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On January 23, 2013 the Philippines alerted the international community that it had initiated a case against China in to help resolve the dispute regarding China's continuing move into the South China Sea. The body set to hear the case against China is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China's response was presented in a scathing 93-point rebuke of the Philippines. China claims that the Philippines has not followed proper channels in trying to resolve territorial disputes, and China remains willing to discuss this at a bilateral level. For their part, Philippine officials claim that China is bullying its way into hegemonic control of the South China Sea. This paper presents a contextual understanding of the current situation with an eye toward history as a way through this potential geopolitical crisis. Based on precedent in the area and in world history, I argue in this paper that the Philippine government's reliance on the UNCLOS to arbitrate with China in the South China Sea is a gamble that will result in greater harm than good for the region. The limited options in how to respond to China should recalibrate how the Philippines should diplomatically move forward with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses the impact of the Rhine Crisis of 1840 on Italian countries and explains the role they played in the European State System when the Continent seemed to be on the eve of a general war. As the paper attempts to prove, the crisis seriously alarmed the ruling classes as well as the general public and revealed the internal problems of the Italian countries as well as their deep distrust towards the egotistic and self-serving policies of the Great Powers. The paper therefore introduces the history of Italy during late 1840 within the wider context of European diplomatic history and serves as a probe into the history of the European State System during the Pre-March period in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most common expedients for preventing conflicts, especially from the Hellenistic period onwards, was the recourse to interstate arbitrations. The phenomenon was not restricted only to the great powers of the day; smaller states would often resort to the process in order to pursue their own interests through less demanding, in militaristic and financial, terms. From the Archaic period to the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and from prominent poleis like Athens and Sparta to smaller ones, the past was prominently used in the context of interstate arbitrations to legitimise claims or actual possession of territories. A favourable verdict would offer direct and tangible benefits for the winning side. However, much like its use in the political discourse, the past played a central role in the arbitrating courts. More so, a positive verdict was not only the outcome of compelling argumentation, but it was supported by historical evidence both in the form of mythical and/or historical accounts and of historical memories. Thus, alongside the many practical benefits, there are other, at least equally, important advantages; namely, the effective alteration of the modes of self-representation and the ability to mould civic identities. This paper will discuss various instances of the use of the past within the interstate arbitration corpus and will examine its central position in yet another aspect of the political life of Ancient Greece, especially from the Hellenistic period onwards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When new discourses appear, they can cause a certain pressure to search for new meaning of past actions and therefore even change recollection. During a period of discursive transition, these processes of memory evolution can cause serious social rifts. These insights from oral history theories are applied in this paper to the Sámi people in Russia, who all too often are seen by outsiders as a homogeneous community. I seek to correct this distorted image by analyzing the several interconnected rifts crisscrossing the Russian Sámi society. The following social fault lines are identified: the generational, the gender, the siyt, and the Lovozero-and-therest rifts, as well as a rift of worldviews, which I describe through two conceptual poles called "activists" and "sovkhoists." Thus, the article contributes to raising awareness about the potentially differing interests of the individuals who constitute what is usually called the Russian Sámi "community" and increasing the critical distance of outsiders towards generalizing claims about "the" Russian Sámi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Entramado is the property of Universidad Libre Seccional Cali and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the lack of Indigenous considerations in settling the Labrador boundary dispute between Quebec and Newfoundland. The Dominion of Newfoundland granted timber permits to the Grand River Pulp and Lumber Company in Labrador in 1902, an act Quebec contested, given its claim to the territory. The final decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in 1927 largely relied on Newfoundland's definition of the word coast, granting Newfoundland significant territory at Quebec's expense. Ignored throughout the process were the Indigenous peoples of Northern Quebec and the Labrador region. This is significant and, as our analysis of the Inuit, Innut, and Algonquian peoples reveals, their concept of the Labrador territory differed greatly from that of both governments. Influenced by their semi-nomadic lifestyle and trade patterns, their understanding of the Labrador territory was larger than that conceived of by Newfoundland or Quebec. This is substantial and provides us with a fuller understanding of the Labrador boundary dispute, and how the inclusion of Indigenous understandings in the dispute may have impacted decision making. On a broader scale, the paper contributes to regional scholarship on the historical relationships between the governments of Quebec and Newfoundland and the Indigenous peoples of the Labrador region. The fact the JCPC ignored known Indigenous knowledge and worldviews is a reflection of Canada's colonial history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early Meiji, Karafuto (the Sakhalin Island) was transformed through the influx of settlers from Russia and Japan, causing a series of conflicts and violence among the residents. The Japanese historical record has framed the stories into competition with Russia over the territorial control, emphasising the place of the island in the emergence of the Meiji state. This paper contends that such framing should be the object of historical investigation. The main case studies are two homicides of commoners, which would have been easily forgotten without the larger political imperative. The lengthy interrogations of witnesses, conducted by officers from two governments, signified the interpretation of local violence into criminal offence, giving grounds for the intervention by the Russian and the Japanese authorities. Meiji Diplomacy utilised the pursuit of redress for a crime against its subjects as a way of strengthening territorial claims in the periphery. Once the border demarcation was concluded at the highest level of diplomacy, however, the murder and other crime cases lost their significance. Based on Kaitakushi manuscripts held in the prefectural Archives of Hokkaido, this article traces the impact of the national history paradigm that has affected our writing of the history of Meiji Japan's far north. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia Mexicana is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There have been many discussions about property disputes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots since 1963, when Turkish Cypriots were ousted from the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. Representatives of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have been negotiating to find a lasting solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ since 1968. One of the main issues of the negotiations is how to find a solution in a bi-zonal federation to the property problem, which started in 1964 for the Turkish Cypriots and 1974 for the Greek Cypriots. Any kind of comprehensive settlement plan would include restitution, exchange, and compensation to resolve property disputes. Therefore, prior to any solution, this study aims to contribute to estimating the cost of compensation of properties through a mass valuation methodology. The study also investigates the cost of relocation of dispossessed owners and current users due to reinstatement. The study demonstrates, in various analyses, the amount needed for compensation of properties that would be left in the South and in the North by Turkish and Greek Cypriot owners, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders are increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history. China's monumental history as an ancient civilization is used to revise the communist party's ideology and to buttress foreign policy ambitions and infrastructural investments—including the 'belt and road initiative' and territorial claims in the South China Sea. This more assertive approach to China's immediate neighbourhood resonates with the official reiteration of imperial tropes and concepts of Confucian philosophy, yet assertions that Beijing wants to reanimate the tribute system remain contested. While using historical narratives to legitimize foreign policy is not new, we are witnessing an unprecedented 'return of history' as a global social force. By revisiting Fukuyama's claims, I develop the notion of 'historical statecraft' and apply it to China's 'belt and road initiative'. The Chinese case is exemplary for the importance of ideational factors in understanding the recent structural changes often described as the weakening of the West. This article examines in what ways China's historical statecraft is challenging western narratives, what controversies emerge as China articulates its identity as a re-emerging ancient Great Power—one which expects global audiences to acknowledge the value of its cultural norms—and whether the Chinese approach to the use of the past for construing alternative political imaginaries contributes to a peaceful reconstruction of global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ‘law of nations’ that colonial powers invoked to claim the South China Sea islands was based not on international convention or custom but on their own municipal laws on guano concession. It provides that states have the exclusive right to assert title over distant islands where their respective citizens have engaged in economic activities. It was applied selectively to advance colonial and maritime interests and to suppress the claim of China. In their own records, the United States and United Kingdom acknowledged China’s prior and exclusive economic activities on the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, and consolidation of title over the Paracel Islands. The records were ignored and subsequently revised, thereby excluding China from availing of the rule. The Japanese peace treaties formalized China’s exclusion by relegating its claim to the same category as the claims that emerged from recent acts of occupation, and subjecting it to resolution by convention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the maritime territorial dispute between North and South Korea. Topics include the strategic challenge that North Korea poses to the U.S. and its allies if it has an operational nuclear weapons capability, the history of the maritime dispute in the Yellow Sea, and several measures that may reduce tension. Also discussed are North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's advancement of their nuclear weapons program, the U.S.' alliance with South Korea, and the unwillingness of North and South Korea and the U.S. to risk war.

This article describes a new data set consisting of precise digital maps of regions that were the subject of interstate territorial disputes in the period 1947 to 2000. Each dispute identified by Huth and Allee is rendered as a polygon corresponding to the area subject to overlapping claims. After describing the data collection procedures and presenting some descriptive statistics, this article develops three novel results that demonstrate the potential of geospatial data to advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of territorial conflict. In particular, I use the data to (1) show how different measurements of the geographic extent of disputes can help unpack the mechanisms through which they dampen international trade, (2) cast doubt on the role of oil deposits in fueling territorial conflict by analyzing the relationship at a finer level of spatial resolution than previously possible, and (3) examine the harmful legacy of territorial conflict on local development in formerly contested regions along the El Salvador-Honduras border. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Armed conflict between states in Southeast Asia has been relatively rare, especially since 1979. The most recent exception to this pattern was a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand that turned violent in 2008 and remained militarized for more than three years. Existing studies of this long-standing conflict have concentrated on explaining the upsurge in violence between 2008 and 2011, but have tended to ignore that fighting was quickly contained each time clashes occurred. This article provides a different perspective and asks how the dispute was managed short of large-scale armed violence. To answer this question, the author adopts an agency-focused perspective that emphasizes the role of critical actors who worked to de-escalate the conflict. Based on field research conducted in Cambodia and Thailand, as well as consulting primary and secondary sources, the author adopts a historical narrative that revisits critical periods from the 1950s onwards and argues that relevant actors in both Cambodia and Thailand had long-standing incentives to avoid escalating the conflict. Two elements were critical: first, crucial actors including Cambodian and Thai bureaucrats, diplomats and members of the security and intelligence services developed an understanding of the problems inherent in defining their land border; and second, the establishment of personal contacts, even in the context of antagonistic relations. Together, these factors created possibilities for Cambodia and Thailand to cooperate in managing conflict and increased the willingness of both sides to exercise self-restraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With fishery incidents emerging as a major threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea, a better understanding of the underlying causes of these incidents becomes important. Mainstream media, and a substantial body of academic literature, attribute these fishing incidents, and the growing presence of Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea, to China’s strategic and political motives, claiming that these fishermen are actually fishing militia. Through revisiting the prevailing fishing militia narrative, this article argues that much wider economic and social factors are at work domestically in China, and that the international and regional scenes are more complex than the picture painted by purely viewing developments with China’s fishing militia in isolation. This article also makes the case that fishing disputes in the South China Sea have been heavily securitized with profound implications for the ongoing territorial and jurisdictional disputes in those waters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing view that the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy in recent years is increasingly assertive. This article attempts to make better sense of this perceived more forceful Chinese diplomacy. It argues that Chinese regional behavior is more profitably understood through the lens of a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects. One is a tougher and more uncompromising approach toward issues that China regards as concerning its core interests. The other is a more flexible and cooperative position toward interests that, while significant, are of secondary importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I explore a little known aspect of British and Japanese history that began not long after Japan open its ports to the west in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is about negotiations between Japan and foreign powers over sovereign control of an island archipelago 1,000 kilometers southeast of Edo (Tokyo). The Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands were first visited by Japanese in the seventeenth century, declared British territory in 1827 and then reclaimed by Japan in 1876. The diplomatic discussions involved the British and US Consuls acting under instructions from their respective governments and negotiating with the highest levels of Japanese authority during both the Tokugawa and Meiji Periods. I argue that the islands were of little importance to either the governments of Britain or America and that the British authorities were more than willing to hand over sovereign control of the Bonin Islands to the Japanese as early as 1862. Indeed, by the mid-1870s, the British authorities in England were more concerned that the Japanese would not claim the islands and that Britain would be burdened with their responsibility. In arguing this, I provide a novel perspective of Japan's struggles with becoming a modern nation in an increasingly international setting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Algerian-Tunisian frontier zone was much contested in the late nineteenth century, defying the logic of modernity that sought to establish territoriality. This modernity appeared only through an imbrication of raids, warfare, environmental shifts, and competing territorial claims. The violence of the territorial process, the changing geography of sovereignty, and uncertain frontier delimitation: these and other elements challenge the image of modernity arising in a fixed territory according to a linear chronology. This article argues that modernity in the Maghrib, seen through the lens of territory, is a temporally and spatially variable process: "modern" sovereign power existed only at certain levels of abstraction and within certain environmental relations. To consider modernity in the Maghrib, we will have to see how claims of sovereignty and the process of territorialization were understood by actors operating on local, regional, and imperial scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores allegations over China's economic aggression in its territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea as of January 2017. Topics include an panel's ruling in favor of the Philippines against China over territorial disputes, China's protests of the ruling, and countries' concern that China will manipulate its economic power to advance its political and strategic interests. Also discussed are the factors that would affect China's foreign policy, China's alleged sanctions against the Philippines after the Scarborough Shoal incident, and China's dispute with Vietnam over HD-981 oil rig deployment in 2014.

The article examines China's maritime claims as of January 2017, highlighting an international arbitral tribunal ruling that invalidated China's nine-dash line and other maritime activities in the South China Sea on July 12, 2016. Topics include China's efforts to protect its maritime rights and interests, its goal of expanding maritime power, and development of maritime technology to explore natural resources. Also discussed are the factors that influenced changes in China's maritime policy since 2012.

The article discusses the political role of coalition forces in Syria including the U.S. in reclaiming the city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Topics include the marginalization of Sunni members that led to the rise of ISIS in Iraq, the rule of president Nouri al-Maliki and disbanding of the Sunni Sahwa Forces. Also cited are the Sunni Nineveh Provincial Council (NPC), Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and failure of Article 40 on issues of disputed territories.

China's massive reclamation work in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea between 2013 and 2015 was a turning point in US policy towards the South China Sea. China intends to use the artificial islands it has constructed -- and the infrastructure it is in the process of installing on them -- for military purposes. While for many years the United States largely positioned itself above the long-simmering territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes between China and five Southeast Asian countries, the prospect of China using its buildup in the southern reaches of the South China Sea to establish greater control of its near seas, in the process diminishing US access to the waters and airspace of the world's most critical waterways, prompted a reassessment in Washington about the South China Sea being part of larger US core interests, and its grand strategy in the Western Pacific. Washington has responded to China's reclamation and construction spree with a new, active strategy that aims to deter China from taking further actions at its reclaimed features that would alter the existing military balance of power in the region and make China pay a "net effect" for its behaviour -- should it continue to pursue an aggressive course of actions -- by engaging more actively with Southeast Asian partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article ascertains whether Japan's possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has a legal basis that is opposable to China. It departs from the traditional approach that focuses on historic titles and ancient maps. It applies an alternative approach that is based on the status quo post bellum or the relative legal position of the parties at the end of armed hostilities. This approach is warranted by the practice of China, Japan and the Allied powers of defining the status quo in the East China Sea as a frame of reference for the future disposition of the islands. Primary records of their conduct in the period 1945-1952 reveal consensus that: (i) the islands are part of Nansei Shoto rather than of Formosa; (ii) they remained under the residual sovereignty of Japan and (iii) they were being claimed by Japan but not China. The conduct of the parties proximate to 1945-1956 indicate that there was no prior existing title to the islands that would contradict the status quo. Rather, during the period 1952 up to the critical date of 1970, the positive acts of the Republic of China and the acquiescence of the People's Republic of China confirmed the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and its neighbours are closely bound by geography. The rise of China presents new challenges and opportunities for the development of its neighbourhood relations and regional strategies. Currently, China's policy priority in its neighbourhood is active promotion of the construction of a community based on shared interests and a common destiny. The real challenge is that China's rise from a weak to a powerful state has triggered multiple and complex reactions and has required significant and profound adjustment of regional relationships. As a consequence there have been growing tensions in China's neighbourhood areas. Traditional Chinese culture sets the highest value on 'peace and harmony', commends the 'defusing' of contradictions and pursues the result of 'reconciliation'. Now that China is getting strong and is able to make choices as it wishes, the time has come for it to display its 'culture of harmony'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's expanding presence in the South China Sea is now a major source of escalating tensions leading to a spiral of confrontation with the United States and the littoral states of east Asia. Under these conditions, conventional analysis suggests that serious conflict is almost inevitable. This article provides an alternative perspective by situating China's growing ambition within the broader transformation of maritime order in the contemporary era. On the basis of a new interpretation of maritime order, the study provides a deeper examination of China's motivations in relation to the maritime disputes, US-China strategic competition, and Xi Jinping's new strategy to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The analysis of the legal, strategic and political dimensions of China's positioning in the South China Sea suggests that maritime nationalism rather than the quest for maritime hegemony is a central motivation driving Chinese actions. A second important insight is that the current approach is strengthening China's control, but undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of other major powers and stakeholders. By focusing on legitimacy as an organizing principle in maritime affairs, it becomes clear that the Chinese leadership stands to gain from integrating its ambition more fully into the evolving maritime order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflicts in the South China Sea over territorial and maritime claims, resource exploitation, and land reclamations have intensified in recent years. Political leaders and diplomats have advanced various ideas to contain or resolve these conflicts before they escalate further. One of the proposals, the South China Sea Peace Initiative (SC-SPI) proffered by President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan, attempts to apply Taiwan's positive experience in handling East China Sea disputes to the South China Sea region by calling for all parties in dispute to shelve sovereignty claims while establishing a regional cooperation mechanism for the joint development of resources. This article examines key assumptions underlying the SCSPI and evaluates its strengths and weaknesses in light of the changing nature of the South China Sea strategic environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nakhchyvan region after the South Caucasus came under the Allied control following the Mudros Armistice of 30 October 1918. It analyses the arguments of the Armenian Government submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to substantiate its vision of territorial delimitation between the two republics with regard to Nakhchyvan, examines the positions of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Allied Powers on the Nakhchyvan problem and assesses the impact of their stance on the settlement of the issue. It argues that the Armenian claims to the region were land-related, being part of the Armenian nationalist aim of constructing an expanded Armenia from the Mediterranean to Garabagh. It also argues that the Allied Powers were guided by their own interests while making proposals on the settlement of the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As the dispute over Kashmir broke out in 1947, a plebiscite of the people of the state offered a mutually acceptable and ostensibly fair path out of the imbroglio. Critics have often laid the blame on Nehru, and the territory’s salience to India, for why a plebiscite was never held. Based on primary documentation, this article makes the case that it was not a lack of commitment to the formula, but rather Nehru’s deeply held strategic and reputational fears that motivated, first, the setting of what Delhi saw as firm but fair pre-conditions, and after the conclusion of the US-Pakistan military pact in 1954, the complete rejection of the plebiscite option. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Relations between Greece and Austria-Hungary had never been particularly cordial, despite some brief periods of a certain rapprochement, and Vienna displayed a total lack of consideration for the interests of Athens also during the Balkan Wars. Greek 'dreams' were only marginally 'tangent' to Vienna's interests and the Ballhausplatz did not envisage any point of convergence of their political goals. The cooperation, let alone the alliance, between Greece and Serbia proved to be a thorn in the Greco-Austrian relations. All issues of Greek interest met with Vienna's strong opposition: the drawing of the southern/southeastern borders of Albania; the fate of Thessaloniki and Kavalla; the future of the East Aegean islands. While Austria was aiming at bringing Bulgaria in her sphere of influence, Germany wanted to attract Athens closer to the Triple Alliance, which led to serious misunderstandings between the two empires. Ultimately, this divergence of policy worked in favour of Greece that obtained Thessaloniki and its hinterland, Kavalla, a large part of Epirus, safeguarded her titles on the Aegean islands and secured a common Greco-Serbian borderline. However, the issue of Northern Epirus was left in abeyance until after the First World War. Finally, the Ballhausplatz, re-evaluating the new geopolitical realities in the Balkans, started looking constructively to the future role of Greece in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on international relations theory to attempt a reframing of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict in Nagorny Karabakh as an enduring rivalry (ER): a particular kind of interstate conflict known for its longevity and stability. The article begins by identifying a number of conceptual deficits circulating around this conflict, notably the notion that it is a “frozen conflict,” before introducing the ER framework and its analytical dividends for this case. Different layers of the ER between Armenia and Azerbaijan are then explored at systemic, interstate, domestic, decision-maker, and temporal levels, with a view more toward identifying directions for future research than conclusive findings. Among the article's tentative conclusions are the primacy of endogenous over exogenous factors in explaining the durability of the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the impacts of the passage of time on the human and physical geography of the territory under dispute, and the convergence of conflict dynamics across disparate levels. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Imago Mundi is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article charts the history of the Buraimi Oasis affair, the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring Trucial Coast (later the United Arab Emirates) and Oman. Having laid out the pre-20th century context, the article traces the rise of the dispute from the discovery of oil in 1932 and the protracted negotiations over the eastern borders of Saudi Arabia (and hence the partitioning of any oil concessions) between Saudi Arabia, the UK and US, factoring in the complex interests of the various oil companies in their exploration of the region. The climax of the affair came in the 1950s, with efforts by Saudi Arabia to win over the areas tribes frequently by bribery, whilst moves were made towards arbitration despite military tension. The article examines the continuing role of the UK in the government of the Trucial coast and Oman throughout the period, the impact on US-UK relations, and the longer-term consequences of the boundary dispute. It also considers the role played by the oil companies such as Aramco in the affair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will explore the evolution of China's border policy through the 1950s and 1960s. Drawing on newly available archival sources and recent secondary literature, it will argue that during the early Cold War, the PRC leadership lacked a clear sense of the concept of national sovereignty, and often attempted to use territorial negotiations with China's neighbours to bargain for broader foreign policy objectives. The article will also examine the historical and political assumptions underlying Mao Zedong's approach to border questions, suggesting that Mao combined longstanding imperial assumptions about universal emperorship with the modern, Marxist idea of a world revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This will be the last official issue produced by the team at the University of North Texas, although Volume 111.1 will contain manuscripts that the UNT team processed. However, the new editorial team based at the University of Mannheim and London School of Economics will handle production of the 111.1 issue. This is a “bigger” issue, at least in terms of size, as we clear the deck for the new team. In some ways this issue is our “swan song”—it truly has been a pleasure serving as editors of the APSR these past four years. We are very grateful to have had the opportunity to serve the association and the discipline we all love, and it has been a great honor to work with so many great folks at APSA. In some ways, it's hard to move on, but we hope that we have made some positive changes as editors of the Review—and we know we leave it in good hands. We thank the new team for assisting in this rather unprecedented transition to a non-US based editorial home. It has been challenging, but in the end it will make the journal and the association better off. We wish Dr. Thomas Koenig and the new team well as they take over this enormously important responsibility. We ask you to support the new team as much as we have been supported by “ya'all” (cannot resist a bit of Texas farewell). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]