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Abstract: Until 1999, the European Union (EU) was for all intents and purposes a ‘civilian’ power. Until this conscious decision to ‘militarize’, the EU proudly promoted itself as a civilized and civilizing economic and political power that used its moral and economic weight to influence world politics. Strangely, the EU chose to militarize itself when there was no external threat. The European Security Strategy (2003) states in its first paragraph that Europe has never been so free, prosperous, or secure. Why then would the EU seek to militarize itself when its civilian status had been such a source of pride? American academics and policy-makers alike have chided the Europeans as ‘soft’. Kagan went so far as to say “Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus.” A major question of contention among American and European policy makers is “who should do the dishes” -- in other words, which side should follow though with post-conflict reconstruction. Using discursive analysis, this paper argues that in order to change its identity from that of a feminine, soft, civilian power, the EU is seeking a security and defense identity to create the image, internationally, of a tough, masculine, militarized, "hard" power so it can play with the big boys. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the discussion about whether a reference to God should be included in the European Draft Constitution and the debates about whether Turkey is part of a European cultural identity have reminded us of the religious tensions and undercurrents of the European integration project. What is and has been the role of religion in European integration? What role, if any, should it play? This paper sets an exclusivist notion of Christendom against an inclusive reading of Christianity. We show how the most common use of religion in the context of European integration comes in the form of Christendom. In contrast to this use of religion, we argue that the role of Christianity cannot be the legitimization of a specific political integration project (as it is used in current debates), but that it may instead be used to support an integrative ethos as well as specific critical interventions against exclusionary policies and against those who try to instrumentalize religion to impose a particular European identity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of an ongoing research project aimed at providing more insights into the transatlantic rift over the use of force in the Iraq crisis, namely a better understanding of the reasons why the issue of the resort to military force against the Iraqi threat led progressively to strong disagreements among the American and European political leaders and the American and European publics about the efficacy and legitimacy of the use of force, particularly to strong anti-American and anti-European feelings. The project aims also at providing more insights into the role that media may play in the public perception and support of the United States and European Union as security actors. In order to attain such aims, the project investigates the interplay of the elite discourse with media and public opinion in the United States and in two European countries (France and Italy) that are still neglected in the literature on the media coverage of the Iraq crisis. The main argument is that, while there might be a synchronization in the focus of the external strategic events covered by the news media across the United States and Europe, there might be also important differences in the amount of media coverage of the crisis and in the news media debates, rooted in specific political-institutional as strategic-cultural contexts. Furthermore, while it is clear that public opinion and media may influence the decision-making process in foreign policy, their role is not systematic, but dynamic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Higher education is considered as a global issue in world politics. Integration of education space in Europe (Bologna process) and its political impact (differentiating of regions, forming a common European elite, etc.) is discussed. Integration in Europe will give rise to similar processes in other countries and regions, inter alia in the USA, which puts forward a problem of adjusting the Bologna system with other educational standards. The paper is showing that Bologna process will stimulate the integration of the higher education field in other regions. Additionally WTO is covering education as a set of services. So, the problem is to adjust different standards (national, regional, IGO etc.) in the field of higher education. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is based on one premise and two established facts. The premise relates regionalism and multilateralism as projects that seek a new ?order? in face of the world?s post cold war ?disorder?. The facts concern, on one hand, the mutations in the relations between the economic, social, and political levels as a consequence of the intensity of the globalization process and, on the other, the loss of legitimacy by international institutions in the post World War II period. The objective is to investigate the European regimes? repertoire, with an emphasis on the role of Community Law, in order to determine the nexuses between these regimes and proposals for a new multilateralism. The hypothesis guiding this paper is that both processes converge ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the ACN and Mercosur relations with the UE and the way as the FTAA affects these latter. The main argument hereby is that the UE is promoting a strategic regionalism in South America, the objective of which is the defense of its interests. This strategy has found receptivity in Mercosur, which has intended to deepen relations with Europe like a strategic instrument of negotiation in the framework of the FTAA process. The hemispheric process, which is considered fundamental in the Andean trade strategy, has a less small influence in the ACN relations with Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the expansion of international society and the Islamic world. It utilizes a methodological approach which concerns the role of law in characterizing the nature of society and its development. During the 19th century, European style legal systems were incorporated into parts of the Ottoman Empire and early 20th century for Persia marginalizing Shari?a which then contributed to these areas having absorbed many of the institutional forms and processes that have been identified with European international society and being later absorbed in the expansion of international society. During the latter part of the 20th century, there has been a revival of the Shari?a in the Islamic world in a Europeanized legal environment. The consequences for international society as yet are ambiguous or unknown. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a ruler of the former ?Christian Republic? went to war, he had to inform his Christian enemy about the fact itself (declaration of war) and would give to him and to other Christian rulers reasons for this serious step (legitimisation of war). This concept was not Christian in its origin, but in the theological theory of Just War it became basic for the order among Christian states. Later it again transcended religious restrictions and became basic for warfare until today.It was, however, not the mere fact of secularisation that made the theory of Just War open for the future international order. Legitimisations of War changed substantially with the revolutions in communications since the 15th Century. The ?personal? declaration of war became less important, the legitimisation by war manifestos became crucial, i.e. official pamphlets that were written or drafted by rulers or high-ranked politicians. Manifestos were directed towards an international public. Their intention might have been in particular to convince other rulers, people of political influence, subjects that were affected by the war etc., but they argued that the reasons given for war in the individual case would be acceptable for the whole Christendom or even for all civilized societies and the whole ?world?. Thus they mirror the existing ideas of an international system and its values, as legitimisations of war make sense only if the author expects that there will be readers who can follow his argument. In the context of the project?s main subject and different panels it is e.g. most significant when Queen Anne of Great Britain in 1702 declared war on France for the ?liberty and balance of Europe?. This was the first time that a monarch used the idea of balance of power in a war legitimisation which shows that at that time it was a political standard that was acceptable to the European public.In my paper I would like to analyse main ideas of an international order given in war legitimisations from 16th to 18th Century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the EU has reacted to specific types of security threat, contribute to a range of security governance functions and coordinate its activities within the system of European security governance. A further aim will be to examine the challenges of the EU in areas where coordination with other security organizations has either failed or taken place, and investigate the factors which either promote or inhibit cooperation among the security organizations. The article suggests that the concept of security governance, although complex in its application, offers certain advantages for the study of security that are not evident in other international relations approaches; significantly the ability to identify security threats more clearly, and to assess more effectively how security threats are managed in a multi-level and multi-actor setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common practice to consider global space a coherent entity that naturally containssocial practices and provide the stage for actors of International Relations (IR).Contesting this notion, this paper shows how the globe has been assembled throughcartographic practices in Europe from 1450-1650. I trace how the emerging disciplineof cosmography transformed knowledge of the world, and how the Spanish attemptsto map the world during the 16th century put in place a system to cartographicallyestablish a new reality of global space. Towards the end, we focus on how the worldwas published by Dutch map makers which disseminated this novel global reality to awider audience. The implications for international relations are; firstly, that globalspace is not natural in the sense it lies 'outside' social relations. Hence, if we wish tounderstand the historical trajectories of current politics we ought to historicize globalspace as a social relation. Secondly, the assemblage of a global space has gone handin-hand with European expansion and the formation of territorial states, and thissuggests that that there is no antagonism between 'territory' and the 'global' but thesespaces are two sides of the same coin of new cartographic practices inaugurated in15th century Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has Europe gone much further than other regions of the world in terms of integration? How do we explain the variation in the ?depth? and ?evolution? of regional integration? Given the presence of significant potential political gains as well as market gains from integration, these institutional differences across regions present an anomaly. Why do we observe the variation in governments? pooling and delegating sovereignty to common institutions in different regions? Contrary to the conventional wisdom which emphasizes the systemic sources of integration?i.e., degree of economic complementarity, members? levels of economic development, the existence of a common threat, relative capabilities of states, the presence of a regional leader, I argue in this paper that state preferences are a key to understanding the variation in regional integration. The existing explanations do not provide compelling answers on the ?depth? and ?evolution? of integration across region across time, since they tend to ignore policy preferences and strategies/choices of states in different regional settings, which are critical to understand the political forces of regional integration. Given that the different level of regional integration can be explained by taking into account the variation of preferences of member states in a particular regional integration scheme, I claim that domestic politics should be the starting point for the theory of comparative regional integration. Once state preferences are set in a given time at point, states via interstate bargains choose a regional integration scheme over others based on their preferences and calculations of costs and benefits. However, state policy preferences themselves are affected and thus reshaped, over time, by regional institutions. Thus the depth and evolution of regional integration over time is a function of the degree of divergence of the participating states? policy preferences, the degree of negotiated agreements of major states, and degree of harmony between current institutions and member states? expectations on them. Put another way, interactions between preferences, interstate bargaining, and institutions produce the outcome of regional integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between Russia and the West are in decline. The range of issues where Russia and the western powers are in disagreement is broad and widening, but all of them have huge significance for the future of Europe. The Russian vision of Europe puts emphasis on the sovereign right of the state to run its own business, while the western interpretation promotes what is presented as universal values of democracy and human rights which are to supersede sovereignty as the key foundational principle of the European political system. The result is that Russia and the West increasingly see each other as two separate - and often opposed - subjects of world politics, and this conflict of vision - at least in the case of Russia - increasingly turns into a constitutive antagonism, which defines the boundaries of political community and determines its identity. This paper analyses some important aspects of this relationship, with the primary focus on Russia. Putting forward the slogan of sovereign democracy and thus insisting on its right to be democratic in its own way, Russia functions in western discourse as an irreducible signifier, an identity which cannot be described as enemy and thus fully driven into the outside, but which, hanging in-between, produces dislocation in the structure of meaning which underlies the entire (neo)liberal world order. This discursive position quite naturally causes irritation on the part of the western policy-makers and analysts, but Russia too, on its part, becomes increasingly frustrated with its failure to obtain recognition for its new identity by the most relevant Other, the West. I argue that, given the peculiar structural position of Russia in the globalizing world, some of these disappointments might have emancipatory potential. However, security practices both in the domestic and international context drive Russia away from using this potential and lead, instead, to the intensification of the binary antagonism between Russia and the West, very much in the spirit of the cold war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Rhetorical action" is one of the most promising explanations of the EU expansion to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It claims that even though the immediate economic gains for existing member states from expansion to CEE are negligible, the CEE states were able to draw on prior rhetorical commitments within EU to equal and fair consideration of all applications for membership to exert moral and symbolic pressure and to obtain the more tangible benefits of EU membership. Thus, this explanation begins to engage with the question of the different kinds of power - material, symbolic - that can be brought to bear in international negotiations between states (and international organizations). In this paper, I discuss the interplay between material and symbolic forms of power within the logic of honour to sharpen these analytical distinctions in order to account for the paradoxes, tensions and possibilities contained in relations between states who have to maintain the important presumption that they are (formally) equal entities while remaining constrained by asymmetrical distributions of material power (economic, military, political). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of international governance has been a central preoccupation in the field of international relations. From the theories of cooperation developed by liberal institutionalists to the theories of the internationalization of the state advanced by Neogramscians, the issue of how states formalize arrangements in order to govern social phenomena that are transnational has represented a central challenge in the discipline. This chapter explores the way politics and social relations are constantly evacuated in discussions of regimes in international relations. It argues that in focusing on the formal features of international regimes, traditional and, many critical approaches, systematically objectify regimes in a way that make it difficult to understand their socio-historical significance. It is not sufficient, when looking at the social nature of these regimes, to posit that regimes are designed according to dominant social interests (be they national interests or social interests). One also needs to situate these institutions in the context of social struggles around power. In missing this point, traditional approaches tend to exaggerate the convergence of interest around these regimes, their coherence, and their stability. More fundamentally, the paper stresses that without an analysis of social relations, these approaches cannot fully grasp the reason why cooperation emerges in certain fields and evolves in particular historical directions to take distinctive forms. After a theoretical discussion of the question of cooperation in IR and IPE, it moves in the second section to discuss the political struggles around monetary governance in the late 19th century which led to widespread adoption of the gold standard in Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing importance of international humanitarian and human rights law has been fuelled by an increasing awareness of the need to address post-conflict trauma. Theorisation of trauma and law is primarily liberal, although there is increasing postmodern dissent; however, there are major problems with both approaches. This paper examines a critical theoretical approach to trauma and justice, with particular emphasis on the writings of Gillian Rose, a major figure in contemporary European social theory but virtually unknown in International Relations. Rose is critical of both liberal and postmodern approaches to law. She agrees with the postmodern position that contemporary law has given rise to 'proud and deadly dualisms' which must be transcended and that the discourse of human rights masks the realities of inequality and domination. However, she disagrees with the postmodern assertion that human law is inherently and inescapably violent. Rose proposes an alternative path to that proposed by liberal and postmodern theorists: unlike the liberals, she emphasises the trauma inherent for so many in everyday life and the necessity of acknowledging and mourning this; unlike the postmoderns, she would not have us mourn indefinitely: instead, she asserts that we must move forward by constructively engaging in political risk. I will examine these two strands of Rose's ethical position - mourning and political risk - in turn. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The alternative globalization movement has been undergoing profound changes since the Seattle protests in 1999. The September 11, 2001 attacks clearly influenced the movement?s dynamics. In the United States, organized labor withdrew from the coalition and globally American foreign policy, war and peace gained prominence on activists? agenda. At the same time, the decline in the number of globalization demonstrations in the United States did not signal the disappearance of the movement. Rather the movement has shifted strategies to ones that garner less media attention, with many groups focusing on lobbying and grassroots education. Europe has continued to experience large-scale demonstrations with protesters focusing on alternatives to economic globalization and voicing critiques of U. S. foreign policy. Countries in the Global South saw the persistence of local protests focusing on structural adjustment policies that had first emerged during the 1980s. Additionally, both in the Global South and in Europe large social forums have been bringing together large numbers of activists, NGOs and academics to establish networks and explore policy alternatives to the dominant neoliberal agenda. This paper traces the evolution of the alternative globalization movement and investigates the reasons behind these clear regional differences in contention. In particular, it focuses on the influence of local political opportunities structures and historical legacies in shaping the different patterns of contestation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As far as most IR theory is concerned, world politics could take place in silence. States certainly communicate, but this could occur without states saying a word to each other. By itself, talk is cheap. This seems odd, since in their attempts to manage problems states have long found it important to talk to each other in public, conference diplomacy. In this paper I argue that, when inter-state talk is public, i.e., when it takes place in a forum, it generates structures of collective intentionality, which helps cause self-restraint and steer states toward jointly desired outcomes. Forum talk does this by constituting, fixing, and keeping salient a perspective of the whole. Much of the energy in the current IR literature on talk is directed at adjudicating between a ?rationalist? logic of consequences and a ?constructivist? logic of appropriateness. But drawing out the forum effects of talk makes clear that talk matters more than rationalist theorizing allows, yet without implying everything that constructivist theorizing suggests. I apply the theory to Concert of Europe deliberations. Demonstrating the power of talk in this hard case allows us to make sense of an important mode of contemporary global governance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explain European behaviour in the American world order. Thus, I seek to answer two interrelated questions: What characterizes European behaviour in the unipolar world order? How is this behaviour explained? In order to answer these questions I begin from structural realist premises and explore how changes and continuity in relative power, relative ideology and relative security affect the European propensity to bandwagon with or balance the United States. The overall conclusion is that the European grand strategy is best characterised as hard bandwagoning with soft balancing at the margins. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives a viewpoint on a controversial issue of transnational regional cooperation (TRC) in Europe and Eurasia covering the analysis of cooperation between Europe and the regions of post-Soviet Russia. By promoting the favorable regime of transnational regional cooperation, both sides become more effective in managing such common problems as mutual security, political, economic and environmental challenges; illegal immigration; drug- and human-trafficking; etc. What is needed for the successful development of TRC in Eurasian context? What factors make a crucial impact on the development of regional cooperation, whether it is further ?inclusion? or ?exclusion? of the regions from cooperation with European neighbors? Is it the geopolitical location of the regions that makes regional cooperation more feasible or are there other factors that influence the success of this process? How might the regulatory and administrative tools of central government facilitate or complicate this process? The study addresses the role of ethnicity, economical development, and geopolitical factors in the establishment and development of transnational regional cooperation. It also investigates the importance of ?domestic-policy factors? (reforms in the federal governments) in the development of TRC. Theoretically speaking, it focuses on the process of the regionalization of foreign policy as compared with the process of federalization and the interplay of domestic and foreign factors in the process of regime transition within the post-Soviet regions. More precisely, it examines the factors that facilitate the development of regional cooperation with international partners, and also the impact of this cooperation on the process of democratization within the regions. The initiative of European countries and organizations are the most important, and, therefore, their ?neighbourhood?s effect? is likely to be the most influential external factor in the process of transition once transition is analyzed, not on national, but on the regional level. Thus, the analysis approaches the phenomenon of regional cooperation with Europe as both a dependent and an independent variable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term ?sovereignty? figures prominently in international affairs. But does ?sovereignty? mean the same thing in different countries and political cultures? In this paper, I examine conceptions of sovereignty as they appear in the writings of US scholars of international relations (IR) and international law, in order to obtain a clearer picture of what ?sovereignty? means in that particularly influential country ? with a somewhat surprising result. I argue that at first glance, the US literature is characterised by two distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) A statist conception that privileges the territorial integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their internal characteristics; (2) A popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are committed by a totalitarian regime. I conclude however that these two conceptions are in fact manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sovereignty which is capable of encompassing these two distinct notions of sovereignty. The US conception of sovereignty is able to do this because it regards itself and its role in the world as unique and different from all other states. Consequently, its conception of sovereignty elevates the US above other countries and protects it against outside influences while, concurrently, maximising its ability to intervene overseas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critiques of mainstream International Relations theory have focused primarily on its Eurocentricity, as well as on the fundamental silences and distortions, that characterise the historical accounts on which it depends. However, critical theorists have yet to draw attention to two of the most problematic aspects of these accounts. First, critical perspectives have left largely unexamined and, in fact, tend to reproduce, Europe?s profoundly erroneous, highly ideological representation of its own history. Second, while critical perspectives are generally critical of nationalist historiography and binary schemas they tend, nonetheless, to focus on whole nations or regions. By leaving intact much of its historical as well as its ontological basis, critical theories actually serve to reinforce, rather than to undermine, mainstream International Relations theory. The aim of this paper is to bring into view an alternative history and ontology. It, first, highlights a number of myths that distort our understanding of the broad historical period on which much of contemporary International Relations theory is based. It, then, endeavors to show how structures and processes obscured by these myths, produce elements of an alternative ontology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s the institutionalisation of a common European foreign policy has made enormous progress and transformed formerly national foreign policies into a complex postnational system within the European Union (EU). This growing formation of an European security discourse is accompanied by changing security practises, especially the implementation of EU-led military mission. The framing of ?new? threats and the institutionalisation of ?new? practices rise the question whether these developments will challenge the granted civilian identity of the EU in international affairs. Poststructuralist approaches have addressed the identity/security nexus and contributed an alternative research agenda for foreign policy analysis. Where concepts like identity and security are relational and remain contested their meaning has to be (re-) produced through discourses and practices.The central goal of the proposed paper is to address the security/identity nexus and ask how the security practices of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) constitute a genuine form of EU?s identity in the world and how this reframing of European identity lashes back on the shape of the security discourse and the possibility of new security practices. I argue that especially the case of ESDP and the question of military resources and missions is convenient to investigate the identity/security nexus because it seduces national priorities over the use of force abroad. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to most predictions and contemporary analysis, innovation with regard to strategic doctrine, military posture, and institutions has left the deep structure of the U.S.-European security bargain intact. The allocation of rights and responsibilities among the contracting parties to guarantee each others? security interests has survived the end of the Cold War. The United States continues to exercise robust leadership, and the Europeans have sustained recognition of their junior status vis-à-vis the Americans, thus making transatlantic security cooperation an instance of enduring hierarchy. This paper defends this non-conventional empirical claim, and offers a logic that explains stability at the level of deep structure.To defend the empirical claim, I do two things: First, I conceptualize the transatlantic security relationship of the Cold War era as a multi-dimensional contract, whose parties have entered into a hierarchical (authority) relationship. In contrast to (Realist) advocates of the discontinuity thesis, transatlantic security cooperation served not only to collectively defend against an external threat, but provided mechanisms that allowed the contracting parties to reassure each other of their benign intentions. In contrast to recent influential contributions in the (Liberal-institutionalist) continuity school, I emphasize that the European allies conferred special rights and privileges on the United States so that its asymmetric share of the material burden went hand in hand with an asymmetric amount of (legitimate) political discretion, yielding hierarchy. After defining the status quo baseline in this fashion, I show that the contracting parties have not decisively deviated from it either prior to or since the end of the Cold War.Existing explanations for the trajectory of U.S.-EU relations fall short in three ways: First, they do not capture the assertiveness with which the United States has pushed for a strategic reorientation of the security bargain, both prior to and after the events of 9/11. Second, they neglect to reflect on the prevailing lack of intra-European consensus with regard to security and defense policies. Finally, in ignoring the dynamics just mentioned, they sidestep the actual puzzle: Why, despite a U.S. drive for change at the operational level, and a lack of unified European loyalty to the original bargain, has the status quo prevailed? I argue that the deep structure of transatlantic security cooperation has remained stable for two reasons. First, its European partners have recognized that the bargain underlying the European Union cannot be modified so as to present a functional substitute for junior membership in the transatlantic club. In fact, the vitality of the intra-European bargain, both before and after its post-1990 amendments, is structurally dependent on the preservation of the transatlantic status quo. Second, in light of Europe?s voluntary subordination, the United States recommitted to the transatlantic alliance, since it allowed for the exercise of robust European, and by extension, global leadership without the exigencies that power projection through ad hoc coalitions of the willing impose. This project contributes both to the substantive debate on transatlantic security relations, and to theoretical discussions over the relative conceptual and explanatory validity of balancing and binding models in security studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interactions between the Chinese empire and European International Society prior to the latter?s expansion into Asia have been subject of much fascination. The irreconcilable differences in diplomatic customs and the ?failure? to establish any meaningful diplomatic relations between Europe and China have typically been seen as a form of a ?clash of civilisations?. This picture, however, is misleading in that it suggests that the encounter of China and Europe had hardly any impact on either the Chinese international order or European International Society. It has been argued elsewhere that the discovery of the New World contributed to the rise of a distinctive ?European? identity. However, how did the so-called ?clash? of China and Europe prior to the nineteenth century impact on European senses of the ?Self?? This paper explores these issues by re-examining the English School?s depiction of the expansion of European International Society, as well as the Society?s earlier interactions with the Chinese empire. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social cohesion is to day the most visible item on the bilateral agenda of the Latin American-Europe relationship. This decision has been taken by the commission 11 months before the Guadalajara Summit of may 2004. It will probably be on eof the main topics at the Vienna Summit in May 2006. This paper will try to analyse what this decision means theoretically and practically for the development of the bilateral relations between both continents. We shall address in particular the followings two questions:What is social cohesion and is there a clear and common definition? Is it a solid basis to develop a strong relationship between both regions? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thesis of this paper is that the European engagement with Cuba is a successful and effective policy. Such policy, enunciated in the 1996 European Common Position toward Cuba, is based in well-founded moral democratic principles of respect for sovereignty and human rights. At the same time, the EU policy allows space for legitimate economic interests and is realistic in its expectations. European policies are efficient because they engage the Cuban people, all the way up to the hierarchy, in a daily debate for wider acceptance of human rights and market economy principles while promoting Cuba?s and European countries? national interests. European policies should be judged on the merits of the goals of the 1996 Common policy goals not by the metric of how much it helps U.S foreign policy goals of regime change. Europe is not interested in creating a political vacuum to fill with the right wing exiles that are the poster boys of the American strategy. On the contrary, the 1996 EU Common Position provides coordination among the European countries individual policies toward achieving three goals that are deeply intertwined: 1) Encourage improvement in human rights standards, 2) Support a transition to a market economy and 3) Improve the standards of living of the Cuban people through economic engagement. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 29 May 2005 the French electorate said 'no' to the EU's Constitutional Treaty in a referendum. The treaty, which had been negotiated by a European Convention (2002-2003) and an Intergovernmental Conference (2003-2004), was the EU's response to perceived needs to strengthen the organization's legitimacy and efficiency after enlargement with 10 new members in 2004. The French 'no' has increased the likelihood that the treaty will never enter into force. What went wrong? This paper will in particular analyse why a number of states that did not constitutionally need a referendum chose this risky strategy of ratification. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will delve into the three main dimensions of explicit and implicit security management and discuss the relative achievements and shortcomings vis-à-vis the establishment of stable and secure ASEAN-China relations in these three areas. I will begin with an overview of the changing discourse on security in the post Cold War era before turning to the three case studies. The first case will look at the management of traditional security with regards to the disputes in the South China Sea. The second case elaborates on non-traditional security based on the example of environmental and energy security in the GMS. The third case focuses on what I call here the umbrella dimension of security management: ASEAN’s and China’s partly complementary and partly competing attempts at contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a multilateral order in line with the two sides’ security interests and strategies. An assessment of the so-called ASEAN Way of informal, consensus-oriented and non-confrontational diplomacy – the main pillar of multilateral dialogue cooperation not only in Southeast Asia but also increasingly the entire Asia-Pacific mega-region and in Asia-Europe relations – will feature prominently in the following. I will argue that ASEAN has become progressively inefficient at managing security due to an ever growing gap between political vision and reality as well as ASEAN’s mythical believe of being able to weather today’s international challenges with a very modest set of soft institutions that has not seen any significant amendments for the past four decades. While ASEAN’s international status as a collective actor and credibility as an organization has suffered from its inability to reform the ASEAN Way, other actors, mainly China, have markedly benefited to the extent that the PRC is gradually assuming ASEAN’s traditional role as the architect of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. Security management in ASEAN-China relations seems to be all the more promising and effective the less the specific approach is solely based on norms and procedures enshrined in the ASEAN Way and the more it is guided by pragmatic policy strategies in well-defined issue areas, particularly in the area of non-traditional security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There remains significant disagreement among scholars of European and international policy-making about the analytical status of multi-level governance. For some it is the most adequate theoretical account, while others see it as a conceptual tool, a purely descriptive framework or metaphor to recognise the involvement of regions, states and international institutions in complex international decision-making processes. This paper identifies the strengths and weaknesses of multi-level governance approaches by going beyond a narrow 'Eurocentristic' understanding and by using the debates surrounding the formation of a Common Economic Space (CES) among Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine as an explorative case study. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is frequently argued that European trade unions would have participated in the neo-liberal restructuring of the social relations of production in Europe through an emphasis on a social partnership approach. This paper will critically evaluate these claims and assess whether unions have actually accepted neo-liberalism or whether they could still play a role in resistance to restructuring. Empirically, this analysis will provide a comparative analysis of French and Swedish trade unions. While the French labour movement is characterised by low unionisation levels and little institutionalised impact on policy-making, they have been rather successful at mobilising for demonstrations and strikes. Swedish unions, on the other hand, enjoy one of the highest unionisation levels in the industrialised world and excellent access to policy-making. They are, however, less active in the mobilisation for strikes. Theoretically, this analysis will be based on a neo-Gramscian perspective, able to conceptualise the restructuring processes related to globalisation as well as to assess the underlying rationale of trade unions strategies. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the USSR, we have seen total transformation of Finnish foreign policy. It includes membership in the European Union, diversification of economic and political ties with neighboring countries, involvement into creation of security architecture in Europe. The aim of the paper is to analyze main trends in Finnish foreign policy, defining priorities of Helsinki?s policy towards Central Europe and Baltic States as well as prospects for Finnish-Russian relations after EU and NATO enlargement in May 2004.The author is going to answer following questions: 1)What are political and economic interests of Finland in Central Europe?2)Is there separate Finnish policy towards Central Europe, which differs from Finnish position towards European Union in general?3)What kind of impact new Finnish policy towards Central European and Baltic countries may have for Finnish-Russian relations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

9/11 and the war on terror seemed to expose the limits of a truly common foreign and security policy, as the big three EU member states ? Germany, Britain and France ? scrambled for national influence in the war in Afghanistan at the expense of EU unity. Each claimed to speak for Europe, given that the EU CFSP lacked the capabilities of going beyond declarations of solidarity with the US, but did so against the objection (and over the heads) of smaller member states as well as the Belgian Presidency and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana. Given the continuous efforts since the creation of CFSP in 1993 to construct a common foreign policy, the question that arises from these events is whether the events of 9/11 and the US-led war on terror have exposed the limits of Europeanization understood as a convergence of views towards a common foreign policy, or whether the changed geo-strategic landscape and US military dominance have not fundamentally changed national commitments to CFSP. This paper will analyse the policies of Britain, France and Germany towards CFSP using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. It will explore the attitudes of the three member states towards CFSP to determine whether the British, French and German foreign policies were a sign for the permanent re-assertion of informal directorates in CFSP or a national struggle for assertion in a changed geo-strategic landscape at the expense of CFSP, and what consequences this is likely to have on the institution itself. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the duo security/identity within the European Union. I argue that in the absence of an "existential threat" security is a function of identity. Therefore, different visions of security at the level of the Union - stemming from different identities - act as a brake with respect to the creation of a viable European common defense. In order to illustrate my thesis I explore the connection between security and identity in France, Great Britain, and Germany. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Euro-Mediterranean relations constitute a sui generis example of regional integration. With the end of the cold war, growing immigratin flows from North Africa towards Europe, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and international tensions resulting from the war in Iraq and the "war on terror," the Middle East and North Africa have become a crucial area of interest in the external relations of the EU. The EU has developed a wide variety of political and economic mechanisms designed to promote stabiity and cooperation. Although the discourse of the EU officially rejects the paradigm of the "clash of civilizations" between the West and Islam, Europe continues to struggle to find a way to accomodate muslims in Europe as well as in the Islamic countries. This paper discusses how the issue of Islam, considered as both a religion and a culture, is dealt with in Euro-Mediterranean relations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EU has a long history for its enlargement whose main driving force to do it has been peace keeping attempts (between France and Germany in particular) and has taken steps toward full scale integration including a common currency. It has been for sure a great job, which has also brought serious issue into international relations, that is to say, multipolar considerations, USA, EU and others. The purpose of our paper is to investigate what is the multipolar global system, asking if it consists of USA, EU, Japan and China, asking if it is initiated by shared-interests etc., from interdisciplinary points of view. In order to examine such issue, we will have a comparative analysis on possibilities of further steps toward East Asian integration with EU Enlargement procedures. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dynasticism played a major role in the conduct of war, peace, and diplomacy in early modern Europe. For much of the period, rulers fought wars mainly to advance claims to territory stemming from marriage and inheritance. Take two examples. First, over the course of a few years Charles of Habsburg managed to acquire effective control over large swaths of Europe by virtue of inheritance. The effect was the rapid formation of a hegemonic power with serious implications for the security of other political communities. Second, Francis I embroiled France in a costly series of wars for hegemony in Italy, yet he did not pursue territorial expansion in other regions, such western Germany, that would have been both easier to achieve and more strategically advantageous for France. The reason? Francis lacked dynastic claims to those regions.All of this suggests that dynastic norms led to very different practices of international politics. But how are we to best understand the relationship between those norms and political behaviors? This paper considers three approaches: structural realism, mainline systemic constructivism, and Krasner's notion of "organized hypocrisy." Evidence from the early modern European experience is both consistent and inconsistent with aspects of all three approaches, which suggests interesting ways that they can be combined to account for systemic variations in the conduct of international affairs.. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger lamented: ?When I want to call Europe, I cannot find a phone number.? Since then the institutional momentum of the European Union (EU) has increased considerably. One of the goals is to create a continuous and stable Common Foreign and Security Policy of the member states. Yet, the foreign policies of the three major states within this Union ? Germany, France, and Great Britain ? often continue to diverge. In this paper I argue with Douglas North that international institutions such as the EU are ?shared mental models? and despite being objective physical facts, they are ?cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors? ideas about how the world works.? More specifically, I argue that the conditions for convergence or divergence and the viability of the EU?s desired Common Foreign and Security Policy are located in the belief systems of national leaders. Common perceptions of a security externality and common prescriptions towards it are a necessary condition for convergence. The sufficient condition, however, is the translation of these beliefs into similar strategic orientations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pre-Westphalian politics in Europe, particularly before 1517, are often either ignored by the IR literature as insignificant or are cariacatured with labels such as "medieval," shades of "heteronomy," or a time of the "unity of Christendom." The English School is to be lauded for the attention it does give to this period, but it falls into these same cliches and traps. This paper tries to unpack these easy descriptors and advance English School thinking on this period by looking at two somewhat rival sets of political practices, bundled under the terms "dynasticism" and "Christendom." I first look at the kinds of political relations these two entailed, and second, examine how they inter-related across much of the fifteenth century. Dynasticism, grand family politics, contending dynastic claims, etc., do explain alot of what happened in this period, but it is especially interesting to see the ways these interact with Christendom's and the Church's own international politics, in their waxing, waning and mutating. In examining events such as the Councils of Siena, Constance and Basel, Church efforts at international peace-making, various crusading initiatives, and dynastic state-building (especially Louis XI of France, 1461-1483), one obtains an improved, more nuanced sense of the patterns of "international" politics in early European international society as they changed in this important period, and of the transformations that came after it. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1940s both Carl Schmitt and Hans J. Morgenthau contemplated the destruction of the old European states-system. Schmitt's major work in this connection is The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, first published in 1950, (first English ed. 2003) but written in the early 1940s; Morgenthau wrote extensively on the subject, but the text that will form the focus of this paper is "The Twilight of International Morality" drawn from Politics among Nations and published in Ethics in January 1948. Although the language employed is very different, and Schmitt's emphasis on the spatial dimension of the European international order is largely absent in Morgenthau, there are striking points of agreement between these two German legal philosophers whose personal histories were so different; they agree in regarding the "bracketing" of war as a duel between sovereigns, characteristic of the old order, as the most effective basis for restraints on the use of force, and agree that in the current international order these restraints have been undermined. They disagree dramatically, however, when it comes to the reasons for this change; for Schmitt, it is the universalism and liberalism of the new internationa law associated with the US and, to a lesser extent, Britain that undermined the old European order, while for Morgenthau it is the combination of universalism and nationalism that has been crucial in challenging the universal ethics of the old order. Schmitt?s account is obviously self-serving but it has some resonance in terms of 21st century international politics, especially with respect to contemporary critiques of Western 'humanitarianism'; Morgenthau's account appears on the face of it to be rather less sophisticated than Schmitt's, but, arguably, actually goes deeper to the roots of the problem. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how the contemporary global international society came about as a result of the expansion to planetary scale of a novel type of a society that emerged in Europe. A global international society may emerged from various civilizational cores of the ancient and classical world and from the takeover of the whole system by one of the civilizational cores. It outlines the classical expansion story in English school literature, as well as how the expansion literature is evolving.

The “war-makes-states” school contends that states that have survived a lengthy and escalating spiral of warfare that increasingly became total became stronger as a consequence. States that have not experienced this trajectory of escalatory warfare are l ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The threat emanating from political violence movements engaged in terrorist activities at the dawn of the 21st century poses serious questions relative to the benchmarks for operational counter-terrorism forces. Many cannot meet the demands set by a mode ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]