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The interactions between the Chinese empire and European International Society prior to the latter?s expansion into Asia have been subject of much fascination. The irreconcilable differences in diplomatic customs and the ?failure? to establish any meaningful diplomatic relations between Europe and China have typically been seen as a form of a ?clash of civilisations?. This picture, however, is misleading in that it suggests that the encounter of China and Europe had hardly any impact on either the Chinese international order or European International Society. It has been argued elsewhere that the discovery of the New World contributed to the rise of a distinctive ?European? identity. However, how did the so-called ?clash? of China and Europe prior to the nineteenth century impact on European senses of the ?Self?? This paper explores these issues by re-examining the English School?s depiction of the expansion of European International Society, as well as the Society?s earlier interactions with the Chinese empire. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will delve into the three main dimensions of explicit and implicit security management and discuss the relative achievements and shortcomings vis-à-vis the establishment of stable and secure ASEAN-China relations in these three areas. I will begin with an overview of the changing discourse on security in the post Cold War era before turning to the three case studies. The first case will look at the management of traditional security with regards to the disputes in the South China Sea. The second case elaborates on non-traditional security based on the example of environmental and energy security in the GMS. The third case focuses on what I call here the umbrella dimension of security management: ASEAN’s and China’s partly complementary and partly competing attempts at contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a multilateral order in line with the two sides’ security interests and strategies. An assessment of the so-called ASEAN Way of informal, consensus-oriented and non-confrontational diplomacy – the main pillar of multilateral dialogue cooperation not only in Southeast Asia but also increasingly the entire Asia-Pacific mega-region and in Asia-Europe relations – will feature prominently in the following. I will argue that ASEAN has become progressively inefficient at managing security due to an ever growing gap between political vision and reality as well as ASEAN’s mythical believe of being able to weather today’s international challenges with a very modest set of soft institutions that has not seen any significant amendments for the past four decades. While ASEAN’s international status as a collective actor and credibility as an organization has suffered from its inability to reform the ASEAN Way, other actors, mainly China, have markedly benefited to the extent that the PRC is gradually assuming ASEAN’s traditional role as the architect of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. Security management in ASEAN-China relations seems to be all the more promising and effective the less the specific approach is solely based on norms and procedures enshrined in the ASEAN Way and the more it is guided by pragmatic policy strategies in well-defined issue areas, particularly in the area of non-traditional security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers insights on a dynamic theory of world politics in China and Europe. It says that ancient China was similar to early modern Europe in both international and domestic politics. Also discussed are the building blocks of such a theory, including strategic interaction of strategies and mechanisms. The building blocks were used to develop a dynamic theory by starting with Eurocentric perspectives of international politics.

Classical Chinese military thought is undoubtedly a precious cultural heritage from the East. However, the US-led West has thus far a limited understanding of the true beauty of the strategic thinking in this treasure house. This study uses the world’s oldest board game, Weiqi (or Go), to bring out the essence of classical Chinese military and strategic thinking. The game of Weiqi bears striking resemblance to international relations and warfare. It also exemplifies the Chinese military classics to a remarkable extent. Weiqi has also been a national game of Japan for well over 1,500 years. It is currently very popular in China, Japan, Korea, and is spreading rapidly across the European and American continents (thanks to the development of internet). As the hegemonic United States seeks to maintain a strategic edge over a rising Pacific Asia, a little knowledge of this ancient board game will take US national leaders a long way in understanding Eastern strategic thinking and achieving the US foreign policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By examining China?s entry into the European international system in the late 19th century, this article seeks to add in a non-western perspective to the English school scholarship on the expansion of the European international system. The expansion of the European international system to the other parts of the world often accomplished through gunboats and coercion. This experience of being coerced indeed had a significant effect on how those non-western states understood norm, power, and the nature of inter-state relations. Yet, while acknowledging the role of the military factor in the expansion of the European international system, conventional English school scholarship hasn?t paid enough attention to the impact of coercion on the non-western states? socializing process. Too often it was assumed that the norm of sovereignty and equality among states was transmitted to and was socialized by non-western states through the expansion of the system. However, a careful examination of China?s entry into the European international system in the 19th century illustrates that assumption is probably wrong. Being defeated and then forced to adapt to the treaty system, Chinese mandarins and elites gradually learnt to follow the western diplomatic practice and use the western norms to protect China?s interest. In the mean time, however, they also learnt from the painful experience that the rules were set by the powerful and the powerful could do whatever it wants to the weak. As such, while China learnt to adapt to the rules and norms of the European international system, it also internalized the logic of power politic and the ?organized hypocrisy? of the European international system, which probably set the roots for China?s cynical and suspicious attitudes toward international society later on. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]