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By conducting discourse analysis on Chinese textual materials around 1962, this paper tries to inductively explore the national identities of Chinese people during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. It finds that China perceived itself as a persistent and resilient nation in the ongoing fight against invasion and oppression. The predominant social discourse around 1962 showed a strong enmity and resistance toward the imperialism which was then imposed on India. These national identities have formed a natural response as maintaining a tough stance toward incursion and repression, and have contributed to China's resolution to defense its territory with resorting to military force, even though it might not be beneficial in terms of diplomatic relations and economic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infrastructure has played an agential role in the securitisation of everyday life in the Karakoram high mountains of north Pakistan. Geopolitics bear heavily on this region where Pakistan shares borders with China, with whom it has aligned its foreign and security policy, and with India, with whom Pakistan remains embroiled in a long‐standing territorial dispute. Consequently, in the Karakoram, geopolitical anxieties have reflected inwards onto local populations through both security infrastructure and securitised infrastructure. In this postcolony frontier space, statecraft also frequently bypasses normative legal and administrative structures; such exceptions to normative law and administration have antecedents in colonial statecraft on the territorial margins of empire. This paper also argues that long cycles of military rule have allowed the military to acquire and project technocratic expertise, become custodians of state‐led development, and recently, to assume guardianship of, and to enter into joint financing with China on, construction projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does a small power respond and adjust to a fluid and potentially dangerous strategic balancing by major powers generated by a territorial dispute? This paper observes that notwithstanding the major powers' mistrust, suspicion, and rivalry, such precarious stability in the South China Sea dispute is sustained by a balance-of-power system. This system is an offshoot of the small littoral states' (in this case, the Philippines') policy of engaging the external maritime powers (the United States and Japan) to counter China's heavy-handedness in dealing with this territorial row. Apprehensive of China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea, the United States and Japan are increasing their strategic involvement in the maritime territorial row. These developments have transformed the dispute into a case of conflict irresolution. To cope with China's heavy-handedness, the Philippines builds up the deterrence capability of its armed forces and forges security partnerships with the United States and Japan. The Philippines hopes that this move will ensure the maintenance of the status quo in the regional balance of power. In conclusion, the paper considers the Philippines' policy as myopic, since it overlooks the fact that the volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea might be the proverbial 'calm before the storm.' It is crucial that the Philippines puts its house in order, economically keeps pace with its more dynamic Southeast Asian neighbors, increases its defense spending, formulates a coherent national security strategy, and concentrates on building a credible armed forces to avoid free-riding on its allies, and more importantly, to enable the country to weather the approaching storm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Asia-Pacific has seen the emergence of a new security dilemma, as geopolitical friction increases due to escalating crises. Significant tensions between China and many of its Asian neighbors have arisen due to maritime disputes, the North Korea nuclear crisis, and a military arms race. There are three main areas of the common security challenges in the Asia and Pacific region today: Chinese military growth, the U.S. military dominance and strategic “rebalance,” and conflicts or hot spots in the region. The future way out of the Asia-Pacific's current security dilemma depends heavily on how the U.S., China, and Japan can work together. This paper seeks to examine three issues: 1) the logic of China's military growth and how serious a threat it has posed to other countries in the region; 2) the major barriers that hold back military exchange programs between China and the U.S.; and 3) the intervening factor, the strengthening of a U.S.-Japan alliance and its repercussions for China. It will provide proposals to establish a collective framework including more specific security dialogues and cooperation in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the past few years, China has experienced a rapid development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN.) In particular, the formation of CAFTA (the China--ASEAN Free Trade Area) will greatly encourage Chinese multinational corporations to "go out" and invest in ASEAN. However, the South China Sea disputes between China and several ASEAN countries have increased the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN. This paper starts with an analysis of the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes, explains how to view and assess these political risks, and then comes up with a systematic and comprehensive mechanism for coping with the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) has long been recognized and considered as a big threat to regional peace and stability. Such perversity has triggered territorial and overlapping claim disputes among countries in the region, including Vietnam, a neck-to-neck neighbor with China. Despite all possible efforts, the stagnation of Vietnam's resolution to deal with this matter in recent years has been problematic which raises the authors' concern about the potential effective response that Hanoi might take in resolving the complexity of the dispute. Firstly, it is important to understand Vietnam's interests in the SCS and its long-term stance in the area. Secondly, to explain the modest action of Vietnam towards China in the SCS, it is key to realize its undeniable economic reliance on this powerful neighbor. Meanwhile, China has continuously posed its massive power over Vietnam's Sea territory which threatened its security. Hence, the readers can understand the intricate relationship that Vietnam is tied up in. Besides this, the authors also analyze the current maritime diplomacy that is pursued by Vietnam along with its effectiveness which becomes the foundation for suggesting the future strategies of Vietnam based on internal balancing and multidirectionalism in its foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the China's foreign policy towards South Asia with the phenomena of strategic stability. South Asia has emerged as progressively vibrant interest to China's foreign policy. Chinese administration has showed consent to continue its harmonized policies towards regional states like India and Pakistan. Following the realistic approach, it is quite possible that China may not prove helpful in resolving the chronic regional territorial disputes however; it will be cooperative in bringing peace and stability in this region along with economic boom. The outcome of discussion reflects that the imperatives of regional security added new dimensions such as China's peaceful rise under Xi Jinping and China's role of strategic balance between India and Pakistan. Due to diverse Chinese interests in this region, it is expected that Beijing will pay more attention towards South Asian affairs in future and will play a role of more responsible stakeholder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—"killing the chicken to scare the monkey." These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders are increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history. China's monumental history as an ancient civilization is used to revise the communist party's ideology and to buttress foreign policy ambitions and infrastructural investments—including the 'belt and road initiative' and territorial claims in the South China Sea. This more assertive approach to China's immediate neighbourhood resonates with the official reiteration of imperial tropes and concepts of Confucian philosophy, yet assertions that Beijing wants to reanimate the tribute system remain contested. While using historical narratives to legitimize foreign policy is not new, we are witnessing an unprecedented 'return of history' as a global social force. By revisiting Fukuyama's claims, I develop the notion of 'historical statecraft' and apply it to China's 'belt and road initiative'. The Chinese case is exemplary for the importance of ideational factors in understanding the recent structural changes often described as the weakening of the West. This article examines in what ways China's historical statecraft is challenging western narratives, what controversies emerge as China articulates its identity as a re-emerging ancient Great Power—one which expects global audiences to acknowledge the value of its cultural norms—and whether the Chinese approach to the use of the past for construing alternative political imaginaries contributes to a peaceful reconstruction of global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While existing studies show that China has been a norm-taker in accommodating to the norms of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to manage the South China Sea disputes, the possibility of China as a normative power in shaping ASEAN norms in the context of China--ASEAN relations has received less attention. This article shall argue that China has sought to socialise ASEAN to recognise China as a normative power by accepting China's preference for direct bilateral negotiations to handle the disputes while maintaining status quo and nonbinding multilateral cooperation. To achieve this objective, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, China initially adopted ASEAN norms of consensus-based, minimalist multilateralism to earn respectful reciprocation from ASEAN towards China. Subsequently, China sought to socialise ASEAN to recognise a new norm which posits that China, as a benign and responsible power, has the hierarchical primacy and legitimacy to set the pace and direction for handling the South China Sea disputes. Nevertheless, China's attempts have been met with limited success. By insisting on direct bilateral negotiations which eschew a legally binding and multilateral solution to the territorial spat, China's actions have challenged ASEAN norms of multilateralism and ASEAN centrality. As a result, ASEAN has reasserted its centrality and consensus-based multilateral diplomacy to steer the management of the disputes. Additionally, China's increased maritime activities in the South China Sea and conflicting foreign policy messages have further undermined China's credibility as a normative power to socialise ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing view that the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy in recent years is increasingly assertive. This article attempts to make better sense of this perceived more forceful Chinese diplomacy. It argues that Chinese regional behavior is more profitably understood through the lens of a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects. One is a tougher and more uncompromising approach toward issues that China regards as concerning its core interests. The other is a more flexible and cooperative position toward interests that, while significant, are of secondary importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the South China Sea dispute and its impact in international relations. It analyses why the Southeast Asian states are highly sovereignty sensitive, and how such sensitivity has made non-intervention the bedrock of managing their foreign policies. China has long viewed the near seas as regions of geostrategic interest, and thus the SCS is not an exception. On the one hand it brings hope and prosperity, and on the other uncertainty and threat. At the end, the article argues whether China’s assertive position regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic might undermine its own position in contested areas like the SCS, and suggests that China will at least have to learn how toshare and bear(term coined by the author) as a member of the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents a roundtable discussion on political, strategic and economic perspectives on territorial disputes among South Korea, Japan and China. Topics discussed include the dispute between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo, strategies and behaviors of Japan and South Korea in this dispute, and China's maritime activities and its impact on the Dokdo dispute.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 saw Congress require the Department of Defense (DOD) to prepare an annual report on Chinese military power. This report contains classified and unclassified editions. Documenting Chinese military developments, strategy, and trends are critical parts of these reports. Beijing's military activities in the East China Sea (ECS) are important report components. This work explains the importance of these and other DOD reports for those studying ECS developments, examines how DOD has documented Beijing's military activities within these publicly accessible reports, and describes how members of Congress have reacted to ECS developments during the Obama Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores allegations over China's economic aggression in its territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea as of January 2017. Topics include an panel's ruling in favor of the Philippines against China over territorial disputes, China's protests of the ruling, and countries' concern that China will manipulate its economic power to advance its political and strategic interests. Also discussed are the factors that would affect China's foreign policy, China's alleged sanctions against the Philippines after the Scarborough Shoal incident, and China's dispute with Vietnam over HD-981 oil rig deployment in 2014.

The article discusses a possible revision to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in light of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to disputes over rocks and islands in the South China Sea, dispute resolution provisions under the UNCLOS in light of competing territorial claims by China and the Philippines, and UNCLOS treatment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in relation to artificial islands.

China and its neighbours are closely bound by geography. The rise of China presents new challenges and opportunities for the development of its neighbourhood relations and regional strategies. Currently, China's policy priority in its neighbourhood is active promotion of the construction of a community based on shared interests and a common destiny. The real challenge is that China's rise from a weak to a powerful state has triggered multiple and complex reactions and has required significant and profound adjustment of regional relationships. As a consequence there have been growing tensions in China's neighbourhood areas. Traditional Chinese culture sets the highest value on 'peace and harmony', commends the 'defusing' of contradictions and pursues the result of 'reconciliation'. Now that China is getting strong and is able to make choices as it wishes, the time has come for it to display its 'culture of harmony'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's expanding presence in the South China Sea is now a major source of escalating tensions leading to a spiral of confrontation with the United States and the littoral states of east Asia. Under these conditions, conventional analysis suggests that serious conflict is almost inevitable. This article provides an alternative perspective by situating China's growing ambition within the broader transformation of maritime order in the contemporary era. On the basis of a new interpretation of maritime order, the study provides a deeper examination of China's motivations in relation to the maritime disputes, US-China strategic competition, and Xi Jinping's new strategy to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The analysis of the legal, strategic and political dimensions of China's positioning in the South China Sea suggests that maritime nationalism rather than the quest for maritime hegemony is a central motivation driving Chinese actions. A second important insight is that the current approach is strengthening China's control, but undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of other major powers and stakeholders. By focusing on legitimacy as an organizing principle in maritime affairs, it becomes clear that the Chinese leadership stands to gain from integrating its ambition more fully into the evolving maritime order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study employs offensive realism to provide a baseline for assessing Beijing's strategic choices in dealing with regional neighbors. In theory, when an ascending power is not yet capable of dominating its home region, it would strive foremost to prevent external powers from extending their influence in its vicinity. To attain that goal, it will likely adopt a carrots-and-sticks strategy, by rewarding some neighbors and punishing others according to their readiness to accommodate its ascendance and keep a cautious distance from external powers. Empirically, China's management of territorial disputes from the 1950s onward is quite consistent with these theoretical expectations. Viewed in this light, restraint and assertiveness are not inversely related in Chinese foreign policy behavior. Rather, they are two sides of the same coin and serve the same overriding purpose of countering adversarial (especially US) influences in China's neighborhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has gained a high profile in Sino–Japanese relations. Since the 2012 escalation of the territorial dispute, there is no sign of any de-escalation despite economic interdependence, which previously helped ease the tension. Drawing on the constructivist understanding of threat perception and power transition theory, this article analyzes the way in which the deepening of threat perceptions associated with a perceived regional power transition prevents Japan and China from working beyond their subjective conceptions of justice associated with boarders and history. Since 2012, the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute has increasingly fitted into a larger picture of power-political conflict taking place in a power transition in which both Japan and China aim to return to ‘normality’ by propagating their territorial claims, strengthening their military capabilities, and strategic realignment. To that end, this article first introduces a theoretical framework on the centrality of threat perceptions in power transition. Second, it traces the ways in which Japan and China have developed a threat perception of each other since 1972. The third section deals with the escalation of the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute since 2010 and highlights the deepening of mutual suspicion and threat perception exemplified at the bilateral and multilateral levels. I conclude that the Sino–Japanese territorial debate entered a new stage of normative and power-political competition in earning international support for territorial claims in the East China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the genesis, usage, and meaning of the People’s Republic of China’s and the Republic of China’s U-shaped line claim in the South China Sea territorial dispute from 1946 to 1974. The Republic of China (ROC) officially created the line in 1947, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) then adopted in 1949. Although the PRC claims sovereignty over all of the disputed islands and features, it remains silent on what specific waters the line claims. Based on ROC national archival files on the line, which remain virtually unused by scholars on the dispute, this article argues that the line was an “islands attribution” boundary until at least 1974. It claimed only the islands, features, and any adjacent waters consistent with contemporary conceptions of international maritime law. The article concludes with the present-day significance of this history and suggestions for future avenues of scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 2013, pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, the Philippines initiated compulsory arbitration against China in an attempt to finally settle their South China Sea disputes. Tired after years of futile negotiating and what it views as belligerent Chinese actions in the Sea, the Philippines hopes that a UN tribunal will reject China's nine-dash line and its claims of sovereignty over much of the Sea. International legal regimes are systems of choice, and China must calculate if it is in its national interest to comply with an adverse award. As an aspiring power, the political, economic, and military costs of ignoring a UN tribunal to China are high. Yet, China's strict adherence to a historic right to the Sea's waters and islands may preclude it from seeing the wisdom in complying with a UN award. Thus, the solution to peace in the South China Sea may sit outside of UNCLOS and may necessitate a freeing from UNCLOS obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically analyses an intuitive and influential conceptual framework by which to understand state strategy in territorial conflicts. According to this framework, a state in a territorial dispute can pursue one of three general strategies: threaten or use force; offer territorial concessions; or delay. This article argues that it is problematic to regard these three candidate strategies as mutually exclusive. It is argued that not only can a strategy of escalation be compatible with one of delay, but many uses of force can be employed instrumentally in service of delaying. The framework, this article contends, does not so much capture "strategy" as it does certain aspects--or outcomes--of strategy, which while appropriate for certain analytical tasks is less so for others. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident is examined and China's strategy during the event is scrutinized with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of applying the framework to an analysis of narrower scope. Lastly, it is argued that a framework for conceptualizing state strategy in territorial disputes should not be confined to three alternatives; it should be more broadly constructed, allowing for more nuance and taking seriously all the domains of statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U-shaped line in the South China Sea has been recently challenged in the international community and this challenge reached its climax when the Philippines presented China with a Notification and Statement of Claim under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (LOSConvention) on 22 January 2013. In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines requests the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to adjudge and declare that China's maritime claims based on the U-shaped line are contrary to the LOS Convention and invalid. Against this background, this article will analyze the issues concerning the related submissions of the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will explore the evolution of China's border policy through the 1950s and 1960s. Drawing on newly available archival sources and recent secondary literature, it will argue that during the early Cold War, the PRC leadership lacked a clear sense of the concept of national sovereignty, and often attempted to use territorial negotiations with China's neighbours to bargain for broader foreign policy objectives. The article will also examine the historical and political assumptions underlying Mao Zedong's approach to border questions, suggesting that Mao combined longstanding imperial assumptions about universal emperorship with the modern, Marxist idea of a world revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article first highlights in Part I the procedural posture of the South China Sea Arbitration (the Philippines v. China) case and the affirmative duty of the Arbitral Tribunal under Article 9 of Annex VII to the UNCLOS, faced with the absence of China, to investigate conscientiously its own jurisdiction by taking notice of all available information and materials whether or not they are submitted to the Tribunal. Part II summarizes the Philippines' claims and highlights their nature as well as the delimitation geographical framework and the delimitation situation in this matter. The Philippines “skillfully” fragments a big dispute with China into various free-standing-appearing entitlement claims and activities claims in order to conceal the sovereignty-delimitation nature of the dispute or claims. Part III discusses the jurisdictional obstacles or objections ratione temporis and ratione materiae. The dispute is outside the jurisdiction of Section 2 courts and tribunals, because it predated the entry into force of the UNCLOS with respect to China. Furthermore, the Philippines' claims are essentially land territorial sovereignty matters, not concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, or are dependent on the resolution of land territorial sovereignty claims. Part IV discusses the jurisdictional obstacles or objections based on Article 298 of the UNCLOS and China's 2006 optional exceptions declaration as well as the Philippines' related Understanding. When defragmented as they must be because of the delimitation geographical framework and/or delimitation situation, the Philippines' claims constitute one delimitation dispute with China. In any event, a dispute “concerning” the interpretation or application of the provisions on delimitation or “relating to” “delimitation” within the meaning of Article 298 has a broader scope than a delimitation dispute, however strict a reading one gives to that term. All these issues have been excluded by China from the jurisdiction of Section 2 courts and tribunals. Such a defragmentation approach must be applied by the Tribunal. In addition, the “nine dash line” claims may present disputes involving historic title or historic rights as relevant circumstances in a potential delimitation between the Philippines and China, all being excluded matters. The Philippines' Understanding may also serve to exclude this case from the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Part V summarizes the arguments made in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]