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This paper presents results of simulating a more collusive behavior of a group of natural gas producing and exporting countries, sometimes called GASPEC. We use the World Gas Model, a dynamic, strategic representation of world gas production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. In particular, we simulate a closer cooperation of the GASPEC countries when exporting pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas; we also run a more drastic scenario where GASPEC countries deliberately hold back production. The results show that compared to our Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and induce price increases in gas importing countries up to 22%. There is evidence that the natural gas markets in Europe and North America would be affected more than other parts of the world. Lastly, the vulnerability of gas importers worldwide is further illustrated by the results of a sensitivity case in which price levels are up to 87% higher in Europe and North America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increase in liquefied natural gas trade has accelerated the integration of previously segmented markets in North America, Europe, and Asia. This paper provides evidence on the integration of the transatlantic natural gas market; it thus complements other papers in the EMF 23 study that focus on prices and international natural gas trade. We test the theoretical proposition that in integrating markets commodity prices should move closer than before. Using 2,059 pairs of daily spot prices for natural gas in North America and Europe we investigate price dynamics covering the period from 1999 until 2008. We apply the Kalman Filter technique which measures convergence by allowing for dynamic structural change to gain detailed information on trends inherent in prices over time. Results suggest an increasing convergence of spot prices on either side of the Atlantic Basin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]