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This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests three democratic peace theory hypotheses for East Asian political cooperation and a fourth commercial exchange hypothesis. H1 suggests that like regimes will have excellent bilateral relations, H2 suggests that unlike regimes will have poor bilateral relations, and H3 draws on Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder to say that democracies will have poor bilateral relations with nondemocracies. Finally, H4 suggests that there is a positive correlation between two regimes' economic ties and their bilateral relations. A robust test of the respective hypotheses (using a pool of nineteen bi-national East Asian dyads that includes China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) provides the most durable support for H4. Economic linkages are defined via a mathematical formula that incorporates the volume of cross-national trade and the base 10 logarithm of each regime’s GDP. Political contestation is defined via a score that incorporates Polity IV data and a measure of Internet openness from the OpenNet Initiative. This test finds H4 is the most convincing explanation for the variation in bilateral relations among the dyads; in addition, the relationship is considerably more robust when the China-Taiwan dyad is excluded. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show that there is stronger correlation between the level of economic development, rather than propensity of government, and openness of foreign policy. It has been known that a general rule of nations’ reaction in terms of foreign relations is difficult to materialize due to contextual particularities of each society. However, it is crucial to examine the society as a body of diverse interests and modes of projecting such interests that leads to the formation of particular foreign policies. Specific interests will be noted along with coinciding interests shared by the losers of the economic reform and the level of openness within a given society. Level of economic reform and democracyâ€"independent variableâ€"and the openness of foreign policyâ€"dependent variableâ€"or willingness to cooperate and dependency towards transnational institutions will be examined. This, as a result, will show that the level of economic development and the concomitant national pride promotes cooperation among nations, thus enabling the formation of regional communities. Some aspects of NATO will be noted in to draw positive conclusions about the prospects of security community formation within North East Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Besides risking escalation of armed conflict, territorial disputes can influence normalized bilateral relations among states both negatively and positively. This paper examines whether issue linkage exists between territorial disputes and other bilateral issues. The main argument is that the level of interdependence between states effects whether they will escalate a territorial dispute and the likelihood of de-escalation in a timely manner. I examine a territorial dispute between China and Japan and their interaction between 1978 and 2001. Findings show that high levels of trade and cooperation on other bilateral issues (non-territorial) are positively correlated with the likelihood of non-military action by both China and Japan, negatively correlated with the likelihood of the initiation of a MID by China, and positively correlated with the likelihood of de-escalation in a timely manner by both China and Japan. These findings indicate that interdependence does not prevent escalatory behavior short of military action and that it influences the decision by leaders to de-escalate rather than escalate the dispute further to armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between the state and memory is properly a fundamental issue in understanding collective memory. However, the prevailing academic-ideological view of memory issue in state socialist context either constructs a memory dystopia or a zero-sum memory game between the state and civil society. This paper is intended to provide a more complicated picture of the state and memory by investigating the case of the Chinese WWII victims' reparations movement (CWRM). This paper proposes a theoretical model of political opportunity structure that combines framing and organizational aspects of social movement. Using this model, we argue that the emergence and development of CWRM is a product of the relationship between an emerging civil society and a socialist state. This relationship is represented in the particular political opportunity structure that CWRM and other movements faced in the 1990s. Moving away from core of the political opportunity structure, activists strategically mobilized local resources by organizing non-governmental organizations and networks; they also framed the movement by adopting nationalism and moral universalism. Both mobilization and framing strategies are less harmful to the core of the political opportunity structure, and hence are tolerated by the state. Therefore, the movement flourishes after 1995. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My project examines the efforts of the Chinese government, particularly in education and propaganda, and its effects on nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments in youth. Is nationalism a result of independent mobilization and thinking on the part of the ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the trade relationship between Japan and China be measured? What are the strengths/weakness of existing models? Is there a more accurate model that can describe trade relations between nations? If so, what is it? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR theorists typically explain the development of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in developing countries as a result of coercive diplomacy on the part of economically developed states seeking to protect the interests of business constituents. We find this model theoretically flawed and suggest an alternative political economy model, derived from the New Institutional Economics literature, that takes account of the internal dynamics of developing states. As those states develop economically, indigenous entrepreneurs make greater demands for IPR protection. Only after developing states are capable of enforcing IPR are they responsive to diplomacy. We demonstrate that domestic factors are statistically significant in the development of IPR regimes in Japan, Korea and the Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is to examine whether the industrial policy is still feasible for developing countries in the epoch of globalisation based on the comparison between the Japanese and Chinese automobile industries. Sharing the same goal of catching up with high-income countries, both Japanese and Chinese governments selected the automobile industry to achieve industrial development and build up a few large firms with international competitive capability. In the postwar period, Japan successfully nurtured its leading automobile producers such as Toyota and Nissan with protectionist industrial policies. Conversely, with the similar package of industrial policies, the Chinese state-supported large automobile producers face tough competition from the global conglomerate automakers and the domestic indigenous producers. Drawing on the success of Japan and the failure of China, intense international competition, low-level technology and institutional inefficiency are the main obstacles for automakers from developing countries to catch up with their global competitors. In the near future, it is still difficult for developing countries to utilize industrial policies to nurture “national champions” in this highly consolidated industrial sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid 1980’s, anti-Japanese mass protests in China have been conducted on the streets, college campuses, and, in recent years, on the Internet. While the Chinese and Japanese governments increasingly tie their fate together economically, growing rancor among the Chinese public over WWII and contemporary issues threatens to tear apart. Opinion polls conducted in China show that rampant nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment is prevalent among Chinese “Generation Y” youths (Chinese citizens born between 1981-1995). Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment is not new phenomena, yet Gen Y nationalists vary from their predecessors in significant ways. This paper will (1) explore this new breed of nationalism and (2) examine the tools that Chinese youths currently use to impact the complex and conflictive Sino-Japanese relationship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's and Japan's popularity campaigns toward Southeast Asia, a vital neighbor to both. It contextualizes soft power campaign in democratic and non-democratic settings and discusses their similarities and differences. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the Japan Times¡¯ seeming inattention to important events in China in 1997 is better understood as the contemporary Japanese practice of ¡Â*withdrawing for universality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The chief concern of this paper is to provide an analysis as to how the mutually-reinforcing phenomena of conflicting identities and conflicting interests have caused and are serving to exacerbate the current tensions between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper analyzes the dramatic dismemberments of the pilot state economic agencies in three "Bureaucratic Nonliberal Capitalist Countries"?Korea, China, and Japan?and compares the transformations of states? economic roles in three cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper asks which among China and Japan will gain more leadership and influence over the Southeast Asia in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite potential gains of significant oil resources and the fact that China has compromised in the majority of its territorial disputes, China has been unwilling to compromise on its claimed sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, against Japan. The purpose of this article is to explain China's reluctance to drop its territorial claim and compromise with Japan about sovereignty of the disputed islands. I argue that there have been strong incentives for China to maintain its territorial claim against Japan because the Chinese government has been able to use the territorial dispute to make bargaining gains on exogenous issues disputed with Japan. By provoking Japan through confrontational actions, China has used the dispute to gain bargaining leverage by achieving concessions on other disputed issues with Japan, or compelling or deterring certain Japanese policies or actions. Data analysis from 1978-2001 supports the theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines Japanese foreign aid policy towards China as the product of Japanese political-bureaucratic relations and electoral politics. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]