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This paper will posit the argument that the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s between Japan and China are the product of a number of factors specific to both states. Using neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide in terms of ways out of this impasse, this thesis will contend that the heightened tensions over energy resources and maritime territory since the mid-1990s have developed as a result of a combination of state specific factors that have hindered Sino-Japanese attempts to find binding agreements on joint-developments and designated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea.Four major contributing factors to the East China Sea disputes are identified in this thesis. In the first place, there is the issue of the security structure in North-east Asia, a structure that remains closely related to one suited to a Cold War environment, where Beijing remains cautious of any real or imagined US-Japanese attempts to contain China; a fact that inhibits China's ability to engage in regional security activities. China thus views the security implications of the East China Sea disputes through both a traditional and non-traditional lens where new issues such as maritime piracy and terrorism provide both states with opportunities and challenges for co-operation. Secondly, there is the influence of domestic politics and nationalism in Japan and China on how the respective governments and populations perceive, address and formulate their maritime security policy . Yinan He highlights the importance of this second factor by claiming that the reason why nationalism has a strong role in this evolving era of Sino-Japanese relations is that 'the historically derived mutual antipathy and mistrust can worsen the security concerns generated by the high ambiguity in their current power balance and cause serious mutual threat perception' . A third issue relates to differing Japanese and Chinese interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) along with the importance of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs); factors closely linked to security concerns in the East China Sea. Lastly, another contributing factor is the clear lack of an adequate security management regime in the North-East Asia region . By choosing neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide and a way forward, this paper will also look at the part played by, distrust, the fear of being cheated on in negotiations, and uncertainties over Japan and China's post-Cold War roles, in contributing to the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2005, tens of thousands of anti-Japanese protesters took to the streets of China's largest cities, condemning Japan's textbook revisions, its U.N. Security Council bid, and its claim to resources in the waters between China and Japan. The anti-Japanese protests demonstrated the capacity for mass collective action among China's urban elite and potentially laid the groundwork for future challenges to the government itself. Given the risk to regime stability that these demonstrations posed, why did China's authoritarian leaders permit the anti-Japanese protests to go on for weeks before reining them in? The 2005 Chinese protests are just one illustration of a larger puzzle: when will authoritarian leaders allow and even encourage anti-foreign protests, and when will they seek to prevent or crack down upon anti-foreign demonstrations? In this paper, which presents the preliminary results of my dissertation fieldwork, I suggest that the government's decision to allow anti-foreign protests in April 2005 was a strategic choice--to use the specter of domestic instability and the escalating costs of domestic repression to gain leverage over Japan on the UN Security Council negotiations. Contrary to the standard literature on audience costs, I suggest that authoritarian governments can indeed generate credible signals vis-à-vis the decision to allow nationalistic protests. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration has been progressing rapidly in Northeast Asia, particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea, and a large volume of industrial and cultural products flow across the region. Despite high-level economic integration, the three countries have not developed an institutional arrangement to stabilize regional politics. To the contrary, Japan and the other two countries continue to dispute over issues related to Japan?s wartime past, including controversies over Yasukuni shrine and Japan?s history textbooks. Based on the constructivist approach, this paper explains why the three countries fight over these issues, focusing on state identity and politics of recognition. Japan developed its state identity mainly through interactions with the United States. Japanese leaders emphasize that Japan, as a liberal democratic country, has developed a pacifist stance after World War II. They want other countries to recognize that their actions, including the prime minister?s visit to the shrine, are consistent with the pacifist stance. In contrast, the memory of Japan?s past colonial rule plays an important part in China and South Korea?s state identity formation. State leaders in each country denounce the colonial rule as unjust invasion while praising past nationalist leaders? fight against it as patriotic. They demand Japan?s current leaders to recognize (acknowledge) wrongdoings of Japan?s colonial rule, opposing any actions that imply Japanese leaders? support for or tolerance of the colonial rule. Through the analysis of the current controversies between the three countries, this paper develops a theoretical discussion of identity and recognition in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs the case of ChinaÂ’s recent anti-Japanese sentiments to answer: (1) What is the nature of ChinaÂ’s current nationalism? And (2) if it were not inherently xenophobic, how would the Chinese leadership deal with nationalistic sentiments toward Japan? The first part of this paper briefly depicts the nature of Chinese nationalism, attributing the emergence of radical nationalistic views to the CCPÂ’s patriotic education campaigns, economic development and commercialization, and technological advancement. Given that ChinaÂ’s recent antagonism toward Japan results from the history-related issues such as textbooks and interest-related UNSC issues, this paper contends that the nature of Chinese nationalism is not predetermined but lies in interactions between China and Japan. This paper further suggests that how the CCP manages these anti-Japanese sentiments is decisive to future Sino-Japanese relations. Nationalism helps the CCP in getting the upper hand in Sino-Japanese relations: on the one hand, the CCP co-opts and channels up anti-Japanese sentiments to deter JapanÂ’s political ambitions; on the other hand, as an authoritarian regime, the CCP is less than hesitant to oppress any radical movements considered as a threat to its party survival. In other words, by cooptation and oppression, it seems that the CCP astutely controls this double-edged nationalism. Thus, future Sino-Japanese relations depend not on the nature of Chinese nationalism but on the leadershipÂ’s cost-benefit calculations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My project examines the efforts of the Chinese government, particularly in education and propaganda, and its effects on nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments in youth. Is nationalism a result of independent mobilization and thinking on the part of the ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, anti-Japanese popular nationalism has been rising in China. Although not directly orchestrated by Chinese government, the visceral nationalist sentiment has deep roots in the decades of centralized school education and official propaganda that implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory. The current Chinese popular hostility to Japan sprang from both the public?s hatred of Japan simulated by the post-Mao era history propaganda and their cynicism toward the government, who they believed had lied about the history in the past. Popular nationalism can fuel widespread mistrust and antipathy in both countries and serve as a catalyst to serious Sino-Japanese conflict in the near future. In the context of Chinese economic success and military buildup as well as the resurgence of Japanese international assertiveness, bilateral conflicts will most likely break out over such issues as the Taiwan controversy, sovereignty of offshore islands, and competition of maritime resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid 1980’s, anti-Japanese mass protests in China have been conducted on the streets, college campuses, and, in recent years, on the Internet. While the Chinese and Japanese governments increasingly tie their fate together economically, growing rancor among the Chinese public over WWII and contemporary issues threatens to tear apart. Opinion polls conducted in China show that rampant nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment is prevalent among Chinese “Generation Y” youths (Chinese citizens born between 1981-1995). Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment is not new phenomena, yet Gen Y nationalists vary from their predecessors in significant ways. This paper will (1) explore this new breed of nationalism and (2) examine the tools that Chinese youths currently use to impact the complex and conflictive Sino-Japanese relationship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite improved relations between China and Japan since Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister in September 2006, nationalism remains a major force in driving the future direction of bilateral relations. On the surface, both Tokyo and Beijing talk with carefully guarded diplomatic language amid strong undercurrents of antagonistic feelings from both sides that range from historical to stratigic to territorial issues. This paper explores the bottom-up anti-Japanese sentiment in China alongside the top-down right-wing views aimed against the rise of China in Japan, which thereby explains how such nationalistic agendas relate to a number of dilemmas that impact profound influences on both policy-making and long-term strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2005 marked a new low in Sino-Japanese relations. A grassroots petition in China, South Korea and around the world gathered more than 30 million signatures in a matter of weeks. Violent demonstrations in China displayed Chinese people's deep resentment of Japan on a range of issues. Both Beijing and Tokyo have traded charges against each other while trying to control the situation from getting worse. This paper examines these developments, and focuses on how nationalism manifested itself in both China and Japan, what are behind the emotional outbursts of public sentiments, and why there is no single model that can explain the nationalistic behavior in either China or Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated in recent years, driven by clashes over the interpretation and commemoration of war history. This stands in contrast to the growth in economic ties between the two countries, and appears to run counter to liberal theories that emphasize the pacifying effects of commerce.In this paper we examine recent trends in Sino-Japanese relations utilizing the theoretical lenses of commercial peace and nationalism. We suggest that economic interdependence is a weaker factor than nationalism in determining the direction of future relations for three reasons. First, although bilateral aggregate levels of trade and investment are increasing, we argue that the structure of these economic interactions suggest that increased commercial ties may not have the pacific power posited by commercial liberal theories. Second, evidence suggests that the attempt by both states to separate economic ties from political ties has been only partially successful, and that nationalism has trumped commercial interests when the two have clashed. Third, we argue that although deepening economic interactions may have increased the costs of conflict, they have not dampened increased relative gain concerns and bilateral threat perceptions. This has generated higher expectations within each state of future militarized disputes, and raised the risk of inadvertent military confrontation in territorial and resource-driven disputes. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the ?rise? of China and Japan in the international political sphere through the theoretical lens of the English School. One of the most important insights provided by the English School approach of International Relations is its notion that ?Great Powers? hold special responsibilities in the Society of States. However, studies of ?great power responsibilities? have not sufficiently problematised or historicised what exactly these ?responsibilities? entail. Building on a recent study by Roland Paris which argues that international peacebuilding constitutes the modern ?mission civilisatrice?, I argue that the English School theoretical framework can offer us a fresh perspective in understanding the political ambitions of China and Japan to play a greater political role in International Society. Moving beyond conventional explanations which trace these movements to domestic nationalism, I explore through a comparative case study of Chinese and Japanese participation in international peacekeeping whether China or Japan?s recent actions for ?a greater international political role? is informed by both states? interaction with a international normative consensus of what constitutes a ?civilised? Great Power in twentieth and twenty first-century International Society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the inauguration of the Koizumi administration in 2001, China and Korea (ROK) have repeatedly protested against the visits by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. After he stepped down as Prime Minister last September, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first official visits to China and Korea helped to reduce, to some extent, the anti-Japanese sentiment in both countries. Although he promised to construct a new relationship of 'strategic reciprocity' with China during his subsequent visit to Beijing in October, his public statement concerning the so-called 'comfort women' issue before the Diet session had revealed his conservative stance on 'statist' nationalism in Japan. After the end of World War II, the Japanese government established and pursued the fundamental national doctrine of maintaining the Japan-US security alliance and gaining economic prosperity under the peace constitution. In other words, Japan adopted and pursued the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' as the political symbol of "Small Japan." However, the doctrine has undergone some changes under strong pressure from the conservative leaders like Former Prime Ministers, Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Junichiro Koizumi. Currently, Prime Minister Abe clearly shows his political will to change the gear in a step-by-step manner from 'Small Japan' to another stance, even if not of "Greater Japan." Even if Mr. Abe maintains "strategic ambiguity" vis-a-vis the neighboring countries, his assertively conservative agenda to change basic political values in Japan, as illustrated in his catch phrase "Beautiful Japan" might cause the neighbors to become more concerned about Japan's future. Their cyclical cautiousness toward Tokyo may very well have a negative impact on the ongoing attempt to build an East Asian community encompassing Japan, China, South Korea, and other countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does nationalistic sentiment intensify? Collective history and memory play significant role in intensifying nationalistic sentiment. It is said that China-Japan political relations falls to their lowest point in years. I believe that lack of sharing history is a major cause of this. In November, 2003, the skit performed by Japanese students and teacher upset Chinese. The skit itself was nothing to do with Japanese atrocity or nationalism. But it ended up provoke anti-Japanese sentiment. Why did this incident become nationalism issue? Why did this incident become issue of Japanese wartime atrocity? I will answer my questions by analyzing how this incident was understood by Chinese and Japanese. I study English, Japanese and Chinese sources to answer my research questions. It is said that X’ian skit showed the recent evidence of Chinese distrust for Japan. By analyzing this incident, I will examine how history and war memory of Chinese and Japanese affect nationalism. The Xian skit brought up the revival of Chinese suffering past and memory of the war which lead to huge anti-Japanese protests. This skit also exhumed Japan’s inability to face history. I will show that how significant for Japan to acknowledge wrongdoing in the past and truly respects the Chinese emotion relate to the past in order to build the relationship of trust. Shared historical understanding is most necessary for the future relationship between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]