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This paper challenges the role individual autonomy has played in debates on moral neuroenhancement (MN). It shows how John Hyman's analysis of agency as consisting of functionally integrated dimensions allows us to reassess the impact of MN on practical agency. I discuss how MN affects what Hyman terms the four dimensions of agency: psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical. Once we separate the different dimensions of agency, it becomes clear that many authors in the debate conflate the different dimensions in the concept they call 'autonomous agents'. They contend that, for example, reason‐giving and previous autonomous acts are relevant to agency as such, when in fact they capture only one aspect of functionally integrated agency. This paper reconsiders MN in light of the functional integration of reason and emotions in practical agency. To illustrate the impact of MN on different aspects of agency, I consider examples from legal practice, which show that autonomy cannot be our sole focus when evaluating the moral implications of MN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper interrogates the ethics of digital pandemic surveillance from Indigenous perspectives. The COVID‐19 pandemic has shown that Indigenous peoples are among the communities most negatively affected by pandemic infectious disease spread. Similarly to other racialized subpopulations, Indigenous people have faced strikingly high mortality rates from COVID‐19 owing to structural marginalization and related comorbidities, and these high rates have been exacerbated by past and present colonial dominance. At the same time, digital pandemic surveillance technologies, which have been promoted as effective tools for mitigating a pandemic, carry risks for Indigenous subpopulations that warrant an urgent and thorough investigation. Building on decolonial scholarship and debates about Indigenous data sovereignty, we argue that should Indigenous communities wish to implement digital pandemic surveillance, then they must have ownership over these technologies, including agency over their own health data, how data are collected and stored, and who will have access to the data. Ideally, these tools should be designed by Indigenous peoples themselves to ensure compatibility with Indigenous cultures, ethics and languages and the protection of Indigenous lives, health and wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The obligations set by the individual right to health are likely to conflict, at least if states are its addressee, with the obligations set by the collective rights to self‐determination that certain sub‐state communities have (or should be recognized). In this paper, I argue that conceiving of the right to health and of collective rights to self‐determination as both aiming at the promotion of individual agency might help us alleviate this particular problem. To do so, I first explain how we can conceive of the right to health and of collective rights to self‐determination as protecting crucial aspects of individuals' agency. It is because both health and the capacity to participate in particular collectives are important ways in which our agency is enabled. I then argue that this conception of the purpose of those rights offers a principle to guide our practical deliberation when the protection of health and the protection of collective self‐determination seem to conflict. Finally, I specify how I think this principle might guide us when it comes to understanding the obligations that the right to health sets for the state towards members of self‐determining sub‐state communities, both in terms of the provision of healthcare goods and services and the provision of the underlying determinants of health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Young children, like adults, understand that human agents can flexibly choose different actions in different contexts, and they evaluate these agents based on such choices. However, little is known about children's tendencies to attribute the capacity to choose to robots, despite increased contact with robotic agents. In this paper, we compare 5‐ to 7‐year‐old children's and adults' attributions of free choice to a robot and to a human child by using a series of tasks measuring agency attribution, action prediction, and choice attribution. In morally neutral scenarios, children ascribed similar levels of free choice to the robot and the human, while adults were more likely to ascribe free choice to the human. For morally relevant scenarios, however, both age groups considered the robot's actions to be more constrained than the human's actions. These findings demonstrate that children and adults hold a nuanced understanding of free choice that is sensitive to both the agent type and constraints within a given scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]