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How important are ambassadors in international politics? While a growing body of research stresses the importance of diplomacy in international politics, it remains unclear if individual ambassadors make a significant difference or what attributes make for an effective ambassador. This paper explores these questions through a systematic analysis of 2,730 US ambassadors between 1946 and 2014. The United States is distinctive in that it sends a sizable number of noncareer political appointees to serve as ambassadors. This provides a unique opportunity to examine how an ambassador's experience shapes where they are placed and how they perform. Using various techniques to address selection effects, including matching, I find that the United States is less likely to experience a militarized dispute with a host nation when it is represented by a political ambassador. Moreover, political ambassadors with professional experience in politics or the military, those who are close to the president, and those who are appointed in permissive congressional environments are less likely to experience militarized disputes during their tenure. Individual ambassadors matter, but diplomatic experience alone is not the only attribute that makes for an effective ambassador. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the first compulsory conciliation proceeding under Article 298 and Annex V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It assesses the competence and conciliation proceedings in a comprehensive manner, with a view to understanding how conciliation may contribute to settling maritime boundary disputes. This paper reviews the conciliation commission's interpretation of Article 281, Article 298(1)(a)(i) and other relevant provisions of Annex V to UNCLOS, and discusses the question of whether a pre-existing treaty between the parties can preclude resort to compulsory conciliation under Article 298(1)(a)(i), a question largely left unanswered by the commission. Furthermore, this paper examines the conciliation proceedings and the outcomes in the light of the law of maritime delimitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The presence of third States occurs when two countries delimit their maritime boundary in a maritime area where there are more than two coastal States. The bilateral nature of maritime delimitation between two States requires the delimitation process not to prejudice the legal rights and interests of third States. On the one hand, at the procedural stage of international adjudication, third States may file an application for permission to intervene in the proceedings before a court or tribunal; at the merits stage, a third-party judicial organ may leave undecided the endpoint of a final boundary line to be delimited, so as not to affect the rights of a third State. On the other hand, in interstate maritime boundary agreements through international negotiation, in order to take care of third States' legal rights and interests, States may adopt several ways of addressing the existence of tripoints. This paper, in four parts, discusses the presence of third States in international maritime boundary delimitation. The first part gives a definition of a third State in the framework of maritime delimitation. The second part reflects on international adjudication relating to the presence of third States. The third part provides some observations on State practices relating to the existence of tripoints. The conclusion points out that there is a widening gap between maritime delimitation in theory and in practice, since recent case law particularly confines the delimitation to a purely bilateral status, without enough focus on the presence of third States, resulting in procedurally prejudicial impacts upon the legal rights and interests of third States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronting a more powerful rival can be a risky proposition. This paper integrates prospect theory into the growing Neoclassical Realist (NCR) literature to identify the conditions under which decision makers are most likely to accept foreign policy risks. I argue that decision makers governing regimes with low levels of political counterframing are more likely to settle into a dominant loss frame when their external security environment erodes. This increases the probability that they will initiate disputes with more powerful adversaries. To assess this proposition, I conduct a test of weaker state confrontation grounded in a NCR framework that utilizes the insights from prospect theory. Data come from the postwar era and support my hypothesis. Loss frames exert influence over the decision to initiate risky foreign policy strategies in regimes in which political counterframing is absent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the central, though understudied, role that a rapidly changing technology--mapping--plays in territorial conflict. As digital cartographic tools replace traditional paper maps, both the processes and outcomes of negotiation over territory change fundamentally. Digitization does not simply produce "better" maps that make settlements easier to reach. Instead, particular features of digital mapping reshape disputes over territory by altering the evaluation of possible solutions, changing the perceived value of territories, and bringing new actors into negotiation processes. Those effects are complex and context-sensitive. They promote conflict resolution in some circumstances but pose new obstacles to settlements in others. This article combines theory on mapping, negotiation, bargaining, and emotions in international relations. I first develop a set of general implications of digital mapping for the processes and outcomes of territorial negotiation. I then examine three illustrative cases: the 1995 Dayton Accords, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, and the 2010 border dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In each case, new features of digital mapping yielded unexpected effects on negotiation and dispute-resolution processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper highlights the issue of the recognition of the existence of a dispute between China and Japan regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, identifies such a recognition, and comments on the implications flowing from that recognition for Japan and China, as well as for other States, especially the United States, and argues that in light of the well-known US position of taking no view on sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty cannot apply to the island. Some comments are also offered on Japan's "nationalization" and other measures and China's response measures and/or counter-measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]