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Compared with similar research mainly focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Australian mainstream media using discourse analysis, this paper explores the reasons for the narrative shift by conducting semi-structured interviews with leading and well-known Australian narrative producers. This paper takes two conditions as a given. Firstly, the BRI narratives in Australian mainstream media shifted in tone from mostly positive to highly critical. Secondly, the Australian mainstream media's increasingly negative attitudes towards the BRI are essentially not just about the BRI but the Chinese government. Based on my analysis and interviews, this paper makes contributions by filling in the gap of finding out reasons to explain this narrative shift. More concretely, this paper finds out that while mainstream media is influential in many areas of national policy making, mainstream media reporting on foreign affairs is less so. By comparison, the Australian government's BRI or China policy has a significant impact on Australian mainstream media reporting. This narrative shift has been driven by international politics and Australia's China policy, influenced by Australian audiences' preference of local news and their local position, and its democratic responsibilities. Meanwhile, the vagueness and constant changing characteristics of the BRI do not help the understanding of the BRI in Australian media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like many other regional powers in the Asia‐Pacific, Australia is a middle‐sized state wedged between two great powers, the United States (US) and the People's Republic of China. While Australia continues to rely upon the US alliance for security, China remains its biggest trading partner. Over the past two decades, Australia's public foreign policy discussions have centred upon Australia's "China Choice" in the context of growing strategic rivalry between these dominant powers. This debate has sought to grapple with the options available to Australia in managing its relations with an increasingly assertive China and an unpredictable US. This article examines the public debate on China policy since the election of the conservative Liberal‐National Coalition government in 2013. It argues the appropriateness of a pragmatic foreign policy in relation to the engagement of great powers has been the central question in Australia's China debate. Yet what constitutes pragmatic action in relation to Australia's China policy is varied and based on differing understandings of how middle‐sized states can and do seek to cope with structural shifts. The paper also argues, however, that an emergent anti‐pragmatist tradition has recently emerged that reflects the unprecedented challenges facing Australian foreign policy and presents "pragmatism" as a threat to Australian sovereignty, principles, and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various topics within the issue, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on social workers in Australia, posttraumatic growth (PTG), and the preparedness of social workers in Israeli hospitals for the next pandemic.

Australia–China relations are at a turning point 50 years after diplomatic recognition. While the past five decades have witnessed extensive growth in economic exchanges, in recent years, bilateral ties have experienced serious deterioration. Australia's alliance with the United States, domestic politics—in particular the two major parties' approaches to foreign policy—and economic interdependence are important variables in Canberra's approach to China. There will be no exception for the incoming Australian Labor Party government to deal with these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Australia's main policy interventions in the South Pacific since the end of the Cold War was sanctions on Fiji in response to the latter's December 2006 coup. Dubbed 'Smart' sanctions, this policy was not only designed to pressure Fiji to return to democracy, but also to sustain Australia's longstanding regional leadership aspirations, aspirations which went hand in hand with its 'strategic denial' of unwelcome geopolitical challengers (Hawksley Global Change, Peace & Security, 21(1) 115-130, 2009). There has been little analysis of the unintended consequences of sanctions, namely, whether 'Smart' sanctions ironically contributed to greater strategic competition in the South Pacific, weakened regional security and prompted expressions of Pacific regionalism that excluded Australia. In the years after the coup, Canberra achieved its primary aim of being, and being seen to be, the dominant power in the South Pacific. However, during this time, Fiji "Looked North" and Pacific Island Countries (PICs) developed greater confidence in the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', thus providing the opportunity for China and other powers to expand their influence in the region (Fry and Tarte, 2015). To the backdrop of growing concern about Chinese influence, the failure of 'Smart' sanctions against Fiji shows the constraints of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The fact that sanctions are no longer a palatable policy option has not been adequately canvassed in the literature. In this context, in order to counter Chinese influence, Australia requires greater soft power resources and a sustained effort to listen to the concerns of PICs in order to achieve Australia's interests (Newton, 2020b). In the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', threatening sanctions is likely to be counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Australia's China Odyssey: From Euphoria to Fear" by James Curran provides a historical overview of Australian attitudes towards China from the end of World War II to the present. The book draws on various sources, including memoirs, declassified government documents, and Wikileaks revelations, to shed light on Australian thinking about China. The author focuses on uncovering the thinking behind historical events and policy behavior rather than mounting an argument or critique. While the book devotes more space to the US factor in Australia's China thinking, it does not explore China's motivations in conducting its international relations. [Extracted from the article]

The rapid deterioration of the Australia‐China bilateral relationship from a warm and positive partnership to cold hostility has been overwhelmingly interpreted as the result of the actions of one or the other of the parties. This article seeks to analyse the recent negative dynamic in Sino‐Australian bilateral ties in a broader context, considering the full history of Sino‐Australian relations, and by drawing into the analysis both countries' crucial relationships with the United States. It argues that a deep and comprehensive understanding of Sino‐Australian relations is not possible without appreciating the triangular dynamics that operate among Australia, China, and the United States. It seeks to conceptually elaborate on the notion of triangulation as a foreign policy strategy as a prelude to examining the changing dynamics of Australia‐China relations between 1949 and the present day. It then traces the evolution of the triangulation dynamic through several phases, most recently attempts by Australia to "de‐triangulate" the relationship before succumbing to Washington's and Beijing's efforts at re‐triangulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]