic context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the Philippines form its foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)? Existing work on the Philippine foreign policy toward China explains the country's stance solely through geopolitical or domestic factors. By examining the political calculus of, and the policy formulation by, the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-) administrations, I argue that a combination of domestic politics, geopolitical considerations, and economic realities have shaped the approach of the Philippines toward China. Rather than focus on one factor to explain the Philippines' foreign policy, I suggest that the combination and interaction of these three factors accounting for how various Philippine administrations have operated explains the Philippines' China policies. Furthermore, I nuance these three factors through the lens of political survival. I suggest that leaders stay in power by accumulating political power and staving off challengers. In the Philippines, I suggest that leaders capitalize on criticizing or deviating from the prior administration's China policies, which have resulted in economic or political effects that generate resentment from the population. As a result, Presidents often reverse or modify the policies set about by the previous administration, resulting in a new set of approaches toward China. Data on this paper was facilitated by years of fieldwork conducted in the Philippines between 2017 to 2020. I interviewed officials in the Aquino, Duterte, and Marcos administrations, Filipino oligarchs, political brokers, lawyers, political party representatives, and in-country observers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of "friendly and cooperative relations' in 1992, relations between South Korea and China have been continuously elevated almost every 5 years. The two countries have achieved great advancements in expanding civil exchanges, bringing economic relations closer, finding common ground in foreign policy and security and elevation of political relations. Despite the honeymoon period that the two countries experienced after they established diplomatic relations, however, conflict is now arising due to differences in opinion and interests in various fields such politics, economy, society, culture, diplomacy, and security. This paper will examine Sino-South Korean relations using the four factor model, which is based on four approaches, starting with economic relations, followed by perception and emotions, diplomacy and security and lastly, these factors" influence on domestic politics. Following this analysis, this paper will argue that despite their continuous but rocky developments, Sino-South Korean relations will sustainably maintain their development. Considering the synergy effect of bilateral relations, two countries are standing on the opportunity to build a New Type of Sino-South Korean relations which would allow for resolution of conflicts and misunderstandings through dialogue and communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the extent to which the official Chinese discourse of Ecological Civilisation (shengtai wenming) is adhered to in practise. Ecological Civilisation (or Eco-Civilisation) is presented as a Chinese vision of human progress which purports to de-couple economic development from environmental degradation. Underpinning the idea are five overlapping pillars (environment, economy, society, culture and governance) which, it is claimed, provide a theoretical framework to promote harmony between humanity and nature. Advocates see the concept as an example of a new Chinese modernity based on socialist values and President Xi Jinping has declared China a torchbearer of the global endeavour for Eco-Civilisation. However, our paper casts doubt over this assertion when applied specifically to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although there is some evidence of a commitment to the principles of Eco-Civilisation, we identify a number of substantial and interlinking practical shortfalls relating to three core themes: inclusion, enforcement and transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) announced in 2015, is a $60 billion package of Chinese-led investment in roads, railways, energy, and industry. It is part of China's new Eurasia-wide Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The likely impact of CPEC is controversial. Some scholars argue that CPEC will generate prosperity, regional equality and rapid economic growth in Pakistan. Other scholars argue, however, that CPEC will lead to debt and to the economic and political subordination of Pakistan to China. The existing discussion of CPEC has a near exclusive inward-looking focus on Pakistan. Some scholars, mainly from outside of Pakistan, have looked in more detail at China, but principally from an international relations perspective. Missing from all of this discussion is how economic change in China, particularly in western China, will influence the likely economic outcome of the CPEC. This paper makes an effort to begin to fill this gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan occupies an elevated role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hosts its so-called flagship project, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Existing literature has often interpreted this project from a geopolitical perspective, as a vehicle through which a rising China projects influence on a peripheral country and advances its own centrality in international affairs. While such motivations certainly played a major role in getting the project off the ground, they are not the sole determinant of its design, or the heated controversies it triggered within Pakistan. This paper seeks to capture both dimensions by analysing the development of CPEC, and the handling of the conflicts it sparked, through a lens of overlapping centre–periphery relations: one between China and Pakistan at the international level, and one between Islamabad and peripheral regions and groups within the country. I argue that this model best captures the pivotal position and resulting agency of national governments in shaping local BRI implementations. It also shows how the BRI is not a straight case of Chinese influence radiating outwards; rather, contestation by local actors in turn forces adaptations in Chinese foreign and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the collapse of the USSR, the European Union (EU) and China have launched a range of leadership initiatives in Central Asia. Focusing on non-traditional security, connectivity and water management cooperation, this paper contributes to the special issue by highlighting the evolution of the EU's goals and practices in Central Asia, contrasting them with China's leadership strategy, and discussing implications for states in the region. The EU and China have diverging approaches to Central Asia due to differences in foreign policy goals and domestic politics. Nevertheless, as of now there seems to be no rivalry between their projects, as neither claims sole leadership nor builds formal institutions with exclusive membership. The presence of two very different leaders is beneficial for Central Asian states as it has allowed them to draw more material resources, generate new ideas, diversify partners and balance external influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigating a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project in Myanmar, this paper contests the proposition that China's state-coordinated investments are, by nature, more accommodating to local people's demands than Western investments. Tension between Myanmar villagers and the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a copper mine project does not square with Beijing's "inclusive globalization" narrative. Drawing upon extensive semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in a Sino-Myanmar copper mine project, as well as other secondary data, this study finds that the Chinese SOE's operation was reactive to the ebb and flow of social resistance and the government's pressure amid the host country's democratization in the 2010s. Reforms were more likely to occur when the Chinese SOE observed more domestic constraints in its operation environment. It showed less incentive to improve its business practices when societal actors failed to display strong resistance, and the host government did not care about its legitimacy. Despite Beijing's efforts to craft an image of itself as a responsible power, conflicts in the BRI project should not be simplified as the SOE's defiance of the state's regulations. They are rooted in the state-centric foreign policy that systematically overlooks societal actors in state-coordinated investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the political implications of China's economic relationship with Africa using the case study of Sino-Nigerian economic relations. China – perhaps the most prominent rising economy of the contemporary era – and Nigeria – one of the Africa's largest economies with a fast-growing consumer population – provide an ideal context to study the economic significance of bilateral ties for the 'Global South.' Nigeria's prospects of sustained economic growth, through Sino diplomatic relations, could appear relatively bleak considering issues involving its growing debt burden, unequal trade composition and deteriorating governance standards, some of which are attributable to China. This paper explores both sides of the argument before concluding that certain political aspects of Sino-Nigerian bilateral relations do indeed undermine sustainable economic development in the long run. It is argued that unequal economic practices, lack of transparency, disregard for environmental concerns, exclusion of civil society and absence of serious engagement with wider social actors and other checks and balances could indeed nurture elements of rentierism across Africa – particularly in resource-rich countries like Nigeria leaving significant detrimental effects that could well outweigh short-term gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International cooperation on peacekeeping operations, and on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, is important in tackling global non-traditional security threats. It also helps China address its 'trust deficit' problem. While both operations seem 'low hanging fruit' for international cooperation, the ways in which China undertakes peacekeeping and HADR cooperation differ – the former encompasses not only cooperation for technical and capacity development but also cooperation for policy harmonisation, while China's HADR cooperation is limited to technical and capacity development. This paper asks, 'why the difference?', despite the fact that they both address similar policy problems. It argues that the difference corresponds to the level of holisticity/fragmentation of China's decision-making process. The more holistic China's decision-making process, the deeper the international cooperation. The nature of China's decision-making processes has international policy implications, because the fragmented nature of those processes maintains cooperation at a functional level only, and hinders the deeper development of cooperation into policy harmonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colonial and postcolonial relations have always constituted sites of knowledge production in the Global South. This is particularly noticeable when it comes to the production of knowledge of a Global South self vis-à-vis the West. However, the literature has not seriously attended self-knowledge production in the Global South with regard to non-Western others. The paper compares South and Southeast Asian think tanks to reflect upon a common identity strategy of small nations to become a civilizational bridge between competing major neighbours. Specifically, China experts in these areas host more or less a common wish or even a desire to be a bridge over the difference of China and its potential rival in India, the West, or both. The bridge role is a rare sensibility in the postcolonial critique of the West. Watching China from its Southern Third World neighbourhood incurs such an agenda. Relying on interviews of retired diplomats and think tank experts, the paper also discusses how the above mentioned methodological characteristics affect the enactment of the bridge role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2013, China has undertaken extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea. China has since been adding new construction and fortifications to the land features that had undergone reclamation between late 2013 and 2015, but none of the new projects rivalled the large-scale reclamation from 2014–15, and nor has China reclaimed any new land features. Land reclamation has theoretical and empirical implications. The literature regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is rich and plenty. Many studies, however, focus on China's bilateral assertive or coercive behaviour as well as China's general strategy in the South China Sea, not land reclamation per se. What explains the timing of China's large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea? Why did China decide to initiate large-scale land reclamation in the first place? This paper, therefore, conducts a comprehensive case study analysing China's land reclamation decisions. I argue that China's land reclamation is a result of capability, rationale, and opportunities which include a calculation of U.S. resolve. This study has implications for understanding Chinese foreign policy decision-making and contributes to the credibility debate in the coercion literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions in the EU-China relationship have hampered cooperation in various sectors, including a set of transnational security issues where engagement with China is unavoidable but nevertheless profoundly challenging. The EU maintains a "tripartite" strategy, originally outlined in its 2019 Strategic Outlook, seeing China as a "partner", but also as an economic "competitor" and a "systemic rival". China's former State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has described the European approach as suffering from "cognitive dissonance". As a result, and as demonstrated by the failure of the 2022 EU-China Summit, the two parties are now operating within two different frameworks, and constructive cooperation has become increasingly difficult. By working with Qin Yaqing's concept of "relationality", this article aims to contribute to a better conceptualisation of the ways in which the EU and China can work with each other to tackle global issues. Challenging the literature that tries to explain the shift in EU-China relations by focusing on individual actors, this research's approach focuses on the relations between actors. Adopting this ontology of relations, this research paper analyses how, in the EU-China relationship, relations between the two parties contribute to creating their own identities and motivate their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the data of China's service trade and diplomatic events with 45 countries, this paper examines the effects of diplomatic relations on service trade based on the gravity model. Through an empirical analysis, the results proved that good diplomatic relations can significantly promote the export of China's service trade and that the effects of diplomatic relations on trade have a clear distinction regarding different political positions. Our results support the view that diplomatic relation does an important role in international trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's main aim is to contribute to the debate on the impact of China's rise on the established norms and practices in the field of international development. To do so, it zooms in on a single infrastructure project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, which involved intense competition between China and Japan. Specifically, it examines how competition between China, a non-Western emerging power, and Japan, an OECD member, led to a recalibration of both China and Japan's approaches to infrastructure financing in the region. The findings suggest that rather than straight convergence or competition between diverging models, there is an ongoing process of two-way adjustment between China, and representatives of the dominant global norms and practices. We also argue that to understand the implications of China's participation in the field of international development, and its impact on the 'rules of the game' of global governance, researchers should avoid positioning inquiries within the premises of China's one-directional impact on the development assistance regime. Rather, it is necessary to take into account a complex set of relationships including China, host countries and other 'socialised' actors, and the process of negotiation between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has developed a series of 'strategic partnerships' with a range of great power states. These partnerships reflect the emergence of an actor that seeks to establish foreign policy goals with an attendant institutional architecture and political commitment. This paper examines two of these partnerships with the United States and China to illustrate the manner in which the EU has constructed a collective identity for itself via discursive association with great power states, while claiming a normative character as an actor of a different kind, with the ability to act strategically with great power states via temporal and ethical forms of social distancing from these same actors. This paper consults recent survey research and policy developments to assess the success of these EU discursive strategies. It is concluded that these partnerships play a somewhat useful role in establishing the EU as an actor of global significance, whilst the EU is less successful in its inherent claims of normative superiority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Third World Quarterly is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Indian Ocean has established itself at the spotlight of global geopolitics as regional and extra-regional states have set their gaze upon the region for power projection. China and India are locked in a strategic competition for dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India is the only state in the geographic space with the potential to challenge China. To achieve its interests, China has crafted a containment strategy against India in the region. China's intentions go beyond acting as a mere counterweight to India, but its strategy is not without consequence. India has also been crafting its own containment strategy against China to limit the latter's increasing assertive maneuvers in the Indian Ocean. This paper argues that Sino-Indian competition goes beyond balancing one another in the IOR. India and China both aim to dominate the region at the expense of each other's influence through the concept and strategy of containment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This survey reviews the growing role and presence of China in the Island Pacific. As the late Professor Ron Crocombe remarked, in the Pacific a major transition is under way from a range of European to Asian influences. Many Western observers have viewed this rise of Asian, and specifically Chinese, influence with alarm, but Crocombe saw it as offering Pacific Islanders new opportunities. This paper first analyses the diversity that can be masked by terms such as ‘China’ and ‘the Pacific’. Then it surveys recent literature on China in the Pacific and scholarship concerned with longer Chinese histories in the region that most recent commentators ignore and which question a number of their assertions. Finally, it suggests possible future directions for historical research on this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper investigates the European Union (EU)-Brazil and EU-China regional policy dialogues, viewed as vectors of crossnational policy transfer. Regional policy is considered as having limited transfer potential due to its inward orientation, context specificity and complexity. Yet, knowledge exchange and voluntary policy transfer have taken place between the EU and Brazil and between the EU and China since the mid-2000s. The study investigates and compares actors, motivations, mechanisms of transfer, conditioning factors and types of outcomes, shedding a light on the underresearched phenomenon of international policy transfer in regional policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the policy transfer process and outcomes outside the occidental context. It extends the voluntary transnational policy transfer framework with an evolutionary perspective and a scalar understanding of space and power at the subnational level. When the Sino-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP), a government-to-government collaboration in promoting industrial development, was studied, it was revealed that two parallel policy transfer networks were developed in the early days of the SIP, which were embedded in different scales of governance and pursuing divergent targets. Their relationship affected the policy transfer outcomes for the SIP, and reveals the important governance and temporal dimensions in transnational policy transfers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the application of the non-interference principle in the context of China’s security policy in Africa, to determine the extent to which we are witnessing an evolution in the application of this principle. Indeed, as seen with the recent opening of the military base in Djibouti or with China’s contribution to peace talks in South Sudan, it would appear that the non-intervention principle is undergoing a course reversal. This paper will argue that, in spite of these apparent shifts, there has been no fundamental change to the application of this principle. To make this point, this article applies Ren’s typology, which characterises three levels of nuance in the forms that the application of non-interference has taken in practice. This typology is then applied in a comparative manner across the four following components of China’s security policy in Africa: peacekeeping operations; military cooperation; naval power projection; and crisis management mediation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the incipient tensions over the Brahmaputra between India and China has become a considerable threat and cause for concern to the downstream dwellers of India's North East Region (NER), especially Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. It enlarges the term 'Brahma-hypothesis' and considers Chinese 'hydro-hegemony' over the Brahmaputra as a 'national security' threat to India. It also argues that apart from having the occasional Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China, India should seek to develop with China and other countries a multilateral diplomatic agreement regarding the management of the Brahmaputra River to secure India's vital interests at national and regional levels. This is also necessary to minimise the sense of insecurity continuously growing in the minds of the people of the NER. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to investigate the impact of China’s aid, trade and investments on the development trajectories in postcolonial Africa, focussed on Rwanda. The analytical framework of this study is informed by Helen Milner’s observation that ‘International political economy is a growth industry’. Furthermore, the study deploys dependency theory and world systems theory to examine how the global economic configuration operates though the hierarchy of core, semi-periphery and periphery among the states. Our focus on Rwanda is based on our observation that this small, landlocked, natural resources-deficient, aid-dependent country is an atypical destination for Chinese patronage and investments. We argue that as a non-resource rich country, Rwanda presents an anomaly, thus, underlining the gap in the existing knowledge on China–Africa engagements. We discuss the inherent dependency in the neoliberal economic structure and present a case for using dependency theory to understand and explain the contemporary globalised economy and emerging South–South cooperation. We conclude with a call for more in-depth cross-comparative research on China–Africa relations to grasp the magnitude of dependencies and economic transformations within postcolonial African states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the debate on terrorism designation and proscription by providing information and analysis on the "double-track" system of terrorism designation and proscription in China. It calls for greater attention to China's terrorism proscription system as China has increased its engagement in international affairs and became more willing and capable of international cooperation in counterterrorism. The case of China provides important insights from a non-Western perspective into how states function in dealing with the challenge terrorism poses. In particular, it examines China's efforts in balancing effective counterterrorism and the accountability of the government. Adopting an interpretivist approach based on primarily Chinese-language documents, it traces the development of China's proscription regime since 2003 to illustrate its evolution from ad-hoc list-making to a more complicated system. Because of the difficulties in collecting information and presenting it as admissible evidence in court, like many other countries, China relies on the executive for terrorism designation and proscription. While the workings of China's proscription system demonstrates authoritarian characteristics, the development of its proscription regime reveals how it sought to respond to the concerns about the legitimacy of its counterterrorism practice, for example, on issues of due process and presumption of innocence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts from the assumption that geostrategic and security interests alone are not sufficient to explain China’s foreign policy choices. It argues that ideas about what China’s role as an actor in the increasingly globalised international system should be, and about world order in general, have a deep influence on China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Taking the North Korean issue as a case study, the paper postulates that China is currently engaged in a search for a ‘new’ identity as a global player. China’s actor identity is composed of various partly contradictory role conceptions. National roles derived from China’s internal system structures and its historical past lead to continuity in foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global power require an adaptation of its foreign policy principles. In the case of its relationship with North Korea, China’s foreign policy is oscillating between the two roles of ‘socialist power’ – as thus comrade-in-arms with its socialist neighbour – and ‘responsible great power’, which leads to it being expected to comply with international norms, and thus to condemn North Korea’s nuclear provocations and related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract Food is a tireless referent in international relations studies about China and its ties with the rest of the world. This paper addresses two contemporary issues. First, why is China so sensitive about grain self-sufficiency? Second, why does there seem to be a lack of effective dialogue between epistemic communities in China and outside over China's overseas agricultural activities? The first part of the paper reviews the development of China's agricultural sector and underlines the importance of China's contribution in stabilizing the world food markets. Next, it explores the ideational sources of Chinese food insecurity, in spite of its success in attaining high levels of self-sufficiency in grain. The third part of the paper reviews the evolution of China's overseas agricultural activities and analyzes the factors that contribute to a mismatch of understanding about the political implications therein. The paper concludes by proposing a couple of conceptual road maps for securitizing food as a referent in debates about China's security environment and Chinese international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nazi concentration camps were considered to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the twentieth century and the world believed that this scenario will never happen again. In today's modern world, in the twenty-first century, the Chinese Communist Party has imprisoned millions of indigenous Turkics in concentration camps in which they are being forced to deny their faith, abandon their own culture, and assimilate to Chinese culture as a whole nation. This paper, initially evaluates the development of China and East Turkistan relations and Beijing's policies towards this region. Then, it examines the situation of concentration camps and who is being held captive and what crimes they have committed in the eyes of the Chinese government. Last but not least, it examines how the Chinese dream, nationalist policies, and developments of international politics played an important role in the establishment of these concentration camps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the political transition of Myanmar in 2011, Myanmar toward China's engagement strategy has led the changes from the state-to-state relations into the multi-layered relations and even into open domestic and foreign connection. Myanmar's foreign policy has also challenged the Beijing's economic and political interests in Myanmar in terms of major economic projects such as the case of Myanmar's Government one-sided suspension for Myit Sone Dam projects in Kachin State, Kyauk Phyu Deep Sea Port, New Yangon Development Project, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) projects along the China-Myanmar Border. In this sense, it could be interesting to find the Myanmar's hedging policy on China's engagement and China's responses to Myanmar's development. Moreover, Myanmar has agreed the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which is strategically important for China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Among the various China's BRI projects in Myanmar, every case has the different characteristic, pattern, and situation, in terms of the different fundamental interaction relations among the state, market and society. Thus, this research paper seeks the three unique cases of BRI projects in Myanmar from the political economic hedging framework via the state-market-society perspective, such as the Kyauk Phyu Deep Sea Port Project (currently running), Myit Sone Done Projects (currently suspending), and the New Yangon Development Project (still negotiating). Three major projects in Myanmar stand for three different patterns of Myanmar's state-market-society relations and their general hedging considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maintaining global peace as China rises is a key strategic goal of Western liberal democracies. Compared to other western liberal democracies, New Zealand's response to the ‘rise of China’ is notable for its absence of security and political frictions and for the achievement of a series of diplomatic ‘firsts’. Can this be explained only by material concern over the national economic interest as China's role in the global economy increases or do ideational factors also underlay how New Zealand engages China? This paper employs the ontological security framework to demonstrate how New Zealand identity as a ‘small trading nation’ and ‘good international citizen’ has shaped its turn to Asia and response to the ‘rise of China'. It first analyses the origins of New Zealand's outward facing identity and resultant foreign policy positions long before China became an important aspect of New Zealand trade policy. It then shows how New Zealand seeks ontological security as a ‘small trading nation’ and ‘good international citizen’ in its relations with China and how China has responded to this type of engagement. The paper illustrates the importance of ideational factors in Western liberal democracies’ responses to the ‘rise of China’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation in 2006, China's renewed interest in Africa has garnered a lot of attention and generated a lot of debate. Western media and analysts have, perhaps not surprisingly, been generally very critical of China's rising influence in Africa. The African reaction, however, has been more mixed. African leaders have welcomed what they see as a new approach to development and increased potential for meaningful South-South co-operation. African civil society groups have been more cautious and are worried about the possible negative repercussions on governance, the environment, human rights and overall economic development. This paper focuses on Chinese foreign aid to Africa and discusses the opportunities and challenges that it presents for China, the African continent, and the international community. This allows the uncovering of many misconceptions regarding the potential impact (whether positive or negative) of this renewed interest by different parties. The paper argues that if one adopts an approach that puts ordinary Africans first, at the centre of development, then the only option available to us is to engage China in a constructive partnership in order to make its aid effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India and China have entered a new low in their bilateral relations. Having fought a war in 1962, it took over three decades for both countries to achieve normalcy at the borders, aided by a series of border management agreements and protocols to maintain tranquility along the border areas. However, the June 2020 Galwan clashes have changed that permanently. This paper argues that the current escalation of border clashes is both a symptom and consequence of the breakdown of the bilateral border management framework which has been dented since the 2017 Doklam standoff between both countries. Delving into diplomatic history relating to Doklam and Galwan, the findings point to the need to correct the epistemic criteria used to reproduce claims of an unambiguous boundary between India and China by both countries, in order to ensure abatement of similar outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition is a natural byproduct of major powers navigating an anarchic world. Small states operating in such a milieu however, face a dilemma when strategizing their foreign policy. At present, two regional behemoths – India and China – remain locked in a Realpolitik affray as they vie for influence by enticing and attracting South Asian states through economic, security and diplomatic initiatives. How do these structural dynamics impact Sri Lanka's policymaking process? Moreover, has the island been able to mount a timely and appropriate response to structural dictates? In what way has domestic variables influenced and channeled policy preferences in Sri Lanka since 2015? By adopting a Neoclassical Realist frame of analysis, this paper appraises the impact made by the external environment and domestic intervening variables on the island's foreign policy trajectory. It concludes that domestic intervening variables drew the island away from optimal choices in its relations with India and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]