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The article takes a critical look at the sovereignty claims surrounding the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. The dispute has long plagued Sino-Japanese relations and is considered one of the key regional security hotspots, with the People's Republic of China mounting an active challenge to Japanese administrative control. This article reviews the case for sovereignty under both the discovery and the prescription principles. However, the article concludes that one cannot find a compelling case for sovereignty under either principle in favour of either claimants. The paper argues that this is due to the traditional insignificance of the islands prior to UNCLOS establishing exclusive economic zones. Rather, the article suggests that to facilitate a resolution to the disputes, the islands should not be classified as islands under UNCLOS as they do not meet the legal threshold for such a classification, either today or historically. If anything, the weakness of claims that contributes to the intractability of the dispute today shows that traditionally neither China nor Japan has considered these territories as islands in a manner that would be in the spirit of UNCLOS. While such a reclassification would not immediately resolve the dispute, it would be a significant step to remove incentives for the further pursuit of conflicting sovereignty over the islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infrastructure has played an agential role in the securitisation of everyday life in the Karakoram high mountains of north Pakistan. Geopolitics bear heavily on this region where Pakistan shares borders with China, with whom it has aligned its foreign and security policy, and with India, with whom Pakistan remains embroiled in a long‐standing territorial dispute. Consequently, in the Karakoram, geopolitical anxieties have reflected inwards onto local populations through both security infrastructure and securitised infrastructure. In this postcolony frontier space, statecraft also frequently bypasses normative legal and administrative structures; such exceptions to normative law and administration have antecedents in colonial statecraft on the territorial margins of empire. This paper also argues that long cycles of military rule have allowed the military to acquire and project technocratic expertise, become custodians of state‐led development, and recently, to assume guardianship of, and to enter into joint financing with China on, construction projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arctic is a region of uast economic potential and a potential arena for global politics in the near future. The impact of global warming has ensured that the water routes through this region stay open for longer periods of time with euery passing year. These routes will be the focus of contention between Arctic and near-Arctic states. As a result, the Arctic Circle can be viewed as an arena Of geopolitical posturing in the near future, where border disputes and issues of sovereignty and military supremacy will dominate the discourse involving the region. Using evidence gleaned from official Chinese government sources and scholarly work on the matter, this paper seeks to answer the question of how China interprets its role within the Arctic region, and the lengths to which it will go to carue a foothold within the region. It shall discuss Chinese interests in the Arctic and discern whether China could pose a security threat to Arctic states, and whether its aims in the region are solely economic or could also be directed towards boosting its military capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the growing involvement of the U.S. security establishment in declaratory United States South China Sea (SCS) policy, a trend that has been building over 2014–15 because of China's island building in the South China Sea. The focus of that policy is that China's newly created SCS islands will not constrain legal U.S. maritime activity on, under, and over the high seas. This was announced by the Secretary of Defense, not the Secretary of State, in Singapore in May 2015, and was a response to the disproportionately large scale of China's unannounced activity that was turning rocks and submerged shoals into credible military outposts. China was accused of undermining trust by introducing a military power dimension to the already complicated sovereignty disputes in the Spratly Islands. These accusations are correct. The reality is that China has changed the strategic balance in the Spratly Island chain by creating facilities on its new islands that will militarily overshadow the garrisons and defensive capabilities of the features occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines or Malaysia. Despite Chinese claims to the contrary, the U.S. military has no doubts that the island building is designed specifically for use as PLA operating bases. Among its more controversial recommendations, this paper puts forth a policy approach that puts more emphasis on deterrence. In this regard, Washington's call for Hanoi to stop improving the facilities it occupies in the Spratlys, probably to appear even-handed, seems strategically misguided. The goal should be to return some sort of strategic equilibrium to the Spratlys; Vietnam is the claimant best equipped to accomplish that. The other aspect of deterrence that will hopefully keep the peace is the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty because of its potential applicability if Filipino servicemen are harmed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines the differential impact of Chinese citizens’ use of traditional media and Internet sources on their political views about the country’s territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Chinese citizens can utilize a variety of conduits of information that allow varying degrees of government control over the way foreign affairs and other controversies are presented. Those who rely on mainstream, state-controlled television, radio, and printed media for information on the disputes, and those who turn to less-prescriptive sources on the Internet, can be expected to have distinctive political attitudes. We use original 2013 Chinese survey data to explore patterns of media consumption and citizens’ attention levels towards the Sino-Japanese island dispute, and views regarding the government’s performance in handling the issue and appropriate policy responses. Those who derive their information from traditional media tend to view the government’s performance more positively, and are more likely both to favour compromise and to oppose the use of military force. By comparison, information from Internet sources, which is more user selfselective, sustains a wider range of attitudes about the Sino-Japanese island dispute and the appropriate policies for dealing with it, including both militaristic and moderate stances. All told, we find that Chinese citizens bring distinctive predispositions to their consumption of media information on this issue, but our results also clearly reflect an ongoing, pervasive influence for China’s state-run traditional media. These findings have important implications for considering the resilience of authoritarian systems in the Internet era. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the past few years, China has experienced a rapid development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN.) In particular, the formation of CAFTA (the China--ASEAN Free Trade Area) will greatly encourage Chinese multinational corporations to "go out" and invest in ASEAN. However, the South China Sea disputes between China and several ASEAN countries have increased the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN. This paper starts with an analysis of the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes, explains how to view and assess these political risks, and then comes up with a systematic and comprehensive mechanism for coping with the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has been engaging more actively in the Arctic, as echoed by the Arctic Council's admittance of China as a permanent observer in May 2013. China's interest in the Arctic can to a large extent be explained by climate change shrinking the ice cover of the Arctic Ocean, which has sparked interest with respect to possible exploitation of natural resources and new shipping routes. One aspect of the possible exploitation of natural resources concerns the International Seabed Area. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's policy paper on China's Arctic aspirations stated that "many Chinese scholars believe that UNCLOS does not entirely safeguard China's perceived Arctic interests" concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. One scholar noted that "[i]f the Arctic states succeed in their claims to extend their outer continental shelves, the international community's and China's right to fairly benefit from Arctic resources will be weakened". This article asks whether China can act as a watchdog against excessive continental shelf claims beyond 200 nautical miles by the littoral states and shield the idea of the common heritage of mankind, as enshrined in the Area. More precisely, the article will ask whether China can bring a case before an international court or tribunal against one of the littoral states if it establishes the outer limits of the extended continental shelf beyond what they are entitled to according to UNCLOS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narratives of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute expose the spectrum of Taiwan's national identity. While Taiwan has long been struggling to legitimise its claim of representing China or to become an independent state, some of the Taiwanese people still welcome their former colonial master, Japan. This paper draws on academic and journalistic work on how Taiwan has responded to the islands dispute. The author also turns to the internet to examine popular sentiments in the region by examining netizens' discourse on the islands from Taiwan's largest bulletin board system (BBS), Station-PTT. This survey finds that the sovereignty dispute surfaces issues of national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An armed conflict between Taiwan and China is not unthinkable in the future. For historical, geographical, economic, and diplomatic reasons, Japan would not be able to stand on the sidelines. Relying on three major concepts—national interests, path dependence and balance of power, this paper explores Japan's three possible roles in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. First, Japan could pass the buck, staying out of the conflict as much as possible and providing at most logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Second, it could balance power, throwing its weight behind Washington against Beijing. Finally, it could play peacemaker. At the end of the article, the author discusses several key factors that would shape Tokyo's decision-making in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and assesses the relative probability of each option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]