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A person trapped in a building engulfed in a raging fire, a person dealing with severe chronic disease, people dealing with a virus pandemic, and people fighting in a protracted war may appear dissimilar but are fundamentally in a similar situation and their behaviors follow a predictable and similar pattern. In this paper, the behaviors of rational people dealing with a significant persistent unpleasant, or dangerous stimulus that is inescapable are elucidated. The unique modulatory effects of stimulus persistence on human behavior as well as the role of means and interest are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on what has come to be known as a 'charm offensive,' a diplomatic technique countries may use to shift their international image through strategic public relations campaigns utilizing personal magnetism. The charm of the selected representative is meant to appeal to a broad international audience with the hope of improving the country's brand. The paper examines the concept and practice of a charm offensive through two case studies. The first is the Iranian charm offensive during the 2015 negotiations of the nuclear deal with the United States, when Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif aimed to improve his country's controversial international image through gentle, diplomatic communication and an aura of civility. The second case study is the charm offensive of North Korea from the 2018 Winter Olympics until the historic meeting of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald J. Trump in June 2018. Both case studies analyze the media representations of the particular charm offensive in two countries, the United States and a regionally more proximate, and therefore likely more directly affected country: Israel and South Korea, respectively. I argue that quick image-transformations often characterize contemporary, highly mediatized international diplomatic communication. Unlike classical cases of soft power, the temporary alliances forged through charm offensives are not built on shared values, but on momentary appearances, and sometimes on deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea, often described as a "hermit kingdom," has been widely demonized as irrational and barbaric. On the other hand, North Koreans are portrayed as passive victims subject to state violence. Within this simplistic dichotomy, it is hard to grasp the complex reality of North Korea where lives are intertwined with the regime, but at the same time daily life operates in different spaces with completely different meanings and resistance to the regime. A lack of understanding on North Korea and its people tackles the further development of the peace building process and the possible integration among Koreans. Therefore, this special section aims to provide new perspectives on both North Korea in relation to the context of division and possible unification of the Korean Peninsula through the "question of culture"; in particular, the everyday cultural practices of North Koreans. The rise of active agency, the widespread of technology, the increase of consumeristic desire and the reorganization of everyday life in North Korea are important aspects to be unpacked. By doing so, the papers in this section examine the potential changes that might occur in the future of North Korea and the division/unification of the North and South by inter-referencing comparable experiences of Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union and Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts from the assumption that geostrategic and security interests alone are not sufficient to explain China’s foreign policy choices. It argues that ideas about what China’s role as an actor in the increasingly globalised international system should be, and about world order in general, have a deep influence on China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Taking the North Korean issue as a case study, the paper postulates that China is currently engaged in a search for a ‘new’ identity as a global player. China’s actor identity is composed of various partly contradictory role conceptions. National roles derived from China’s internal system structures and its historical past lead to continuity in foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global power require an adaptation of its foreign policy principles. In the case of its relationship with North Korea, China’s foreign policy is oscillating between the two roles of ‘socialist power’ – as thus comrade-in-arms with its socialist neighbour – and ‘responsible great power’, which leads to it being expected to comply with international norms, and thus to condemn North Korea’s nuclear provocations and related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Analysts remain sharply divided on the underlying motivations behind North Korea's ballistic missile program, more than two years after Pyongyang startled the world by test firing its Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998. In the aftermath of the historic South-North summit meeting in June and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright's path-breaking trip to Pyongyang in October, proponents of the engagement school argue that with a mixture of patience and inducements, North Korea will ultimately negotiate away its missiles. They point to the 1994 Agreed Framework as a key reminder that North Korea uses its weapons of mass destruction capability as a bargaining chip. Conversely, countervailing arguments point out that North Korea's ballistic missile program serves multiple purposes such as shifting the correlation of forces to its favor, supporting the military's modernization goals, and as the primary symbol of military prowess and that, as a result, a negotiated settlement is unlikely. This paper assesses North Korea's potential reasons for pursuing a robust ballistic missile program over the past two decades and the broader strategic consequences of North Korea's missile arsenal, particularly if it succeeds in developing intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. In addition, it also analyzes South Korea's political and military responses to North Korea's accelerated ballistic missile program including South Korea's own ballistic missile modernization goals. The paper also reviews the problems associated with trilateral policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Finally, policy options are analyzed but none appear to be able to satisfy the seemingly contradictory objectives of the key players in the ongoing North Korean missile saga. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Inherent to the United States' approach toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the second North Korean nuclear issue emerged in the early fall of 2002 has been a policy predisposition that has coexisted with little tangible movement in the direction of resolving this very serious regional and global problem. Indeed, since its inception, overall this problem has become worse. That the DPRK has detonated three nuclear bombs hardly makes the security environment in Northeast Asia more stable, contrary to Pyongyang's claims that its nuclear deterrent force does just that, or brings the North Korean nuclear issue any closer to resolution. For sure, major missteps by Pyongyang have exacerbated the nuclear issue. Moreover, because the Bush and Obama administrations have maintained this predisposition embedded in U.S. ideology, which like any belief system, including the DPRK's juche (self reliance) idea, begets emotion 1 accompanied by both self-deception and deception on the part of state officials, 2 policies implemented by Washington in response to the North's perceived provocations have produced few successes. Policies built on faulty foundations, specifically those that exude the animus of the Cold War, are more likely to fail than not. This paper concludes by providing a practical solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, which should be attractive to both Washington and Pyongyang: a conditional peace treaty that rather quickly leads to the DPRK's denuclearization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Apart from North Korea, no state's nuclear program in the twenty-first century has raised more concern to international security than Iran's. While Iran insists that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purpose in line with Article IV of non-proliferation treaty, the USA and its allies insist that Iran has military intentions and called for sanctions. The failure of sanctions to deter Iran from its nuclear agenda had made many scholars and policy-makers call for a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Situated within this debate, this paper positions itself as an antagonist to the preemptive airstrike option and argues that involving India in a possible nuclear “iron curtain” against Iran – a move known as technical isolation – remains the best option to the current nuclear crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea looms large as a challenge for the United States and China. US-China cooperation in working to deal with the challenge of North Korea is often held up as an example of constructive engagement between Washington and Beijing. Nevertheless, North Korea has the potential to generate discord or even conflict between the United States and China. This paper considers several possible scenarios for North Korea and evaluates the implications of each for the US-China relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Russia's strategic interests related to the regional security dilemma surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Based on two basic principles—a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and political resolution of the crisis—the Putin administration has attempted to represent itself as an even-handed broker striving to normalize the situation. Peaceful resolution of the crisis would benefit not only Russia and but the entire region; however, Putin's efforts have not been instrumental toward these ends, notwithstanding his close contact with the North Korean leader. Russia has produced no policy suggestions capable of accommodating the conflicting interests of the United States and North Korea. Despite a lack of progress, Russia continues to desire multilateral talks since the meetings forestall unilateral actions by the two countries that would be detrimental to Russian interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common view is that China is North Korea's ally. The two countries share a similar political system and considerable strategic interest in regional international relations. Indeed, this is true to a large extent. This paper, however, analyses the problems in the bilateral relations that are gradually eroding the strategic ties the two countries formed 50 years ago. Its central argument is that, in reality, beneath the surface of the alliance relations the two countries share very few common interests. In fact, the two countries can hardly agree to any matters between them, be it historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programs, or diplomatic interactions. This heralds an uncertain future for the bilateral relations and thus may further complicate the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]