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Based on a questionnaire that was administered to 75 defence policy actors in France, Germany, the UK and in Brussels, this paper explores the beliefs system of European defence actors with a view to identifying the main points of convergence and the main fault lines that structure the European security and defence policy (ESDP). This paper's focus on social representations addresses two research questions. First, what do ESDP actors think about ESDP? Second, can we classify their preferences in terms of sociological factors that structure the ESDP domain? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competing perspectives on the role of the European Union (EU) as a foreign policy actor disagree on whether the EU could (and should) be a successful military conflict manager on the international security arena. Essential to the debate of whether it could be successful is the question of what would constitute success in this new sphere of EU foreign policy. Having undertaken extensive analysis of the institutional framework and policy processes of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within it, the existing literature has yet to agree on a shared notion of success in this realm. In effect, a theoretical framework in which to evaluate the success rate of ESDP military conflict management missions has yet to be developed. This paper therefore discusses how to define and evaluate success in this area of the ESDP and provides an analytical starting point for how to determine different degrees of success in EU military conflict management according to a set of internal and external success criteria. In this way, the paper seeks to advance Foreign Policy Analysis, the study of the CFSP and the ESDP, whilst adding also an EU specific dimension to the existing theories of military intervention and conflict management. The purpose of this undertaking is to inform the current debates concerning whether, when and how the EU should engage in military conflict management beyond its own borders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter focuses on the formation of modern regions as a precursor to the discussion of their transformation in later chapters. It defines regions as geographically clustered subsystems of states within larger international systems/societies. It stresses the extent to which the existence of regions depends on both how distance matters in relation to interaction capacity, and on the prevalence or not of empires in the system. It looks at the formative processes of contemporary regions by identifying four different routes by which today's regions came to be: the unbroken self-making of Europe, and for the rest, various types of encounter with Europe involving different degrees of disconnection between today's regions and their earlier history: repopulation, colonization/decolonization and encounter/reform. The chapter then looks at the development processes of modern regions since decolonization using regional security complex theory to capture strategic interaction, and international society to capture socio-political structures. Since both of these perspectives are statecentric, differences in type of state are an important part of the analysis. The paper concludes by looking at how this combination of formative and developmental processes is likely to play out in relations between the regional and global levels of the international system/society over the coming decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to expand the theoretical concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex (MERSC) (Buzan and Waever 2004), based on the literature e.g. on security, regional integration, development and global governance towards a Euro-Mediterranea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-Cold War era has been characterized by a dramatic expansion of the international security agenda to include "new" wars, the role of non-state actors as security threats, the concept of "human" security, security aspects of globalization and development, and other trends, all of which add to the traditional security agenda. Although the US and Europe generally agree on the importance of these issues, they also show an increasing amount of divergence regarding whether military force is an appropriate solution. And when both sides do agree the need for military force, as in the interventions in Iraq (1991) and Kosovo, they often dispute other aspects of these operations, such as their multilateral dimension, the role of strategic bombing, protection of civilians, and so on. The increasing involvement of the EU in security affairs, largely through its European Security and Defense Policy, suggests this trend may intensify. Accordingly, this paper explores nature of such divergence and its implications for transatlantic security relations. It notes in particular the limits of several contending explanations drawn from realism (differences in power and interests) and liberalism (differences in historical experience and cultural/institutional development), and focuses instead on processes associated with learning-by-doing to explain the emergence of a European approach to international security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines developments in EU Member States’ counter-terrorism policies in the last decade. Most EU initiatives to develop a common European capacity to prevent terrorism from the mid-1990s have aimed at improving cooperation among the Member States. Concerned onlookers still wait for these efforts to produce intended results. While these problems can be attributed an unwillingness to suspend the sovereign prerogative in national security matters, another related reason is arguably that the Member States have very different national counter-terrorism legacies. Previous empirical research on counter-terrorism within the EU only gives some guidance as to whether this would be a reasonable claim. First, it has yet presented few comparable indicators of Member States’ counter-terrorism policies. All previous studies draw on case studies or, at best, comparative case studies, rendering longitudinal systematic comparison within and across polities difficult. Second, most previous research has primarily focused on an overly narrow conception of counter-terrorism policy. Urging the need for systematic studies in this area, the objective of this study is to develop a conceptual framework and an analytical method to study counter-terrorism policies of EU Member States. We proceed in two steps. First, we define counter-terrorism policy as a two-dimensional concept combining Member States’ positioning on (a) counter-terrorism ambitions and (b) civil rights ambitions. Striking a balance between these core values is the most critical challenge in the liberal democratic response to terrorism. Second, we estimate all Member States’ positioning in this two-dimensional space over time (1996-2006) by resorting to paneldata obtained from various EU bodies following key conventions related to counter-terrorism cooperation in Europe. These data will enable us to analyze the correlation between the fight against terrorism and the civil rights ambitions of the Member States. Adjacently we will be able to show how national experiences of terrorism affect cohesion and diversity among EU Member States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to systematically reconstruct the transformation of the West in order to be able to better understand how the normative foundation of the transatlantic relationship is changing through new patterns of securitization/desecuritization. Especially since 9-11, the state and future of the transatlantic relationship has been discussed passionately in both political and academic circles. The cohesiveness of the transatlantic community (of values, as it were), by and large taken for granted since the heydays of the Cold War is apparently becoming problematic. Linking US and European interests and identities the “West” purports to represent a central semantic category â€" but with a rather diffuse meaning. We propose to conceptualise the West as an empty signifier, as a placeholder for a non-defined universality with the power to integrate different interests and identities because of its emptiness. It is this very semantic structure, opening up different ways of relating to the West, which has made it possible to conceive of it as a distinct, yet unspecified form of normative order. While the content of the West thus remains unspecific, the patterns of relating to it change over time. We will reconstruct the discursive practices effecting such a gradual transformation in terms of dynamics of securitization/desecuritization, of naming potential and possible threats to the West articulated within the Transatlantic space. This opens up a perspective on transformations within the West as a political order treating change not only as an irritation measured against the past but also as the creative source of institutional consequences shaping the future. Changing ascriptions of threat, for example the transformation from a bipolar system with nuclear threats by superpowers to a multipolar system with asymmetric threats by terrorists, may trigger gradual transformations not only in the patterns of securitization/desecuritization but also in the institutional structure of transatlantic relations, especially as far as its classical institutional manifestation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is concerned. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom holds that the transatlantic relationship has changed fundamentally since the end of the cold war. Diverging power disparities, cultural predilections, and national interests have prompted America and the states of Europe to adopt incompatible foreign policy orientations that make cooperation increasingly difficult. Until Europe becomes powerful enough to balance the United States militarily, the former partners? foreign policies will continue to diverge and joint action will remain illusory. This article rejects the conventional wisdom to demonstrate that while cultural incompatibilities do lie at the heart of the transatlantic rift, a particular type of communication that takes place in specific institutional settings can ameliorate the effect of these incompatibilities. The effectiveness of this model is illustrated through an in-depth case study analysis of transatlantic efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. The conclusion extends this analysis to the recent transatlantic divisions over the war in Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US approach to ESDP is a useful illustration of how American views towards European Security have developed since the early 1990s and since 9/11. From the outset successive administrations have been consistent in warning of the dangers of wasteful duplication, divisive discrimination and divorce inducing decoupling. To prevent such developments Washington instituted the Berlin plus framework institutionalising EU functional dependence and political deference. The NATO Reaction Force robs the Headline Goals of much of its purpose. Despite this, for Washington ESDP continues to subtract more than it adds to European security. As a result the US has changed its policy approach. The Bush administration’s tone has become emollient not because it has got its way but because it no longer considers this an important topic in its priorities post 9/11. As a case study then it illustrates the changing way in which Europe, European security and NATO are viewed in Washington. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The promotion of order in the Balkans (within the context of a larger European context) has been the central policy concern of states and international organizations since the early 1990s. The existence and the persistence of the conflict seemed to challenge the new possibilities for security and stability in Europe. It is very much in response to the Balkan crises that the EU had to develop its order-promotion identity. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis this identity was transformed into committed policy-making both towards the region as well as its larger external relations. This was reflected in the understanding that the countries of the Balkans no longer represented a distant abroad but potential candidates. This shift of policy suggests that the accession, association and partnership activities of the Southeast European states can extend the EU’s order to the region by initiating the development of a nascent security community in the region. The justification for such supposition derives from the history of trust-promotion among the member states of the EU. The establishment of order in the region is made out in the promotion of security community practices in Southeastern Europe through the socialization by and in EU-initiated activities. It is significant that at the current stage, the EU involvement in the Balkans is actively engaging regional state elites in activities that intend to bring their decision-making in line with promoted standards. Therefore, the current state of affairs in Southeastern Europe can be described as the establishment of an elite security community. It is a type of a nascent security community that promotes a framework for strategic interaction between the EU and Balkan state elites, through which the EU advances its interests and values, while building regional consensus on the objectives of policy-making. The EU’s power of attraction (i.e. coercion) maintains a broad agreement on the fundamental rules of such contractual relations. The interaction among elites within this context promotes the transfer of Euro-Atlantic standards to their policy-making. In such pattern of relations, Balkan state elites are bounded by the norms of prescribed behavior (which includes regional cooperation) or risk punishment. Thus, the experiences from following prescribed patterns of behavior inform the decision-making process and modify its framework towards expected habits and policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new model for relations between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours. It argues that, against the background of the growing challenges of the European Neighbourhood Space, there is a need to think about a new model for relations between the Mediterranean Neighbourhood Partner States and the EU. The model should enable a significant upgrade of the political and security relations, as well as those in the economic, research, cultural and social/human fields. The paper departs from the assumption that the time has come to implement the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) principles and ideas and to accelerate the discussions on the development of a new strategic model. Drawing on the ENP experience, the paper proposes the creation of what it calls the ‘Privileged Union’ Model. The paper will present and discuss this new model, and will further present common tools needed to confront political, social and security challenges in the European Neighbourhood Space. The paper will also present the various programmes and agencies that could be open to all Mediterranean ‘Privileged Union’ Member States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What dynamics in the 1990s prevented the OSCE from becoming a treaty-based collective security organization? This essay seeks to answer this question and explain the lack of institutional development of the OSCE with reference to some of the leading approaches to international relations.The paper is divided into two sections. The first starts by presenting the interactions within the CSCE framework immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall. With an initial focus on the 1990 Charter for a New Europe, it compares the basic concepts of the realist and the liberal institutionalist traditions that have been applied to multilateral cooperation in the security field. What follows is the analysis of the diplomatic maneuvers that were undertaken by the most influential actors of the pan-European scenario specifically between the 1994 Budapest Summit of the CSCE and the 1996 Lisbon Meeting of the then OSCE. Focusing on the early talks for the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe (eventually concluded at the 1999 Istanbul Summit with the approval of the Charter for European Security) sheds additional light on how states are reluctant to make concessions for the sake of international cooperation if they are not certain of the benefits that they might derive from it. Hints on the negotiations for the mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities are also presented to further support this thesis.The diplomatic showdowns that occurred within the CSCE/OSCE framework throughout the 1990s provide insights into how this multilateral process perfectly mirrored the dynamics and the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era. Multilateral security cooperation in the pan-European context was conditioned by the decisions of most influential states. The paper shows that a multilateral institution with broad-based membership and extremely flexible structures like the OSCE-which was designed to promote quiet and preventive diplomacy-cannot be reformed without strong mutual interests of most relevant participating states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ?capabilities-expectations gap? is a well known and ?painful? phenomenon of the ESDP and undermines its inner legitimacy as well as its reliability vis-à-vis external actors. This gap is further exacerbated inter alia through ill-informed debates, for example those surrounding the strategic nature of the European Security Strategy. Yet it also results from the difficulties that the discipline of European Studies has in answering the question of what it is that actually generates European military capabilities. The paper will show that Strategic and Security Studies approaches can offer helpful and persuasive insights if they are combined with the theoretical knowledge and empirical context of European Studies. Therefore the paper merges the core-concepts of ?strategy?, ?security? and ?Europeanization? into an analytical framework. Such an approach offers a different perspective on the politico- military machinery of the EU and its member states. It will be shown that military capabilities are principally a result of a multi-stage, recurrent security strategy-building process, and are created as enablers to implement certain security strategy objectives. Applied to the EU through two empirical examples - Battle Groups and Armaments Cooperation ? it will be shown that EU capabilities depend on the extent of the Europeanization of strategy. This emphasises the existence and deficits of the EU?s agential and structural features that form a coherent strategic approach. In so doing, the paper contributes to a more precise understanding of the comparatively complex mechanisms that create the Union?s capabilities as part of, and depending on, a unique transnational evolution of strategy-building on the one hand, and to the assessment of the status and prospects of the EU?s capability-building as well as a reconstitution of the debate about ESS invoked expectations and capabilities on the other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are security concerns opponents of international cooperation? This paper argues that securitization is not necessarily unwanted from an internationalist perspective. To the contrary, security concerns may figure as catalysts either for self-help or for international cooperation depending on the differential characteristics with which they are being framed. Developing the notion of complex securitization, the paper categorises different ideal-typical security concern framings according to their referent object(s), rivalry, exclusiveness and agency, arguing that although some ideally-typical outlooks generate isolationist discourses others effectively empower internationalist decision-making. In this analytical framework, the current European threat environment is qualified as a modern public bad situation, i.e. a host of non-rival, non-exclusive and non-state sponsored security problems. Scaling complex securitization up to the international system, the paper argues that post-cold war Europe is marked by a convergence of this particular view among continental policymakers. This insecurity community establishes cooperative peace as a reaction to the subjectively assessed nature of the contemporary security concerns, not based on shared values. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that the European approach to security is new and distinct. Its strength lies in capitalizing on international norms, institutions, and law, while converting a variety of global connections into soft power. Multipolarity has challenged would-be hegemons who no longer wield the power to impose their values on potential dissidents and enemies, by the same token creating new opportunities for soft power. Europe seeks to wield moral authority in terms of both means and ends it pursues. In the final analysis, this paper examines to what extent moral authority, as the most critical component of soft power, has become a security tool in a multipolar world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that, even after the end of the Cold War, (neo-)realist theory continues to highlight important mechanisms of international politics. The strengths and boundaries of neorealist explanations have to be carefully explored not only for explanatory purposes but also to arrive at responsible recommendations for policy. The paper takes recent developments in the European security order as its focus and argues that the development of an autonomous EU military capability for crisis intervention (ESDP) can be conceived as part of a balancing process against preponderant U.S. power. Together EU member states aim at increasing their autonomy from the U.S. and each member state contributes to this process depending on its individual traditions of security and defence policy. Member policies towards creation and design of ESDP thus constitute a form of ?constrained balancing?: they are directed towards the common goal of maximizing autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, yet constrained by the enduring effects of past security policies as they have become embedded in international and domestic institutions. Building on neorealist and historical institutionalist thought the paper develops an analytical framework and uses a structured focused comparison of UK and German policies towards ESDP to explore the framework?s strengths and weaknesses. It concludes by outlining possible future scenarios and briefly discussing important policy implications. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states attempt to create an additional institution when they are already members of an existing institution that performs similar functions and relies on similar resources as the proposed institution? And why do we observe variation in institutional overlap? I address these questions through an examination of European efforts to create a security institution independent of NATO. The puzzle addresses the creation of multiple centers of authority and possibly power on the international level? also called heterarchy - in the form of diverse cooperative arrangements that overlap. As such, the paper feeds into several strings of IR literature: institution/alliance-building and maintenance, as well as autonomous decision-making. The units of analysis are France, Germany and the UK and the empirical cases include the European Political Cooperation, Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Policy. My own explanatory pathway combines International Relations and Comparative Politics literature. The main independent variable is the degree of ideological affinity between political parties on the international level. I intend to show that they account for different international outcomes over time. I argue that the existence and form of institutional overlap depends on the constellation of party ideologies on the international level. If one observes ideological similarities on the international level, new institutions will be developed - assuming these ideologies are consistent with the creation of a new institution. If, however, one observes ideological diversity, then institution building will be inhibited - regardless of the content of the ideologies. New external events/shocks can drive new thinking about institution to be created, but the relative success in creating such an institution depends on the extent to which ideologies in favor of building a new security institution are shared. This hypothesis is contrasted to two sets of hypotheses derived from major schools of thought: realism and neoliberal institutionalism. Through theory testing, I draw insights from elements of these alternative theories with the most explanatory power. I do not treat these explanations necessarily as mutually exclusive, but instead, I expect them to partially complement each other. This argument will be tested with the creation of an index based on the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset. While the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset was used at times to support arguments that party ideologies matter, neither that argument nor this method has found broader application in European Union studies or International Relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a new approach to studying Europe’s external relations. It has become analytically indefensible to study Europe either as a model or an actor in isolation from the other, for two simple reasons. First, the EU’s ‘presence’ â€" that is, the perceptions others have of it as well as the effects it has on others â€" is now increasingly determined by the Union’s ‘actorness’: its ability to act as a coherent, autonomous and endowed agent in international politics (with a legal personality, diplomatic corps, and so on), and vice versa. Second, the new security environment enhances both the EU’s attraction as a model and the importance of both its policy role (actual or potential) over border security, migration, counterterrorism, energy dependency, trans-border crime, and its template for other regions seeking to reconcile economic free movement and human rights protection with adequate security controls. In short, a holistic inquest into the consequences of Europe assesses its impact on international politics both because of what it is â€" a model for other regions of the world â€" as well as what it does. Because it is doing more than ever in foreign policy (broadly defined), it is no longer safe to conclude that the EU influences international politics more because it attracts than because it interacts with other regions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1992 Maastricht Agreement gave hope to some of the more optimistic EU scholars, policy makers, and other observers that a new era of foreign, security, and defense policy integration among EU member states was near. After some fifteen years since the signing of the Maastricht Agreement it is appropriate to take stock of the extent to which European states have been able to forge an "ever closer union" in foreign, security, and defense policy.Integration in these areas has neither achieved what the most optimistic EU observers had anticipated nor has it failed as miserably as the most pessimistic had predicted. The results are rather mixed. Variation among EU member states regarding the level of support for closer integration in foreign, security, and defense policy persists, and as the prelude to the Iraq War in 2003 demonstrated, EU member states are not immune to a complete breakdown in their foreign and security policy objectives.Such shifts from periods of greater foreign, security, and defense policy coordination to more fractious periods is part of a broader research question in international relations. States go through periods of intense coordination in the realms of foreign and security policy only to see complete disintegration and breakdown at other points. What explains this variation? This paper looks at the nature of foreign, security, and defense policy coordination and breakdown between states and at these dynamics among EU member states in particular. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the EU has reacted to specific types of security threat, contribute to a range of security governance functions and coordinate its activities within the system of European security governance. A further aim will be to examine the challenges of the EU in areas where coordination with other security organizations has either failed or taken place, and investigate the factors which either promote or inhibit cooperation among the security organizations. The article suggests that the concept of security governance, although complex in its application, offers certain advantages for the study of security that are not evident in other international relations approaches; significantly the ability to identify security threats more clearly, and to assess more effectively how security threats are managed in a multi-level and multi-actor setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s the institutionalisation of a common European foreign policy has made enormous progress and transformed formerly national foreign policies into a complex postnational system within the European Union (EU). This growing formation of an European security discourse is accompanied by changing security practises, especially the implementation of EU-led military mission. The framing of ?new? threats and the institutionalisation of ?new? practices rise the question whether these developments will challenge the granted civilian identity of the EU in international affairs. Poststructuralist approaches have addressed the identity/security nexus and contributed an alternative research agenda for foreign policy analysis. Where concepts like identity and security are relational and remain contested their meaning has to be (re-) produced through discourses and practices.The central goal of the proposed paper is to address the security/identity nexus and ask how the security practices of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) constitute a genuine form of EU?s identity in the world and how this reframing of European identity lashes back on the shape of the security discourse and the possibility of new security practices. I argue that especially the case of ESDP and the question of military resources and missions is convenient to investigate the identity/security nexus because it seduces national priorities over the use of force abroad. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

9/11 and the war on terror seemed to expose the limits of a truly common foreign and security policy, as the big three EU member states ? Germany, Britain and France ? scrambled for national influence in the war in Afghanistan at the expense of EU unity. Each claimed to speak for Europe, given that the EU CFSP lacked the capabilities of going beyond declarations of solidarity with the US, but did so against the objection (and over the heads) of smaller member states as well as the Belgian Presidency and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana. Given the continuous efforts since the creation of CFSP in 1993 to construct a common foreign policy, the question that arises from these events is whether the events of 9/11 and the US-led war on terror have exposed the limits of Europeanization understood as a convergence of views towards a common foreign policy, or whether the changed geo-strategic landscape and US military dominance have not fundamentally changed national commitments to CFSP. This paper will analyse the policies of Britain, France and Germany towards CFSP using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. It will explore the attitudes of the three member states towards CFSP to determine whether the British, French and German foreign policies were a sign for the permanent re-assertion of informal directorates in CFSP or a national struggle for assertion in a changed geo-strategic landscape at the expense of CFSP, and what consequences this is likely to have on the institution itself. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger lamented: ?When I want to call Europe, I cannot find a phone number.? Since then the institutional momentum of the European Union (EU) has increased considerably. One of the goals is to create a continuous and stable Common Foreign and Security Policy of the member states. Yet, the foreign policies of the three major states within this Union ? Germany, France, and Great Britain ? often continue to diverge. In this paper I argue with Douglas North that international institutions such as the EU are ?shared mental models? and despite being objective physical facts, they are ?cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors? ideas about how the world works.? More specifically, I argue that the conditions for convergence or divergence and the viability of the EU?s desired Common Foreign and Security Policy are located in the belief systems of national leaders. Common perceptions of a security externality and common prescriptions towards it are a necessary condition for convergence. The sufficient condition, however, is the translation of these beliefs into similar strategic orientations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US- Adriatic Charter, an initiative in the spirit of the 1998 U.S.-Baltic Charter, was proposed jointly by the Presidents of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to President Bush at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. It was signed by four ministers of foreign affairs in Tirana on May 2, 2003. Charter as a diplomatic project had two objectives -- to secure the open door NATO policy and to provide framework for the cooperation and mutual support of candidate countries. On both of these two accounts it was successful. The Charter partners made strong commitments on such areas as democratic reforms and the creation of the conditions for NATO membership. Additional effect of the Charter is the very real progress made in mutual relations of the countries of South East Europe by improving the security conditions in the region. US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership is a successful example of cooperation among small states with common interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarly debate on the development of a military dimension in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has mainly revolved around its implications from the perspectives of international relations theory and European Union (EU) law. However, as the ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]