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This paper focuses on sovereign green bonds issued in Europe. By issuing green bonds, European governments commit themselves to realizing environmentally friendly projects and encourage other entities, including private-sector ones, to do the same, thus increasing further domestic investments in addressing climate change. However, considering that governments could pursue their sustainable goals by also issuing conventional bonds, this begs the question of why governments should prefer green bonds. A dataset of European sovereign green bonds was retrieved from the Bloomberg Fixed Income database to answer this question. The data cover all European sovereign green bonds issued until the end of 2023. Quantitative analysis confirms the existence of a small green premium for the issuers, representing an incentive to increase the issuances of sovereign green bonds. Furthermore, the government's carbon emissions reduction, the power sector decarbonization, and good climate policies, measured by the Government Climate Risk Score, contribute to further reducing a country's climate risk and consequently the costs of the issuance, thus triggering a virtuous circle which could, in turn, accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions. Despite these benefits, hurdles still exist, and have curbed the development of the market. Examples include divergence between the use of funds raised through green bonds, which should be earmarked exclusively for climate and environmental projects, and the fungibility requirements for proceeds from sovereign debt and fiscal revenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adapting to climate change is becoming a routine and necessary component of planning at all levels. In the case of small island developing states (SIDS), the successful development, implementation and evaluation of national-level adaptation policies are especially important because of their disproportionate vulnerability. The status of adaptation policies in these countries, however, is poorly understood and documented, particularly for the Atlantic, Indian Oceans, Mediterranean and South China Seas (AIMS) region. This is so largely because of minimal mainstream research interest in these small nations. This paper helps fill this gap. It develops an Adaptation Policy Assessment Framework that facilitates a rapid qualitative assessment of countries' national adaptation policies. It applies the framework to seven representative policies across six of the nine SIDS in the AIMS region—Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Maldives, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles and Singapore. It finds that countries are mostly successful in identifying climate and climate-related vulnerabilities and linking associated risks to other national development priorities such as poverty reduction. Countries, however, struggle with establishing and maintaining systems to review and improve adaptation interventions, which is not entirely unique to them or their circumstances. This paper's findings provide critical points of reflection for countries preparing and revising their National Adaptation Plans in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. They also contribute to a broader understanding of the complexities of climate policy development in small jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanity has a shrinking window to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions, yet climate action is still lacking on both individual and policy levels. We argue that this is because behavioral interventions have largely neglected the basic principles of operant conditioning as one set of tools to promote collective climate action. In this perspective, we propose an operant conditioning framework that uses rewards and punishments to shape transportation, food, waste, housing, and civic actions. This framework highlights the value of reinforcement in encouraging the switch to low-emission behavior, while also considering the benefit of decreasing high-emission behavior to expedite the transition. This approach also helps explain positive and negative spillovers from behavioral interventions. This paper provides a recipe to design individual-level and system-level interventions to generate and sustain low-emission behavior to help achieve net zero emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Computable general equilibrium models (CGE) are used to estimate the ex-ante quantitative impact of a change in economic policy. There is a bulk of research in the field of sustainable development applying it for testing implementation of carbon taxation, analyzing reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG), or addressing agricultural issues to work the land efficiently. The main objective of this review is to provide an exhaustive analysis of the literature about these models and their evolution over the last 50 years. The search was conducted in the main academic databases (Scopus and Web of Science), where 1353 articles were found from 1966 to 2019 related to the topic. The results of the descriptives, relational, and content analyses carried out show the current state of the-art, trends, subfields of research, and future gaps to fulfill. This article contributes to the literature that uses CGE models providing an overview of its different applications in the field of sustainability. It gives useful insights to academics who want to further research the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement created an institutionalized role for non-state actors through voluntary cooperation. Many international NGOs (INGOs) are particularly active in these "Paris partnerships," often working with multinational corporations to reduce emissions and promote decarbonization. Though there is ample work on both the effectiveness of the Paris partnerships and on the role of INGOs in the global climate regime, much of this work focuses "outward" – on how INGOs contribute to climate mitigation and adaptation, or influence norms, discourse and policy. Yet, there is considerably less work that focuses "inward" – examining who INGOs work with in order to achieve their policy goals. This paper provides a descriptive analysis of key INGOs in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, as a first step in a larger research agenda to understand the incentives and opportunities that drive INGO behavior. Specifically, it uses network analysis to identify the "climate establishment" – which I define as the insider INGOs working within the multilateral process and with large corporations to influence rulemaking, soft law and firm behavior. Measures of network centrality demonstrate that two INGOs – WWF and the World Resources Institute – are by far, the most authoritative members of the climate establishment. They participate in the largest number of partnerships, and have "important" friends, as measured by eigenvector centrality. The data also indicate that the climate establishment sees carbon pricing as a key strategy, and it often cooperates with banks that are large funders of fossil fuel projects. The descriptive analysis of the climate establishment and its partners raises important questions for future research about why INGOs choose to partner with F100 companies, and how such cooperation might influence INGO behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines public support for global- and national-level climate policy instruments in Finland, and the ways urban/rural-domicile and climate change risk perception predict people's attitudes toward climate policies. Moreover, this study analyzes the degree to which perception of closeness to the district modifies people's climate policy attitudes. The research method employed was ordinal logistic regression and data were from the demographically representative Finland 2019-survey (n = 1742 and response activity = 44%). According to the results, subsidizing renewable energy is an especially popular climate policy instrument, whereas approving new nuclear plants is rather unpopular. Policy instruments were typically more popular at the global level than they were at the national level. Perception of climate change risk was especially strongly linked with support for a national carbon tax. The effect of urban/rural-domicile and subjective closeness to the district on the attitudes was highly dependent on the policy instrument in question. The study contributes to the understanding of how climate policy attitudes vary depending on the climate change risk perception, urban/rural-domicile, and the instrument-type. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a global crisis that requires countries to act on both domestic and international levels. This paper examines how climate policies in these two arenas are related and to what extent domestic and international climate ambitions are complementary or disparate. While scholarly work has begun to assess the variation in overall climate policy ambition, only a few studies to date have tried to explain whether internationally ambitious countries are ambitious at home and vice versa. According to the common view, countries that are more ambitious at home can also be expected to be more ambitious abroad. Many scholars, however, portray the relationship instead as disparate, whereby countries need to walk a tightrope between the demands of their domestic constituencies on the one hand and international pressures on the other, while preferring the former over the latter. This study uses quantitative methods and employs data from the OECD DAC dataset on climate finance to measure international climate ambitions. Overall, the present work makes two major contributions. First, it provides evidence that international climate financing ambition is complementary to domestic climate ambition. Second, the article identifies the conditional effect of domestic ambition—with regard to responsibility, vulnerability, carbon-intensive industry and economic capacity—on international climate ambition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As ongoing research efforts contribute to elucidating the consequences of climate change as well as adaptation and mitigation options, aligning the current research knowledge with stakeholder opinions and perceptions remains critical for adopting effective climate change policies. This paper utilizes an interactive survey to (1) address the aforementioned gap in studies involving three groups of stakeholders and opinion makers and (2) perform a comparative primary study of the climate change assumptions, risk perceptions, policy preferences, observations, and knowledge of Czech farmers, governmental policy-makers and researchers. This study shows that the stakeholder groups agree that the climate is clearly changing, attribute this change mostly to man-made causes and expect the negative effects to either prevail or be unevenly geographically distributed. The large majority of all three groups consider unmitigated climate change a major threat even by 2050 and agree that preparing in advance is the best sectoral strategy. Importantly, while investment in adaptation measures is considered the most efficient tool for accelerating the implementation of adaptation measures, the CAP and EU rules (as valid in 2016) are believed to hinder such measures. The results of this study have ramifications for the wider region of Central Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an assessment of Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement on climate; the main goal of which is to provide guidance on how “to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2”. Paraphrasing, Article 4.1 says that, to achieve this end, we should decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions so that net anthropogenic GHG emissions fall to zero in the second half of this century. To aggregate net GHG emissions, 100-year global warming potentials (GWP-100) are commonly used to convert non-CO2 emissions to equivalent CO2 emissions. The GWP-scaling method is tested using methane as an example. The temperature projections using GWP-100 scaling are shown to be seriously in error. This throws doubt on the use of GWP-100 scaling to estimate net GHG emissions. An alternative method to determine the net-zero point for GHG emissions based on radiative forcing is derived, where the net-zero point is identified with the maximum of GHG forcing. This shows that, to meet the Article 2 warming goal, the net-zero point for GHG emissions needs to be reached as early as 2036, much sooner than in the Article 4.1 window. Other scientific problems in Article 4.1 that further undermine its purpose to guide efforts to achieve the Article 2 temperature targets are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies successive Soviet and Russian government positions on climate change between the late 1980s and the Putin era. It thereby bridges a gap between expanding research on both the role of the Soviet Union in climate change science and diplomacy and on Russian climate change policy after the turn of the millennium. While far-reaching late Soviet plans for decisive participation in the groundbreaking Rio Earth Summit contrasted with the lack of priority accorded to it by Russia during a period of political and economic turmoil, this article argues that there was, before and after 1991, a remarkable continuity of real concern in government about anthropogenic climate change and its negative consequences, not least for the Soviet Union and Russia. This continuity of concern took form in 1989 and lasted for a decade. In contrast to the misleading picture presented to outside observers, notably by the highly visible Yuri Izrael’ and some of the Russian delegations at international climate conferences in the 1990s, a neglect of anthropogenic climate change and its dangers for Russia took hold in the Russian government only after Vladimir Putin came to power. A renewed official recognition of the dangers of anthropogenic climate change materialized only with the 2009 Climate Doctrine. However, until recently this recognition remained half-hearted in comparison with the clear government positions of the late 1980s and the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks: How can climate coalitions challenge the predominantly white, political arena of the US environmental movement and become racially inclusive coalitions that advance climate justice? Methodologically, we draw on participant observation with an Oregon coalition from 2016 to 2020 and 80 interviews with: social justice, environmental justice (EJ), environmental and climate advocates; professional lobbyists (unions); state legislators and staff members. We find that racial inclusion is initially attempted through altering coalition culture and access, by (1) establishing explicitly shared values and goals in a principles document and (2) improving the racial diversification of the coalition by recruiting social and environmental justice groups and sharing resources to enable their participation. These initial steps to diversify the coalition, while insufficient, serve as a prerequisite for developing an effective and durable coalition that is racially inclusive. The cultural shifts mentioned above are a foundation, making possible structural changes in the coalition that include: (3) expanding the steering committee to add racially diverse social justice and EJ groups to leadership positions, (4) institutionalizing more robust platforms of communication that establish working networks and build trust, and (5) altering the coalition agenda to support both rural climate groups and their fight to block the Jordan Cove Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Project and social justice groups in lobbying for climate equity in bill design. In the discussion, we argue that climate justice as an external policy goal is supported by internal structural changes for racial inclusion in the coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The latest IPCC report states that it is unequivocally clear that human actions are the most prominent cause of present day global warming and climate change. While alarming, this news has mobilized nations, cities, and communities across the world to engage in an array of mitigation and adaptation activities. Our research focuses on San Diego County, CA, USA, to answer two major questions regarding mitigation and adaptation measures being taken in the region: (1) What climate change mitigation and adaptation activities have taken place, are underway, and are planned for the future in San Diego County? (2) How successful and effective have these activities been at meeting their objectives to mitigate climate change or adapt to the impacts of climate change? Through a mixed-methods online survey, we gathered responses from 28 climate change experts throughout San Diego County to ensure a cross-sectoral perspective of the actions being taken. Results document 39 different mitigation and/or adaptation activities taking place in San Diego County. Notably, the majority of activities were reported to be effective at meeting their mitigation and/or adaptation objectives and to be of high priority. However, the effectiveness of projects was not uniform across sectors, and respondents also highlighted challenges and areas for improvement. Based on our results, we provide three key recommendations: (1) improve communication and coordination across sectors, (2) ensure that adaptation activities are also a priority alongside mitigation, and (3) include environmental and climate justice issues in mitigation and adaptation activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. political polarization is at a high point since the Civil War, and is a significant barrier to coordinated national action addressing climate change. To examine where common ground may exist, here we comprehensively review and characterize successes and failures of recent state-level decarbonization legislation, focusing especially on bipartisanship. We analyze 418 major state-government-enacted bills and 450 failed bills from 2015 to 2020, as well as the political contexts in which they were passed or defeated. We use bivariate analyses and regressions to explore correlations and partial correlations between the policy characteristics and political contexts of bills, and their passage or failure, their bipartisanship, and vote shares they received. Key results include (i) nearly one-third of these state-level decarbonization bills were passed by Republican-controlled governments. (ii) Bipartisan or Republican co-sponsors disproportionately passed financial incentives for renewable energy, and legislation that expands consumer or business choices in context of decarbonization goals; Democrat-only co-sponsors disproportionately passed bills that restricted consumer and business choice, such as mandatory Renewable Energy and Efficiency Portfolio Standards (REEPS) and emissions standards. (iii) Bipartisan bills were disproportionately proposed in “divided” states, did not restrict consumer and business choice, had environmental justice components framed economically, and lacked environmental justice components framed either using academic social-justice jargon or non-neutrally with respect to immutable characteristics such as race. (iv) Bills that expand consumer or business choice were disproportionately enacted. Though climate change is a polarized issue, our results provide tangible insights for future bipartisan successes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 2005 and 2019, a quarter of US fossil fuel production came from federal lands and waters. We estimate that the extraction, transportation and combustion of these fuels resulted in emissions equivalent to roughly 1.4 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. To better understand their future role in the US emissions profile, we use publicly available data and machine learning to model coal, oil and natural gas production on federal lands and waters to 2030, and calculate associated life cycle climate emissions. We estimate that total emissions from fossil fuels produced on federal lands and waters decline 6% below 2019 levels by 2030; and note that absent additional policy, further reductions may be challenging as some of the cheapest fossil fuels occur on federally owned lands and many are effectively subsidized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drained agricultural peatlands emit significantly higher amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per hectare than mineral soils. GHG abatement costs for representative cereals (CF) and dairy (DF) farms in southwestern Finland were estimated by integrating an emission-based tax together with an option to invest in a subsidized adjustable drainage system on peat soils in a farm-level dynamic optimization model. With an average 10% share of peat soils from overall farm area, emissions tax rates over 15 (CF) and 19 (DF) €/tCO2e triggered adjustable drainage investments with a significant reduction in GHG emissions per ha, when assuming no crop-yield effect from the adjustable drainage. Abatement costs for emissions tax rates €12–50/tCO2e/ha were €16–44/tCO2e (CF) and €26–51/tCO2e (DF) for whole farm-soil emissions, depending on the share of peatlands on the farm, on the yield effects of adjustable drainage, and on crop prices. High emissions tax rates imply higher abatement costs since farms have a limited capability to adjust their production and land use. Thus, emissions reductions from peatlands can be achieved at reasonable costs when investing in adjustable drainage on peatlands. The income losses due to emissions tax, however, are high, but they can be compensated for farmers by lumpsum payments independent of their production decisions. Since existing agricultural policies such as the EU CAP system may have limited effectiveness on GHG emissions, the emissions tax and adjustable drainage on peatlands could promote GHG abatement significantly on farms and areas with abundant peatlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governance of several cross-cutting challenges, such as food security, climate change, and sustainable development, calls for integrative policy approaches. However, efforts to better theorize the drivers of integration beyond listing explanatory factors remain weak. Viewing integration as a process of policy change for dealing with complex problems, this study argues that policy integration analysis can benefit from an advocacy coalition approach (ACF) to address this theoretical gap. It illustrates the analytical framework by empirically investigating the drivers of policy (dis)integration in Brazil's subnational water policy introduced in the 2010s. The level of conflict between coalitions, adjustment of policy beliefs, coordination within and across coalitions, and existence of venues for interaction and policy-oriented learning were presented as factors that can foster or hinder the integration of public policies. Moreover, the study discusses the potential to acknowledge in ACF the mechanisms for coordinating policy actors and instruments, which would facilitate the analysis of the policy processes of cooperation. It also demonstrates that recent droughts in Northeast Brazil have been increasingly related to the local impacts of climate change, contributing to reframing water management as a cross-sectoral climate and water governance issue. The analysis was based on a literature review, semi-structured interviews, and social network analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]