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The flow and structure of international news are obviously important factors in shaping the picture of the world in our minds. Therefore, the scientific study of the flow and structure of international news is also important. In 1965, Galtung & Holmboe Ruge published a theory of international news which has proved seminal. Several papers have used it as a starting-point for discussions and further investigations (Smith 1969; Cheesmann 1970; Rosengren 1970; Sande 1971). It has also been anthologized (Tunstall 1970). In the present paper, the flow and structure of international news in general and the Galtung-Ruge theory in particular will be discussed from a methodological, an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Let us start with the methodology.

On October 7, 1961 a conference devoted to the Applications of Game Theory to Negotiation was held at Princeton University under the auspices of the Institute for Defense Analyses and with the support of the Carnegie Corporation. In addition to open discussion1 of the problems of formulating a mathematical model of negotiation, the meeting considered summaries of three papers prepared by Fred C. Ikle, John C. Harsanyi, and Dean G. Pruitt. Revised versions of these papers are included in this special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. It is the main purpose of this editorial note to explain the context in which they arose. As such, it also provides the issue editor with a forum in which he

1 This research was supported in whole by the United States Air Force under Contract No. AF 49(638)-317 monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research of the Air Research and Development Command. as s ported in whole by the It is to be noted that in G-type games a2 dominates a, and p2 dominates pi, and, hence, the outcome (a2, /82) may appear to be the rational joint choice. On the other hand, the outcome (al, /i) has a larger joint payoff than any other; further, since x1 > X4, the outcome (ai, /1) has a larger individual payoff than that associated with (a2, P/2). We regard (ac, P/) as the collaborative strategy, since only in this way may subjects maximize their return. Whether or not one may reasonably expect pairs of subjects to collaborate with one another is an open question. However, in an iterated version of such a game there are strong intuitive grounds for expecting the emergence of a collaborative strategy, especially when the number of trials becomes large.4 The specific game employed in the paper mentioned above is given by xl = 3, x2 = 0, xa = 5, and x4 = 1. Actually, three versions of this game, G1, G2, and G3, were used. The results reported in this paper have to do with three additional G-type games and with four non-G-type games. The non-Gtype games have the same general payoff

The paper is aimed at describing systematic trends in the violence between political groups. The report is in two parts. Part one describes the formulation of an empirical test for the existence of (1) a short (15-30 year) term and (2) a long (80-120 year) term periodic fluctuation in the historical occurrence of war. The research described in part one is based, largely, on empirical (versus theoretical) generalizations. That is, not much concern is given to the 'why' of such patterns. The second part of the paper speculates about several possible reasons for these patterns. (Author)

The paper analyzes conflict formations now prevailing in contemporary international society. The study begins with the assertion that the development of capitalism and anticapitalist move ments in international politics has led to the globalization of international politics and to the emergence of an international society. This society is here conceived as an antagonistic totality made up particularly of the following conflict formations: intercapitalist, West-East, North-South, inter-socialist, inner-Third World, and formations of structural violence where in ternational and national conflict formations intersect.The paper includes a short discussion on some fundamental principles of peace and social justice in international society. It concludes with some preliminary remarks on the foundation of a structural theory of international society. The author stresses that a further analysis of inter national society will have to look closely into the production relations and the exchange relations emerging from them on a world scale. The theorem of unequal and combined development is given particular importance. The author con tends that on this basis, causes and regularities of conflict formation dynamics can be better understood than by the highly abstract approaches of the last ten to fifteen years, particularly those of the conventional systems analysis.

Drawing largely on the Pentagon Study and other documentary evidence, the paper tries to trace the evolution in the post World War II period of the US imperial drive to the shores of Asia, and especially the historical record of the US Indo china involvement. Stress is laid on motivation and the driving forces behind the US engagement, particularly the political, strategical and economic interests. The paper analyzes the political strategy of the Nixon Administration and points to the continuity of US Pacific policies during the last five Admini strations. There has been only discontinuity in strategies, various Administrations trying to tackle the difficulties encountered from different angles and with different political and military instru ments. Doubt is expressed if the Nixon strategy- which in fact means a return to traditional great power diplomacy in the spirit of the XIX century - could produce a lasting peace. A lasting resolu tion of the Indochina conflict would require the fulfilment of two basic conditions: (1) to relieve tension in the inner circle of conflict by satis fying the social and national aspirations of the Indochinese peoples, i.e. stopping outside inter vention and allowing the national movements freely to shape the fate of the Indochinese nations; and (2) to eliminate conflict in the outer circle by making the area free of great power rivalry, especially in the military field, i.e. neutralization of the region. Some concluding remarks are offered con cerning the nature and dynamics of the US Indo china involvement. Pure profit motives could hardly account for this ruinous undertaking. Among the determinants for this drive are new elements of a world power balance, new attributes usurped by the executive bureaucracy, and new domestic and world domination patterns. Atten tion is drawn to the realively autonomous role of the superstructure. There is a need for further studies of the fabric, structure, and dynamics of these new phenomena in order effectively to con front them.

VER A DECADE HAS PASSED since Richard Wollheim (1962) presented "a paradox in the theory of democracy." In that paper, Wollheim himself tried to sketch a solution to the paradox, and there subsequently have appeared at least four other such attempts. While the literature that has grown up around this problem has certainly not been totally unproductive, a good deal of further clarification is needed. It is something of an embarrassment to modern political philosophy that no approach has yet been published which both makes plain what is truly paradoxical about Wollheim's paradox and solves the paradox in a correct and complete manner. In this paper, I set myself the immodest task of doing just that. Moreover, this solution will also provide a way out of the controversy between actand rule-utilitarians. In the first part, 1 will present Wollheim's paradox and comment on his solution. In the second part, I will summarize and criticize the solutions of the other writers on this subject. And in the third part, I will give my own solutions to the paradox of democracy.

A set of hypotheses on the structure of foreign news, which had been presented by Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, is tested empirically by comparing New York Times' coverage of Sino-Indian relations in 1962 with the 'actual' relations of the two countries as reflected in their official correspondence, published by the Indian government in a series of White Papers. Four of the six hypotheses tested are confirmed. It is found that international relations, according to the newspaper, is comprised as predicted of a series of simple, discrete. and dramatic events, whose nature is such as to tend to confirm our expectations of what will happen. On the other hand, predictions that the newspaper would over-select events which are rare or unexpected, and overemphasize events which are more negative in their consequences, were not confirmed. Since the New York Times is generally considered one of the world's most complete and factual newspapers, these findings probably apply with even greater force to most other news papers in the world. Therefore, in reporting international news, newspapers should place more emphasis on background material, on complex and ambiguous events, and on dissonant events. Although Galtung and Ruge had only hypothesized, rather than demonstrated, the existence of the twelve factors influencing news selection discussed in their paper, this study seems to confirm that most, it not all, of the factors do exist and do exert a distorting effect on the news selection process.

1 The original version of this paper was written at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, under Contract Nonr-358 (01), NR 047-006 of the Cowles Foundation with the Office of Naval Research. It was distributed as Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 46. A revised version of this paper was presented at the Princeton Conference on Game Theory and Negotiations in October, 1961. The paper has benefited from comments by the other participants of the Conference. 2 But of course there are exceptions. For a model dealing with the case where the players do not know one another's utility functions, see (Luce and Adams, 1956). know (and know they do not know) each other's utility functions. I shall also indicate some interesting problems our analysis raises for empirical research.

Leadership has long been a topic of considerable interest in the social sciences. Nearly every aspect of leadership has been the subject of some degree of study. The present paper is concerned with some of the situational factors which determine the form of leadership which will arise and be accepted in a group. Two basic questions will be considered: 1. Under what conditions will there be pressure toward centralized authoritarian leadership? 2. Under what conditions is a more participative democratic form of leadership likely to arise? While this is certainly not a new topic, this paper attempts to develop a somewhat more systematic approach than has ordinarily been undertaken toward this subject. I feel that the "model" developed in this paper provides a framework or structure for further experimentation and theoretical development that has perhaps previously been lacking. My initial interest in making such a study was stimulated by observations made last summer in Indonesia and Burma of a strong desire, particularly among certain high government officials, for centralized control. I observed this same trend beginning to develop in Malaya. Recent releases from Ghana suggest that this situation is not confined to Asia. Particularly in Indonesia, which is the situation most familiar to me, there was an eadership has long been a topic of conoriginal attempt at developing a free society and a free enterprise economy. In each of the countries mentioned there was no revo

Among different forms of 'nonviolent direct action', an extensive taxonomy for which has been provided by Gene Sharp (1959), Gandhian satyagraha occupies a unique place. This is due to both historical and substantive reasons. A factor analysis of the ingredients of different forms of nonviolent direct action (Chatterjee and Bhattacharjee 1971) shows that satygraha has high loading on Factor III which the authors identify as 'something like active principled striving toward total transformation' of the individual, group, community, or state. Satyagraha has second highest loading on Factor I, identified as 'some sort of absolutist stand toward moral-ethical commitment to nonviolence'. This emphasis on total transformation, on dynamism, and on unswerving commitment to nonviolence may have contributed to some of its success in historical reckoning. First Gandhi and then Martin Luther King have demonstrated the value of nonviolent satyagraha as an effective weapon for correcting untenable positions, when obtaining redress through constitutional means is slow, difficult, or beset with hurdles. In recent times social scientists have started taking an interest in analyzing the processes underlying satyagraha. Some members of the 'strategic community' who utilize approaches from game theory, decision theory, and general systems theory in elucidating complex social processes have also tried to apply such methods for a deeper understanding of the satyagraha process. The present paper, while reviewing some of these attempts to analyze the strategic aspects of satyagraha, seeks to show that more sophisticated effort is required for finding the most appropriate game model for Gandhian satyagraha. Some of the observations will be supported with empirical evidence, collected by the author, on a series of three satyagrahas resorted to by a group of encroachers in a government grazing reserve in Angarkata in north-eastern Assam. A brief account of the three Angarkata satyagrahas is given in the Appendix. For a fuller account, the reader may refer to a report by Chatterjee and Sudarshan Kumari (1969); a short journalistic rendering has been published by Chatterjee (1970).

This paper reevaluates certain aspects of Dahrendorf's conflict theory in relation to social mobility. Specifically, the relationship between the degree of openness or closedness of the mobility opportunity structure of society and the degree of intergroup antagonism is examined. A game simulation is initiated whereby the researcher is able to create simulated situations of varying mobility opportunity and observe, by means of pre- and posttest questionnaires, the relative antagonism between groups within the situation and the participants' latent antagonism outside the simulated situation. The findings provide support for Dahrendorf's hypothesis, but also indicate that further dynamics are involved in the structure of mobility systems.

This paper reports a secondary analysis of a series of simulation runs which explored the effects of a broad array of variables on a nation's response to an imminent strategic attack from an unidentified source. Seven variables appeared as important in determining whether a nation would counterattack or delay retaliation when given such a warning. These variables include availability of a weapon survivability system, the economic and force capabilities of the nation, the decision makers' perceptions of the degree of tension in the world and of the degree of ambiguity in the situation, as well as the decision style and level of self-esteem of the decision makers. The results suggest that factors other than the invulnerability of weapon systems are involved in maintaining the stability of deterrence in an extreme crisis.

This paper discusses the difficulties involved in relaxing the self-interest assumption as it is traditionally used in conjunction with the assumption of rationality. A formal model of altruistic behavior is developed and employed in the analysis of the problems of burden-sharing among rational allies. It is demonstrated that altruistic behavior among political actors is not, in general, sufficient to remove all areas of contention between the actors although the scope of disagreement is shown to be narrowed by altruistic behavior. Additional applications of the model of non-self-interested behavior are presented and suggested.

Since the Arab-Israel war of 1967, military expenditure/GNP ratios for the participants in the conflict-Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Irag-have escalated to levels far surpassing those in other developing areas and even those of the superpowers locked in an extensive global arms race. In the Middle East, a region of low per capita income and not especially endowed with an abundance of natural resources, the costs incurred by military expendenditures are particularly severe. The purpose of the paper is to measure these costs. A simple variant of the Harrod-Domar model is employed to determine the military burden. Estimates are made for both the 1960-1970 and the 1970-1980 periods. A set of assumptions-none peculiar to the Middle East-is posited to describe the transfer of resources from military to civilian production in a hypothesized process of deescalation. The additions to civilian production provide the basis for the estimates of the economic sacrifice the Middle East populations incur in maintaining the abnormal levels of military expenditure/GNP ratios.

This paper first reviews the descriptions and structural explanations for variations in urban population densities in the United States over several decades. The research reviewed focuses on shifts in the technology and economics of travel as being the major influences on urban density distributions. These variables appear to be somewhat less adequate as explanations of the process in recent decades. After reviewing these findings and suggesting several research questions, we attempt to assess the evidence relating variations in population density to several other aspects of human behavior. A review of the research relating high population densities to various "social pathologies" indicates that little of the variance in rates of these pathologies can be attributed to density independently of other social structural variables. Some important consequences of population density have been reported, however, and possible research directions are outlined.

This paper (1) explains the variables and methods used to calculate the MIRV threat to the fixed-site land-based ICBM forces of the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) attempts to reconstruct the calculations presented in the 1969 ABM debate by Albert Wohlstetter, George Rathjens, and John S. Foster about the number of Minutemen which could be expected to survive an attack by forces of various sizes and characteristics; and (3) applies these methods, together with some plausible assumptions about classified variables, to two other security issues: the import of the SALT limitation on the size of the Soviet SS-9 force and the character of the threat to the Soviet fixed-site ICBM force posed by the American MIRV program.

Two years ago, Rapoport (1970) asked peace researchers if their work was applicable. In the March 1971 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution Kent replied to Rapoport's query. This paper continues the dialogue established by Rapoport and Kent. Its central questions concern the nature of peace research and researchers, the source of support, and the applicability (usefulness) of the research. Rapoport's perception of the goal of peace research

The findings reported at that time established that there were in fact certain relationships between domestic and foreign conflict behavior variables, depending upon the type of nation, the variables, and the time lags involved. This paper deals with certain deficiencies found in that earlier study. It will also report results, parallel to those published earlier, but incorporating some of the changes made in the analysis. One major deficiency of the earlier study was the method by which indicators were compiled for the six dimensions of domestic and foreign conflict behavior. The measures used were based on factors extracted by Rummel for the 1955-57 data (Rummel, [3]). Although I was using the Tanter data also (Tanter, [4]), thus giving six years of data, from 1955-60, I continued to use the factors relevant only to the 1955-57 period. A second problem relates to the way in which the raw scores were used. As indicated in Table 4 of the earlier article, I used both raw and transformed scores, adding these according to the way variables loaded on the appropriate factors of the Rummel solution. For example, on the subversive dimension, guerrilla warfare, with a loading of .90, and assassinations, with a loading of .66, both received equal weight when the final score was compiled. It is obvious that guerrilla warfare should have received a larger proportion of the weight in the dimension.' Because of the above two difficulties, it was decided to perform a series of new factor analyses, using the data from 1955 to 1960. In addition, I extracted factor scores for the nations on a yearly basis. It is these factor scores, one per dimension per country per year, which will be used as the data in computing correlations between the dimensions of domestic and foreign conflict behavior. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of the factor analyses performed. These results are also compared with the results obtained by Rummel [3] and Tanter [4] in the earlier analyses.2 With regard to domestic conflict, it was decided, using the eigenvalue-one criterion, to extract two factors on the orthogonal rotation. These factors are very similar to those found by Tanter in his analysis of the 1958-1960 data. Assassinations does not load above .50

Undoubtedly, many students of negotiation are interested in their subject because negotiation is one of the outstanding mechanisms by which social and political conflicts can be resolved. Their hope is that a close and detailed study of the process of negotiation will yield information which will help to ease some of the world's more threatening tensions. In this paper we shall discuss some of the reasons why reaching this goal is more difficult than

In his basic paper, "On Welfare Theory and Pareto Regions,"2 Professor Ragnar Frisch has properly emphasized the necessity for specifying carefully the constraints that confine the "Pareto Region," that region within which the Pareto criterion for classifying positions is to be employed. As he demonstrates, the region will depend upon the nature of the constraints introduced, and the set of points or positions that may be classified as "optimal" will vary with these constraints. I propose here to discuss the nature of the appropriate constraints in a somewhat different manner and from a different philosophy than that of Frisch. His view, which is that "social value judgments" must be introduced in order to determine

Within the limits set by structural arrangements and by institutions, individuals choose their course of action. Anthropologists have always been interested in the outcome of these choices either because they reflect ongoing change or because they elucidate interrelations between institu tions. In order for decision-making analysis to be more than anecdotal, however, it needs to be guided by a set of assumptions concerning reasoning and cognitive processes, and the conditions germane to them. Economists. sociologists, psychologists, philosophers and mathematicians have already outlined many useful assumptions. Part of our task in this paper is to con tribute to a systematization of those assumptions that arc most relevant to anthropological interests. We also discuss the advantages and limitations of decision analysis for social anthropology, examine the theoretical and methodological implications of "rationality," and present a sequence of hypothetical steps that we regard as requisites for an adequate decision- making analysis.

There are two levels of analysis of intrapersonal conflict: the action level and the belief level, the former dealing with external motor responses and the latter with internal affective and cognitive processes. Particular instances of conflict may, for theoretical convenience, be localized at one or another of these levels. For example, one may ask how a person acts when simultaneously motivated to approach and to avoid an external object (3, 9, 10). Or one may ask instead what happens to the cognitive representation of an external object when the object simultaneously incurs favorable and unfavorable cognitions (12). The present paper is addressed to the latter type of question. We shall not consider the problem of whether and how the action level is to be reduced to the belief level or vice

Although students of world politics have come increasingly to speak of their empirical domain as a social system, little effort has gone into the systematic observation and measurement of its formal or informal structure. One structural attribute of the inter national system which leaves a definite trace and is therefore readily measurable, is that of alliance patterns. This paper examines all written (peacetime only) alliances among system members, describes the procedures for classifying them, and then transforms such information into quantitative indicators of alliance aggregation for various forms of the international system for every year between 1815 and 1939. Such data make it possible to treat this particular system attribute as either a dependent or an inde pendent variable for purposes of hypothesis testing or exploration in world politics.

The development of a science of threat systems is a desirable but slow-dangerously slow-process (cf. Boulding, 1963). The uneven evolution of this science has given it several characteristics of doubtful value. In the first place, "strategic thinking" has acquired military connotations. When a student of international politics refers to "the strategists," he usually has in mind those who are primarily concerned with military policy-and he expects other students of international politics to know that this is what he has in mind. Although there are many nonmilitary situations in international politics in which the ability of one nation to gain its ends depends to an important degree on what other nations do (cf. Schelling, 1960, p. 5), such situations are rarely viewed as "strategic." Even within the field of military affairs, the term "strategic thinking" usually connotes a concern with nuclear deterrence policies. Although the valuable contributions to theorizing about threats by students of nuclear strategy must be acknowledged, it would be undesirable to treat such theories as the exclusive province of such scholars. In addition to its military connotations, the concept of strategic thought has become associated with game theory. Thinking about threats, however, is too important to be left to the game theorists. For example, after a highly stimulating discussion of "fractional threats," Schelling (1960, p. 184) talks about them as if the importance of his discussion lay in having found a rationale for such tactics in game theory terms. But what if Schelling had failed to find a niche in game theory for fractional threats? Should we then forget about them? Such tactics are clearly phenomena of the real world. Many students of international politics can benefit from Schelling's imaginative discussions regardless of their implications for game theory. This might be called the problem of "how to steal without getting caught"that is, how can the student of international politics "steal" Schellings's ideas without getting caught by Schelling's game theory orientation? For many students of international politics, the primary significance of Schelling's work lies in improved understanding of the real world, not in his contributions to the game theory. Threats pervade human relations and should not be discussed solely in terms of nuclear deterrence or game theory. The purpose of this paper is to broaden the context within which threats are discussed by looking at selected aspects of recent thinking about threats from a more general perspective than that of either game theory or nuclear strategy. The discussion will focus on: (1) the basic concept of threat, (2) the relationship between threats and promises, (3) the coerciveness of threats, (4) the costs of threats, (5) the role of ambiguity in threat systems, and (6) the relationship between threats and the concept of deterrence.

This paper evaluates the policy relevance of models according to two criteria: (1) the degree to which policy makers may perceive they have control over predictors in the model; and (2) the degree of confidence policy makers may have in the model's implications. An evaluation is made of various models applicable in world politics from the perspective of their policy relevance. These include: game theory models and experimental games, man-machine simulation models, aggregate data models, and computer simulation models and information systems.

Most revolutionary elite studies merely discuss and analyze the few key men who build and create revolutionary movements, as well as look upon the "political revolutionary" as a singular, modal type. This paper is a discussion and analysis of the generality of the leadership of one specific political revolution, the 1905 Russian Revolution. By means of Q-factor analysis, it was discovered that the 1905 revolutionary leadership cluster into one of six activity categories or types: (1) rebel, (2) striker, (3) propagandist, (4) party organizer, (5) upper-level politician, (6) intelligentsia. Not only was each type distinct in terms of its revolutionary role, but also unique in terms of childhood, adolescent, and familial characteristics. Moreover, each type, which developed sequentially, parallels the necessary functions of a political system, as specified by Almond and Coleman.

A theory is formulated with which to analyze transactions in social retationships Economic types of exchange characterized by calculation and self-interest on the part of the actors are contrasted with more "social" forms of transaction such as occur in the cases of role relationships with interlocking rights and obligations and persons strongly attached to one another. The social factors and conditions determining the types of transaction likely to occur between actors are examined in the paper. The key idea in this respect is that the structural and temporal context of interaction, including the past and anticipated character of their relationship, affects actors' orientations toward one another, their preferences, decisions and interaction patterns.

This paper was developed with the aim of contributing to theory about the relations between pairs of nations. Nevertheless, its focus is considerably broader, involving relations between two parties (i.e., decisionmaking units) of any kind, whether nations, organizations, groups, or individuals. Quite clearly there are differences among the kinds of parties just enumerated. But there are also similarities which, hopefully, make it possible (and if possible indeed desirable) to develop broader generalizations embracing all kinds of parties.

Many observers have recently noted that the international system is evolving into a multipolar world. At the same time, the notion of balance of power is being severely criticized for its vagueness and inconsistency. Seven empirically testable propositions which exemplify refined and narrowed notions of balance of power are reviewed and analyzed in this paper. These propositions, authored by A. L. Burns, M. Kaplan, D. Singer and M. Small, F. H. Hinsley, R. Rosecrance, and F. Harary concern one of four major approaches to the multipolar system: (1) the rules of a theoretical balance of power system, (2) the functioning of alliances, (3) historical systemic periodization, and (4) the application of structural balance theory to the interna tional system. The Situational Analysis Project provided the data for testing these propositions over the first twelve years of the "Bismarckian system," 1870 through 1881. The propositions did not hold up well under detailed testing. The rules of the balance of power system were violated—in particular, an "ingratiation effect" was found in place of the balance-restoring mechanism; alliances led to a lessening of cooperation and attention between allies; and historical periodization was found to be inaccurate. The findings, however, did support the fundamental assumption underlying the structural balance theory. Since the future may be quite like the nineteenth century in terms of structure, a reevaluation of the Bismarckian system is not an irrelevant exercise but rather an inquiry into the functioning of a system we may actually have to operate.

It is often pointed out that conflicts of interest are - or should be - of great importance in social science. However, it seems to be far from clear what a conflict of interest is. The main purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary but fairly systematic survey of dif ferent interpretations or definitions of 'conflict of interest'. Intra-party conflicts are not discussed. As a point of departure it is assumed that there is a conflict of interest between two parties if, and only if, their interests are incompatible. The problematic terms here are 'interest' and 'incompatible'. These are very seldom defined in social science. The meaning of 'interest' is discussed in sections 3 and 4; subjectivistic, objectivistic, naturalistic, and normative interpretations of this term are distinguished and exemplified. The meaning of 'incompatible' is discussed in section 5. It is sometimes held that conflict theorists tend to neglect 'real' conflicts of interest. The content of this claim is discussed in the last section.

1 This study attempts to construct some rationale for certain of Dr. S. P. Huntington's historically based findings (3) by means of multiplier diagrams whose use the writer learned early in 1958 from Professor T. W. Swan, in an as-yetunpublished paper, "Circular Causation" (1957), and from D. W. E. G. Salter, both of the Australian National University. It is further maintained that such diagrams (which are of a kind applied to the problem of arms races by A. Rapoport [5, pp. 275-78]) require the addition of representations of temporal effects if they are to help account for the behavior of "sophisticated" contestants in an arms race. Dr. Huntington's is a rich and suggestive essay, which brings together much interesting information and develops a theory of the subject along non-quantitative lines. I should like to thank him and Professor W. T. R. Fox, both of the Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia, and members and visiting associates of the Center of International Studies, Princeton, for their critical help in the development of the following ideas. ace may make its increases naively; that is, it may increase its armaments simply because it has come to believe that another's

This paper is about binary choices with externalities. These are either-or situations,not choices of degree or quantity. An "externality" is present when you care about my choice or my choice affects yours. You may not care, but need to know-whether to pass on left or right when we meet. You may not need to know, but care---you will drive whether or not I drive--- but prefer that I keep off the road.You may both care and need to know. The literature of externalities has mostly to do with how much of a good or a bad should be produced,consumed,or allowed.HereI consider only the interdependence of choices to do or not to do, to join or not to join, to stay or to leave, to vote yes or no, to conform or not to conform to some agreement or rule or restriction. Players will accept hockey helmets (or not) by individual choice for several reasons. Chicago star Bobby Hull cites the simplest factor: "vanity." But many players honestly believe that helmets will cut their efficiency and put them at a disadvantage, and others fear the ridicule of opponents. The use of helmets will spread only through fear caused by injuries like Green's-or through a rule making them mandatory. . . One player summed up the feelings of many: "It's foolish not to wear a helmet. But I don't because the other guys don't. I know that' silly, but most of the players feel the same way. If the league made us do it, though, we'd all wear them and nobody would mind." Shortly after Teddy Green of the Bruins took a hockey stick in his brain, the player, Don Awrey, commented to a Newsweek(1969) reporter, "WhenI saw the way Teddy looked, it was an awful feeling . . . I'm going to start wearing a helmet now, and I don't care what anybody says." A voluntary helmet may be seen as cowardly,but nobody thinks a baseball player timid when he dons the batting helmet without which the league will not let him bat. Motorcycle helmets are not only worn regularly,but probably worn more gladly, in states that require them. When ever ascribed motives matter, the way a choice is organized or constrained will itself be a part of the "outcome" and affect the payoffs.

Bu çalışmada uluslar içindeki ve uluslar arasındaki eşitsizliği ve bu eşitsizliğin değişmeye karşı direncini açıklamak için bir emperyalizm teorisi geliştirilmektedir. Merkez ile Çevre ülkeleri arasında bir ayrıma giderek Merkezde iktidarda olanlarla Çevre ülkelerde güce sahip olanlar arasında çıkar birliği olduğu fikri savunulmaktadır. Sonuçta Çevre ülkelerdeki insanların çoğunluğunun aleyhine, fakat Merkez ülkelerdeki çoğunluğun lehine bir ilişki ortaya çıkmaktadır. Makalede ayrıca emperyalizmin iki mekanizması olduğu belirtilmektedir: Biri hakim olan ulusun ilişki sürecinden dolayı zenginleştiği dikey etkileşim, diğeriyse çevre ülkelerde üzerinde baskı kurulan ulusların birbirlerinden ayrı tutulduğu feodal etkileşim yapısıdır., Galtung develops a theory of imperialism to account for inequality within and between nations and the resistance of this inequality to change. He distinguishes between Centre and Periphery and argues that those in power in the former have a community of interest with those in power in the latter. The result is a relationship which operates at the expense of the majority of the people in the Peripheral countries, but which is largely in the interest of the majority of the people in Centre countries. Two mechanisms of imperialism are defined. One is the pattern of vertical interaction whereby the dominating nation enriches itself as a result of the interaction process. The second mechanism is the feudal interaction structure whereby the dominated nations in the periphery are kept apart.

The Cuban crisis of October 1962 may be analyzed from several perspectives. The investigator may focus his attention on the unique characteristics of the situation and sequence of events which are outlined here. The analyst of international relations may, as is suggested in this paper, examine these events so as to permit relevant comparisons with other crisis situations, both those resolved by war and those eventually resolved by non-violent means. The conceptual framework for this analysis is a two-step mediated stimulus-response model in which the acts of one nation are considered as inputs to other nations. Such psycho-political variables as perceptions and expressions of hostility are traced over time by means of content analysis of documents to test the consistency of the model. In the Cuban crisis, both sides tended to perceive rather accurately the nature of the adversary's actions and then proceeded to act at an appropriate level. Efforts by either party to delay or reverse the escalation toward conflict were generally perceived as such, and responded to in like manner.

In this paper, an attempt will be made to define and describe "pacifism" from a sociological point of view, i.e., with use of sociological concepts and theories. This is done with two aims in mind: (1) to clarify some theoretical problems in sociology as well as in pacifist ideologies and (2) to point out some hypotheses that might not only be validated theoretically or ideologically but also possibly be tested empirically. We shall make use of this definition of "pacifism"

Most so-called "theories" and "explanations" in the behavioral sciences tend to be formulated in qualitative terms which are often ill-defined. Hence, consequences can seldom be rigorously deduced from them, and those consequences that are extracted can seldom be conclusively tested. This has made it possible for conflicting explanations of the same type of behavior to live side by side for many years; for example, Gestalt and Associationalist theories of perception; Freudian, Adlerian, Jungian, and many other varieties of psychoanalytic theories; and a large number of learning theories. Because most psychological theories are not testable in any conclusive way they seem never to die, and only seldom even to fade away. A more important consequence is that theory development is not nearly as cumulative in the behavioral sciences as it is in other sciences; convergence and generalization of behavioral theories are relatively rare phenomena. This paper reports the results of using a specifically designed research methodology to obtain and generalize a quantitative explanation of human behavior in multi-person, interactive games. The games are interactive in the sense that the payoff to one individual resulting from the selection of a particular strategy depends on the strategy selections of the other participants. The payoffs are monetary and the games are structured so that the monetary preferences of outcomes for each individual create a conflict of interest among the participants. The only permitted form of interaction between the participants, and thus the only way the conflict can be resolved, is through the selection of strategies during the course of the game. The objective of the research program reported herein was to identify, quantify, and relate the properties of the conflict environment, the history of the conflict, and the characteristics of the individual which explain his actions at a particular time in the game.

THE ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS IS A TECHNIQUE FOR INVESTIGATING THE STABILITY OF VARIOUS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO A CONFLICT BETWEEN SEVERAL PARTIES. ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO EACH OF THEM ARE LISTED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF 0 (IN FAVOR) OR 1 (OPPOSED) TO EACH OPTION. THE SET OF ASSIGNMENTS IS A POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT. SEVERAL TABLES ARE DEVELOPED FROM THE STAND POINT OF THE PREFERENCES OF EACH PARTY, OR COALITIONS OF THE PARTIES. ONE SUCH TABLE CONTAINS A LISTING OF A PROPOSED OUTCOME AS SOLUTION, OR STATUS QUO, AND ALL OTHER OUTCOMES ARE GIVEN IN EITHER A PREFERRED OR NOT PREFERRED (TO THE STATUS QUO) CATEGORY. ELEMENTARY GAME THEORETIC IDEAS OF STABILITY ARE USED TO STUDY WHETHER THE STATUS QUO OUTCOME IS STABLE UNDER SANCTIONS BY OPPOSING PARTIES. THE PROCEDURE IS APPLIED IN THIS PAPER TO THE SUBWAY- HIGHWAY DEBATE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. OTHER APPLICATIONS ARE MENTIONED. /AUTHOR/

Thousallds of variables have been proposed to explain or describe the complex variety and i~lterco~lnectiolls of social and illternatio~lal relations. Perhaps an equal number of hypotheses and theories linkillg these variables have been suggested. The few basic variables and propositions central to ullderstalldillg remain to be determined. The systematic dependencies and correlations among these variables have been charted only roughly, if at all, and many, if not most, call be ~lleasurecl only on presence-absence or rank order scales. And to take the data on any one variable at face value is to beg questions of validity, reliability, and comparability. Confronted with entangled behavior. unkno\vn interdependencies, nlasses of qualitative and cluantitative variables, and bad data, many social scientists are turning toward factor analysis to uncover major social and internatio~lal pa t terns .Vactor hundred variables, conlpellsate for random error and invalidity, and disentangle complex interrelationships into their major and distinct regularities. Factor analysis is not without cost, ho\\-ever. It is lnathe~llatically complicated and entails diverse and numerous consideratio~~s in application. Its technical vocabulary includes strange terms such as e i g e ~ z ~ n l u e s , iv iate , dim,e~zsions, orthogonal, londingr, and co~rrn11~nality. Its results usually absorb a dozen or so pages in a given report, leaving little room for a methodological iiltroductio~l or explanation of terms. Add to this the fact that students do not ordinarily learn factor allalysis in their formal training, and the stun is the major cost of factor analysis: most laymen, social scientists, and policy-makers find the nature ant1 significance of the results incomprehensible. The problem of cornn~unicati~lg factor analysis is especially crucial for peace research. Scholars in this field are clraw~l An invitec1 paper for The Jolrrncll of Conflict frolll clisciplines alld professions, alld Resolt~tion. Prepared in connection with research supported by the National Sciencc Fotunf ? ~ them are acquainted with thr dation. GS-1230. For many helpful comments method. made on a previous draft. I wish to thank As our empirical kllowledge of conflict Henry Kariel, hlichael Haas, Robert Hefner: processes, behavior, conditions, and pattelns \Voocly Pitts, and J. David Singer. Portions of the article are taken from Rummel ( 1968). beconle illcreasi~lgly expressed in factor"or a bibliography of applications of factor analvtic terms, those who need this knowlanalysis in the social sciences (esclucling psyedge lnost in order to make illforlned chology), see Rummel (1968). A bibliography of a ~ ~ l i c a t i o n s to conflict and inte~national decisions may be those who are most A A

In recent years sociologists have begun to pay systematic attention to relations between national societies. Inevitably, problems arise as to the relationship between sociological and other kinds of analytic treatment of international phenomena, while the appropriateness of prevalent systems of sociological analysis and theory is also necessarily questioned. In probing the basic relations between national societies in sociological terms, the present paper revolves around these issues at various

The paper contains an analysis, based on the 300 biggest industrial corporations and commercial banks, of the degree of concentration of various types of capital. First some techniques of concen tration are explored. At the transnational level, the most conspicuous phenomenon is the forma tion of new types of international teams between banks, teams which imply ever-closer ties between banks. Contributing to increasing concentration are the foreign operations - establishment of repre sentative offices and branches - of major banks. Some long-term aspects on the degree of con centration are also touched on. These explorations indicate that the degree of concentration has increased considerably since the beginning of the 20th century. Especially (West) Germany and Great Britain have declined in importance, while countries like the US, Japan, and Italy have increased their financial power. The overall con centration of capital power among nations is marked. In the field of banking and multinational business corporations, the degree of concentration is not so conspicuous, although US banks and BINGOs account for 35-40 % of the total activi ties. Neither is the rank order of various nations completely the same; for example Japan has a more dominant role in banking than in other fields, and Great Britain has gained relatively more dominance in the system of BINGOs. The bulk of the article consists of descriptive analysis of the degree of concentration of capital power and changes in it, but the authors also carry out some explanatory investigations. These investigations indicate, among other things, that the 'free flow' of capital - advocated by OECD - does not change the structure of capital con centration, and that industrial capital alone determines the extent of outflowing capital. Furthermore, the data clearly indicate a division of labor between smaller West European states: relatively speaking, the Netherlands and Switzer land are centers of industrial capital; whereas e.g. Belgium, a political centrum of Western Europe, is much weaker in this respect. The authors also indicate the impact of the war in Vietnam on the banking activities in this region: the most im portant banks of the area have grown very rapidly. This finding is clearly connected with the tendency of finance capital to become involved in large-scale violent conflicts.

investigated with respect to their effect on the outcome (or series of outcomes), among them the personality and the sex of the experimental subjects. This paper concerns itself with sex role as it relates to choice behavior in one of the more common games of conflict, that of Chicken (Rapoport and Chammah, 1966). Research that has considered sex role, either as a primary or as an interacting variable affecting experimental game behavior, can be classified into two general categories-research in which subjects play against programmed opponents and research in which subjects play against each other. In the first category the evidence is mixed at 1. The author wishes to extend his thanks to Denis Carpio, who ran the experiments, and to James Emshoff for his collaboration throughout the study. The experiments were conducted while the author was on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania and were supported in part by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. best. Using the Prisoner's Dilemma Bixenstine and Wilson (1963), Bixenstine, Potash, and Wilson (1963), McKeown, Gahagan, and Tedeschi (1967), and Tedeschi et al. (1968) found no significant sex/choice-behavior correlation. But Bixenstine, Chambers, and Wilson (1964) using an 80 percent random match program found that males were more likely to play cooperatively (avoid the dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemma) than were females. Komorita (1965) on the other hand discovered that females were more likely to be cooperative against both a 50 percent and a 75 percent random matching program than were males.

Trust and suspicion appear to underlie many social interactions. Thus it is not surprising that they occupy an important role in various efforts to account for the stability or instability of a wide variety of human relationships. One of the earliest systematic formulations of these concepts appeared in this journal over a decade ago (cf. Deutsch, 1958). Yet little progress has been made since then toward a more satisfactory conceptualization of trust and suspicion. This paper is devoted to the examination of both the theoretical and the methodological considerations relevant to the empirical study of trust and suspicion.

location and elimination of guerrilla forces and their leaders. It is the significance of the location of such guerrilla bases that is the focus for this paper. The consistency of locational elements in the guel~rilla bases in the cases of China and Vietnam (and ap

Switzerland is one of the few democracies that has regulated its political conflicts for a long time with very little violence. If we operationalize the degree of political violence by the number of deaths from domestic group violence per million population, Switzerland has the value zero for the period studied by the authors of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Russett et al., 1964). That is, from 1950 to 1962 nobody was killed in Switzerland for political reasons. Since 1962 the value has remained at zero; even the worldwide student unrest of recent years has been articulated in Switzerland with relatively little violence. This paper takes the case of Switzerland to test some hypotheses about the conditions for nonviolent patterns of conflict resolution in democratic systems. Most hypotheses that we have found in the literature are not particularly concerned with political nonviolence but rather with democratic stability. Nevertheless, since political nonviolence is usually considered to be one element of democratic stability (see, for instance, Wildenmann and Kaase, 1968), hypotheses about the conditions of democratic stability have also to be valid for the conditions of political nonviolence. Using the case of Switzerland to test such hypotheses requires, first, a description of the case itself. For this description we developed a system analysis model based especially on the works of Deutsch (1966) and Easton (1965). To fill this frame of reference we studied, by the method of participant observation, the following three decision-making processes: (1) The decision of the Swiss Confederation to give financial aid to the cantonal universities. (2) The decision of the Aargau Canton to found a new university. (3) The decision of the Liberal Party (Freisinnig-denwkratische Partei) about the program for a federal election. Besides these three case studies we undertook four survey studies about the political behavior of the citizens of Switzerland. Finally, we used for our description, insofar as possible, the whole literature about the Swiss political system. We abstracted from our data a total of 149 general observations about that political system. Space forbids enumerating all these observations here, or even giving the detailed description from which the observations were derived. (See Steiner, forthcoming.) The following observations will serve as an illustration

Introduction Several writers have pointed to the impact on behavior of reality as it is conceived psychologically (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918; Allport, 1950; Merton, 1957; Rosenthal, 1964). Though writing on a wide variety of topics, these men have developed the theme that expectations which people have operate as internal factors which influence evaluations, behavior, and the course of events. Most closely associated with the topic of this paper, Allport (1950) contended that the expectancies which men have in regard to war are critical factors in determining whether or not wars will occur. It also seemed quite reasonable to anticipate that a person's attitudes toward war in general would be related to his evaluation of a particular war. Along this line, Putney and Middleton (1962) found students believing war to be more likely were more accepting of war in general. The present research unit dealt with two attitudinal levels. The more abstract level concerned the inevitability of war and the commonly associated idea of the roots of war being in man's basic nature. The second

I. Madness in Methodology? When, after nearly a decade of study and work in the field, I left mathematical logic and the logic of science, I made a resolution not to write papers on the methodology or logic of social science-for fear I would never learn any social science. It was all too easy at the time to publish applications of Boolean algebra or the calculus of relations or the like that could just conceivably be relevant to some future empirical study, in, say, economics. But I had the uneasy feeling that in offering guides for new approaches to social science, I might never approach very closely myself. And I did want to learn something of the facts of life and the substantive issues whose powerful interest had dragged me away from the more chaste attractions of logic. I also had an uncomfortable suspicion that the devastating remark of the great French mathematician, Henri Poincare, about sociology ("The most methods, and the least results") might only too accurately describe the way one might dally in the approach to any social science in order to avoid actually going in and getting lost in a very dense jungle. Maps, brochures, the purchase of compasses, machetes, bush jackets, and rakish tropical helmets can be used as a

At the very outset it is necessary to give some analytical clarification to the distinction between "calculated" and "emotional" decisions. The discussion which follows does not pretend to be either inclusive or definitive. It is clearly not a theory of decisionmaking. It is simply an introduction to the terminology and model used in this paper. We may think of two "styles" of decisionmaking. Let us call the first "calculated" style and the second "emotional" style. Decisions made in the calculated style are characterized by a range of processes which mediate between the impulse or stimulus to act and the act itself. Thus, attempts to gather information, perceive alternative courses of action, relate alternatives to consequences, and relate consequences to organizational or personal goals are necessary in the calculated style. On the other hand, decisions made in the emotional style are characterized by the direct relationship of action to impulse. This style allows for no n Analytical Clarification