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The article introduces various papers published within the issue, including one on government debt restructuring in Europe, another on bank bias in Europe's financial system and a paper on the risks of mortgage credit bubbles leading to crises and lower growth.

We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks' exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. Contrary to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks' exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partially hedge on-balance-sheet exposures. Residual exposures imply that changes in interest rates have redistributive effects within the banking sector. Received October 31, 2017; editorial decision August 30, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the distortions that banks' cross-border activities, such as foreign assets, deposits and equity, can introduce into regulatory interventions. We find that while each individual dimension of cross-border activities distorts the incentives of a domestic regulator, a balanced amount of cross-border activities does not necessarily cause inefficiencies, as the various distortions can offset each other. Empirical analysis using bank-level data from the recent crisis provides support to our theoretical findings. Specifically, banks with a higher share of foreign deposits and assets and a lower foreign equity share were intervened at a more fragile state, reflecting the distorted incentives of national regulators. We discuss several implications for the supervision of cross-border banks in Europe. - Thorsten Beck, Radomir Todorov and Wolf Wagner [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various papers related to the economic crisis, effects of fiscal policy and recapitalization of banks and the duration of housing slumps in the Europe.

This paper examines whether multinational banks have a stabilizing or a destabilizing role during times of financial distress. With a focus on Europe, it looks at how these banks' foreign affiliates have been faring during the recent financial crisis. It finds that retail and corporate lending of these foreign affiliates has been stable and even increasing between 2007 and 2009. This pattern is related to the functioning of the internal capital market through which these banks funnel funds across their units. The internal capital market has been an effective tool to support foreign affiliates in distress and to isolate their lending from the local availability of financial resources, notwithstanding the systemic nature of the recent crisis. This effect has been particularly large within the EU integrated financial market and for the EMU countries, thus showing complementarity between economic integration and multinational banks' internal capital markets. In light of these findings, this paper supports the call for an integration of the European supervisory and regulatory framework overseeing multinational banks. The analysis is based on an analytical framework which derives the main conditions under which the internal capital market can perform this support function under idiosyncratic and systemic stresses. The empirical evidence uses both aggregate evidence on foreign claims worldwide, and firm-level evidence on the behaviour of banking groups' affiliates, compared to stand-alone national banks. - Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Giacomo Calzolari, Alberto Franco Pozzolo and Micol Levi [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes bank performance in the context of the integrated European Union market and its member countries. First, the paper investigates the technical efficiency of banks in each country sample using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model incorporating only banking variables. Then, a second DEA model is defined incorporating environmental factors together with banking variables in order to standardize the country-specific environmental conditions. Based on these models, the paper systematically analyzes the efficiency position for each of the European banking industry if average banks decide to operate in any other country. The results indicate that adverse (advantageous) environmental conditions are a positive (negative) factor for the home banking industry and being technically efficient appears to be a significant deterrence to foreign competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe's financial structure has become strongly bank-based-far more so than in other economies. We document that an increase in the size of the banking system relative to equity and private bond markets is associated with more systemic risk and lower economic growth, particularly during housing market crises. We argue that these two phenomena arise owing to an amplification mechanism, by which banks overextend and misallocate credit when asset prices rise, and ration it when they drop. The paper concludes by discussing policy solutions to Europe's 'bank bias', which include reducing regulatory favouritism towards banks, while simultaneously supporting the development of securities markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper shows that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were of second-order importance in determining the capital structure of large U.S. and European banks during 1991 to 2004. Instead, standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to banks, except for banks whose capital ratio is close to the regulatory minimum. Consistent with a reduced role of deposit insurance, we document a shift in banks’ liability structure away from deposits towards non-deposit liabilities. We find that unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects are ultimately the most important determinant of banks’ capital structures and that banks’ leverage converges to bank specific, time-invariant targets. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses various reports on the geographies of finance published within the issue, including one on spatial linkages of financial transactions across Europe around 1750, another on the effect of distance on the interrelationship between global banking and local credit markets, as well as a report on whether firms located in financial centres are more likely to go public.

We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Basel III Accord was the centrepiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe — Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators setting post crisis capital requirements had to reconcile three inter-related and potentially conflicting objectives: banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. The different national preferences on Basel III reflected how different national regulators defined and pursued these objectives, which in turn reflected the structure of national banking systems — specifically, systemic patterns of bank capital and bank-industry ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2007-2010 financial crisis highlighted the central role of financial intermediaries' stability in buttressing a smooth transmission of credit to borrowers. While results from the years prior to the crisis often cast doubts on the strength of the bank lending channel, recent evidence shows that bank-specific characteristics can have a large impact on the provision of credit. We show that new factors, such as changes in banks' business models and market funding patterns, had modified the monetary transmission mechanism in Europe and in the US prior to the crisis, and demonstrate the existence of structural changes during the period of financial crisis. Banks with weaker core capital positions, greater dependence on market funding and on non-interest sources of income restricted the loan supply more strongly during the crisis period. These findings support the Basel III focus on banks' core capital and on funding liquidity risks. They also call for a more forward-looking approach to the statistical data coverage of the banking sector by central banks. In particular, there should be a stronger focus on monitoring those financial factors that are likely to influence the functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism particularly in periods of crisis. - Leonardo Gambacorta and David Marques-Ibanez [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currency mismatch is a vehicle that exposes the economy to systemic risk, but it is also an engine of growth. We analyse this dual role at the macro and the micro levels. At the aggregate level, we construct a new measure of currency mismatch in the banking sector that controls for bank lending to unhedged borrowers - that is, those with no foreign currency income. Using our measure, we find that across emerging European economies, increases in currency mismatch are associated with higher growth in tranquil times, but also with more severe crises. On net, after taking into account the crisis period, we find a positive link between currency mismatch and growth. These results are also confirmed for a broader sample of emerging economies. In our firm-level analysis, we find that in emerging Europe, currency mismatch relaxes borrowing constraints, reduces interest rates and enhances growth across sets of firms that arguably are the most credit constrained - that is, small firms in non-tradables sectors - but not across large firms. An advantage of our approach is that it considers both listed and non-listed firms, and so we are able to effectively capture the effects of currency mismatch across the entire economy, not just the financially privileged stock market listed firms. - Romain Ranciere, Aaron Tornell and Athanasios Vamvakidis [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the long history of rising and persistent unemployment in Europe, almost all welfare-state institutions-employment protection legislation, unions, wages, wage structure, unemployment insurance, etc.-have been alleged to have caused and found guilty of causing this tragic development at some point in time. Later, welfare-state institutions in interaction with external shocks were identified as more plausible causes of rising equilibrium unemployment in Europe. Monetary policy has managed, to be regarded as innocent. Based on the assertion of the neutrality of money in the medium and long run, the search for causes of European unemployment has shied away from the policy of central banks. But actually the institutional set- up regarding monetary policy is very different between the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the Bundesbank and its successor, The European Central Bank (ECB). We argue that the interaction of adverse shocks and tight monetary policies may have been the major-although probably not the only-cause of unemployment in Europe remaining at ever higher levels after each recession. We identify the monetary policy of the Bundesbank as asymmetrical, in the sense that the Bank did not actively fight against recessions, but it dampened recovery periods. Less constraint on growth would have kept German unemployment at lower levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I interpret the European Central Bank's two-pillar strategy by proposing an empirical model for inflation that distinguishes between the short- and long-run components of inflation. The latter component depends on an exponentially weighted moving average of past monetary growth and the former on the output gap. Estimates for the 1971–2003 period suggest that money can be combined with other indicators to form the‘broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments’ that constitutes the ECB's second pillar. However, the analysis does not suggest that money should be treated differently from other indicators. While money is a useful policy indicator, all relevant indicators should be assessed in an integrated manner, and a separate pillar focused on monetary aggregates does not appear necessary.— Stefan Gerlach [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I discuss possible problems engendered by loss of national monetary policies, and study them from three empirical perspectives. First, are business cycles sufficiently synchronized across EMU member countries? The evidence suggests that economic activity in those countries has become increasingly correlated in the 1990s, and that policy co-ordination has played a role in generating that outcome. Second, are there asymmetries in the mechanisms through which policy affects economic activity? The paper documents that policy transmission was indeed heterogeneous in the member countries, and that structural and financial factors were sensibly related to cross-country differences in the response of output to a monetary policy shock. Third, how is policy implemented in an environment of diverse business cycle fundamentals and transmission mechanisms? Estimation of monetary policy reaction functions finds that the European Central Bank is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the Bundesbank alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the progress and pitfalls of monetary policy during transition in central and eastern Europe. Role of monetary policy in initial money stabilization; Microeconomic impediments to monetary policy; Implications of fiscal tightening and exchange-rate flexibility; Effects of incentives and corporate governance in banks; Implications of investments in writing off bad debt on monetary transmission.

This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. We argue that a viable European fiscal union can be constructed without joint liability for public debt or a centralized government with a large common budget. Such a fiscal union should combine elements of market discipline with stabilization in case of asymmetric shocks. Our proposal addresses the shortcomings of most other reform designs, which fail to offer a solution for insolvent or non-cooperative euro countries. We suggest a design which combines limited fiscal insurance with an orderly procedure to restructure the debt of insolvent member states. We show that fiscal insurance and a sovereign insolvency procedure are no contradiction but, on the contrary, are mutually reinforcing. Effective fiscal insurance helps to limit the stability risks involved in the implementation of an insolvency regime for sovereigns. And vice versa, a welldefined insolvency procedure reduces the risk that a fiscal capacitymotivated as an insurance against transitory asymmetric shocks degenerates into a permanent transfer system. Moreover, we show that both elements promote the functioning of the European banking union and the new European fiscal governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their different ways, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the US Fed combine expertise with representation: key members of these institutions along with their staff are appointed on the basis of their expertise and professional qualifications whereas each organization is conceived, in part, so as to represent the constituent nation-states or regions that make up their currency zones. In this article, the tension between expertise and representation apparent in the constitution of each institution is explored with emphasis on the ways in which geography is represented in monetary policy decision-making. The formal representation of nation-states in the ECB, their voting rights, and the significance or otherwise of large Eurozone countries is also considered. Being an analytical assessment of the effectiveness of the ECB compared with the Fed, the effectiveness of each institution is assessed in the light of financial risk and uncertainty and the complex interplay between monetary policy-making and fiscal federalism. Implications are drawn as regards the management of the Euro crisis has been managed, and the ways in which the welfare of peripheral countries have been discounted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use employment data for 2008-2012 to analyse the impact of the subprime and Eurozone crises on the British and German financial sector. In the UK, the sector contracted and its spatial concentration increased across regions and urban hierarchy, with London as the sole winner. In Germany there has been no contraction overall, and no significant change in the spatial distribution of financial employment. We argue that while in both countries forced consolidation and financial re-regulation have acted as centripetal forces, in Germany they have been offset by strong regional and local banking, underpinned by a decentralized state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large share of dollar-denominated lending is done by non-U.S. banks, particularly European banks. We present a model in which such banks cut dollar lending more than euro lending in response to a shock to their credit quality. Because these banks rely on wholesale dollar funding, while raising more of their euro funding through insured retail deposits, the shock leads to a greater withdrawal of dollar funding. Banks can borrow in euros and swap into dollars to make up for the dollar shortfall, but this may lead to violations of covered interest parity when there is limited capital to take the other side of the swap trade. In this case, synthetic dollar borrowing also becomes expensive, which causes cuts in dollar lending. We test the model in the context of the Eurozone sovereign crisis, which escalated in the second half of 2011 and resulted in U.S. money market funds sharply reducing their exposure to European banks in the year that followed. During this period dollar lending by Eurozone banks fell relative to their euro lending, and firms who were more reliant on Eurozone banks before the Eurozone crisis had a more difficult time borrowing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The State aid regime for the financial sector remains in place but the review of individual restructuring plans seems to be coming to a close.In relation to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU the Commission is still focused on payment systems and has been pursuing banks regarding financial benchmarks.As regards merger control, the scene was dominated by the in-depth investigation into a mobile wallets JV.The Commission further dealt with cases at the intersection of State aid and merger control and monitored a number of stock exchange developments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Deregulation of financial services is well under way in many European countries. This has led to fears that economies are now more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. The authors focus on one aspect of financial deregulation, namely liberalization of the banking system. They show that measures such as the abolition of reserve requirements increase macroeconomic variability under some circumstances but reduce it under others. No general macroeconomic case can be made for banking regulation or for its liberalization. Analysis of microeconomic issues is more fruitful. Asymmetric information and the risks of contagion in a panic can lead to runs against the banking system. To the extent that these are socially inefficient, public intervention may be jus- tified. This presumption is stronger since the risks of bank runs have grown recently with the increased maturity mismatch - the finance of illiquid loans by liquid short-term deposits. To meet this danger, the authors recommend regula- tion of deposit contracts whilst preserving incentives for bank monitoring by private parties. Specifically, they propose an post liability of current and former depositors when banks default, thereby offsetting the incentive to withdraw funds at the onset of a crisis. Being quick off the mark would no longer be sufficient, and sophisticated depositors would press for greater disclosure and fuller monitoring of bank activities. The authors also recommend that remaining controls on deposit interest rates should be scrapped and that supervision of international banking should be cooperatively conducted by host and parent authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]