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The article discusses vaccination hesitancy among people in Europe and U.S. with reference to the article published in "Journal of Public Health". Topics discussed include development of strategic approach against widespread misinformation and conspiracy theories on COVID-19 vaccines, research published by EU agency Eurofound on the vaccine hesitancy among adults in Europe, and progress on COVID-19 vaccination campaigns in US.

The article informs that the U.S. European centrality is urgently needed toward cohesive and comprehensive transatlantic ‘One Health' approach in addressing global COVID19 response and health security. Topics include multifaceted and multilateral global COVID-19 ‘One Health' approach and develop an enhanced transatlantic post-pandemic recovery; and role of European Union (EU) joint procurement of medical countermeasures to large-scale disease outbreaks with considerable public support.

Market services productivity Since the mid-1990s, market services have positively influenced labor productivity growth in the US, but not in most European countries. We analyze these cross-country differences in growth dynamics using industry-level measures of output, inputs, and multifactor productivity (MFP) from the new EU KLEMS database. We find that using detailed data has important implications for empirical analysis of policy influences on growth. Increased investment in information and communication technology (ICT) capital and growth in human capital contributed substantially to labor productivity growth in market services across all European countries and the US. However, countries differ most strongly in the rates of efficiency improvement in the use of inputs. We find no evidence of an externality-driven relationship between such efficiency changes and the growth of ICT use or of employment of university-educated workers. We also find that entry liberalization has been beneficial for productivity growth in telecommunications, but not in other service industries. — Robert Inklaar, Marcel P. Timmer and Bart van Ark [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Evidence on association of maternal pre-pregnancy weight with risk of orofacial clefts is inconsistent.Methods: Six large case-control studies of orofacial clefts from Northern Europe and the USA were included in analyses pooling individual-level data. Cases included 4943 mothers of children with orofacial clefts (cleft lip only: 1135, cleft palate with cleft lip: 2081, cleft palate only: 1727) and controls included 10 592 mothers of unaffected children. Association of orofacial cleft risk with pre-pregnancy maternal weight classified by level of body mass index (BMI, kg/m 2 ) was evaluated using logistic regression adjusting for multiple covariates.Results: Cleft palate, both alone and with cleft lip (CP+/-CL), was associated with maternal class II+ pre-pregnancy obesity (≥ 35)compared with normal weight [adjusted odds ratio (aOR) = 1.36; 95% confidence interval (CI) = 1.16, 1.58]. CP+/-CL was marginally associated with maternal underweight (aOR = 1.16; 95% CI = 0.98, 1.36). Cleft lip alone was not associated with BMI.Conclusions: In this largest population-based study to date, we found an increased risk of cleft palate, with or without cleft lip, in class II+ obese mothers compared with normal-weight mothers; underweight mothers may also have an increased risk, but this requires further study. These results also suggest that extremes of weight may have a specific effect on palatal development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resorting to the "rule of law" within the traditional environment of international law generates difficulties, especially when circumstances require us to square the circle by accommodating normative claims with state legal orders, fundamental rights, and democracy. Unsurprisingly, in recent cases brought before supranational courts, such as the European Court of Justice (Kadi and Al Baarakat, for example), or domestic courts, such as the United States Supreme Court (Hamdan, for example), the import and notion of the rule of law have been interpreted in ways that reveal the uncertainty surrounding the concept and the rather idiosyncratic or instrumental uses to which it is put. Through the analysis of such instances, this article proposes a restatement of the rule of law that better explains its use beyond state borders. Then, it shows how the relation between different orders, as a factual matter, does not obey some monist hierarchy and does not even reflect the logic of the "dualism" of self-contained systems. Given that the autonomy of legal orders is a vital contemporary reality, confrontation between them and with international law appears to be replacing the formal primacy of sources as well as blind or dogmatic closure by content-dependent constitutional assessments. In this connection, a road taken in the European environment shows that communicative pluralism can embark on a practice of giving reasons inherently capable of producing common standards, the rule of law, and thin lines of principle. All of these factors are ingredients that might finally evolve further into a rule of recognition for the international legal order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, we argue that critical International Relations (IR) scholars must consider American Orientalism in tandem with American Exceptionalism in order to better understand US identity, foreign policymaking, and hegemony. We claim that American Exceptionalism is a particular type of American Orientalism, a style of thought about the distinctions between the “West” and the “East” that gives grounding to the foundational narrative of “America.” While Exceptionalism and Orientalism both deploy similar discursive, ontological, and epistemological claims about the “West” and its non-western “Others,” Exceptionalism is also rooted specifically in American political thought that developed in contradistinction to Europe. As such, we demonstrate that different logics of othering are at work between the West and the non-West, and among Western powers. We implore critical IR scholars to interrogate how the United States and Europe alternatively collude and clash in wielding normative power over their non-Western Others. We claim such research is important for exploring the staying power of American hegemony and understanding the implications of European challenges to American foreign policy, particularly given recent concerns about a so-called transatlantic divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rhetoric surrounding the crisis in transatlantic relations is overcharged. Although the United States and Europe have reached a turning point, the changes that they need to make are neither fundamental nor controversial. No matter how you polarize the debate, the solution combines more flexibility and more cooperation. Moreover, this solution has been known for some time. Hence the real questions to consider are not about how this crisis came about, but why it persists. At least part of the answer lies in the structure of interdependence. Although both sides in the Atlantic alliance have an interest in flexible cooperation, the United States is much more central to the countries of Europe than ‘Europe’ is to the United States. Because of this asymmetry, a crisis that started from real misunderstanding has been extended as Americans appear neglectful and Europeans oversensitive. Part of the answer also lies in our expectations of the relationship. Some observers suggest that the crisis will only end when both sides realize that it is time to grow up. Perhaps they already have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the postwar partnership between Europe and America now a historical artefact? Much depends on whether the notion of America as a ‘European power’ still holds. The US attained this status through a strategy of ‘empire by integration’, extending its postwar ‘empire’ through negotiation and support for European integration, and envisaging a collectively powerful Europe as fundamental to the health of its most important security alliance. The election of George W. Bush, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the war in Iraq are often seen as producing deep ruptures both in American policy towards Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the embrace of a new US policy of ‘disaggregation’ of Europe is unproven, and in any event unlikely to mark a permanent shift. The US and Europe are surprisingly close to agreement on ends for the international order. Conflict over Iraq has obscured a significant increase in policy cooperation and convergence of strategy in the war on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The call for a common US–European approach to the multiple problems of the wider Middle East region has become the latest truism of the transatlantic circuit. But the Middle East is also the region that has historically most divided Americans and Europeans. Steven Everts argues that, despite the different reflexes and assumptions, a joint transatlantic effort is both necessary and feasible. But it will only work if both sides are prepared to adjust policies, allocate sufficient resources and, most of all, take political risks. He sketches a joint strategy based on four pillars: a new international bargain for Iraq; keeping the two-state solution alive in Israel–Palestine; preventing the next transatlantic bust-up over Iran; and with regard to the crisis of governance, taking concrete steps to promote political reforms throughout the region. The author concludes that in the Middle East, Europe must be more strategically daring while America must be more politically astute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]