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Improvement of transport infrastructure in Europe is often characterized as a precedent for further integration of economies and regions in an enlarged Europe. In the early 1990s this process was institutionalized in the development of pan-European transport corridors. Extension of three pan-European transport corridors to Russia was a logical continuation of the EU's efforts in engaging Russia with Europe. Taking this as a loose starting point, the paper focuses on reasoning embedded in Russian policies on development of its transport infrastructure. The shift from conceptualization of infrastructure development in Russia as a part of pan-European corridor policy to that of international transport corridors provides an example to inquire transition from one logic of reasoning to another. The notion of different game forms is introduced and linked with analytical application of 'practical inference' scheme. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High on the list of the Russian government's "Strategic Enterprises and Strategic Stock Companies" that was first made public in August 2004 are a number of companies that are specialized in infrastructure development.Taking control of Russia's premier infrastructure construction and management firms is the central plank in Moscow's effort to develop a new strategy of influence in the countries to Russia's south. During the past two years the Russian government has sought to extend its influence over the countries of the region through gaining management responsibility or substantial equity in energy and transportation systems in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Russia's neo-mercantilist expansion into the region is driven primarily by political rather than economic considerations. The Kremlin is determined to counter American and European influence in the region while also building a bulwark against Chinese encroachment. Harnessing Russia's comparative advantage in energy and power appears to use business in order to advance strategic purpose. However if commercial risks are not carefully managed, the Russian government may find itself shouldering unexpected burdens as the Central Asian enterprises continue to produce losses, demand subsidies, and provide only minimal strategic political advantage. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]