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This paper studies the first compulsory conciliation proceeding under Article 298 and Annex V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It assesses the competence and conciliation proceedings in a comprehensive manner, with a view to understanding how conciliation may contribute to settling maritime boundary disputes. This paper reviews the conciliation commission's interpretation of Article 281, Article 298(1)(a)(i) and other relevant provisions of Annex V to UNCLOS, and discusses the question of whether a pre-existing treaty between the parties can preclude resort to compulsory conciliation under Article 298(1)(a)(i), a question largely left unanswered by the commission. Furthermore, this paper examines the conciliation proceedings and the outcomes in the light of the law of maritime delimitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Records from Mexico's foreign ministry (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, or SRE) reveal their skepticism of Brewster Cameron and the Chamizal Title Company's methods and intentions and shed light on the disjointed nature of the "pro-Mexico" side of the Chamizal claim. When Julio Provencio sold his lands along the Rio Grande border line between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua to Santiago Alvarado in 1885, he articulated a predicament that many Mexican landowners in his community faced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was standard practice in Mexico during the presidency of Porfirio Díaz (1884-1911) to compensate surveyors with titles to one third of the land area that they surveyed, which is likely the reason Mexican claimants to the Chamizal tract would have accepted a similar arrangement with Warder and later the Chamizal Title Company in exchange for legal representation. The company's goal in the 1907 interviews was to produce a collection of flood testimonies to prove the avulsive movement of the Rio Grande and to obstruct U.S. claimants' attempts to dispossess Mexican landowners.[28] The leading questions and rote format of the testimonies make them seem, at first glance, redundant and mundane, but embedded within them lie useful hints about the information the Chamizal Title Company thought would be key to make their legal case, as well as incidental environmental knowledge and memory in the Chamizal tract. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the central, though understudied, role that a rapidly changing technology--mapping--plays in territorial conflict. As digital cartographic tools replace traditional paper maps, both the processes and outcomes of negotiation over territory change fundamentally. Digitization does not simply produce "better" maps that make settlements easier to reach. Instead, particular features of digital mapping reshape disputes over territory by altering the evaluation of possible solutions, changing the perceived value of territories, and bringing new actors into negotiation processes. Those effects are complex and context-sensitive. They promote conflict resolution in some circumstances but pose new obstacles to settlements in others. This article combines theory on mapping, negotiation, bargaining, and emotions in international relations. I first develop a set of general implications of digital mapping for the processes and outcomes of territorial negotiation. I then examine three illustrative cases: the 1995 Dayton Accords, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, and the 2010 border dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In each case, new features of digital mapping yielded unexpected effects on negotiation and dispute-resolution processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper highlights the issue of the recognition of the existence of a dispute between China and Japan regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, identifies such a recognition, and comments on the implications flowing from that recognition for Japan and China, as well as for other States, especially the United States, and argues that in light of the well-known US position of taking no view on sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty cannot apply to the island. Some comments are also offered on Japan's "nationalization" and other measures and China's response measures and/or counter-measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The presence of third States occurs when two countries delimit their maritime boundary in a maritime area where there are more than two coastal States. The bilateral nature of maritime delimitation between two States requires the delimitation process not to prejudice the legal rights and interests of third States. On the one hand, at the procedural stage of international adjudication, third States may file an application for permission to intervene in the proceedings before a court or tribunal; at the merits stage, a third-party judicial organ may leave undecided the endpoint of a final boundary line to be delimited, so as not to affect the rights of a third State. On the other hand, in interstate maritime boundary agreements through international negotiation, in order to take care of third States' legal rights and interests, States may adopt several ways of addressing the existence of tripoints. This paper, in four parts, discusses the presence of third States in international maritime boundary delimitation. The first part gives a definition of a third State in the framework of maritime delimitation. The second part reflects on international adjudication relating to the presence of third States. The third part provides some observations on State practices relating to the existence of tripoints. The conclusion points out that there is a widening gap between maritime delimitation in theory and in practice, since recent case law particularly confines the delimitation to a purely bilateral status, without enough focus on the presence of third States, resulting in procedurally prejudicial impacts upon the legal rights and interests of third States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has steadily extended its military reach from a domestic zone of defense against territorial invasion in the late 1950s, through regional security policy in the late 1970s to what has now become a globally scaled military role. This re-expansion is perceived by some as evidence of revived militaristic ambitions, and by others as subservience to the US global strategy. However, taking the cue from Japan's 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (New Taikō), this paper assesses the role globalization has played in this territorial expansion. The impact of globalization is evident in the double expansion of Japan's national security conception in geographical terms and self-defense forces roles in global security. These ‘expansions’ are studied through two key elements of globalization – the deterritorialization of complex relations of interdependence between states (security globality) and the inter-penetrating nature of these relations blur the boundary between foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The impact of climate change on the circumpolar north has raised the profile of the Arctic Ocean to coastal states and presents serious foreign policy challenges. Chief among these is the pending delimitation dispute over the extended continental shelf between Canada, Denmark, the United States, and Russia. While delimitation disputes are not new to Arctic states, extended continental shelf claims are complicated by the existence of multiple claimants and a still developing international legal regime. To inform policymakers about what to expect from overlapping claims to disputed maritime areas, this paper draws comparative lessons for Arctic policymakers based on East Asia's experience responding to overlapping jurisdictional entitlements created by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). East Asian states have been grappling with the challenge presented by overlapping claims to resource-rich seabeds since the region ratified UNCLOS in the mid-late 1990s. In light of similar geographic conditions (a dispute over a semi-enclosed sea), alliance structures and the relative infancy of the claimant states with UNCLOS entitlements-Canada only ratified the treaty in 2003, and the United States has yet to do so-this paper sets out the case that important comparative lessons can be drawn from the East Asian experience with maritime delimitation disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How important are ambassadors in international politics? While a growing body of research stresses the importance of diplomacy in international politics, it remains unclear if individual ambassadors make a significant difference or what attributes make for an effective ambassador. This paper explores these questions through a systematic analysis of 2,730 US ambassadors between 1946 and 2014. The United States is distinctive in that it sends a sizable number of noncareer political appointees to serve as ambassadors. This provides a unique opportunity to examine how an ambassador's experience shapes where they are placed and how they perform. Using various techniques to address selection effects, including matching, I find that the United States is less likely to experience a militarized dispute with a host nation when it is represented by a political ambassador. Moreover, political ambassadors with professional experience in politics or the military, those who are close to the president, and those who are appointed in permissive congressional environments are less likely to experience militarized disputes during their tenure. Individual ambassadors matter, but diplomatic experience alone is not the only attribute that makes for an effective ambassador. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a 'dependent ally' tradition and a 'middle power' approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, 'pragmatic' Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the 'nine-dash line' on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about cocoa-induced conflict between the Ibadan and the Ijebu, two Yoruba sub-groups of southwestern Nigeria. Although historians have examined the socio-economic impact of cocoa, they have however downplayed how it created violent conflict. I examine the interrelatedness of the transformation of land tenure system and economics of cocoa production to show that although the colonialists, and the Ibadan and the Ijebu claimed that land/boundary was the main source of conflict, in reality it was cocoa. Cocoa conflict realigned an indigenous culture of political allegiance, created new methods of litigation and arbitration, and rendered the colonial legal system incapable of solving a conflict that had strong impact on the imperial treasury. As it turned out, the “conflict” not the “law” or “court” dictated the pattern of resolution and compromise. If crude oil is a major source of tension between the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta region since the 1970s, cocoa during the colonial period negatively impacted the colonial economy and reconfigured the pattern of relations between the natives and the British imperial authority. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper, we investigate how international law shapes leaders' decisions regarding the use of force in the context of territorial disputes. We argue that if the legal principles relevant to the dispute are capable of suggesting a focal point, international law will have a powerful role to play in informing leader behavior. Specifically, if a focal point exists, the state that it favors will avoid using force and prefer negotiations when considering an initial challenge to the status quo. However, we expect focal points to have the opposite effect once states are involved in a militarized dispute. Under these circumstances, the state with a legal advantage will be more likely to escalate the level of military force. Using a series of statistical tests, we find strong support for our theoretical argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes cross-border water disputes in Mesopotamia that involve Turkey, Iraq and Syria. It focuses on the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish: Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP)) that is being undertaken by various administrations of the government of the Republic of Turkey in the last few decades and tries to shed light on some important legal issues surrounding it. On 3 October 2005, Turkey began negotiations with the European Union (EU) for accession as a full member. Attention is also given to the extent to which the matter may complicate Turkey's relations with the EU during these negotiations. Water conflicts in the Middle East have recently become a popular subject for international scholars. Numerous writers, from academics to intelligence analysts, have contributed various perspectives to the increasingly complex issues surrounding the topic. Scholars who specialize in water problems in the Middle East have devoted particular attention to the region watered by the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and their tributaries--an area commonly known as Mesopotamia. Many of these publications are promulgated by two distinct (and opposing) party views: that of the Turkish government on the one hand, and that of the Syrian and Iraqi governments on the other. Consequently, much of the work underpinning the growing body of scholarship in this area reflects the biases of each position. In analyzing the longstanding conflicts over water rights in Mesopotamia, this paper endeavors to accomplish several things. First, to give readers a more complete understanding of the current dispute, a detailed account of the opposing views of Turkey and Syria/Iraq is provided. Second, the merits of each position are weighed in light of the current state of public international law, with particular attention given to Turkey's desire to exercise extensive control over the watercourses at issue. Lastly, the potential effects of the changing political climate in the region--namely Turkey's accession talks with the EU, Iraq's recent regime change, and the uncertainty of Syria's political future--are considered and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though game theory has been utilized mostly in economics, it has wide applications in other fields as well. This paper delineates two illustrative game-theoretic applications to Philippine politics - the People Power Revolution in the mid-1980s and the conflict over the Spratly Islands in the mid-1990s. Zero-sum games model these two events, and elementary matrix theory is used to determine pure strategies and locate equilibrium points. Recommendations for using game theory in other political situations are included, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the classroom and the real world. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Confronting a more powerful rival can be a risky proposition. This paper integrates prospect theory into the growing Neoclassical Realist (NCR) literature to identify the conditions under which decision makers are most likely to accept foreign policy risks. I argue that decision makers governing regimes with low levels of political counterframing are more likely to settle into a dominant loss frame when their external security environment erodes. This increases the probability that they will initiate disputes with more powerful adversaries. To assess this proposition, I conduct a test of weaker state confrontation grounded in a NCR framework that utilizes the insights from prospect theory. Data come from the postwar era and support my hypothesis. Loss frames exert influence over the decision to initiate risky foreign policy strategies in regimes in which political counterframing is absent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article draws on prospect theory to explain the variation of China's risk propensity during the 2012–14 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes with Japan. China's initial reference point 1.0 regarding the disputed islands was the 'shelving agreement' 'shelving the sovereignty dispute and a tacit acceptance of Japan's de facto exclusive control. So after Japan's 'nationalization' of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, China was clearly in a domain of losses. China was thus highly risk-acceptant by intensifying maritime and air patrolling, engaging in provocative behaviors, and suspending crisis management mechanisms. Meanwhile, China's reference point evolved. Discourse analysis of Chinese official statements and media coverage indicated that regularized patrolling or joint control became China's reference point 2.0. As it started to act from a domain of gains, Chinese behaviors turned risk-averse by scaling back patrolling and resuming negotiations over crisis management mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although attempts to conquer entire states became rare after 1945, attempts to conquer small pieces of territory persisted. Why do states so often seize—and even fight wars over—remarkably small areas? We argue that traditional explanations predicated on the material or ethnic value of disputed territories largely cannot explain the escalation of territorial disputes since 1945. Instead, actors more often seize territory to be seen seizing it. We theorize that the roots of these conquest attempts often lie in careerist incentives within militaries. Military officers seize small pieces of disputed territory in pursuit of promotions or political office, especially in states where the military wields greater political power. We test this theory with a statistical analysis of conquest attempts in territorial disputes (1965–2000) using new geospatial and conquest data along with a medium- n process analysis of all conquest attempts since 1945. Our results suggest that careerist self-aggrandizement plays an important role in contemporary territorial conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates on China's rise often limit the focus on the continuity and sustenance of the United States' hegemony and the liberal global order. This debate often ignores the primacy of the regional actors, who are generally reduced to 'pawns' in great power politics, acting without agency, interests, or values of their own. Instead, this article suggests that as China rises—like any other great power of the past—it will first aim to secure regional primacy through an array of policy instruments. To test this it examines three case-studies: 1) China–Pakistan relations in nuclear proliferation; 2) China–India relations with respect to border conflict; and 3) Sri Lanka–China relations for development infrastructure. It finds that China's rise has not been benign and instead Beijing has adopted aggressive policies in its neighbourhood. This article finds that the strategic binary of balancing (interest-based containment) and engagement (constructive cooperation) does not reflect immediate realities and long-term sustainability for regional actors. Instead, it suggests the latter would be better advised looking for closer cooperation with like-minded allies in the region (and beyond) as a way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on separatist groups has paid relatively little attention to groups' exact territorial claims and their influence on strategies. We explain the geographic distribution of separatist violence using new geospatial data on the location and extent of groups' territorial claims. We argue that variation in where separatists attack stems from variation in how groups allocate effort across two main objectives: control in the claimed region and the coercion of policy concessions from the center. We hypothesize that the relative importance of these objectives derives from features of the claim, the claimed region, and the separatist movement. We show that groups with "fuzzy" claims that do not follow administrative boundaries or clear geographic features attack more around their envisioned state's border, violence tends to concentrate within the claimed region when it is ethnically heterogeneous or the movement is fragmented, while relatively unified movements attack more in the national capital. La bibliografía sobre grupos separatistas ha pasado casi por alto los reclamos territoriales exactos y su repercusión en las estrategias que utilizan. Explicamos la distribución geográfica de la violencia separatista con información geoespacial nueva sobre la ubicación y la dimensión de los reclamos territoriales de los grupos. Sostenemos que la variación en los lugares donde atacan los grupos separatistas se debe a la variación en la forma en que los grupos distribuyen sus esfuerzos en base a dos objetivos principales: el control de la región reclamada y la coerción de las concesiones de política del centro. Nuestra hipótesis es que la importancia relativa de estos objetivos deriva de las características del reclamo, de la región reclamada y del movimiento separatista dado. Demostramos que los grupos con reclamos «difusos» que no siguen los límites administrativos o las características geográficas claras atacan más alrededor de su frontera de estado visualizada y que la violencia tiende a concentrarse dentro de la región reclamada cuando hay heterogeneidad étnica o cuando el movimiento está fragmentado, mientras que los movimientos relativamente unidos atacan más en la capital nacional. La littérature sur les groupes séparatistes a accordé relativement peu d'attention aux revendications territoriales précises de ces groupes et à leur influence sur les stratégies. Nous expliquons la répartition géographique de la violence séparatiste en nous appuyant sur de nouvelles données géospatiales sur la localisation et l'étendue des revendications territoriales des groupes. Nous soutenons que la variation des lieux d'attaque des séparatistes découle de la variation de la manière dont les groupes allouent leurs efforts entre deux objectifs principaux : le contrôle dans la région revendiquée et la coercition de concessions politiques de la part du pouvoir central. Nous émettons l'hypothèse que l'importance relative de ces objectifs découle des caractéristiques de la revendication, de la région revendiquée et du mouvement séparatiste. Nous montrons que les groupes dont les revendications sont « floues », c'est-à-dire qui ne suivent pas les frontières administratives ou de caractéristiques géographiques claires, attaquent davantage autour 'e la frontière de l'État qu'ils envisagent et que la violence tend à se concentrer dans la région revendiquée lorsqu'elle est ethniquement hétérogène ou que le mouvement est fragmenté, alors que les mouvements relativement unifiés attaquent davantage dans la capitale nationale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In AABA songs (sometimes called verse–bridge songs) written and performed by the Beatles, the song texts' scansion and rhyme show significant contrasts between different sections, and these contrasts often have important formal and narrative functions. Combining rock Formenlehre with phonetic analysis, this article shows that A modules tend to have irregular scansion and frequent rhyme, while B modules tend to show regular scansion and less frequent rhyme. In the unusual cases where A modules have infrequent rhyme, the B modules tend to offer contrast by showing greater rhyme frequency. These contrasts represent an independent, recurring formal device in the Beatles' catalogue that does not entirely comport with other well-defined formal processes, such as the loose-verse/tight-chorus schema. The scansion and rhyme have various narrative and formal functions: They often suggest a contrast between an active and passive state in the song's protagonist, and disruptions to regular patterns or conflict with grammatical boundaries can play a critical role in shaping phrases. B modules that thwart the norm can connote an especially high emotional arousal or suggest a process of intensification and conclusion, linking the form to an expanded statement–response–departure–conclusion form. The analyses demonstrate the central role that prosody often plays in popular song and show the importance of considering its relation to other musical patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Don Herzog's book Sovereignty RIP offers a tour d'horizon of one strand of sovereignty's conceptual history and its changing meanings over time. It culminates in a ferocious call to bury the notion of sovereignty and replace it with concepts such as jurisdiction, authority and state. Based on insights from conceptual history, in particular about basic concepts, the review essay criticizes Herzog's approach. It questions whether one can convincingly denounce the concept of sovereignty by relying predominantly on episodes from Anglo-American history as Herzog does. Instead, the essay tells two alternative stories in order to first argue that ignoring other narratives risks misunderstanding and misinterpreting the current re-rise of sovereignty-related discourses and that, second, sovereignty remains an important tool to understand how both the constitutional state and multilevel governance work. Eventually it would be more pernicious to discard the concept of sovereignty instead of engaging with it and confronting its diverging conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does territorial change occur in conflict settings without a radical transformation of state interests and international norms? Territorial change is understood here as the unfolding of nonconflictual territorial visions, actions, and interactions in the absence of sovereignty transfer and/or transformation of the existing status of a disputed territory. This article addresses the question of territorial change in conflict settings by examining Turkey's coastal radar technology as an evolving border security infrastructure in the Aegean Sea. Entailing remotely controlled unmanned stations, mobile vehicles, and drones, Turkey's radar technology generates territorial change. Rather than merely enabling or constraining territorial engagement, technology actively produces territory by transforming it into a nonconflictual state. The altering of territory is achieved by the realignment of security conditioned by and functionally dependent on technology. Radar technology mediates Aegean security in ways that are different from its conventional external-oriented framework targeting another sovereign state. Yet, far from moving away from militarization, radar technology produces irregular migration as a new referent of militarized border security, while simultaneously bringing civilian actors to the fore. Territorial change materializes as technology alters the directionality of territorial vision, transforms "seeing" into "visualization," and makes possible new types of sovereign violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multi-professional service firms must deal with external pressures, such as increasing digitalization and internal tensions arising from differences between professions. Advances in digital technologies affect the content and control of work among professions, reshaping established jurisdictions. Although the importance of digital technologies for professions and their organizations is growing, our understanding of how digitalization affects the content of professional work and jurisdictional arrangements between existing and emerging professions is limited. Drawing on data collected from 25 semi-structured interviews, participant observations, and archival data in a Big Four firm, we explored the changes in content and control of audit work due to digitalization, and how auditors responded to jurisdictional conflicts through boundary work. Findings of the study show digitalization impacts critical activities and jurisdictions of auditors in diagnosis and treatment phases, increasing the effectiveness and value of audit work. Accounting auditors can respond to jurisdictional conflicts through different boundary work types for each act of professional practice. The study advances our understanding of digitalization's implications on professions by revealing that professions can reduce contestation and increase collaboration through boundary work in the diagnosis and treatment phases. In contrast, professions' ability to abstract helps them maintain favorable conditions in the inference phase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scholarly literature on paradiplomacy has tended to focus overly on subnational governments in federal systems rather than those in unitary and centralized countries. However, it is important to note that some subnational governments in these countries have been increasingly proactive in international relations (IR). This study explores the paradiplomatic activities of Yunnan, a province in the south of China which, since the early 1990s, has actively engaged in cross-border cooperation. Combining the concept of paradiplomacy with the theory of actorness, this study first argues that Yunnan has been incentivized to conduct paradiplomacy through the decision of Beijing to open China's borders; the inefficiency of the central government in managing border-related issues; and the interprovincial competition over economic and diplomatic clouts in the Mekong subregion. Second, this study argues that Yunnan's new external affairs powers have been consolidated by a host of new opportunities stemming from the external environment. Third, it argues that Yunnan's new external affairs powers have enabled it to leverage two broad instruments (infrastructure development and economic statecraft) to make neighboring countries more dependent on cooperation with it. And finally, it is argued that Yunnan's role as an IR player has been acknowledged both by neighboring countries and by Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid the epistemic divide about what social cohesion means as a foundational concept, the pursuit of social integration as a policy objective is more desirable than ever among policy makers. While scholarly debates seek to restore conceptual clarity for social cohesion and social integration separately, referring to them interchangeably in policy reports seems to go conveniently unnoticed across different migration contexts. This study seeks answers to the question: how does the concept of social cohesion manifest itself in forced migration contexts? It does so by first reviewing the state of the art on social cohesion-forced migration nexus to identify the recurring themes and substitute concepts in the literature. Secondly, based on an in-depth textual analysis of 327 scholarly articles and policy reports on the forcibly displaced theme in Turkey published between 2011 and 2018, this study presents a classification of conceptual frames on social cohesion in forced migration contexts as security threat-based, humanitarian emergency-driven, policy regime-oriented, and socio-interactional. One of the main findings is that the existing social cohesion models of the settlement countries do not explain what has been unfolding in Turkey in the post-2011 period with the mass influx of the forcibly displaced and ongoing conflict at its borders. The study concludes with a discussion on why integrating policy regime-oriented and socio-interactional approaches are more likely to advance both the quest for conceptual clarity around social cohesion and facilitate the design of actionable policies in protracted large-scale displacement contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights conference on the territorial problems of Upper Silesia held in Marburg, Germany. Claims of the area based on ethnic and historic categories; Reassessment of the literature on the history of Silesia and Upper Silesia; Influence of Catholicism and social democracy on the identification of non-national modes.

Despite the popularization of investor-state arbitration (ISA), administrative review remains a helpful local remedy for investment-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in some states. China has a complicated and comprehensive legal system of administrative review. It has concluded a large number of international investment agreements (IIAs), and nearly half of them contain an administrative review provision. These provisions could be considered as an expropriation review mechanism, a standalone ISDS option, an ISA supporting measure or a pre-ISA requirement. Given that administrative review has legal and practical limits, and that China's national law on dispute settlement and foreign investment governance keeps changing, the attractiveness and significance of administrative review for ISDS are diminishing. In China's recent IIA-making, there appears an emerging trend of abandoning administrative review. In the long run, it remains to be seen how China will balance local remedies and ISA in IIA-making and foreign investment governance in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Colombian–Venezuelan borderlands are facing a 'double crisis': at the same time as armed groups reconfigure following the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia is concurrently receiving millions of refugees, migrants, and Colombian returnees from neighbouring Venezuela. While much international coverage of the crisis has focused on Cúcuta, the major border crossing in the department of Norte de Santander, the crossing via the Guajira Peninsula is the second most frequented official land crossing into Colombia. In 2020, La Guajira was home to more than 166,000 refugees and migrants, the third highest concentration in the country. This happened at the same time as new and old armed groups were using violent measures to control strategic territory in the region. This practice note takes stock of the risks that affect security conditions as perceived and experienced by communities in La Guajira, and outlines the self-protection strategies that some communities employ to respond to the changing security conditions. It demonstrates the need for enhancing efforts for integration (for example, documentation) and response mechanisms that are shared between Colombia and other countries in the region in order to mitigate risks for Venezuelans in border regions of Colombia. The information reported here comes from a targeted civil society workshop held in Riohacha—the capital city of La Guajira—and a field visit made in April 2019 under the research programme 'From Conflict Actors to Architects of Peace—CONPEACE'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The geopolitical and geophysical realities of south Asia create a deep sense of paradox. On the one hand, territorial disputes and hyper-nationalism have resulted in some of the most militarized borders in the world. South Asia's international boundaries are subject to a range of conflicts, which includes high-level armed confrontations between India and Pakistan and low-level, yet deadly, incidents at the India–Bangladesh border. On the other hand, the region's ecology is inherently interlinked through shared rivers, glaciers and forests. South Asia's borders therefore present unique opportunities for environmental peacebuilding, as they are the epicentre of political conflicts as well as the source of transnational ecological connections. This article argues that grassroots processes of environmental peacebuilding can be used to build societal resistance to the rise of ethno-nationalistic populism in south Asia. Using interview data, the article tests concepts on pathways to environmental peacebuilding against underlying drivers of regional conflicts. The study suggests ways by which grassroots environmental initiatives on the Sundarbans forest between India and Bangladesh and the Thar desert between India and Pakistan can address the contemporary rise in nativist politics. The article contributes to existing literature by connecting theories on pathways to environmental peacebuilding to the ideational drivers of territorial and political conflicts. It adds to policy discussions by suggesting an ecological response to the contemporary rise of ethno-nationalistic populism in various regions of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work analyses the concrete application of Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS, 1982 which enjoins states to find a resolution to their maritime boundary disputes. It uses the Nigeria–Sao Tome and Principe model of joint development agreement to achieve this by critiquing the important provisions of the agreement. It demonstrates that amicable maritime disputes resolution for resources ownership and control can be achieved by negotiations and agreements. This is authoritative third-party authorities like the ICJ and international arbitral institutions. And pending a more permanent delimitation and resolution, cooperative resources development would emerge and possibly thrive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Anglo-Portuguese relations in the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly conflicts over territorial claims in West and East Africa. It examines how these conflicts were de-escalated and why they did not tear asunder the long-standing, if asymmetrical, alliance between Britain and Portugal. After briefly surveying Anglo-Portuguese relations in the early modern period and in the first half of the nineteenth century, the article focuses on the way that conflicts were resolved through third-party arbitration between the 1850s and 1870s. Drawing on archival research in Portugal and Britain, the article contributes to the rich historiographies on informal empire, the partition of Africa, and the emergence of international law in the context of imperial conflict and collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the rumor that Bolivia enjoyed the political support of the U.S. during the Chaco War, fought between Bolivia and Paraguay over the disputed Chaco territory, has garnered legitimacy throughout the Americas. Topics covered include how an oil-driven narrative of the Chaco War has laid the groundwork for the first oil nationalization in Bolivia in 1937, the Latin American approach to mediating U.S. influence in the region as well as Latin American goals of resource sovereignty, and how Bolivia redefined itself internationally in the postwar era.

The maritime boundary dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia was submitted to the compulsory conciliation procedure under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This is the first instance of conciliation, whether voluntary or compulsory, under UNCLOS. The Timor Sea conciliation led to the successful settlement of the long-standing deadlock between the parties that had hitherto not been settled by negotiation and had no possibility of being settled by litigation (within, for example, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or International Court of Justice proceedings) or arbitration (within the context of an UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal). This article aims to elucidate the unique mechanism of conciliation and, to this end, analyses both the procedural particularities of conciliation under UNCLOS and the substantive considerations in conciliation proceedings. The author places emphasis, in particular, on the fundamental importance of the economic factor in the Timor Sea maritime delimitation – namely, the sharing ratio of the natural resources in the Greater Sunrise gas fields. Being a definitive factor for the success of this conciliation, it was the economics of this dispute that incentivized the parties to compromise and settle. Furthermore, given that conciliation is a most elucidating piece in the rather complicated puzzle that is the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanism, the Timor Sea conciliation offers valuable insights into this mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on International political borders which have historically performed one overriding function that is the delimitation of a state's territorial jurisdiction, but today they are sites of intense security scrutiny and law enforcement. Topics discussed include Traditionally, created to secure peace through the territorial independence of political units. Today borders face new pressures from heightened human mobility, economic interdependence and threat from nonstates.

This article examines the origin and nature of the compulsory conciliation procedure under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how it has played out in the conciliation between Timor-Leste and Australia—the first time this procedure has been triggered. The article identifies the features of the UNCLOS conciliation procedure—many of which are unique—that appear to have played a significant role in this success of this case and which could be useful for future disputes—including its compulsory nature, its procedural flexibility, its ability to take into account non-legal considerations, its 12-month deadline and its substantive reporting requirement. The article concludes by looking at the significance of this case for future disputes—highlighting that its implications go beyond UNCLOS, as many of the major multilateral environmental treaties, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement contain untested compulsory conciliation procedures that are similar to UNCLOS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past one hundred years, a series of international cases have addressed the group or unity principle in the context of territorial allocation. This article provides an analysis of such jurisprudence, and concludes that this principle can act as a mediating principle to inform the interpretation and application of the primary rules relating to territorial acquisition, thus raising a presumption about the extent and scope of an established territorial title. By showing respect for the natural link between land territories that form an integral group or unity, this principle might provide an efficient and pragmatic approach to settling territorial disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders are increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history. China's monumental history as an ancient civilization is used to revise the communist party's ideology and to buttress foreign policy ambitions and infrastructural investments—including the 'belt and road initiative' and territorial claims in the South China Sea. This more assertive approach to China's immediate neighbourhood resonates with the official reiteration of imperial tropes and concepts of Confucian philosophy, yet assertions that Beijing wants to reanimate the tribute system remain contested. While using historical narratives to legitimize foreign policy is not new, we are witnessing an unprecedented 'return of history' as a global social force. By revisiting Fukuyama's claims, I develop the notion of 'historical statecraft' and apply it to China's 'belt and road initiative'. The Chinese case is exemplary for the importance of ideational factors in understanding the recent structural changes often described as the weakening of the West. This article examines in what ways China's historical statecraft is challenging western narratives, what controversies emerge as China articulates its identity as a re-emerging ancient Great Power—one which expects global audiences to acknowledge the value of its cultural norms—and whether the Chinese approach to the use of the past for construing alternative political imaginaries contributes to a peaceful reconstruction of global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comment offers some brief observations on ideas that may promote the settlement of disputes that may arise from the Belt and Road Initiative, such as a possible standing investment court, a unified appellate mechanism or a legal aid mechanism as system components, a "lawyer for the situation" spirit for lawyering, an emphasis on a friendly style of dispute settlement, and a style of directly providing for rules of interpretation as part of the applicable law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While territorial disputes have long been considered essential in the study of inter-state conflict, the existing literature has largely overlooked the actual initiation of territorial disputes in the first place. The conventional wisdom holds that, given that the anticipated consequences of dispute escalation are likely to be worse for weaker states than for stronger states, the former should be less likely than the latter to initiate a dispute. However, a large proportion of territorial disputes have in fact been initiated by weaker states. Why does a weaker state initiate a territorial claim over its relatively stronger counterpart? Drawing insights from the work on reputation building in the recent inter- and intra-state conflict literature, this article provides an explanation that focuses on the role of information and uncertainty in the initiation of territorial disputes. A potential weaker challenging state’s decision to initiate a territorial dispute against a relatively stronger state depends upon information about whether or not the potential stronger target has made concessions in past disputes, and whether or not the potential stronger target may be expected to do so again in the future. Using Bayesian logistic regression, my analysis of the territorial dispute claims from 1816 to 2001 confirms that weaker states are more likely to initiate territorial disputes if potential stronger target states have yielded in previous disputes, and if potential stronger target states are unlikely to encounter additional challengers in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Lord Palmerston's joke about the Schleswig-Holstein question. Topics covered include the complexity of Danish-German territorial and dynastic dispute, the problems raised by Palmerston's joke, and English writer and critic Lytton Strachey's opinion on the territorial and dynastic dispute.

International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) continues to be widely chosen as the preferred method of dispute resolution for parties, particularly where matters cross international boundaries. However, with the divergence of cases from open courts to predominantly closed arbitration hearings, questions of transparency have, and will continue to arise. This article is situated within the framework of transparency and asks whether confidentiality should still hold to be the norm in arbitration. Additionally, questions are asked around the development of law and operation of precedent in ICA. Indeed, what this article ultimately seeks to achieve is evaluating whether arbitration can serve as a mechanism for generating privately made law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have experiencedmajor institutional transformations. As part of that process, territorial contestations between states and ethnic minorities engendered three outcomes: negotiated territorial self-government (TSG) arrangements; the denial of such arrangements; and the emergence of de-facto states. Through a qualitative comparative analysis of twenty-four minorityTSG claims in seventeen post-communist CEE states, we find that: (i) TSG arrangements emerged as externally facilitated instruments for managing or preventing violent conflict in predominantly low-capacity, only partially democratic states; (ii) peacefully pursued TSG claims were most likely to be denied in high-capacity consolidated democracies; and (iii) de-facto states emerged where patron-states intervened in violent conflicts in low-capacity states. These findings defy widely held expectations about the influence of Europeanization, coupled with democratic consolidation, on the accommodation of minority claims; and they offer new insights into the significance of external intervention for the institutional outcomes of ethnic minorityTSG claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While existing studies show that China has been a norm-taker in accommodating to the norms of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to manage the South China Sea disputes, the possibility of China as a normative power in shaping ASEAN norms in the context of China--ASEAN relations has received less attention. This article shall argue that China has sought to socialise ASEAN to recognise China as a normative power by accepting China's preference for direct bilateral negotiations to handle the disputes while maintaining status quo and nonbinding multilateral cooperation. To achieve this objective, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, China initially adopted ASEAN norms of consensus-based, minimalist multilateralism to earn respectful reciprocation from ASEAN towards China. Subsequently, China sought to socialise ASEAN to recognise a new norm which posits that China, as a benign and responsible power, has the hierarchical primacy and legitimacy to set the pace and direction for handling the South China Sea disputes. Nevertheless, China's attempts have been met with limited success. By insisting on direct bilateral negotiations which eschew a legally binding and multilateral solution to the territorial spat, China's actions have challenged ASEAN norms of multilateralism and ASEAN centrality. As a result, ASEAN has reasserted its centrality and consensus-based multilateral diplomacy to steer the management of the disputes. Additionally, China's increased maritime activities in the South China Sea and conflicting foreign policy messages have further undermined China's credibility as a normative power to socialise ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the implications of the post-2011 conflict in Syria for the relationship between Turkey's shifting border politics and its domestic politics, focusing on the period until mid-2015. The analysis demonstrates that two factors explain the shifts in Turkey's border management modalities in this period. These factors were: first, Turkey's aspiration to enhance its regional influence through a power reconfiguration in post-conflict Syria, in which the Assad regime would be replaced by a predominantly Islamist power elite; second, its concern about its territorial integrity and centralized nation-state model, which it tried to safeguard by impeding the emergence of a Kurdish state, or governance structure with increased autonomous powers and expanded territorial control. Power reconfigu-rations over the course of the conflict and newly arising threats emanating from the neighbouring civil war also had significant implications for Turkey's border management patterns. Embedded within a highly interconnected region that has also been increasingly structured in ethno-sectarian terms, instrumentally shifting border politics gave rise to a high degree of contestation in the domestic sphere, and contributed to the reinforcement of ethnic and sectarian identity boundaries permeating society and politics in Turkey. The case of Turkey is significant in understanding the overall impact of the post-2011 political transition processes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on border politics, on the degree of interdependence between domestic and international politics, on the links between state borders and identity boundaries, and on state-society relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims at a better understanding of the changing nature of borders in warring Syria. Contrary to much media commentary, the Syrian uprising and the subsequent conflict have not been about territorial claims. In 2011, the borders of Syria were de facto pacified and, with the important exception of the border with Israel, were accepted as the legitimate boundaries of the Syrian state. This, however, does not contradict the fact that the unfolding of the Syrian uprising has had deep transformative effects on the borders of the country. Their nature, functions and management have significantly evolved since the uprising first broke out. In 2017, these borders no longer delineate a coherent territory under the control of a unique and somehow cohesive actor: the state. The ongoing territorial and political fragmentation of the country into territories controlled by different armed parties has given rise to multiple forms of control over the Syrian border that reflect the outcome of the armed confrontation. This article analyses the transformations of the borders from the outer boundaries of a state that exercises its sovereignty over its territory and delivers state functions and public goods to its citizens to a spatial envelope in which competing internal legitimacies operate. It also explores the new dynamics of the borders in relation with Syria's neighbours and the international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the future of boundary conflicts involving water resources. Water demand in regions including the Nile River Basin, the Jordan River Basin, and the Euphrates River Basin is addressed. Also discussed are the Indus River Basin and the Ganges River Basin. The role of domestic governance in water supply management is noted. The impact of international relations on the regions discussed is analyzed in light of military conflicts, particularly involving Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in the Jordan River region.

This article ascertains whether Japan's possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has a legal basis that is opposable to China. It departs from the traditional approach that focuses on historic titles and ancient maps. It applies an alternative approach that is based on the status quo post bellum or the relative legal position of the parties at the end of armed hostilities. This approach is warranted by the practice of China, Japan and the Allied powers of defining the status quo in the East China Sea as a frame of reference for the future disposition of the islands. Primary records of their conduct in the period 1945-1952 reveal consensus that: (i) the islands are part of Nansei Shoto rather than of Formosa; (ii) they remained under the residual sovereignty of Japan and (iii) they were being claimed by Japan but not China. The conduct of the parties proximate to 1945-1956 indicate that there was no prior existing title to the islands that would contradict the status quo. Rather, during the period 1952 up to the critical date of 1970, the positive acts of the Republic of China and the acquiescence of the People's Republic of China confirmed the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The uniqueness of China's approach in the China--Philippine arbitration is demonstrated in its explication of the dash-line claim. A trend of territorialization in the dash-line claim is discernible since China deems the dash line to be one means for delineating maritime limits and for drawing a maritime boundary, namely maritime delimitation. This position and its connotation not only worry the Philippines but also all stakeholder countries. One explanation is China's reading of the relations between the law of sea and public international law, which implies that the law of the sea has been established as a unique legal regime and, thus, can be operated in an exclusive manner. This approach, which has also been dubbed 'the-land-prioritizes-the-sea' approach runs the risk of isolating the law of the sea regime from the terrain of general international law. The key lies in treating the law of the sea as a regime characterized with conditioned operational closure, so that the spirit of 'land-dominates-the-sea' can be meaningfully honoured and implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and its neighbours are closely bound by geography. The rise of China presents new challenges and opportunities for the development of its neighbourhood relations and regional strategies. Currently, China's policy priority in its neighbourhood is active promotion of the construction of a community based on shared interests and a common destiny. The real challenge is that China's rise from a weak to a powerful state has triggered multiple and complex reactions and has required significant and profound adjustment of regional relationships. As a consequence there have been growing tensions in China's neighbourhood areas. Traditional Chinese culture sets the highest value on 'peace and harmony', commends the 'defusing' of contradictions and pursues the result of 'reconciliation'. Now that China is getting strong and is able to make choices as it wishes, the time has come for it to display its 'culture of harmony'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]