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This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is to examine whether the industrial policy is still feasible for developing countries in the epoch of globalisation based on the comparison between the Japanese and Chinese automobile industries. Sharing the same goal of catching up with high-income countries, both Japanese and Chinese governments selected the automobile industry to achieve industrial development and build up a few large firms with international competitive capability. In the postwar period, Japan successfully nurtured its leading automobile producers such as Toyota and Nissan with protectionist industrial policies. Conversely, with the similar package of industrial policies, the Chinese state-supported large automobile producers face tough competition from the global conglomerate automakers and the domestic indigenous producers. Drawing on the success of Japan and the failure of China, intense international competition, low-level technology and institutional inefficiency are the main obstacles for automakers from developing countries to catch up with their global competitors. In the near future, it is still difficult for developing countries to utilize industrial policies to nurture “national champions” in this highly consolidated industrial sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]