Search

Executive Summary: This paper examines the staffing needs of the US Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), as it seeks to eliminate an immigration court backlog, which approached 2.5 million pending cases at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2023. A previous study by the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) attributed the backlog to systemic, long-neglected problems in the broader US immigration system. This paper provides updated estimates of the number of immigration judges (IJs) and "judge teams" (IJ teams) needed to eliminate the backlog over ten and five years based on different case receipt and completion scenarios. It also introduces a data tool that will permit policymakers, administrators and researchers to make their own estimates of IJ team hiring needs based on changing case receipt and completion data. Finally, the paper outlines the pressing need for reform of the US immigration system, including a well-resourced, robust, and independent court system, particularly in light of record "encounters" of migrants at US borders in FY 2022 and 2023. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immigration became an especially thorny and publicly discussed issue with the so-called Refugee Crisis beginning in 2015. The stance of the Czech and Polish governments was dominated by strong anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric. Still, both countries have witnessed a steady increase in mainly short-term immigration from various Asian countries such as Bangladesh or Pakistan ever since. This paper analyses Czech and Polish migration policies against the backdrop of a historically constructed notion of anti-illegal immigration policy, and category of temporary migration, coupled with the problematic nature of debt-financed migration in Asia. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Czechia and Poland (2018-2021), in-depth and semi-structured interviews with migration experts, academic and grey literature, official documents, and the method of Accidental ethnography, this paper argues that silencing of actual labor immigration in political communication while employing anti-migration rhetoric represents a discursive gap typical for liberal democracies. It further concludes that rendering migrant labor as a temporary commodity and turning a blind eye on recruitment of international migrants represents a continuity practice of migrant labor subordination within the nation-state, originating during colonialism and the advent of capitalism in the nineteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

He spoke about the causes of the growing immigration court backlog, particularly the "imbalance in resources" between the court system and the immigration enforcement agencies that feed cases into the courts. Immigration court reform through the creation of an Article 1 immigration court or, in the alternative, legislation to allow USCIS to review (first) all applications for immigration status. Keywords: rule of law; due process; asylum; access to justice; immigration courts EN rule of law due process asylum access to justice immigration courts 228 237 10 07/25/23 20230601 NES 230601 This paper introduces a special collection of papers on access to justice, the rule of law, and due process in the US immigration system. US Immigration Courts, despite their challenges, represent a locus of due process in the US immigration system and "the first exposure of many immigrants to due process and the rule of law in the United States.". [Extracted from the article]

The author addresses the development and implementation of a service-learning project for an undergraduate course in which students interview immigrant women, incorporate the interviewees’ experiences into an analytical paper, and present the findings at the end of the semester. Students are required to use C. Wright Mills’s concepts of history and biography by situating the stories told by the women within the larger sociohistorical contexts in which they live. The article proceeds in four sections. The first section provides an overview of service learning and its benefits. This is followed by a detailed description of the service-learning project. In the third section, the author draws from a postclass survey, course evaluations, and her observations to illustrate the ways in which the project enhances student learning and enables students to deepen their understanding of the sociological imagination. The article concludes with suggestions for how the project can be applied in other courses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents information about Canada's Green Paper on Immigration Policy. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the Honorable Robert Andras, finally tabled the Canadian government's Green Paper on immigration policy, in the House of Commons on February 3, 1975. Canadian governments produce green papers in order to initiate a national discussion on particular issues, and white papers when they wish to make specific policy proposals, often leading to legislation. It examines the contents of Canada's Green Paper and to reflect upon the circumstances in which it was written and on the implications it may have for the future development of our immigration policy and programs. Throughout the post-war period, Canadian immigration policy has had very short-term objectives, although there has always been an underlying assumption that immigration meant population growth and that this was what Canada needed. The motivation of the Canadian government in setting up a task force-the Canadian Immigration and Population Study-in September 1973 to produce a Green Paper on immigration and population growth.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between manufacturing industry transfer and land use efficiency in china. Our study found that industrial transfer does not have a significant impact on land use efficiency in the full sample. However, when differentiating between the direction of manufacturing transfer, we found that in areas where manufacturing moves out, it inhibits land use efficiency significantly. Whereas in areas where manufacturing moves in, it has no significant impact on land use efficiency. We further analyzed the impact of manufacturing adjustment range and adjustment quality on land use efficiency. The results show that manufacturing structure adjustment has a positive impact on land use efficiency in the full sample and manufacturing immigration areas. In manufacturing emigration areas, manufacturing adjustment quality inhibits land use efficiency significantly, while manufacturing adjustment range improves land use efficiency significantly. Based on these findings, we suggest some policy recommendations to improve land use efficiency through manufacturing transfer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increase in international migration and the global number of students learning mathematics through a language other than their home language makes migrants' educational pathways a particularly urgent issue. The current paper focuses on the German context as Germany is currently one of the major immigration countries in the Western context. Because German is widely perceived as the language of opportunity for migrants in the German school system, it is overwhelmingly the selected language of learning and teaching in the broader school system and within migrant classes. The article is based on qualitative interviews with mathematics teachers teaching migrant classes; and the data analysis followed the Grounded theory tradition. The central phenomenon that seemed to preoccupy all teachers was how to adapt mathematics teaching to the language- and mathematics-related diversity of their students while simultaneously helping them to transfer smoothly to the mainstream classes or pass the final examinations successfully. Due to the lack of institutional support for teaching in migrant classes and problems in dealing with multilingualism and mathematics-related diversity in mathematics lessons, they were generally frustrated with the situation despite being strongly motivated at first. Using three examples from the data, we illustrate teachers' strategies in relation to multilingualism and mathematics-related diversity. Overall, the study points to the necessity of supporting teachers in their mathematical practices in migrant classes to contribute to more inclusive mathematics education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US immigration court system seeks to "fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administer and interpret US immigration laws" (DOJ 2022a). It represents the first exposure of many immigrants to due process and the rule of law in the United States, and occupies an integral role in the larger US immigration system. Yet it labors under a massive backlog of pending cases that undermines its core goals and objectives. The backlog reached 1.87 million cases in the first quarter of FY 2023 (Straut-Eppsteiner 2023, 6). This paper attributes the backlog to systemic failures in the broader immigration system that negatively affect the immigration courts, such as: Visa backlogs, United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) application processing delays, and other bottlenecks in legal immigration processes. The immense disparity in funding between the court system and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that feed cases into the courts. The failure of Congress to pass broad immigration reform legislation that could ease pressure on the enforcement and court systems. The lack of standard judicial authorities vested in Immigration Judges (IJs), limiting their ability to close cases; pressure parties to "settle" cases; and manage their dockets. The absence of a statute of limitations for civil immigration offenses. Past DHS failures to establish and adhere to enforcement priorities and to exercise prosecutorial discretion (PD) throughout the removal adjudication process, including in initial decisions to prosecute. The location of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which oversees US immigration courts, within the nation's preeminent law enforcement agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ). The misconception of many policymakers that the court system should primarily serve as an adjunct to DHS. A past record of temporary judge reassignments and government shutdowns. The paper supports a well-resourced and independent immigration court system devoted to producing the right decisions under the law. Following a short introduction, a long section on "Causes and Solutions to the Backlog" examines the multi-faceted causes of the backlog, and offers an integrated, wide-ranging set of recommendations to reverse and ultimately eliminate the backlog. The "Conclusion" summarizes the paper's topline findings and policy proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes that the United States treat naturalization not as the culmination of a long and uncertain individual process, but as an organizing principle of the US immigration system and its expectation for new Americans. It comes at a historic inflection point, following the chaotic departure of one of the most nativist administrations in US history and in the early months of a new administration whose executive orders, administrative actions, and legislative proposals augur a different view of immigrants and immigration. The paper examines two main ways that the Biden--Harris administration can realize its immigration, naturalization and integration goals: i.e., by expanding access to permanent residence and by increasing naturalization numbers and rates. First, it proposes administrative and, to a lesser degree, legislative measures that would expand the pool of eligible-to-naturalize immigrants. Second, it identifies three underlying factors--financial resources, English language proficiency, and education--that strongly influence naturalization rates. These factors must be addressed, in large part, outside of and prior to the naturalization process. In addition, it provides detailed estimates of populations with large eligibleto- naturalize numbers, populations that naturalize at low rates, and populations with increasing naturalization rates. It argues that the administration's immigration strategy should prioritize all three groups for naturalization. The paper endorses the provisions of the US Citizenship Act that would place undocumented and temporary residents on a path to permanent residence and citizenship, would reduce family- and employment-based visa backlogs, and would eliminate disincentives and barriers to permanent residence. It supports the Biden-Harris administration's early executive actions and proposes additional measures to increase access to permanent residence and naturalization. It also endorses and seeks to inform the administration's plan to improve and expedite the naturalization process and to promote naturalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on some of the systematic studies of migration in Africa. The causes and rationalization of migrations have been elaborated upon by geographers and economists in relation to agricultural, industrial-development and urbanization. The article includes works, methods and theories specific to African migrations including analytical models and techniques. It includes studies related to the causes and factors which sustain African migrations. It comprises works intended to show migration differentials, characteristics of migrants--age, sex, socioeconomic status, educational and occupational patterns. The article lists the effect of migration on the source areas and destinations. It includes issues related to depopulation, dislocation and adjustment to conditions created by migration. Some of the studies enlisted are "Migrant Urban Workers, and Rural Property Ownership: A Case Study of Migrants in Calabar, Nigeria," by E.M. Abasiekong; "Population Growth and Socio-economic Change in West Africa," edited by J.C. aldwell; and "Movement of Population from Rural to Urban Areas in Sierra Leone With Special Reference to the Colony Rural Areas," by G.R. Collings.

This study examines the legal capacity available to low-income immigrants on national, state and sub-state levels. Legal professionals working in charitable immigration service programs serve as the study's rough proxy for legal capacity, and undocumented immigrants its proxy for legal need. The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) compiled data on charitable immigration programs and their legal professionals from the: US Department of Justice's (DOJ's) "Recognized Organizations and Accredited Representatives Roster by State and City," which is maintained by the Executive Office for Immigration Review's (EOIR's) Office of Legal Access Programs (OLAP). Directories of two leading, legal support agencies for charitable immigration legal programs, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) and the Immigrant Advocates Network (IAN). CMS supplemented and updated these sources with information from the websites of charitable immigration programs. It also added legal programs to its dataset that did not appear in any of these lists. It counted as legal professionals, attorneys, federally accredited non-attorneys, paralegals and legal assistants. The paper finds that there are 1,413 undocumented persons in the United States for every charitable legal professional, and far less capacity than the national average in: States such as Alabama (6,656 undocumented per legal professional), Hawaii (4,506), Kansas (3,010), Georgia (2,853), New Jersey (2,687), Florida (2,681), North Carolina (2,671), Virginia (2,634) and Arizona (2,561). Metropolitan areas (MAs) such as Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario (5,307), Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington (4,436), Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale (3,439) and Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land (3,099). San Bernardino County (6,178), Clark County (4,747), Riverside County (4,625), Tarrant County (3,955) and Dallas County (3,939). The study's introduction summarizes its top-line findings. Its first section describes the importance of charitable immigration legal programs to immigrants, families and communities. Its second details the study's findings on charitable legal capacity and immigrant need. Its third compares the legal capacity of 1,803 charitable legal programs and their 7,322 legal professionals, with the US undocumented population by state and for the 15 largest MAs and counties. Its fourth describes CMS's research methodology and data sources. The paper ends with policy recommendations on how to expand legal capacity for low-income immigrants and better assess legal capacity and need moving forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, governments have sought to deter migration by investing in the development of migrant-sending communities, despite macroeconomic data that shows that development can increase emigration. However, emerging research suggests that well-designed aid can promote rootedness in home communities. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has increasingly attempted to use development to deter migration from the Northern Triangle states of Central America. Is this policy sound? This paper argues that development should not be instrumentalized to discourage people from migrating. It examines migration and development policies from the lens of Catholic social teaching, which recognizes the need for states to respect the agency of individuals. This is particularly important when it comes to complex and consequential decisions like whether to migrate. The Catholic Church recognizes both a right to migrate, when necessary, and the responsibility of states, particularly wealthy nations, to help people realize the right not to migrate; that is, to thrive in their home communities. The paper argues for US government assistance to alleviate poverty and invest in human capital in Central America, but independently of efforts to deter migration. Prioritizing aid to potential migrants risks reducing its effectiveness. The United States should instead pursue a whole-of-government strategy that emphasizes the right relationships with aid recipients, and that prioritizes and empowers the poor and marginalized. The paper is strongly influenced by the author's 15 years of work for Catholic agencies on migration and development, more than one-half of those with Catholic Relief Services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers estimates of US foreign-born populations that are eligible for special legal status programs and those that would be eligible for permanent residence (legalization) under pending bills. It seeks to provide policymakers, government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers, and others with a unique tool to assess the potential impact, implement, and analyze the success of these programs. It views timely, comprehensive data on targeted immigrant populations as an essential pillar of legalization preparedness, implementation, and evaluation. The paper and the exhaustive estimates that underlie it, represent the first attempt to provide a detailed statistical profile of beneficiaries of proposed major US legalization programs and special, large-scale legal status programs. The paper offers the following top-line findings: • Fifty-eight percent of the 10.35 million US undocumented residents had lived in the United States for 10 years or more as of 2019; 37 percent lived in homes with mortgages; 33 percent arrived at age 17 or younger; 32 percent lived in households with US citizens (the overwhelming majority of them children); and 96 percent in the labor force were employed. • The Citizenship for Essential Workers Act would establish the largest population-specific legalization program discussed in the paper. 7.2 million (70 percent) of the total undocumented population would be eligible for legalization under the Act. Approximately two-thirds of undocumented essential workers reside in 20 metropolitan areas. • The populations eligible for the original Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and for permanent residence on a conditional basis and removal of the conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 are not only ready to integrate successfully, but in most cases have already done so. A high percentage are long-term residents, virtually all have completed high school (or attend school), a third to one-half have attended college, and the overwhelming majority live in households with incomes above the poverty level. • The median household income of California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey residents that are eligible for the original DACA program is higher than the US median household income. New York and New Jersey residents that are eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 also have median incomes above the US median household income. The total eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 have median household incomes that are 99 percent of the US median income. • Unlike populations eligible for most special legal status and population-specific legalization programs, childhood arrivals can be found in significant numbers and concentrations in communities throughout the United States, particularly in metropolitan areas. • More than 1.8 million persons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras would be eligible for TPS if the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated Guatemala for TPS and redesignated El Salvador and Honduras. • Local communities can best prepare for legalization by collaborating on: (1) the hard work of assisting individual immigrants to meet their immigration needs; (2) dividing labor, integrating services, screening the undocumented for status, and building legal capacity; and (3) implementation of special legal status programs. This collectivework should be viewed as a legalization programin itsown right. • The populations eligible for legalization and legal status under the programs analyzed in the paper have overlapping needs and large numbers of immigrants would be eligible for more than one program. However, substantial differences between these populations in size, geography, length of residency, education, socio-economic attainment, and English language proficiency argue for distinct preparedness and implementation strategies for each population. The paper also makes several broad policy recommendations regarding legalization bills, special legal status programs, and community-based preparedness and implementation efforts. In particular, it recommends that: • Congress should pass broad immigration reform legislation that includes a general legalization program or, in the alternative, a series of population-specific programs for essential workers, childhood arrivals, agricultural workers, persons eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), and long-term residents. In the interim, the Biden administration should also designate and re-designate additional countries for TPS. • Immigration reform legislation should allow the great majority of US undocumented residents to legalize, should reform the underlying legal immigration system, and should provide for the legalization of future long-term undocumented residents through a rolling registry program. • Congress, the relevant federal agencies, and advocates should ensure that any legalization program be properly structured and sufficiently funded, particularly the work of CBOs, states, and localities. • Local communities should continue to build the necessary partnerships, capacities, skills, and resources to implement a legalization program. They should do so, in part, by collaborating on special legal status programs such as DACA, TPS, and naturalization campaigns, as well as through the steady-state work of assisting immigrants in their individual immigration cases and funding their representation as necessary in removal proceedings. Section I of the paper describes the populations that would be eligible for legalization under pending bills and that are potentially eligible for special legal status programs. Section II presents top-line findings based on the Center for Migration Studies' (CMS's) estimates and profiles of these populations. The report offers estimates of each population by characteristics -- such as length of time in the country, English language proficiency, education, household income, health insurance, and homeownership -- that are relevant to preparedness and implementation activities. Section III makes the case for immigration reform and a broad legalization program. Section IVoffers detailed recommendations on the substance, structure, and implementation of these programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether the threat of recruitment by rebel groups spurs domestic and international migration. The existing literature on wartime displacement has largely focused on potential victims of violence. We argue that alongside potential victims, we should expect to see the out-migration of individuals who are attractive to the rebels as potential recruits. To test this hypothesis, we draw on original survey data collected in the context of the MFDC insurgency in southern Senegal. Causal identification stems from instrumenting recruitment threat with the density of the local forest canopy cover. Analyzing data from 3,200 respondents and over 24,000 family members, we show that individuals who fit the recruitment profiles of rebel groups are more likely to leave and be sent away by their families. Our paper contributes micro-evidence for a mechanism linking violent conflict to migration, which so far has received scant attention, and provides a deeper understanding of the composition of refugee flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the Delphi methodology employed to select a final dashboard of 30 indicators on the socio-educative inclusion of refugee and migrant children in Europe. Firstly, a procedure for identifying Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) was carried out, including a specialized scientific literature review, the mapping of previous indicators, and qualitative workshops with key stakeholders at micro, meso, and macro levels in six countries. Then, a Delphi design was implemented to assess, rate, and provide meaningful qualitative improvements to a pool of pre-selected indicators. The Delphi methodology involved a group of international experts on the matters of inclusive education or migration, researchers, NGOs, and public officers. As an alternative to traditional "benchmark-based" consensus, we introduced the use of a) the CARA model and b) an alternative multi-input and mixed-method consensus-building procedure. The results provided a significant contribution to qualitative methods on the one hand and to migration and integration literature on the other. The methodological innovations, the diversity of experts' perspectives involved in the process, and the structured nature of the method constituted significant advantages to improve the robustness of the Delphi methodology for selecting and validating indicators. Future research involving a Delphi methodology can benefit from applying the present procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nativism, the belief that the rights of those who came first should be prioritized over immigrants, is an increasingly important driver of the rise of far-right populism. It is also leading to hate crimes and even terrorist attacks against immigrants. However, it remains unclear when and why local communities come to oppose immigration. One important set of questions concerns whether nativism is most likely to emerge in societies in which immigrants constitute a higher proportion of the total population or those where there is rapid growth in the immigrant population, even if absolute numbers or their proportion of society remain low. This paper employs multivariate analysis to test these two hypotheses. We use data from a survey of nativist (and populist) sentiment in New Zealand conducted in 2020 along with population data from the national censuses of 2013 and 2018. We compare the results from all New Zealand regions. Our findings strongly support the second hypothesis regarding the importance of the rate of growth in the immigrant population. Those regions that have the highest rate of change in immigrant populations present the highest levels of nativist sentiment, despite their immigrant populations being both small in size and as a proportion of the local population. Conversely, those regions where immigrant numbers are high or they constitute a large proportion of the local population return low levels of nativist sentiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first develops a labor supply forecast for the U.S. labor market in the 1980s, focusing on the effects of the low fertility rates of recent years, and then compares that forecast with the BLS projection of employment demand in the next decade. The author attempts to isolate those occupations and age-sex groups that are likely to have a shortfall of workers and to match the characteristics of those shortage categories with the demographic characteristics of the illegal alien work force. He predicts a relative shortage of unskilled workers in the 1980s, a major departure from past trends, and suggests that an increased flow of immigrants to meet that shortage would benefit skilled older workers and, to a lesser extent, the owners of capital. He also argues, however, that increased immigration would harm domestic unskilled workers--who are increasingly minority group members--by lowering their relative income and raising their equilibrium unemployment rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Undocumented immigration has been a significant political issue in recent years, and is likely to remain so throughout and beyond the presidential election year of 2016. One reason for the high and sustained level of interest in undocumented immigration is the widespread belief that the trend in the undocumented population is ever upward. This paper shows that this belief is mistaken and that, in fact, the undocumented population has been decreasing for more than a half a decade. Other findings of the paper that should inform the immigration debate are the growing naturalized citizen populations in almost every US state and the fact that, since 1980, the legally resident foreign-born population from Mexico has grown faster than the undocumented population from Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governance of immigration has a checkered past, and policy makers' efforts at reform rarely meet expectations. Critiques have echoed over the years and across the political spectrum. The current system of immigration governance is scattered around the federal government, with no clear chain of command. No single government department or agency captures the breadth of the Immigration and Nationality Act's reach. At the crux of understanding immigration governance is acknowledging that immigration is not a program to be administered; rather, it is a phenomenon to be managed. The abundance of commissions that have studied the issues and the various administrative structures over time offers some wisdom on ingredients for successful governance. Based upon this research, options for effective immigration governance emerge. This paper studies the administration of immigration law and policy with an eye trained on immigration governance for the future. It opens with a historical overview that provides the backdrop for the current state of affairs. It then breaks down the missions and functions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by the lead agencies tasked with these responsibilities. The paper concludes with an analysis of options for improving immigration governance. Each of these options poses unique challenges as well as political obstacles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of literature has argued that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration can be, in practice, unclear. This literature points out that each individual migrant may have mixed motives for migrating, including both forced and voluntary reasons. Few studies, however, have actually set out to analyze mixed-motive migration. This paper examines the mixed-motive migration of unaccompanied minors from Central America's Northern Triangle states (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), using data from a small 2016 survey carried out in 10 shelters for unaccompanied child migrants run by a Mexican government child welfare agency. Using this survey, the paper identifies the immigrating minor's motives, which are oftentimes mixed, and details differences by nationality, gender, and age groups. Some of the key findings include: • Around one-third of the child migrants surveyed had mixed motives, including both forced and voluntary reasons for migrating. • Violence appears most often as a reason for migrating among minors with mixed motives, as opposed to the search for better opportunities, which appears more often as an exclusive motive. • Significant differences between the three nationalities are observed. Relatively few Guatemalan minors indicated violence as a motive, and few displayed mixed motives, as opposed to Hondurans, and especially Salvadorans. • The minors fleeing violence, searching for better opportunities, and indicating both motives at the same time were largely mature male adolescents. • The minors mentioning family reunification as their sole motive were predominantly girls and young children. The results indicate that binary formulations regarding forced and voluntary migration are often inadequate. This has important implications, briefly addressed in the conclusions. These implications include: • the need for migration scholars to consider forced reasons for migrating in the context of mixed-motive migration; • the fact that mixed motives call into question the established, clear-cut categories that determine whether someone is worthy of humanitarian protection or not; • the need to have in-depth, attentive, and individual asylum screening because motives may be interconnected and entangled, and because forced reasons may be hidden behind voluntary motives; and • the need for a more flexible policy approach, so that immigration systems may be more inclusive of migrants with mixed motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asylum seekers and refugees continue to face serious obstacles in their efforts to access asylum. Some of these obstacles are inherent to irregular migration, including dangerous border crossings and the risk of exploitation. Yet, refugees also face state-made obstacles in the form of sophisticated migration control measures. As a result, refugees are routinely denied access to asylum as developed states close their borders in the hope of shifting the flow of asylum seekers to neighboring countries. Restrictive migration control policies are today the primary, some might say only, response of the developed world to rising numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. This has produced a distorted refugee regime both in Europe and globally -- a regime fundamentally based on the principle of deterrence rather than human rights protection. While the vast majority of European states still formally laud the international legal framework to protect refugees, most of these countries simultaneously do everything in their power to exclude those fleeing international protection and offer only a minimalist engagement to assist those countries hosting the largest number of refugees. By deterring or blocking onward movement for refugees, an even larger burden is placed upon these host countries. Today, 86 percent of the world's refugees reside in a low- or middle-income country, against 70 percent 20 years ago (Edwards 2016; UNHCR 2015, 15). The humanitarian consequences of this approach are becoming increasingly clear. Last year more than 5,000 migrants and refugees were registered dead or missing in the Mediterranean (IOM 2016). A record number, this makes the Mediterranean account for more than two-thirds of all registered migrant fatalities worldwide (IOM 2016). Many more asylum seekers are subjected to various forms of violence and abuse during the migratory process as a result of their inherently vulnerable and clandestine position. As the industry facilitating irregular migration grows, unfortunately so too do attempts to exploit migrants and refugees by smugglers, criminal networks, governments, or members of local communities (Gammeltoft- Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013). The "deterrence paradigm" can be understood as a particular instantiation of the global refugee protection regime. It shows how deterrence policies have come to dominate responses to asylum seekers arriving in developed states, and how such policies have continued to develop in response to changes in migration patterns as well as legal impositions. The dominance of the deterrence paradigm also explains the continued reliance on deterrence as a response to the most recent "crisis," despite continued calls from scholars and civil society for a more protection-oriented and sustainable response. The paper argues that the current "crisis," more than a crisis in terms of refugee numbers and global protection capacity, should be seen a crisis in terms of the institutionalized responses so far pursued by states. Deterrence policies are being increasingly challenged, both by developments in international law and by less wealthy states left to shoulder the vast majority of the world's refugees. At the same time, recent events suggest that deterrence policies may not remain an effective tool to prevent secondary movement of refugees in the face of rising global protection needs, while deterrence involves increasing direct and indirect costs for the states involved. The present situation may thus be characterized as, or at least approaching, a period of paradigm crisis, and we may be seeing the beginning of the end for deterrence as a dominant policy paradigm in regard to global refugee policy. In its place, a range of more or less developed alternative policy frameworks are currently competing, though so far none of them appear to have gained sufficient traction to initiate an actual paradigm shift in terms of global refugee policy. Nonetheless, recognizing this as a case of possible paradigm change may help guide and structure this process. In particular, any successful new policy approach would have to address the fundamental challenges facing the old paradigm. The paper proceeds in four parts. Firstly, it traces the rise of the deterrence paradigm following the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideologically driven refugee protection on the part of states in the Global North. The past 30 years have seen the introduction and dynamic development of manifold deterrence policies to stymie the irregular arrival of asylum seekers and migrants. This array of measures is explored in the second part of the paper through a typology of five current practices that today make up "normal policymaking" within the deterrence regime. Third, the paper argues that the current paradigm is under threat, facing challenges to its legality from within refugee and human rights law; to its sustainability due to the increasing unhappiness of refugee-hosting states with current levels of "burden-sharing"; and to its effectiveness as direct and indirect costs of maintaining the regime mount. Finally, the paper puts forward three core principles that can lay the groundwork in the event of a paradigm shift: respect for international refugee law; meaningful burden-sharing; and a broader notion of refugee protection that encompasses livelihoods and increased preparedness in anticipation of future refugee flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environment & Urbanization is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

From the second half of the 19th century, emigration was part of the daily life of almost all Eastern Europeans. According to Lithuanian census data from 1923, the Jewish community accounted for 150,000 (7%) of Lithuania's total population of 2 million people (excluding the Vilnius region). During the period 1928–1938, Jews made up about 34% of all Lithuanian emigrants. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between Jewish emigrants and the Lithuanian government from 1918 to 1940. The article will attempt to show how those who have already emigrated are connected to Lithuania, both at a governmental and personal level. Correspondence between the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Lithuanian Jewish communities shows connections related to economic, cultural, and political networks. In addition, the Lithuanian government sought to strengthen ties with the Lithuanian Jewish diaspora, but personal perspective of emigrants does not reflect this tendency. By combining the personal and governmental perspectives, it becomes clear whether these different viewpoints provide similar or different answers to the research questions, and allows us to see the Jewish emigration process in its entirety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an empirical analysis of earnings differentials among male Hispanic immigrants in the United States. The principal finding of the study is that there are major differences in the rate of economic mobility of the various Hispanic groups. In particular, the rate of economic progress by Cuban immigrants exceeds that of other Hispanic groups, the result in part of the fact that Cuban immigrants have invested more heavily in U.S. schooling than other Hispanic immigrants arriving in this country at the same time. The author concludes that these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that political refugees are likely to face higher costs of return immigration than do "economic" immigrants, and therefore the former have greater incentives to adapt rapidly to the U.S. labor market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After providing an introduction to the symposium as a whole, this paper argues that basic changes are needed in this country's immigration policy to cope with the large flow of migrants who have entered the United States illegally in recent years. Fogel attacks the position, described best in Michael J. Piore's recent study, Birds of Passage, that most illegal immigrants fill only those jobs that native workers will not take and intend their stay in the United States to be temporary, not permanent. Fogel disputes both of those claims and argues that alternate forms of adjustment to labor shortages are available and preferable. He favors an immigration policy that would make our society less heavily dependent on rapid economic growth and, by reducing the number of migrants permitted to enter this country, would increase the relative wage of low-skilled indigenous workers. He recommends particularly the adoption of a law prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens and levying civil or criminal penalties on employers who violate that law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a theoretical examination of the probable effects on the U.S. labor market of a continued high rate of illegal immigration. The author constructs a model to estimate the impact each additional immigrant has on the employment of the domestic population, on GNP, and on the distribution of income. The model suggests that in non-recessionary periods the most important effect of a high rate of immigration is on the wage rates of low-skilled labor rather than on the employment of low-skilled native workers, but immigration also increases the earnings of high-skilled workers and the owners of capital. In the very long run, the author concludes, this redistribution of income will be offset to some extent by increases in the supplies of skilled labor and capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the results of a study by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) on potential beneficiaries of the DREAM Act of 2017 (the "DREAM Act" or "Act"). The study reveals a long-term, highly productive population, with deep ties to the United States. In particular, it finds that: • More than 2.2 million US residents would qualify for conditional residence under the DREAM Act. • An additional 929,000 -- who are now age 18 and over -- arrived when they were under 18, but have not graduated from high school and are not enrolled in school and, thus, would not currently qualify for status under the Act. • The DREAM Act-eligible can be found in large numbers (5,000 or more) in 41 states and more than 30 counties, metropolitan areas, and cities. • Potential DREAM Act recipients have lived in the United States for an average of 14 years. • Sixty-five percent (age 16 and above) participate in the labor force, with far higher rates in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Utah, Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee, and Oregon. • This population works heavily in sales and related occupations; food preparation and serving; construction and extracting; office and administrative support; production; transportation and material moving; and building/grounds cleaning and maintenance. • Many of the DREAM Act-eligible are highly skilled and credentialed. • 70,500 are self-employed. • Eighty-eight percent speaks English exclusively, very well, or well. • 392,500 have US-citizen children, and more than 100,000 are married to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident. • Twenty-nine percent has attended college or received a college degree. • The DREAM Act-eligible include 50,700 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras, 45 percent of whom live in the Miami metro area, Los Angeles County, the Washington, DC area, Houston, New York City, the San Francisco metro area, and the City of Dallas. The study also underscores the immense investment -- $150 billion -- that states and localities have already made in educating these young Americans. It argues that over time and with a path to citizenship the return on this investment will increase by virtually every indicia of integration -- education levels, employment rates, self-employment numbers, US family members, and English language proficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a study that scrutinises if and how teachers with so-called migration background in Switzerland have pedagogical potential in dealing with migration-related diversity and – more precisely – with the recognition of their students. The notion of recognition refers to Honneth's theoretical elaborations and their translations into the pedagogical context by Helsper and Lingkost. The study is pursued with a qualitative approach, with data collection by means of biographical-narrative interviews (Schütze), theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss) and a hermeneutical data analysis (Schütze, Rosenthal). The analysis reveals three ideal types that each show particular resources as well as particular restrictions in their attempts to realise recognition. The results are discussed in regard to the development potential they disclose. While the type-specific particularities each call for more professionalisation, the restrictions point to the fact that teachers with migration-related resources can only fully live their potential if they do not have to experience their belonging, acceptance and recognition as latently fragile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens' sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the conditions facilitating career transitions across dissimilar cultural contexts. Particular attention is devoted to two critical obstacles faced by transitioners during cross-cultural role reorientations. First, transitioners must make sense of the unspoken demands and requirements ascribed to their work role in the new cultural context. Second, they must find ways to access and mobilize context-specific resources and information in a context alien to them. Empirically, the histories of 452 merchants emigrated from the southern provinces to Amsterdam during the period 1578–1602 are analyzed. The difference between Amsterdam’s merchant culture (based on open competition, speculative and “depersonalized” financial investments) and that of the southern provinces (a well-protected economic environment based on the guild system) required a reorientation from the role of pre-modern merchants to that of capitalist entrepreneurs. A set of hypotheses predicting why some immigrant merchants successfully completed this career transition while others did not is presented and brought to test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides evidence that highly skilled migrants continue to remain connected with and deeply committed to their home country. These connections challenge the notion of knowledge and skills loss from high-skilled migration. Highly skilled migrants are also involved in remittance giving, which, although of the noneconomic type, offers new possibilities for building wealth. These are the so-called 'knowledge transfers' which consist of the flows of knowledge, skills and ideas to the home country. This paper analyses these knowledge transfers through the highly skilled Filipino migrants in New Zealand and Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environment & Urbanization is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Current representations of large movements of migrants and asylum seekers have become part of the global consciousness. Media viewers are bombarded with images of people from the global south riding atop of trains, holding on to dinghies, arriving at refugee camps, crawling beneath wire fences or being rescued after being stranded in the ocean or the desert for days. Images of gruesome scenes of death in the Mediterranean or the Arizona or Sahara deserts reveal the inherent risks of irregular migration, as bodies are pulled out of the water or corpses are recovered, bagged, and disposed of, their identities remaining forever unknown. Together, these images communicate a powerful, unbearable feeling of despair and crisis. Around the world, many of these tragedies are attributed to the actions of migrant smugglers, who are almost monolithically depicted as men from the Global South organized in webs of organized criminals whose transnational reach allows them to prey on migrants and asylum seekers' vulnerabilities. Smugglers are described as callous, greedy, and violent. Reports on efforts to contain their influence and strength are also abundant in official narratives of border and migration control. The risks inherent to clandestine journeys and the violence people face during these transits must not be denied. Many smugglers do take advantage of the naiveté and helplessness of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, stripping them of their valuables and abandoning them to their fate during their journeys. Yet, as those working directly with migrants and asylum seekers in transit can attest, the relationships that emerge between smugglers and those who rely on their services are much more complex, and quite often, significantly less heinous than what media and law enforcement suggest. The visibility of contemporary, large migration movements has driven much research on migrants' clandestine journeys and their human rights implications. However, the social contexts that shape said journeys and their facilitation have not been much explored by researchers (Achilli 2015). In other words, the efforts carried out by migrants, asylum seekers, and their families and friends to access safe passage have hardly been the target of scholarly analysis, and are often obscured by the more graphic narratives of victimization and crime. In short, knowledge on the ways migrants, asylum seekers, and their communities conceive, define, and mobilize mechanisms for irregular or clandestine migration is limited at best. The dichotomist script of smugglers as predators and migrants and asylum seekers as victims that dominates narratives of clandestine migration has often obscured the perspectives of those who rely on smugglers for their mobility. This has not only silenced migrants and asylum seekers' efforts to reach safety, but also the collective knowledge their communities use to secure their mobility amid increased border militarization and migration controls. This paper provides an overview of contemporary, empirical scholarship on clandestine migration facilitation. It then argues that the processes leading to clandestine or irregular migration are not merely the domain of criminal groups. Rather, they also involve a series of complex mechanisms of protection crafted within migrant and refugee communities as attempts to reduce the vulnerabilities known to be inherent to clandestine journeys. Both criminal and less nefarious efforts are shaped by and in response to enforcement measures worldwide on the part of nation-states to control migration flows. Devised within migrant and refugee communities, and mobilized formally and informally among their members, strategies to facilitate clandestine or irregular migration constitute a system of human security rooted in generations-long, historical notions of solidarity, tradition, reciprocity, and affect (Khosravi 2010). Yet amid concerns over national and border security, and the reemergence of nationalism, said strategies have become increasingly stigmatized, traveling clandestinely being perceived as an inherently -- and uniquely -- criminal activity. This contribution constitutes an attempt to critically rethink the framework present in everyday narratives of irregular migration facilitation. It is a call to incorporate into current protection dialogs the perceptions of those who rely on criminalized migration mechanisms to fulfill mobility goals, and in so doing, articulate and inform solutions towards promoting safe and dignifying journeys for all migrants and asylum seekers in transit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the direction and magnitude of the effects of personal, kinship, market, and contextual attributes of visa applicants on their desirability as immigrants to the United States, as judged by members of the professional staff of the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Two classic sociological questions underlie this politically relevant topic: how do societies choose their members? and how do societies allocate scarce benefits? Using the factorial survey pioneered by P.H. Rossi, we obtained from the Commission staff, numerical ratings of the desirability as immigrants of fictitious visa applicants embodying the full range of potentially relevant characteristics discussed in the political arena. Although the ratings were obtained by a number-assignment technique believed to generate a continuous variable, we accommodate the variable's possible ordinality by performing all analyses twice- using both ordinary-least-squares techniques and maximum-likelihood ordered. response techniques. The results are unambiguous: although a lawful and coherent set of rules guides each respondent's ratings, leading to a personal point system for the selection of immigrants, no two staff members' point systems are alike, not even qualitatively. In the complex weave of agreements and disagreements, three conclusions emerge. First, there is unanimous support for granting preference to visa applicants who have a job offer or a United States-citizen sibling. Second, there is severe disagreement by applicant's region of origin. Third, there is a range of disagreement on other attributes, for example, on whether the United States should favor the immigration, ceteris paribus, of older versus younger applicants or of male versus female applicants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the history of Cherokee Indians, members of North American Indian people formerly inhabiting a large area of the Appalachian Mountains. The author's presentation of Cherokee history in this paper departs factually and interpretatively from that presented in a paper by researcher Duane Champagne. Champagne studies American Indian revitalization movements and state building as responses to American political subordination. The evidence and interpretation presented by the author here is for a very different view of nineteenth-century Cherokee history. During the period of so-called state building the Cherokee experienced two revitalization efforts in direct opposition to it. First, the 1811-12 "Ghost Dance," and second, the White Path "rebellion." Moreover, they experienced yet another revitalization movement immediately thereafter. It was the Yonaguska movement and it was linked to events of the state-building period. Of equal, if not greater, importance to the view of early nineteenth-century Cherokee history presented here is the emigration of large numbers of Cherokee out of the Cherokee lands to west of the Mississippi River during the period of state building.

Geographical movement has important implications for organized religion. As people move from place to place, they create a revolving door situation for religious groups. Congregations and denominations gain members and lose them in accordance with the participation inclinations of geographically-mobile individuals. Some retain denominational ties; some switch; some drop out. Despite the frequency and importance of residential movement, limited research on the mobility-involvement issue has been carried out to date, with most studies focusing on the themes of immigration and migration. In this paper, the author looks at the question in the Canadian setting, drawing upon national survey data for 1990. The extent of residential and provincial movement since 1980 is examined, with the relationship between religious involvement, mobility, and a number of additional pertinent variables explored. Seven variables, including residential mobility, emerge as the most salient, and are assembled in a causal model to examine their direct and indirect effects on participation. Residential mobility is found to have a noteworthy total effect, partly because of its indirect influence through age. The relative importance of residential mobility as a determinant of involvement is discussed, along with region of destination, religious identification, and childhood socialization. The paper concludes with reflections on the implications of the findings for religious involvement and religious organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Political Science Review is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The cognitive process of social categorization and perceived outgroup threat leads to the perception of the world as divided into intergroup conflict relations between enemy and friend groups--termed "friend-enemy divided thinking." This study proposes the concept of friend-enemy divided thinking from the perspective of intergroup conflict and examines how this concept affects (1) political attitudes toward international relations and (2) conspiracy beliefs, which are closely related to intergroup conflict. A survey was conducted in Japan (N= 735). The results showed that the stronger the friend-enemy divided thinking is, the stronger the conspiracy beliefs are. People with stronger friend-enemy divided thinking felt threatened by national defense and immigration and supported negative policies against international relations. Both conspiracy beliefs and negative political attitudes toward national defense and immigration in international relations were interpreted to be associated with the perception of a hostile intergroup conflict that is heightened by friend-enemy divided thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that, in an upper-middle-class suburb in a North Central state, Jewish families report more extended familism than do Christian families. The resent paper shows more clearly the association between ethnicity and familism by using three further indices of extended familism and by dividing the Christian respondents into Catholics and Protestants. The three new indices --extensity of kin households present in the metropolitan area, intensity of such Presence, and interaction with those households -- are more significantly associated with ethnicity than was the index used in the previous research --functionality of interaction with households of kin. Generally, the Protestants are the Least familistic of the three ethnic categories. It was hypothesized that occupation and migration are variables that intervene between ethnicity and extended families; the data, however, rule otherwise. It is tentatively concluded, rather, that extended families intervenes between ethnicity and migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author sketches one time segment of an adjustment history. An earlier paper in the periodical "American Sociological Review," surveyed the background of the problem and indicated the methodological and circumstantial justifications for orienting the study to an examination of the familial complex in the U.S. The period to be discussed here begins with the establishment of the population in relocation centers which was completed on November 1, 1942, eleven months after Pearl Harbor and seven months alter the evacuation began. It ends in January 1945 with the opening of the Pacific Coast to relocation. Subsequent events will merely be touched upon. The data upon which this study is based are chiefly of two sorts. The first is a structural analysis of the records of 3000 families, one tenth of those registered at the time of evacuation. Seventy per cent of these family records were extensively supplemented in the field from the files of the War Relocation Authority, and provide the quantitative documentation.

The article presents central frameworks for guiding the development and improvement of population statistics. A shared understanding between producers and users of statistics is needed with regard to the concepts, data, processes, and outputs produced. In the United Kingdom, population estimates are produced by conducting decennial censuses and by estimating intercensus populations through the addition and subtraction of the demographic components of change derived from registers of vital events and from a combination of administrative data and surveys for internal and international migration. In addition, data cleaning, imputation, and modelling may be required to produce the desired population statistics. The frameworks presented in this paper are useful for aligning the required concepts of population statistics with the various sources of available data. Taken together, they provide a general 'recipe' for the continued improvement and expansion of official statistics on population and demographic change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global expansion in the boundaries of professional work, the introduction of managerial concepts and thinking, and changes in the organizational form of professional service firms all impact the process by which professionals come to identify with their profession. The focus of this paper is on transnational professional careers and professional identity development, which remain an under-researched aspect of how globalization affects the professions. Based on original survey data from Australia, we chart the influence of social and organizational contexts on professional identity development for migrant and local accounting professionals respectively. Findings suggest that unlike the “boundaryless” opportunities associated with globe-trotting professionals, the majority of professional migrants are significantly constrained by the organizational and inter-subjective settings in which they work. Theoretically, we extend the concept of professional identity development to include not only formative early career experiences, but also large institutional jolts such as those provided by migration. Findings also help expand current understandings of organizations as sites of professionalization by shedding light on their impact on transnational careers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese migrants are currently the largest group of non- Japanese nationals living in Japan. This growth is largely the result of educational migration, positioning many Chinese in Japan as studentmigrants. Based on 20 months' ethnographic fieldwork in Ikebukuro, Tokyo's unofficial Chinatown, this paper explores the ways in which the phenomenology of the city informs the desire for integration amongst young Chinese living in Japan. Discussions of migrant integration and representation often argue for greater recognition of marginalised groups. However, recognition can also intensify vulnerability for the marginalised. Chinese student-migrants' relationship to Ikebukuro's streets shows how young mobile Chinese in Tokyo come to learn to want to be "unseen." Largely a response to the visual dynamics of the city, constituted by economic inequality, spectacle, and surveillance, the experiences of young Chinese students complicate the ways we understand migrants' desires for recognition and integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Psychiatry is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Background: People experiencing homelessness have limited access to palliative care support despite high levels of ill health and premature mortality. Most research exploring these challenges in the United Kingdom has focused on people living in hostels or temporary accommodation. People with uncertain or restricted immigration status are often unable to access this accommodation due to lack of entitlement to benefits. There is little research about the experiences of those in the United Kingdom who cannot access hostels or temporary accommodation due to restricted or uncertain immigration status with regards to palliative and end-of-life care access. Aim: To explore the barriers to palliative and end-of-life care access for people with uncertain or restricted immigration status, who are experiencing homelessness and have advanced ill health, and the experiences of UK hospices of supporting people in this situation. Design: A multi-method cross-sectional study. Setting/participants: An online survey for hospice staff followed by online focus groups with staff from inclusion health, homelessness and palliative care services, charities and interviews with people experiencing homelessness. Results: Fifty hospice staff responded to the online survey and 17 people participated in focus groups and interviews (focus groups: n = 10; interviews: n = 7). The survey demonstrated how hospices are not currently supporting many people with restricted or uncertain immigration status who are homeless and that hospice staff have received limited training around eligibility for entitlements or National Health Service (NHS) care. Interview and focus group data demonstrated high levels of unmet need. Reasons for this included a lack of consistency around eligibility for support from local authorities, issues relating to NHS charging, and mistrust and limited knowledge of the UK health and social care system. These barriers leave many people unable to access care toward the end of their lives. Conclusion: To advocate for and provide compassionate palliative and end-of-life care for people with uncertain immigration status, there is need for more legal literacy, with training around people's entitlement to care and support, as well as easier access to specialist legal advice. Plain language summary: Palliative care, homelessness and restricted or uncertain immigration status Most research from the UK about access to support at the end of life for people who are homeless has looked at the experiences of people who are staying in hostels or temporary accommodation. People that are not UK nationals are not entitled to the benefit which pays for hostel or temporary accommodation. There is a group of people in the UK who are very unwell, who are homeless and are not able to access hostel accommodation due to their immigration status. This project explored the experiences of this group around access to palliative care. We spoke to professionals from health and social care services, charities and local councils and people who are in this situation themselves. Hospice staff were also surveyed to see if they had experience of supporting people in this situation. The survey showed that hospices are not currently supporting many people with restricted or uncertain immigration status who are homeless, and that they have limited training around supporting people in this situation. In the interviews and focus groups, opinions were heard about challenges to palliative care support for people with uncertain or restricted immigration status who were experiencing homelessness. Professionals described how it can be hard to obtain support from local authorities, and also understanding rules about who has to pay to receive NHS care. People with uncertain or restricted immigration status who were also homeless did not always know how to access the UK health and social care system and had negative experiences of doing so in the past. As a result, many people are unable to access care towards the end of their lives. To provide compassionate palliative and end-of-life care for people with uncertain immigration status, there is need for more legal literacy, with training around people's entitlement to care and support, as well as easier access to specialist legal advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]