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The flow and structure of international news are obviously important factors in shaping the picture of the world in our minds. Therefore, the scientific study of the flow and structure of international news is also important. In 1965, Galtung & Holmboe Ruge published a theory of international news which has proved seminal. Several papers have used it as a starting-point for discussions and further investigations (Smith 1969; Cheesmann 1970; Rosengren 1970; Sande 1971). It has also been anthologized (Tunstall 1970). In the present paper, the flow and structure of international news in general and the Galtung-Ruge theory in particular will be discussed from a methodological, an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Let us start with the methodology.

On October 7, 1961 a conference devoted to the Applications of Game Theory to Negotiation was held at Princeton University under the auspices of the Institute for Defense Analyses and with the support of the Carnegie Corporation. In addition to open discussion1 of the problems of formulating a mathematical model of negotiation, the meeting considered summaries of three papers prepared by Fred C. Ikle, John C. Harsanyi, and Dean G. Pruitt. Revised versions of these papers are included in this special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. It is the main purpose of this editorial note to explain the context in which they arose. As such, it also provides the issue editor with a forum in which he

In these four pages, this paper can be neither a complete introduction nor a complete survey of the role of computer graphics in simulation. However, these examples drawn from the experience of the Naval Post graduate School computer laboratory will illustrate a wide class of applications which may suggest uses in other fields. The interested reader should refer to the January 1971 issue of SIMULATION (which was devoted entirely to computer graphics applications in simulation) and to the supplementary reading list at the end of this paper.

1 This research was supported in whole by the United States Air Force under Contract No. AF 49(638)-317 monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research of the Air Research and Development Command. as s ported in whole by the It is to be noted that in G-type games a2 dominates a, and p2 dominates pi, and, hence, the outcome (a2, /82) may appear to be the rational joint choice. On the other hand, the outcome (al, /i) has a larger joint payoff than any other; further, since x1 > X4, the outcome (ai, /1) has a larger individual payoff than that associated with (a2, P/2). We regard (ac, P/) as the collaborative strategy, since only in this way may subjects maximize their return. Whether or not one may reasonably expect pairs of subjects to collaborate with one another is an open question. However, in an iterated version of such a game there are strong intuitive grounds for expecting the emergence of a collaborative strategy, especially when the number of trials becomes large.4 The specific game employed in the paper mentioned above is given by xl = 3, x2 = 0, xa = 5, and x4 = 1. Actually, three versions of this game, G1, G2, and G3, were used. The results reported in this paper have to do with three additional G-type games and with four non-G-type games. The non-Gtype games have the same general payoff

The paper is aimed at describing systematic trends in the violence between political groups. The report is in two parts. Part one describes the formulation of an empirical test for the existence of (1) a short (15-30 year) term and (2) a long (80-120 year) term periodic fluctuation in the historical occurrence of war. The research described in part one is based, largely, on empirical (versus theoretical) generalizations. That is, not much concern is given to the 'why' of such patterns. The second part of the paper speculates about several possible reasons for these patterns. (Author)

C h a r l e s Wagley has included the U.S. South in his definition of "Plantation America," a region which extends".. .from about midway up the coast of Brazil into the Guianas, along the Caribbean coast throughout the Caribbean itself and into the United States."lThroughout this geographic expanse, the technological and organizational characteristics of plantations have decisively influenced the pattern of change and development which was experienced. Seen in this way, the American South, because of the dominant presence of plantation agriculture, differed significantly from other regions of the country in the years covered by this study. Specifically, our focus in this paper is to examine the relationship between the structure of the plantation economy of the South and that region's failure to keep pace with the economic development experienced in the nation as a whole in the period between the Civil War and World War I. To do so, the paper is divided into two parts: in the first, we define what we mean by a plantation economy, and chronicle how it was that plantations reestablished themselves in the aftermath of slave emancipation, and in the second, we argue analytically that there are grounds to believe that the pace of economic development in plantation economies will he relatively slow and we offer some empirical data relevant to our hypothesis.

The paper analyzes conflict formations now prevailing in contemporary international society. The study begins with the assertion that the development of capitalism and anticapitalist move ments in international politics has led to the globalization of international politics and to the emergence of an international society. This society is here conceived as an antagonistic totality made up particularly of the following conflict formations: intercapitalist, West-East, North-South, inter-socialist, inner-Third World, and formations of structural violence where in ternational and national conflict formations intersect.The paper includes a short discussion on some fundamental principles of peace and social justice in international society. It concludes with some preliminary remarks on the foundation of a structural theory of international society. The author stresses that a further analysis of inter national society will have to look closely into the production relations and the exchange relations emerging from them on a world scale. The theorem of unequal and combined development is given particular importance. The author con tends that on this basis, causes and regularities of conflict formation dynamics can be better understood than by the highly abstract approaches of the last ten to fifteen years, particularly those of the conventional systems analysis.

Drawing largely on the Pentagon Study and other documentary evidence, the paper tries to trace the evolution in the post World War II period of the US imperial drive to the shores of Asia, and especially the historical record of the US Indo china involvement. Stress is laid on motivation and the driving forces behind the US engagement, particularly the political, strategical and economic interests. The paper analyzes the political strategy of the Nixon Administration and points to the continuity of US Pacific policies during the last five Admini strations. There has been only discontinuity in strategies, various Administrations trying to tackle the difficulties encountered from different angles and with different political and military instru ments. Doubt is expressed if the Nixon strategy- which in fact means a return to traditional great power diplomacy in the spirit of the XIX century - could produce a lasting peace. A lasting resolu tion of the Indochina conflict would require the fulfilment of two basic conditions: (1) to relieve tension in the inner circle of conflict by satis fying the social and national aspirations of the Indochinese peoples, i.e. stopping outside inter vention and allowing the national movements freely to shape the fate of the Indochinese nations; and (2) to eliminate conflict in the outer circle by making the area free of great power rivalry, especially in the military field, i.e. neutralization of the region. Some concluding remarks are offered con cerning the nature and dynamics of the US Indo china involvement. Pure profit motives could hardly account for this ruinous undertaking. Among the determinants for this drive are new elements of a world power balance, new attributes usurped by the executive bureaucracy, and new domestic and world domination patterns. Atten tion is drawn to the realively autonomous role of the superstructure. There is a need for further studies of the fabric, structure, and dynamics of these new phenomena in order effectively to con front them.

VER A DECADE HAS PASSED since Richard Wollheim (1962) presented "a paradox in the theory of democracy." In that paper, Wollheim himself tried to sketch a solution to the paradox, and there subsequently have appeared at least four other such attempts. While the literature that has grown up around this problem has certainly not been totally unproductive, a good deal of further clarification is needed. It is something of an embarrassment to modern political philosophy that no approach has yet been published which both makes plain what is truly paradoxical about Wollheim's paradox and solves the paradox in a correct and complete manner. In this paper, I set myself the immodest task of doing just that. Moreover, this solution will also provide a way out of the controversy between actand rule-utilitarians. In the first part, 1 will present Wollheim's paradox and comment on his solution. In the second part, I will summarize and criticize the solutions of the other writers on this subject. And in the third part, I will give my own solutions to the paradox of democracy.

GASP IV is a FORTRAN-based simulation language which provides the framework for modeling systems involving both continuous and discrete phenomena. A general ization of the definition of "event" allows for time to be advanced in a next-event fashion while permit ting a step-wise evaluation of system state variables described by difference or differential equations. Subprograms are included in GASP IV to handle the details of state and event control (including state- variable integration when necessary), information storage and retrieval, collection and analysis of data on system performance, and generation of reports and plots. In this paper, the GASP IV philosophy and modeling approach are described. Descriptions of the subpro grams included in GASP IV and the required user- written subprograms are given. The types of applica tions that have utilized GASP IV are listed. A com panion paper (beginning on p. 71) presents a detailed example of the use of GASP IV for simulating a continuous reaction process involving discrete startups and shutdowns.

A set of hypotheses on the structure of foreign news, which had been presented by Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, is tested empirically by comparing New York Times' coverage of Sino-Indian relations in 1962 with the 'actual' relations of the two countries as reflected in their official correspondence, published by the Indian government in a series of White Papers. Four of the six hypotheses tested are confirmed. It is found that international relations, according to the newspaper, is comprised as predicted of a series of simple, discrete. and dramatic events, whose nature is such as to tend to confirm our expectations of what will happen. On the other hand, predictions that the newspaper would over-select events which are rare or unexpected, and overemphasize events which are more negative in their consequences, were not confirmed. Since the New York Times is generally considered one of the world's most complete and factual newspapers, these findings probably apply with even greater force to most other news papers in the world. Therefore, in reporting international news, newspapers should place more emphasis on background material, on complex and ambiguous events, and on dissonant events. Although Galtung and Ruge had only hypothesized, rather than demonstrated, the existence of the twelve factors influencing news selection discussed in their paper, this study seems to confirm that most, it not all, of the factors do exist and do exert a distorting effect on the news selection process.

1 The original version of this paper was written at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, under Contract Nonr-358 (01), NR 047-006 of the Cowles Foundation with the Office of Naval Research. It was distributed as Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 46. A revised version of this paper was presented at the Princeton Conference on Game Theory and Negotiations in October, 1961. The paper has benefited from comments by the other participants of the Conference. 2 But of course there are exceptions. For a model dealing with the case where the players do not know one another's utility functions, see (Luce and Adams, 1956). know (and know they do not know) each other's utility functions. I shall also indicate some interesting problems our analysis raises for empirical research.

Leadership has long been a topic of considerable interest in the social sciences. Nearly every aspect of leadership has been the subject of some degree of study. The present paper is concerned with some of the situational factors which determine the form of leadership which will arise and be accepted in a group. Two basic questions will be considered: 1. Under what conditions will there be pressure toward centralized authoritarian leadership? 2. Under what conditions is a more participative democratic form of leadership likely to arise? While this is certainly not a new topic, this paper attempts to develop a somewhat more systematic approach than has ordinarily been undertaken toward this subject. I feel that the "model" developed in this paper provides a framework or structure for further experimentation and theoretical development that has perhaps previously been lacking. My initial interest in making such a study was stimulated by observations made last summer in Indonesia and Burma of a strong desire, particularly among certain high government officials, for centralized control. I observed this same trend beginning to develop in Malaya. Recent releases from Ghana suggest that this situation is not confined to Asia. Particularly in Indonesia, which is the situation most familiar to me, there was an eadership has long been a topic of conoriginal attempt at developing a free society and a free enterprise economy. In each of the countries mentioned there was no revo

Among different forms of 'nonviolent direct action', an extensive taxonomy for which has been provided by Gene Sharp (1959), Gandhian satyagraha occupies a unique place. This is due to both historical and substantive reasons. A factor analysis of the ingredients of different forms of nonviolent direct action (Chatterjee and Bhattacharjee 1971) shows that satygraha has high loading on Factor III which the authors identify as 'something like active principled striving toward total transformation' of the individual, group, community, or state. Satyagraha has second highest loading on Factor I, identified as 'some sort of absolutist stand toward moral-ethical commitment to nonviolence'. This emphasis on total transformation, on dynamism, and on unswerving commitment to nonviolence may have contributed to some of its success in historical reckoning. First Gandhi and then Martin Luther King have demonstrated the value of nonviolent satyagraha as an effective weapon for correcting untenable positions, when obtaining redress through constitutional means is slow, difficult, or beset with hurdles. In recent times social scientists have started taking an interest in analyzing the processes underlying satyagraha. Some members of the 'strategic community' who utilize approaches from game theory, decision theory, and general systems theory in elucidating complex social processes have also tried to apply such methods for a deeper understanding of the satyagraha process. The present paper, while reviewing some of these attempts to analyze the strategic aspects of satyagraha, seeks to show that more sophisticated effort is required for finding the most appropriate game model for Gandhian satyagraha. Some of the observations will be supported with empirical evidence, collected by the author, on a series of three satyagrahas resorted to by a group of encroachers in a government grazing reserve in Angarkata in north-eastern Assam. A brief account of the three Angarkata satyagrahas is given in the Appendix. For a fuller account, the reader may refer to a report by Chatterjee and Sudarshan Kumari (1969); a short journalistic rendering has been published by Chatterjee (1970).

This paper reevaluates certain aspects of Dahrendorf's conflict theory in relation to social mobility. Specifically, the relationship between the degree of openness or closedness of the mobility opportunity structure of society and the degree of intergroup antagonism is examined. A game simulation is initiated whereby the researcher is able to create simulated situations of varying mobility opportunity and observe, by means of pre- and posttest questionnaires, the relative antagonism between groups within the situation and the participants' latent antagonism outside the simulated situation. The findings provide support for Dahrendorf's hypothesis, but also indicate that further dynamics are involved in the structure of mobility systems.

In this paper, the effect of the method of control on the transfer function of two-phase servomotors is investigated. The methods of control considered are the amplitude, time-phase, frequency, voltage-frequency, pulse-width and space-phase control. Torque equations are derived for different methods. The motor gain and time-constant are determined from the torque-speed and speed-signal characteristics. The servomotor torque, speed, time-constant and gain — and their dependence on the signal magnitude — are compared for the different methods of control. It is shown that for the same value of the signal, the motor time-constant may vary between 2·2 msec and 45 msec and the gain may be increased six times if the method of control is changed.

This paper reports a secondary analysis of a series of simulation runs which explored the effects of a broad array of variables on a nation's response to an imminent strategic attack from an unidentified source. Seven variables appeared as important in determining whether a nation would counterattack or delay retaliation when given such a warning. These variables include availability of a weapon survivability system, the economic and force capabilities of the nation, the decision makers' perceptions of the degree of tension in the world and of the degree of ambiguity in the situation, as well as the decision style and level of self-esteem of the decision makers. The results suggest that factors other than the invulnerability of weapon systems are involved in maintaining the stability of deterrence in an extreme crisis.

This paper discusses the difficulties involved in relaxing the self-interest assumption as it is traditionally used in conjunction with the assumption of rationality. A formal model of altruistic behavior is developed and employed in the analysis of the problems of burden-sharing among rational allies. It is demonstrated that altruistic behavior among political actors is not, in general, sufficient to remove all areas of contention between the actors although the scope of disagreement is shown to be narrowed by altruistic behavior. Additional applications of the model of non-self-interested behavior are presented and suggested.

Since the Arab-Israel war of 1967, military expenditure/GNP ratios for the participants in the conflict-Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Irag-have escalated to levels far surpassing those in other developing areas and even those of the superpowers locked in an extensive global arms race. In the Middle East, a region of low per capita income and not especially endowed with an abundance of natural resources, the costs incurred by military expendenditures are particularly severe. The purpose of the paper is to measure these costs. A simple variant of the Harrod-Domar model is employed to determine the military burden. Estimates are made for both the 1960-1970 and the 1970-1980 periods. A set of assumptions-none peculiar to the Middle East-is posited to describe the transfer of resources from military to civilian production in a hypothesized process of deescalation. The additions to civilian production provide the basis for the estimates of the economic sacrifice the Middle East populations incur in maintaining the abnormal levels of military expenditure/GNP ratios.

In this paper the composite thermal conductivities of unidirec tional composites are studied and expressions are obtained for pre dicting these conductivities in the directions along and normal to the filaments. In the direction along the filament an expression is presented based on the assumption that the filaments and matrix are connected in parallel. In the direction normal to the filaments composite thermal conductivity values are obtained first by utiliz ing the analogy between the response of a unidirectional composite to longitudinal shear loading and to transverse heat transfer; second by replacing the filament-matrix composite with an idealized ther mal model. The results of the shear loading analogy agree reason ably well with the results of the thermal model particularly at filament contents below about 60%. These results were also com pared to experimental data reported in the literature and good agreement was found between the data and those theoretical re sults that were derived for circular filaments arranged in a square packing array.

This paper (1) explains the variables and methods used to calculate the MIRV threat to the fixed-site land-based ICBM forces of the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) attempts to reconstruct the calculations presented in the 1969 ABM debate by Albert Wohlstetter, George Rathjens, and John S. Foster about the number of Minutemen which could be expected to survive an attack by forces of various sizes and characteristics; and (3) applies these methods, together with some plausible assumptions about classified variables, to two other security issues: the import of the SALT limitation on the size of the Soviet SS-9 force and the character of the threat to the Soviet fixed-site ICBM force posed by the American MIRV program.

Two years ago, Rapoport (1970) asked peace researchers if their work was applicable. In the March 1971 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution Kent replied to Rapoport's query. This paper continues the dialogue established by Rapoport and Kent. Its central questions concern the nature of peace research and researchers, the source of support, and the applicability (usefulness) of the research. Rapoport's perception of the goal of peace research

The findings reported at that time established that there were in fact certain relationships between domestic and foreign conflict behavior variables, depending upon the type of nation, the variables, and the time lags involved. This paper deals with certain deficiencies found in that earlier study. It will also report results, parallel to those published earlier, but incorporating some of the changes made in the analysis. One major deficiency of the earlier study was the method by which indicators were compiled for the six dimensions of domestic and foreign conflict behavior. The measures used were based on factors extracted by Rummel for the 1955-57 data (Rummel, [3]). Although I was using the Tanter data also (Tanter, [4]), thus giving six years of data, from 1955-60, I continued to use the factors relevant only to the 1955-57 period. A second problem relates to the way in which the raw scores were used. As indicated in Table 4 of the earlier article, I used both raw and transformed scores, adding these according to the way variables loaded on the appropriate factors of the Rummel solution. For example, on the subversive dimension, guerrilla warfare, with a loading of .90, and assassinations, with a loading of .66, both received equal weight when the final score was compiled. It is obvious that guerrilla warfare should have received a larger proportion of the weight in the dimension.' Because of the above two difficulties, it was decided to perform a series of new factor analyses, using the data from 1955 to 1960. In addition, I extracted factor scores for the nations on a yearly basis. It is these factor scores, one per dimension per country per year, which will be used as the data in computing correlations between the dimensions of domestic and foreign conflict behavior. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of the factor analyses performed. These results are also compared with the results obtained by Rummel [3] and Tanter [4] in the earlier analyses.2 With regard to domestic conflict, it was decided, using the eigenvalue-one criterion, to extract two factors on the orthogonal rotation. These factors are very similar to those found by Tanter in his analysis of the 1958-1960 data. Assassinations does not load above .50

Undoubtedly, many students of negotiation are interested in their subject because negotiation is one of the outstanding mechanisms by which social and political conflicts can be resolved. Their hope is that a close and detailed study of the process of negotiation will yield information which will help to ease some of the world's more threatening tensions. In this paper we shall discuss some of the reasons why reaching this goal is more difficult than

While attention in the iron and steel industry has been focused on the study and analysis of the flow of materials through the main productive units (blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills), the analysis of this flow through the nonproductive units (the mixer and soaking pits) is generally over looked. These two units would create serious bottle necks in production if their capacities were not properly determined before being installed. This paper considers the soaking-pit/rolling-mill complex as a queueing system in which the soaking pits are viewed as units circulating a cyclic queue, and the rolling mill as the service station. A simulation model representing the pit-mill system is developed: (1) To predict the improvement in the capacity of the system through adding more pits (2) To predict the effect of breakdowns and mainte nance or the shutdown of a pit. Several criteria, including their economic aspects, are used to measure the performance of the system. The optimal capacity of the system is determined such that an economic balance between the cost of service and the cost of waiting for that service is achieved.

In his basic paper, "On Welfare Theory and Pareto Regions,"2 Professor Ragnar Frisch has properly emphasized the necessity for specifying carefully the constraints that confine the "Pareto Region," that region within which the Pareto criterion for classifying positions is to be employed. As he demonstrates, the region will depend upon the nature of the constraints introduced, and the set of points or positions that may be classified as "optimal" will vary with these constraints. I propose here to discuss the nature of the appropriate constraints in a somewhat different manner and from a different philosophy than that of Frisch. His view, which is that "social value judgments" must be introduced in order to determine

Within the limits set by structural arrangements and by institutions, individuals choose their course of action. Anthropologists have always been interested in the outcome of these choices either because they reflect ongoing change or because they elucidate interrelations between institu tions. In order for decision-making analysis to be more than anecdotal, however, it needs to be guided by a set of assumptions concerning reasoning and cognitive processes, and the conditions germane to them. Economists. sociologists, psychologists, philosophers and mathematicians have already outlined many useful assumptions. Part of our task in this paper is to con tribute to a systematization of those assumptions that arc most relevant to anthropological interests. We also discuss the advantages and limitations of decision analysis for social anthropology, examine the theoretical and methodological implications of "rationality," and present a sequence of hypothetical steps that we regard as requisites for an adequate decision- making analysis.

There are two levels of analysis of intrapersonal conflict: the action level and the belief level, the former dealing with external motor responses and the latter with internal affective and cognitive processes. Particular instances of conflict may, for theoretical convenience, be localized at one or another of these levels. For example, one may ask how a person acts when simultaneously motivated to approach and to avoid an external object (3, 9, 10). Or one may ask instead what happens to the cognitive representation of an external object when the object simultaneously incurs favorable and unfavorable cognitions (12). The present paper is addressed to the latter type of question. We shall not consider the problem of whether and how the action level is to be reduced to the belief level or vice

Iterative techniques for function optimization have been considered extensivezy for use in all-digital computation. Relatively little has been done to take advantage of the much higher integration speed of hybrid computation systems. This paper demonstrates application of one simple procedure in a hybrid envi ronment and compares the results to those obtained by an efficient digital procedure. Even though a much more efficient procedure was used on the digital, time-saving factors between 8 and 2 were obtained via the simpler hybrid implementation. Since the dollar cost of the hybrid is much less than that of the digital, the hybrid has a large advantage per solution.

Although students of world politics have come increasingly to speak of their empirical domain as a social system, little effort has gone into the systematic observation and measurement of its formal or informal structure. One structural attribute of the inter national system which leaves a definite trace and is therefore readily measurable, is that of alliance patterns. This paper examines all written (peacetime only) alliances among system members, describes the procedures for classifying them, and then transforms such information into quantitative indicators of alliance aggregation for various forms of the international system for every year between 1815 and 1939. Such data make it possible to treat this particular system attribute as either a dependent or an inde pendent variable for purposes of hypothesis testing or exploration in world politics.

The development of a science of threat systems is a desirable but slow-dangerously slow-process (cf. Boulding, 1963). The uneven evolution of this science has given it several characteristics of doubtful value. In the first place, "strategic thinking" has acquired military connotations. When a student of international politics refers to "the strategists," he usually has in mind those who are primarily concerned with military policy-and he expects other students of international politics to know that this is what he has in mind. Although there are many nonmilitary situations in international politics in which the ability of one nation to gain its ends depends to an important degree on what other nations do (cf. Schelling, 1960, p. 5), such situations are rarely viewed as "strategic." Even within the field of military affairs, the term "strategic thinking" usually connotes a concern with nuclear deterrence policies. Although the valuable contributions to theorizing about threats by students of nuclear strategy must be acknowledged, it would be undesirable to treat such theories as the exclusive province of such scholars. In addition to its military connotations, the concept of strategic thought has become associated with game theory. Thinking about threats, however, is too important to be left to the game theorists. For example, after a highly stimulating discussion of "fractional threats," Schelling (1960, p. 184) talks about them as if the importance of his discussion lay in having found a rationale for such tactics in game theory terms. But what if Schelling had failed to find a niche in game theory for fractional threats? Should we then forget about them? Such tactics are clearly phenomena of the real world. Many students of international politics can benefit from Schelling's imaginative discussions regardless of their implications for game theory. This might be called the problem of "how to steal without getting caught"that is, how can the student of international politics "steal" Schellings's ideas without getting caught by Schelling's game theory orientation? For many students of international politics, the primary significance of Schelling's work lies in improved understanding of the real world, not in his contributions to the game theory. Threats pervade human relations and should not be discussed solely in terms of nuclear deterrence or game theory. The purpose of this paper is to broaden the context within which threats are discussed by looking at selected aspects of recent thinking about threats from a more general perspective than that of either game theory or nuclear strategy. The discussion will focus on: (1) the basic concept of threat, (2) the relationship between threats and promises, (3) the coerciveness of threats, (4) the costs of threats, (5) the role of ambiguity in threat systems, and (6) the relationship between threats and the concept of deterrence.

This paper is intended to clarify some questions that are essential to the black struggle for liberation. Its major aim is to suggest a more effective framework for the analysis of the historical and contemporary situation of black people in the United States. We have seen how the concept we are calling internal colonialism fits what we know to be the concrete historical experiences of black people and the relationship of these experiences to Third World underdevelopment and European (including Euro-American) development66. In discussing the newly emerging theory of internal colonialism we start from the assumption that theoretical knowledge, if it is to be useful, must reflect what is real in the world more deeply and thoroughly. It is therefore necessary for us to press beyond the point where the colonial analogy only looks and feels good to the essence of what really ails us in black communities across the United States. Ultimately, it is only when we meet with success in our continuing struggle to alter our present reality of oppression that we will really know if the theory of internal colonialism or any other knowledge was/is correct and of any merit. Since we dare not wait until then, it is to the important task of using what insights our analysis has already yielded and raising our struggle against oppression and exploitation to a higher level to which we should all turn.

This paper evaluates the policy relevance of models according to two criteria: (1) the degree to which policy makers may perceive they have control over predictors in the model; and (2) the degree of confidence policy makers may have in the model's implications. An evaluation is made of various models applicable in world politics from the perspective of their policy relevance. These include: game theory models and experimental games, man-machine simulation models, aggregate data models, and computer simulation models and information systems.

Most revolutionary elite studies merely discuss and analyze the few key men who build and create revolutionary movements, as well as look upon the "political revolutionary" as a singular, modal type. This paper is a discussion and analysis of the generality of the leadership of one specific political revolution, the 1905 Russian Revolution. By means of Q-factor analysis, it was discovered that the 1905 revolutionary leadership cluster into one of six activity categories or types: (1) rebel, (2) striker, (3) propagandist, (4) party organizer, (5) upper-level politician, (6) intelligentsia. Not only was each type distinct in terms of its revolutionary role, but also unique in terms of childhood, adolescent, and familial characteristics. Moreover, each type, which developed sequentially, parallels the necessary functions of a political system, as specified by Almond and Coleman.

A theory is formulated with which to analyze transactions in social retationships Economic types of exchange characterized by calculation and self-interest on the part of the actors are contrasted with more "social" forms of transaction such as occur in the cases of role relationships with interlocking rights and obligations and persons strongly attached to one another. The social factors and conditions determining the types of transaction likely to occur between actors are examined in the paper. The key idea in this respect is that the structural and temporal context of interaction, including the past and anticipated character of their relationship, affects actors' orientations toward one another, their preferences, decisions and interaction patterns.

This paper was developed with the aim of contributing to theory about the relations between pairs of nations. Nevertheless, its focus is considerably broader, involving relations between two parties (i.e., decisionmaking units) of any kind, whether nations, organizations, groups, or individuals. Quite clearly there are differences among the kinds of parties just enumerated. But there are also similarities which, hopefully, make it possible (and if possible indeed desirable) to develop broader generalizations embracing all kinds of parties.

Many observers have recently noted that the international system is evolving into a multipolar world. At the same time, the notion of balance of power is being severely criticized for its vagueness and inconsistency. Seven empirically testable propositions which exemplify refined and narrowed notions of balance of power are reviewed and analyzed in this paper. These propositions, authored by A. L. Burns, M. Kaplan, D. Singer and M. Small, F. H. Hinsley, R. Rosecrance, and F. Harary concern one of four major approaches to the multipolar system: (1) the rules of a theoretical balance of power system, (2) the functioning of alliances, (3) historical systemic periodization, and (4) the application of structural balance theory to the interna tional system. The Situational Analysis Project provided the data for testing these propositions over the first twelve years of the "Bismarckian system," 1870 through 1881. The propositions did not hold up well under detailed testing. The rules of the balance of power system were violated—in particular, an "ingratiation effect" was found in place of the balance-restoring mechanism; alliances led to a lessening of cooperation and attention between allies; and historical periodization was found to be inaccurate. The findings, however, did support the fundamental assumption underlying the structural balance theory. Since the future may be quite like the nineteenth century in terms of structure, a reevaluation of the Bismarckian system is not an irrelevant exercise but rather an inquiry into the functioning of a system we may actually have to operate.

It is often pointed out that conflicts of interest are - or should be - of great importance in social science. However, it seems to be far from clear what a conflict of interest is. The main purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary but fairly systematic survey of dif ferent interpretations or definitions of 'conflict of interest'. Intra-party conflicts are not discussed. As a point of departure it is assumed that there is a conflict of interest between two parties if, and only if, their interests are incompatible. The problematic terms here are 'interest' and 'incompatible'. These are very seldom defined in social science. The meaning of 'interest' is discussed in sections 3 and 4; subjectivistic, objectivistic, naturalistic, and normative interpretations of this term are distinguished and exemplified. The meaning of 'incompatible' is discussed in section 5. It is sometimes held that conflict theorists tend to neglect 'real' conflicts of interest. The content of this claim is discussed in the last section.

This paper describes a new solid-state, monolithic inte grated analog multiplier, based on the controlled-trans conductance principle that is designed for high speed, high accuracy, and excellent linearity. A novel differ ential amplifier circuit permits cancellation of undesired nonlinearities, and carefully matched device geometries account for the good accuracy of the new multiplier. With an inherent voltage gain of A v = 1/10, the multi plier will provide a ± 10 V output at ± 10 mA with linearity approaching 0.1 % at 100 Hz. The multiplier package may be used in conjunction with an external operational amplifier and external resistors, and offers the advantages of monolithic construction (low cost, ex cellent temperature tracking) with the precision of ad justable-parameter, discrete construction.

In earlier work we have reported on CELIA, a program for simulating the behavior of linear iterative arrays of cells. The action of a cell is influenced by both its neighbors. Our main application area was biology, where the program can be used to test hypotheses about the developmental rules for organisms. More recently we have been applying our program to test proposed solutions to some fairly complicated biozogically-based problems. We have investigated whether one can achieve regulative global polarity in organisms without polarity in individual cells, by solving the French flag problem of Wolpert, using only symmetric elements. In our attempted simulation of pigmentation patterns on the shells of sea-snails, we have found it necessary to find a solution to a generalized version of the firing squad synchronization problem, in which the firing squad is growing while it is trying to synchronize itself. We found that our original program CELIA was some what awkward for simulating such complicated situa tions. A new program has been devised in which the state of the individual ceZZs is described by a set of attributes and each attribute itself may be a list structure. The present paper reports on these changes and ex plains how they turn out to be useful in the appli cations mentioned above.

1 This study attempts to construct some rationale for certain of Dr. S. P. Huntington's historically based findings (3) by means of multiplier diagrams whose use the writer learned early in 1958 from Professor T. W. Swan, in an as-yetunpublished paper, "Circular Causation" (1957), and from D. W. E. G. Salter, both of the Australian National University. It is further maintained that such diagrams (which are of a kind applied to the problem of arms races by A. Rapoport [5, pp. 275-78]) require the addition of representations of temporal effects if they are to help account for the behavior of "sophisticated" contestants in an arms race. Dr. Huntington's is a rich and suggestive essay, which brings together much interesting information and develops a theory of the subject along non-quantitative lines. I should like to thank him and Professor W. T. R. Fox, both of the Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia, and members and visiting associates of the Center of International Studies, Princeton, for their critical help in the development of the following ideas. ace may make its increases naively; that is, it may increase its armaments simply because it has come to believe that another's

This paper is about binary choices with externalities. These are either-or situations,not choices of degree or quantity. An "externality" is present when you care about my choice or my choice affects yours. You may not care, but need to know-whether to pass on left or right when we meet. You may not need to know, but care---you will drive whether or not I drive--- but prefer that I keep off the road.You may both care and need to know. The literature of externalities has mostly to do with how much of a good or a bad should be produced,consumed,or allowed.HereI consider only the interdependence of choices to do or not to do, to join or not to join, to stay or to leave, to vote yes or no, to conform or not to conform to some agreement or rule or restriction. Players will accept hockey helmets (or not) by individual choice for several reasons. Chicago star Bobby Hull cites the simplest factor: "vanity." But many players honestly believe that helmets will cut their efficiency and put them at a disadvantage, and others fear the ridicule of opponents. The use of helmets will spread only through fear caused by injuries like Green's-or through a rule making them mandatory. . . One player summed up the feelings of many: "It's foolish not to wear a helmet. But I don't because the other guys don't. I know that' silly, but most of the players feel the same way. If the league made us do it, though, we'd all wear them and nobody would mind." Shortly after Teddy Green of the Bruins took a hockey stick in his brain, the player, Don Awrey, commented to a Newsweek(1969) reporter, "WhenI saw the way Teddy looked, it was an awful feeling . . . I'm going to start wearing a helmet now, and I don't care what anybody says." A voluntary helmet may be seen as cowardly,but nobody thinks a baseball player timid when he dons the batting helmet without which the league will not let him bat. Motorcycle helmets are not only worn regularly,but probably worn more gladly, in states that require them. When ever ascribed motives matter, the way a choice is organized or constrained will itself be a part of the "outcome" and affect the payoffs.

The Cuban crisis of October 1962 may be analyzed from several perspectives. The investigator may focus his attention on the unique characteristics of the situation and sequence of events which are outlined here. The analyst of international relations may, as is suggested in this paper, examine these events so as to permit relevant comparisons with other crisis situations, both those resolved by war and those eventually resolved by non-violent means. The conceptual framework for this analysis is a two-step mediated stimulus-response model in which the acts of one nation are considered as inputs to other nations. Such psycho-political variables as perceptions and expressions of hostility are traced over time by means of content analysis of documents to test the consistency of the model. In the Cuban crisis, both sides tended to perceive rather accurately the nature of the adversary's actions and then proceeded to act at an appropriate level. Efforts by either party to delay or reverse the escalation toward conflict were generally perceived as such, and responded to in like manner.

In this paper, an attempt will be made to define and describe "pacifism" from a sociological point of view, i.e., with use of sociological concepts and theories. This is done with two aims in mind: (1) to clarify some theoretical problems in sociology as well as in pacifist ideologies and (2) to point out some hypotheses that might not only be validated theoretically or ideologically but also possibly be tested empirically. We shall make use of this definition of "pacifism"

Most so-called "theories" and "explanations" in the behavioral sciences tend to be formulated in qualitative terms which are often ill-defined. Hence, consequences can seldom be rigorously deduced from them, and those consequences that are extracted can seldom be conclusively tested. This has made it possible for conflicting explanations of the same type of behavior to live side by side for many years; for example, Gestalt and Associationalist theories of perception; Freudian, Adlerian, Jungian, and many other varieties of psychoanalytic theories; and a large number of learning theories. Because most psychological theories are not testable in any conclusive way they seem never to die, and only seldom even to fade away. A more important consequence is that theory development is not nearly as cumulative in the behavioral sciences as it is in other sciences; convergence and generalization of behavioral theories are relatively rare phenomena. This paper reports the results of using a specifically designed research methodology to obtain and generalize a quantitative explanation of human behavior in multi-person, interactive games. The games are interactive in the sense that the payoff to one individual resulting from the selection of a particular strategy depends on the strategy selections of the other participants. The payoffs are monetary and the games are structured so that the monetary preferences of outcomes for each individual create a conflict of interest among the participants. The only permitted form of interaction between the participants, and thus the only way the conflict can be resolved, is through the selection of strategies during the course of the game. The objective of the research program reported herein was to identify, quantify, and relate the properties of the conflict environment, the history of the conflict, and the characteristics of the individual which explain his actions at a particular time in the game.

THE ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS IS A TECHNIQUE FOR INVESTIGATING THE STABILITY OF VARIOUS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO A CONFLICT BETWEEN SEVERAL PARTIES. ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO EACH OF THEM ARE LISTED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF 0 (IN FAVOR) OR 1 (OPPOSED) TO EACH OPTION. THE SET OF ASSIGNMENTS IS A POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT. SEVERAL TABLES ARE DEVELOPED FROM THE STAND POINT OF THE PREFERENCES OF EACH PARTY, OR COALITIONS OF THE PARTIES. ONE SUCH TABLE CONTAINS A LISTING OF A PROPOSED OUTCOME AS SOLUTION, OR STATUS QUO, AND ALL OTHER OUTCOMES ARE GIVEN IN EITHER A PREFERRED OR NOT PREFERRED (TO THE STATUS QUO) CATEGORY. ELEMENTARY GAME THEORETIC IDEAS OF STABILITY ARE USED TO STUDY WHETHER THE STATUS QUO OUTCOME IS STABLE UNDER SANCTIONS BY OPPOSING PARTIES. THE PROCEDURE IS APPLIED IN THIS PAPER TO THE SUBWAY- HIGHWAY DEBATE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. OTHER APPLICATIONS ARE MENTIONED. /AUTHOR/

Thousallds of variables have been proposed to explain or describe the complex variety and i~lterco~lnectiolls of social and illternatio~lal relations. Perhaps an equal number of hypotheses and theories linkillg these variables have been suggested. The few basic variables and propositions central to ullderstalldillg remain to be determined. The systematic dependencies and correlations among these variables have been charted only roughly, if at all, and many, if not most, call be ~lleasurecl only on presence-absence or rank order scales. And to take the data on any one variable at face value is to beg questions of validity, reliability, and comparability. Confronted with entangled behavior. unkno\vn interdependencies, nlasses of qualitative and cluantitative variables, and bad data, many social scientists are turning toward factor analysis to uncover major social and internatio~lal pa t terns .Vactor hundred variables, conlpellsate for random error and invalidity, and disentangle complex interrelationships into their major and distinct regularities. Factor analysis is not without cost, ho\\-ever. It is lnathe~llatically complicated and entails diverse and numerous consideratio~~s in application. Its technical vocabulary includes strange terms such as e i g e ~ z ~ n l u e s , iv iate , dim,e~zsions, orthogonal, londingr, and co~rrn11~nality. Its results usually absorb a dozen or so pages in a given report, leaving little room for a methodological iiltroductio~l or explanation of terms. Add to this the fact that students do not ordinarily learn factor allalysis in their formal training, and the stun is the major cost of factor analysis: most laymen, social scientists, and policy-makers find the nature ant1 significance of the results incomprehensible. The problem of cornn~unicati~lg factor analysis is especially crucial for peace research. Scholars in this field are clraw~l An invitec1 paper for The Jolrrncll of Conflict frolll clisciplines alld professions, alld Resolt~tion. Prepared in connection with research supported by the National Sciencc Fotunf ? ~ them are acquainted with thr dation. GS-1230. For many helpful comments method. made on a previous draft. I wish to thank As our empirical kllowledge of conflict Henry Kariel, hlichael Haas, Robert Hefner: processes, behavior, conditions, and pattelns \Voocly Pitts, and J. David Singer. Portions of the article are taken from Rummel ( 1968). beconle illcreasi~lgly expressed in factor"or a bibliography of applications of factor analvtic terms, those who need this knowlanalysis in the social sciences (esclucling psyedge lnost in order to make illforlned chology), see Rummel (1968). A bibliography of a ~ ~ l i c a t i o n s to conflict and inte~national decisions may be those who are most A A

In recent years sociologists have begun to pay systematic attention to relations between national societies. Inevitably, problems arise as to the relationship between sociological and other kinds of analytic treatment of international phenomena, while the appropriateness of prevalent systems of sociological analysis and theory is also necessarily questioned. In probing the basic relations between national societies in sociological terms, the present paper revolves around these issues at various