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This paper argues for the benefits of bridging the debate between rationalism and constructivism to European foreign policy analysis. It is suggested that European Foreign Policy is driven by two interdependent forces, which are defined as security and normative considerations. Security policy is, in this paper, regarded as predominantly driven by intergovernmental and rationalist processes whilst norms are the focus of a communitarian and constructivist approach to European Foreign Policy. The predominance of these two processes is however constantly in a flux, depending on the foreign policy issue at hand and the behaviour of the actors involved. Many regard rationalist and constructivism approaches to foreign policy analysis as opposites. This paper seeks to argue otherwise.The EU is here seen as both an arena and an actor. Foreign policy makers are perceived to be acting along a continuum, moving from the logic of consequentialism to the logics of arguing and appropriateness, as they are been socialised into the foreign policy processes. It is however argued that this movement can in some cases be reversed in which actors move back to favouring a rationalist logic of consequentialism depending on the foreign policy interest at play. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's aims are twofold: First, to chart - using current studies, ethnic minority surveys and scenario-based population projections (which are ongoing) - the ethno-religious makeup of western Europe in 2025 with particular attention to Muslim populations. Second, to sketch out the implications of these changes for international politics. Constructivist approaches in IR stress the importance of intra-state identity conflicts in determining foreign policy outcomes. The paper moves on to consider scenarios for European foreign policy based on survey-data derived assumptions about non-European immigration, immigrant integration patterns, ethnic minority residential segregation, immigrant voting and dominant party coalition behaviour within states. While the most likely outcome of demographic developments is a polarisation between 'native' ethnic groups, with their secular outlook, and 'immigrant' minorities (especially if Muslim) who are more religious, other outcomes are possible. For instance, one cannot rule out the emergence of a trans-ethnic cleavage uniting moral traditionalists of all faiths against the secular mainstream - a development which characterized American society in the post-1968 period. These domestic scenarios would in turn point toward divergent foreign policy identities - especially with respect to the Muslim world and the general 'war on terror'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the transatlantic dimension of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It argues that the EU's growing strategic role in the countries and regions of its periphery has significant implications for the US and transatlantic relations. It analyzes the extent to which US and EU interests coincide or conflict in particular parts of the European neighborhood, as well as the prospects for transatlantic cooperation in Europe's "near abroad." It also considers the larger implications of ENP for the US and global order. Contrary to the predominant neo-realist view, I argue that ENP and the EU's growing strategic engagement in its periphery represent a potential challenge for US global hegemony and leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims at unpacking the old/new Europe theme, one outlined by the US Secretary of Defense in January 2003 during a period of intense rhetorical battles. Rumsfeld's enunciation, indicative of a divide that emerged across the Atlantic over the issue of war in Iraq, is here used as an inroad into exploring what has recently gone wrong, why and what are the prospects of closing the gulf that has opened up in the sphere of transatlantic relations. His statement is depicted as offering a window into the US administration's conceptualizations pertaining to Europe in a security-related, post-9/11 context and perceptions on what the ties between Europe and North America are basically about. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to critically examine the purported values gap that has emerged between Europe and the United States in the aftermath of the divisiveness over the Iraq war as well as the ensuing debates over Robert Kagan?s Mars/Venus caricature. The paper shifts the level of analysis from elite rhetoric to mass public opinion by studying two primary sources of survey data: The German Marshall Fund?s Transatlantic Trends and The Pew Surveys. Our focus is on three broad areas of global governance: support for multilateral institutions, economic globalization and the fight against terrorism. Using survey questions that gauge mass attitudes in these three areas we attempt to highlight citizens? values and opinions about some of the most pressing issues that affect global society today. In addition to the comparative analysis of European and American values at the mass level, we also focus on how mass attitudes compare with those of the political elite on both sides of the Atlantic. The paper is organized into three sections. The first section offers a critical review of the recent literature on the state of transatlantic relations and shows that the missing element in many of these debates are the voices of the actual citizens. Affiriming the normative significance of public opinion, the second section sets up a conceptual and theoretical framework in which we link ideas from democratic theory and global governance to new approaches in discourse analysis. The final part of the paper employs this framework to analyze the data and to draw conclusions about the future of transatlantic cooperation on global issues with a secondary goal of assessing the extent to which there is divergence or convergence in key attitudes and values across the Atlantic or a from another perspective, a creeping obsolescence of transatlantic dialogue in the first place. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ?capabilities-expectations gap? is a well known and ?painful? phenomenon of the ESDP and undermines its inner legitimacy as well as its reliability vis-à-vis external actors. This gap is further exacerbated inter alia through ill-informed debates, for example those surrounding the strategic nature of the European Security Strategy. Yet it also results from the difficulties that the discipline of European Studies has in answering the question of what it is that actually generates European military capabilities. The paper will show that Strategic and Security Studies approaches can offer helpful and persuasive insights if they are combined with the theoretical knowledge and empirical context of European Studies. Therefore the paper merges the core-concepts of ?strategy?, ?security? and ?Europeanization? into an analytical framework. Such an approach offers a different perspective on the politico- military machinery of the EU and its member states. It will be shown that military capabilities are principally a result of a multi-stage, recurrent security strategy-building process, and are created as enablers to implement certain security strategy objectives. Applied to the EU through two empirical examples - Battle Groups and Armaments Cooperation ? it will be shown that EU capabilities depend on the extent of the Europeanization of strategy. This emphasises the existence and deficits of the EU?s agential and structural features that form a coherent strategic approach. In so doing, the paper contributes to a more precise understanding of the comparatively complex mechanisms that create the Union?s capabilities as part of, and depending on, a unique transnational evolution of strategy-building on the one hand, and to the assessment of the status and prospects of the EU?s capability-building as well as a reconstitution of the debate about ESS invoked expectations and capabilities on the other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Roma have recently been referred to as a ?European Minority? reflecting both their nature of a truly transnational minority and their importance for the process of European integration. The paper studies the dynamics between European integration and the situation of the Roma minorities in Bulgaria and Romania by examining how the two have mutually influenced each other. The paper also presents some arguments about the impact of the experience of current candidate states in advanced stage of negotiations (like Bulgaria and Romania) on the future negotiation process for countries in less advanced stages like Turkey and Croatia. Unlike larger minorities in the two countries, the Roma have no kin state and are not politically mobilized. This not only makes them truly ?transnational? minority, but also, makes them largely dependant on the policies of the Southeast European states for both socio-economic development and political representation. The European integration process, which has greatly influenced the development of politics in the region, has thus had a very direct effect on the states policies towards this disadvantaged minority. On the other hand, the Roma minorities in both Bulgaria and Romania have taken advantage of the reduced restrictions on travel in Western Europe and have taken their way of life to the European countries, thus influencing public opinion and the public policy. The dynamics between the European conditionality and the situation of the Roma minority in their home countries have thus been a very complicated and mutually dependent process. It has been reflected in the conditions for entry (the Copenhagen criteria) and in numerous programs and initiatives of the EU aimed at supporting the integration of the Roma domestically. The experience of the accession process of Bulgaria and Romania in this regard will certainly impact the future role attributed to minority protection in accession negotiations of new candidate states. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on marginal interactions between Europe and its southern periphery: the settings for EU-Mediterranean relations are the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In telling the story of Europe's self-assertion vis-a-vis its southern neighbours, possibilities for the margins are uncovered. The paper also explores how the dysfunctional interplay between Europe and its southern margins can be handled. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of an ongoing research project aimed at providing more insights into the transatlantic rift over the use of force in the Iraq crisis, namely a better understanding of the reasons why the issue of the resort to military force against the Iraqi threat led progressively to strong disagreements among the American and European political leaders and the American and European publics about the efficacy and legitimacy of the use of force, particularly to strong anti-American and anti-European feelings. The project aims also at providing more insights into the role that media may play in the public perception and support of the United States and European Union as security actors. In order to attain such aims, the project investigates the interplay of the elite discourse with media and public opinion in the United States and in two European countries (France and Italy) that are still neglected in the literature on the media coverage of the Iraq crisis. The main argument is that, while there might be a synchronization in the focus of the external strategic events covered by the news media across the United States and Europe, there might be also important differences in the amount of media coverage of the crisis and in the news media debates, rooted in specific political-institutional as strategic-cultural contexts. Furthermore, while it is clear that public opinion and media may influence the decision-making process in foreign policy, their role is not systematic, but dynamic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the EU has reacted to specific types of security threat, contribute to a range of security governance functions and coordinate its activities within the system of European security governance. A further aim will be to examine the challenges of the EU in areas where coordination with other security organizations has either failed or taken place, and investigate the factors which either promote or inhibit cooperation among the security organizations. The article suggests that the concept of security governance, although complex in its application, offers certain advantages for the study of security that are not evident in other international relations approaches; significantly the ability to identify security threats more clearly, and to assess more effectively how security threats are managed in a multi-level and multi-actor setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between Russia and the West are in decline. The range of issues where Russia and the western powers are in disagreement is broad and widening, but all of them have huge significance for the future of Europe. The Russian vision of Europe puts emphasis on the sovereign right of the state to run its own business, while the western interpretation promotes what is presented as universal values of democracy and human rights which are to supersede sovereignty as the key foundational principle of the European political system. The result is that Russia and the West increasingly see each other as two separate - and often opposed - subjects of world politics, and this conflict of vision - at least in the case of Russia - increasingly turns into a constitutive antagonism, which defines the boundaries of political community and determines its identity. This paper analyses some important aspects of this relationship, with the primary focus on Russia. Putting forward the slogan of sovereign democracy and thus insisting on its right to be democratic in its own way, Russia functions in western discourse as an irreducible signifier, an identity which cannot be described as enemy and thus fully driven into the outside, but which, hanging in-between, produces dislocation in the structure of meaning which underlies the entire (neo)liberal world order. This discursive position quite naturally causes irritation on the part of the western policy-makers and analysts, but Russia too, on its part, becomes increasingly frustrated with its failure to obtain recognition for its new identity by the most relevant Other, the West. I argue that, given the peculiar structural position of Russia in the globalizing world, some of these disappointments might have emancipatory potential. However, security practices both in the domestic and international context drive Russia away from using this potential and lead, instead, to the intensification of the binary antagonism between Russia and the West, very much in the spirit of the cold war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explain European behaviour in the American world order. Thus, I seek to answer two interrelated questions: What characterizes European behaviour in the unipolar world order? How is this behaviour explained? In order to answer these questions I begin from structural realist premises and explore how changes and continuity in relative power, relative ideology and relative security affect the European propensity to bandwagon with or balance the United States. The overall conclusion is that the European grand strategy is best characterised as hard bandwagoning with soft balancing at the margins. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives a viewpoint on a controversial issue of transnational regional cooperation (TRC) in Europe and Eurasia covering the analysis of cooperation between Europe and the regions of post-Soviet Russia. By promoting the favorable regime of transnational regional cooperation, both sides become more effective in managing such common problems as mutual security, political, economic and environmental challenges; illegal immigration; drug- and human-trafficking; etc. What is needed for the successful development of TRC in Eurasian context? What factors make a crucial impact on the development of regional cooperation, whether it is further ?inclusion? or ?exclusion? of the regions from cooperation with European neighbors? Is it the geopolitical location of the regions that makes regional cooperation more feasible or are there other factors that influence the success of this process? How might the regulatory and administrative tools of central government facilitate or complicate this process? The study addresses the role of ethnicity, economical development, and geopolitical factors in the establishment and development of transnational regional cooperation. It also investigates the importance of ?domestic-policy factors? (reforms in the federal governments) in the development of TRC. Theoretically speaking, it focuses on the process of the regionalization of foreign policy as compared with the process of federalization and the interplay of domestic and foreign factors in the process of regime transition within the post-Soviet regions. More precisely, it examines the factors that facilitate the development of regional cooperation with international partners, and also the impact of this cooperation on the process of democratization within the regions. The initiative of European countries and organizations are the most important, and, therefore, their ?neighbourhood?s effect? is likely to be the most influential external factor in the process of transition once transition is analyzed, not on national, but on the regional level. Thus, the analysis approaches the phenomenon of regional cooperation with Europe as both a dependent and an independent variable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to most predictions and contemporary analysis, innovation with regard to strategic doctrine, military posture, and institutions has left the deep structure of the U.S.-European security bargain intact. The allocation of rights and responsibilities among the contracting parties to guarantee each others? security interests has survived the end of the Cold War. The United States continues to exercise robust leadership, and the Europeans have sustained recognition of their junior status vis-à-vis the Americans, thus making transatlantic security cooperation an instance of enduring hierarchy. This paper defends this non-conventional empirical claim, and offers a logic that explains stability at the level of deep structure.To defend the empirical claim, I do two things: First, I conceptualize the transatlantic security relationship of the Cold War era as a multi-dimensional contract, whose parties have entered into a hierarchical (authority) relationship. In contrast to (Realist) advocates of the discontinuity thesis, transatlantic security cooperation served not only to collectively defend against an external threat, but provided mechanisms that allowed the contracting parties to reassure each other of their benign intentions. In contrast to recent influential contributions in the (Liberal-institutionalist) continuity school, I emphasize that the European allies conferred special rights and privileges on the United States so that its asymmetric share of the material burden went hand in hand with an asymmetric amount of (legitimate) political discretion, yielding hierarchy. After defining the status quo baseline in this fashion, I show that the contracting parties have not decisively deviated from it either prior to or since the end of the Cold War.Existing explanations for the trajectory of U.S.-EU relations fall short in three ways: First, they do not capture the assertiveness with which the United States has pushed for a strategic reorientation of the security bargain, both prior to and after the events of 9/11. Second, they neglect to reflect on the prevailing lack of intra-European consensus with regard to security and defense policies. Finally, in ignoring the dynamics just mentioned, they sidestep the actual puzzle: Why, despite a U.S. drive for change at the operational level, and a lack of unified European loyalty to the original bargain, has the status quo prevailed? I argue that the deep structure of transatlantic security cooperation has remained stable for two reasons. First, its European partners have recognized that the bargain underlying the European Union cannot be modified so as to present a functional substitute for junior membership in the transatlantic club. In fact, the vitality of the intra-European bargain, both before and after its post-1990 amendments, is structurally dependent on the preservation of the transatlantic status quo. Second, in light of Europe?s voluntary subordination, the United States recommitted to the transatlantic alliance, since it allowed for the exercise of robust European, and by extension, global leadership without the exigencies that power projection through ad hoc coalitions of the willing impose. This project contributes both to the substantive debate on transatlantic security relations, and to theoretical discussions over the relative conceptual and explanatory validity of balancing and binding models in security studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social cohesion is to day the most visible item on the bilateral agenda of the Latin American-Europe relationship. This decision has been taken by the commission 11 months before the Guadalajara Summit of may 2004. It will probably be on eof the main topics at the Vienna Summit in May 2006. This paper will try to analyse what this decision means theoretically and practically for the development of the bilateral relations between both continents. We shall address in particular the followings two questions:What is social cohesion and is there a clear and common definition? Is it a solid basis to develop a strong relationship between both regions? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

9/11 and the war on terror seemed to expose the limits of a truly common foreign and security policy, as the big three EU member states ? Germany, Britain and France ? scrambled for national influence in the war in Afghanistan at the expense of EU unity. Each claimed to speak for Europe, given that the EU CFSP lacked the capabilities of going beyond declarations of solidarity with the US, but did so against the objection (and over the heads) of smaller member states as well as the Belgian Presidency and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana. Given the continuous efforts since the creation of CFSP in 1993 to construct a common foreign policy, the question that arises from these events is whether the events of 9/11 and the US-led war on terror have exposed the limits of Europeanization understood as a convergence of views towards a common foreign policy, or whether the changed geo-strategic landscape and US military dominance have not fundamentally changed national commitments to CFSP. This paper will analyse the policies of Britain, France and Germany towards CFSP using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. It will explore the attitudes of the three member states towards CFSP to determine whether the British, French and German foreign policies were a sign for the permanent re-assertion of informal directorates in CFSP or a national struggle for assertion in a changed geo-strategic landscape at the expense of CFSP, and what consequences this is likely to have on the institution itself. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dynasticism played a major role in the conduct of war, peace, and diplomacy in early modern Europe. For much of the period, rulers fought wars mainly to advance claims to territory stemming from marriage and inheritance. Take two examples. First, over the course of a few years Charles of Habsburg managed to acquire effective control over large swaths of Europe by virtue of inheritance. The effect was the rapid formation of a hegemonic power with serious implications for the security of other political communities. Second, Francis I embroiled France in a costly series of wars for hegemony in Italy, yet he did not pursue territorial expansion in other regions, such western Germany, that would have been both easier to achieve and more strategically advantageous for France. The reason? Francis lacked dynastic claims to those regions.All of this suggests that dynastic norms led to very different practices of international politics. But how are we to best understand the relationship between those norms and political behaviors? This paper considers three approaches: structural realism, mainline systemic constructivism, and Krasner's notion of "organized hypocrisy." Evidence from the early modern European experience is both consistent and inconsistent with aspects of all three approaches, which suggests interesting ways that they can be combined to account for systemic variations in the conduct of international affairs.. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) has become very popular when analysing the foreign policy and external relations of the European Union. There is however confusion about what “normative power” actually means and that is why the debate has not b ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vienna meant a downturn in the bi-regional relationship between Europe and Latin America. This relationship never could find a strategic content as wished in Rio de Janeiro for the first meeting in 1999. After the relative failure of Madrid in 2002, the European Commission chose ?social cohesion? as the content of the strategic relationship, together with multilateralism and integration, to give the light of Vienna where two features appeared clearly: the lack of Latin American Integration and the ideological divisions within Europe and Latin America as well as between them. Taking that into account it might be possible to think of a new bi regional partnership, which could include three important topics, energy, migration and the triangular relationship with the United States. In all these three cases, Mexico should play a key role in the discussions as it did since the institutionalization of the relationship EU/Latin America ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]