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To what extent can a country’s effectiveness in reducing child poverty be attributed to the size of family cash transfers (that is, both benefits and tax advantages) or to their design? In this paper, we disentangle the importance of each of these two factors, focusing on the family support system in Lithuania and comparing it with four other new member states. Both single parent and large families are increasingly susceptible to poverty in Lithuania. This contrasts with other former communist countries, namely Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, which protect these family types much better. This paper examines whether their family transfer systems would achieve similar results in Lithuania. We employ the EUROMOD microsimulation tax-benefit model to swap family policies across countries and test whether size or design has greater effects on child poverty reduction in Lithuania. Hungarian, Slovenian and Czech policies would considerably improve the poverty situation among large families. Single parent families would only gain if Lithuanian spending on family transfers increased radically. Estonian policies would lead to mixed results: small gains for large families and losses for single parent families. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

One of the core dilemmas of current welfare politics is the question of how to ensure social protection while providing incentives to seek employment at the same time. A way to address this dilemma is to base policies and policy models on the principle notion that 'work must pay'; in other words, income from employment should be higher than the social support of the unemployed. However, how accurately do these approaches and models represent the reality of benefit recipients, particularly in the context of increased employment precariousness? In this article, we use the cases of two disadvantaged regions in Czech Republic in order to contrast the presumptions of 'making work pay' policies with the everyday experience of welfare recipients. As we show, their situations are strongly shaped by current changes in the labour market, particularly the precarious character of accessible employment and high levels of indebtedness. The modelling of financial employment incentives and the public policies based on these calculations often do not correspond with the reality of welfare recipients that are often cycling in and out of precarious forms of employment. However, the authors' main claim is that the very idea of the 'work must pay' approach focuses on the wrong question. A truly functioning financial incentive would need to focus not solely on the difference in income between those who work and those who do not work, but rather should analyse what type of arrangements allow working households to rise permanently above the poverty line. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]