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Copyright of Transformations in Business & Economics is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper deals with a less well-known connection between Thomas Reid's conception of common sense and pragmatism. The paper starts with an exposition of the different principles of common sense one can find in Reid's writings and a discussion of their epistemic status. The main focus of the paper is on what one may call 'Reid's dilemma of common sense'. I argue that Reid's writings not only present us with a dilemma of common sense but that they also offer a way out of the dilemma, one that is pragmatist in a certain sense. I also discuss the question whether the proposed way out can work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In my rejoinder, I show how Brock’s and Burman’s replies to my article (Araujo, 2017) are based on a series of misunderstandings and misattributions. First, I argue that Brock ignores crucial passages of my article and my related book, and show not only that he misunderstands Wundt’s position on the introspective method, but also that his claim, according to which there is nothing new in my approach, lacks substance. Second, I argue that Burman’s text fails to make contact with the substantive thrust of my paper, and that his appeal to contextualism is vague and does not address the substantive questions I raise. Finally, I conclude that Brock’s rejection of my proposal, as well as his misunderstandings and misattributions, derives from a kind of methodological dogmatism, against which the best medicine is methodological pluralism, and that Burman’s worries are unjustified and can be avoided by a careful reading of my paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides some philosophical groundwork for contemporary debates about the idea of critical thinking. Discusses three styles of critique: critical dogmatism, transcendental critique (Karl-Otto Apel), and deconstruction (Jacques Derrida). Argues that while transcendental critique is able to solve some of the problems of the dogmatic approach to criticality, deconstruction provides the most coherent and self-reflexive conception of critique. (KS)

This commentary offers 10 critical characterizations of contemporary special education and 5 major implications for the future of the field. It urges special educators to turn their attention unambiguously and forcefully to empirical research to generate reliable common knowledge of effective instruction of students with disabilities. (Author/CR)

"Wherever there is smoke there must be fire." In 1957, Aram M. Frenkian noticed that both ancient Greek and Indian philosophy makes use of the smoke-fire analogy as a model for inferential reasoning. He postulated that Greek use of the example reflected Indian influence on Greek philosophy which was mediated through the works of Pyrrho, the founder of Sceptisicm, who had accompanied Alexander the Great on his Indian campaign (327-5 BCE) and learnt from Indian sages ('gymnosophists' as the Greeks called them). More recent scholarship mainly shares his views. In the present paper, I argue that the smoke-fire example formed part of a complex theory of sign inference, and that not only the isolated analogy, but the theory as a whole which it illustrates is present in both cultures. Furthermore, the variants of this theory comprise such close and extended similarities that they must be the result of direct contact between Indian and Greek thinkers, although it is impossible to decide whether they stem from a common origin, or are the result of influence from one culture to the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study aims to clarify the meaning, the epistemic construction, and the pragmatics of the term āgama occurring in Pātañjalayogaśāstra I.7 and its commentaries. Since āgama is a linguistic construction, this paper is also a contribution to the inquiry into the philosophy of language of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. The inclusion of linguistic-philosophical arguments corroborates the Pātañjalayoga system of philosophy as a śāstra text and its logical and epistemological paradigm. The structure of the present work is as follows: a first part strictly dealing with textual sources, and a second where the content of textual sources is discussed. Relying on the early literature ranging from the Pātañjalayogaśāstra (c. 400 CE) to the Pātañjalayogasūtravṛtti of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (PYV, half of 17th—half of 18th cent. CE), to āgama can be accorded two principal meanings: as a generic verbal testimony, and as authoritative verbal teachings. Grounded on the evaluated textual material, the second part of this essay presents a hypothesis aiming at the understanding of verbal testimony: in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, āgama exhibits an epistemological, linguistic and psychological construction. In fact, as an epistemic theory of verbal testimony āgama functions following three main vectors being: (a) epistemological source and instance of valid cognition, namely a pramāṇa, (b) linguistically structured, āgama exhibits a propositional structure (vākya); and (c) a mental episode, placing āgama as one among the different mental events (cittavṛtti) described in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the current issue of "political correctness" in the academic community and the responsibility of scholarly journals to avoid ideological domination from either the right or the left. Describes the 1934 Nazi takeover of the International Review of Education, the only international journal of comparative education at that time. (SV)

Argues that the study of Great Books need not be a politically conservative enterprise. Suggests that such a program be extended to offering the best education to all and the teaching of critical thinking. Urges that non-Western works be included as well as the best of women and minority writers. (DK)

In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This paradox of belief is based on an intuitively correct principle of doxastic coherence. My aim is to show that this paradox contributes to elucidating the puzzling nature of belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at knowledge. I go on to develop an alternative view, according to which inquiry aims at maximizing the epistemic value of our credences. This alternative view makes room for knowledge that falls shy of certainty, and it coheres nicely with a rich body of work in epistemic decision theory. I proceed to highlight the implications of this replacement for some important topics in epistemology, including the dogmatism paradox, the nature of interrogative attitudes, and the norm of practical reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inquiry aims at knowledge. Your inquiry into a question succeeds just in case you come to know the answer. However, combined with a common picture on which misleading evidence can lead knowledge to be lost, this view threatens to recommend a novel form of dogmatism. At least in some cases, individuals who know the answer to a question appear required to avoid evidence bearing on it. In this paper, we'll aim to do two things. First, we'll present an argument for this novel form of dogmatism and show that it presents a substantive challenge. Second, we'll consider a way those who take knowledge to be the aim of inquiry can mount a response. In the course of doing so, we'll try to get clearer on the normative connections between inquiry, knowledge and evidence gathering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Kafkas University, Faculty of Divinity Review is the property of Kafkas University, Faculty of Divinity and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

T. C. Chao (1888–1979) was a leading Chinese Protestant theologian renowned for his creative works of Chinese theology. Although scholars have traced significant changes and shifts in Chao's theology in the 1940s, a particular formal aspect of his mature thinking has not received the attention it deserves. Chao began to emphasise and practise a particular form of Chinese theology in the 1940s and early 1950s, namely, doctrinal or dogmatic theology. This paper traces the development of Chao's dogmatic theology and examines one representative dogmatic locus in his thinking, the doctrine of the Trinity. It argues that Chao's turn to dogmatics not only richly illuminates a crucial aspect of his mature life and thought, but also sheds light on the legacy of Andrew Walls, whose work highlights Christianity's cross-cultural diffusion and the gospel's encounter with the cultural worlds it takes root within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how theories can be assessed within the epistemological viewpoint advanced by the Austrian physicist Ludwig E. Boltzmann. It builds upon, and further develops, the perspective of Boltzmann's thinking as advanced by Ribeiro and Videira [1998. "Dogmatism and Theoretical Pluralism in Modern Cosmology." Apeiron – Studies in Infinite Nature 5 (3–4): 227–234]. Boltzmann's epistemological viewpoint accepts that reality is real and proposes that reality can be described by different points of view because his main philosophical thesis states that scientific theories are images of Nature. We present the historical context that witnessed the genesis of Boltzmann's ideas and expand Ribeiro and Videira's [Ibid] perspective by arguing that later in his life Boltzmann realized the insufficiency of his thesis as justification for theoretical pluralism and avoidance of dogmatism. Consequently, his thinking went beyond epistemology, the nature of scientific knowledge, to include realism, the nature of the represented objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that vice-charging, the practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice, can itself be epistemically vicious. It identifies some potential vices of vice-charging and identifies knowledge of other people as a type of knowledge that is obstructed by epistemically vicious attributions of epistemic vice. The hazards of vice-charging are illustrated by reference to the accusation that parents who hesitate to give their children the MMR triple vaccine are guilty of gullibility and dogmatism. Ethnographic and sociological research is used to make the case that this charge is, in a significant range of cases, epistemically unjust and hinders attempts to make sense of vaccine hesitancy. This epistemic injustice consists in the representation of vaccine hesitant parents as less than full epistemic agents. A case is made for a more tolerant and inclusive approach, not only to vaccine hesitancy but also to other forms of unorthodoxy or non-compliance. The primary objective in these cases should be to achieve Verstehen of seemingly alien outlooks and practices so that policy makers and practitioners in public services can more effectively educate a sceptical public about the risks of vaccine hesitancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to investigate how personality traits of consumers influence their ethnocentrism and brand loyalty towards local brands. The paper argues that certain personality traits of ethnocentric customers (i.e: Cosmopolitanism, Dogmatism, Collectivism, and Materialism) influence the strength of their brand loyalty towards local brands. A cross-sectional survey design, was applied to collect data using self-administered structured questionnaires distributed among 394 consumers in the FMCG industry. The findings of this study highlight the fact that the influence of personality traits on the brand loyalty of ethnocentric customers is not identical, and hence that they needed to be identified separately. In particular, cosmopolitanism, collectivism and dogmatism strengthen the influence of ethnocentrism towards brand loyalty while materialism weakened the impact of ethnocentrism on brand loyalty. Thus, this research extended the Theory of Reasoned Action by proving that attitude towards buying and subjective norms are the antecedents of performed behaviour, and they cannot be generalized across consumers but vary according to the predominant personality traits of consumers. This study has implications for local brand owners, in that they can understand the influence of personality traits and ethnocentric values of individual consumers on their brand loyalty towards local brands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue for a (pro tanto)moral duty against dogmatism: I argue that the social costs of a disagreement can give those who are party to it added moral reasons to reconsider their controversial beliefs and (so) not to be dogmatic. In Sect. 1, I motivate the idea that the social costs of disagreement may give rise to reasons to reconsider our beliefs by considering intuitive examples to that effect. I suggest that some of the stock intuitions that epistemologists of disagreement have depended on to make their arguments are implicitly influenced by social costs that are salient to the disagreements in their cases. In Sect. 2, I respond to a Practical Objection to my argument that political philosophers might be keen to press. According to this objection, the social costs of disagreement do not give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism because we can adequately address those costs just by compromising on how we act on our beliefs in the context of the disagreement. In Sect. 3, I address a contrasting objection to the moral duty against dogmatism that might be pressed by epistemologists, which I term the Truth Objection. This objection points out that the social costs of disagreement do nothing to affect the strength of the evidence for or against one's contentious beliefs, and so complains that those who reconsider their beliefs just on account of the social costs of disagreement 'cave in' to social pressure in a problematic way. In the course of addressing the Truth Objection, I more carefully explain how the social costs of disagreement give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism by distinguishing between 'truth-motivated' and 'truth-indifferent' reasons for inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A longstanding assumption within higher education is that there is a clear link between argumentative writing and critical thinking. In this paper, I challenge this assumption. I argue that argumentative writing genres of persuasion, inquiry, and consensus fail to target students' open-mindedness, which is an important aspect of critical thinking. In particular, argumentative writing genres do not challenge students to confront key cognitive biases, namely confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, when engaging in moral, political, and/or social questions. The motivation to conduct a balanced selection of evidence as well as an unbiased interpretation of evidence is overshadowed by the motivation to preserve one's prior beliefs. The structure of argumentative writing genres thereby stifles open-mindedness and can even nurture dogmatism. As a result, in our goal to develop students' critical thinking skills through argumentative writing, we may be doing more harm than good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to conceptually and empirically explore and challenge the dogma of Corporate visual identity (CVI) consistency. The goal is to nuance the current polarized debate of consistency or no consistency.Design/methodology/approach A qualitative research strategy is employed in this paper. Specifically, the empirical work rests on an interview study with strategists from ten different CVI agencies. The interview transcripts are analyzed using template analysis.Findings In terms of findings, both empirical and conceptual arguments for and against CVI consistency are presented. Many of these arguments rest on conflicting assumptions of CVI communication, CVI authenticity and CVI management, which all influence the debate of CVI consistency.Practical implications CVI practitioners are presented with a more reflective approach to dealing with consistency and hands on examples for inspiration.Originality/value This paper offers alternative and more nuanced conceptualizations of CVI consistency. This includes seeing consistency and inconsistency as ends of a spectrum to be balanced rather than mutually exclusive and by differentiating between consistency across platforms and consistency over time – coined CVI continuity. Furthermore, several future research areas that can help to further develop the field of CVI are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an important view in the epistemology of perception, dogmatism proposes that for any experience (e.g. perceptual, memorial, imaginative, etc.), if it has a distinctive kind of phenomenal character, then it thereby provides us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world. This paper rejects dogmatism by looking into the epistemology of imagining. In particular, this paper first appeals to some empirical studies on perceptual experiences and imaginings to show that it is possible for imaginings to have the distinctive phenomenal character dogmatists have in mind. Then this paper argues that some of these imaginings fail to provide us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world at least partly due to their inappropriate etiology. Such imaginings constitute counterexamples to dogmatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of International Relations / Medzinarodne Vztahy is the property of University of Economics in Bratislava, Faculty of International Relations and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification (PCEJ). According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely connects epistemology and philosophy of mind and has recently been proposed by several authors, most notably by Elijah Chudnoff, Ole Koksvik, and James Pryor. At the present time, however, there is no work that contrasts these different versions of PCEJ. This paper not only bridges this gap, but also reveals problems in current versions of PCEJ. Consequently, I argue for a new version of PCEJ that focuses on what is given within experience and not on how what is given pushes me towards believing something. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science is among humanity's greatest achievements, yet scientific censorship is rarely studied empirically. We explore the social, psychological, and institutional causes and consequences of scientific censorship (defined as actions aimed at obstructing particular scientific ideas from reaching an audience for reasons other than low scientific quality). Popular narratives suggest that scientific censorship is driven by authoritarian officials with dark motives, such as dogmatism and intolerance. Our analysis suggests that scientific censorship is often driven by scientists, who are primarily motivated by self-protection, benevolence toward peer scholars, and prosocial concerns for the well-being of human social groups. This perspective helps explain both recent findings on scientific censorship and recent changes to scientific institutions, such as the use of harm-based criteria to evaluate research. We discuss unknowns surrounding the consequences of censorship and provide recommendations for improving transparency and accountability in scientific decision-making to enable the exploration of these unknowns. The benefits of censorship may sometimes outweigh costs. However, until costs and benefits are examined empirically, scholars on opposing sides of ongoing debates are left to quarrel based on competing values, assumptions, and intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Considers some of the fanatical beliefs that may possibly lead to a nuclear holocaust in the not-too-distant future, shows how dangerous these ideas are, and suggests that one of the best ways to minimize this kind of absolutistic and dogmatic thinking is through the psycho-educational approach pioneered by scientific counseling and psychotherapy. (Author)

Discusses Hannah Arendt's belief that Nazi Adolf Eichmann's crimes stem from his failure to think. States that educators in a democracy must teach students to think about political and social issues. Covers methods of teaching thinking (as differentiated from problem solving) and dangers of a political realm without thinking citizens. (CH)

Discusses the human predilection toward fanaticism; the debt that Western culture owes to fanatics; fundamental objections to fanaticism; the way that traditional educational approaches cultivate a propensity toward dogmatism, obscurantism, and authoritarianism; and possible educational methods for encouraging critical thinking. (GT)

Characteristics of heresy are outlined. The heresy hunt, in which heresy is labeled and heretics are suppressed, serves as an anxiety-relieving ritual for institutional elites and facilitates their dominance within the institution. A case study of heresy, the "modernist controversy" in Roman Catholicism, is examined. (Author/RM)

Copyright of Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos em Educação is the property of Jose Luis Bizelli, editor of Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos em Educacao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper attempts to investigate the prevalence of the novels of the 'obsessive decade' in the '70s, using the means of the quantitative studies and macroanalysis, as they are theorised by Franco Moretti and Matthew L. Jockers. We will focus on how the subversive nature of the novels of the 'obsessive decade' can be detected through quantitative analysis of textual structures (thematic, lexis). In the political context of the '70s, due to the imposing of certain restrictions (we are referring to the July Thesis of 1971), the situation of Romanian literature changed. One of the decrees of the Communist Party, proposed in 1964 due to the installation of Nicolae Ceaușescu's totalitarian regime, was to develop a critique of the dogmatism of the '50s. In the '70s, the novels of the 'obsessive decade' were viewed as subversive by censorship and by literary criticism. Therefore, the main focus of my paper is to re-discuss the subversive formula of the novels of the 'obsessive decade' in the '70s, from a different and innovative point of view, within a quantitative approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show how Emerson provides a reworking of Kantian understandings of moral education in young children's Bildung. The article begins and ends by thinking of Emersonian self-cultivation as a form of improvisatory or wild Bildung. It explores the role of Bildung and selfcultivation in preschools through a philosophy that accounts for children's 'Wild wisdom' by letting Emerson speak to Kant. The paper argues that Kant's vision of Bildung essentially involves reason's turn upon itself and that Emerson, particularly in how he is taken up by Cavell, shows that such a turn is already present in the processes of children inheriting, learning, and improvising with language. This improvisatory outlook on moral education is contrasted with common goals of moral education prescribed in early childhood education where the Swedish Curriculum for the Preschool Lpfö 98 is used as an example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historical Searches / Historijska Traganja is the property of Institute for History, University of Sarajevo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the claim that the two final articles of Rav Kook's book Ikvei Hatzon were written as a response to a lecture given by Hermann Cohen. It first reviews Cohen's lecture showing that, regarding the concept of God, Cohen argues for the compatibility of Judaism and Kantianism in denying the dogmatic-mythological preoccupation with the existence of God in favor of understanding God as the basis of morality. Second, it analyzes Kook's articles, demonstrating that he accepts the compatibility of Judaism and Kantianism together with the denial of the dogmatic relation to God as a substance. Nevertheless, Kook is not satisfied with the critical view that denies the dogmatic relation to the substance altogether, since it formulates a merely negative relationship with God. Instead, he develops his concept of the Divine Ideals, which synthesizes the dogmatic preoccupation with substantiality and the critical denial of it. The Divine Ideals are the moral progression of man, through which man gradually becomes identical to God. Within the Divine Ideals, dogmatism becomes an emotional striving to be identical with God as a substance, while criticism is the intellectual negation of the possibility of such identity, which ensures that the process will continue indefinitely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The source of objective meaning is a controversial topic. For most of human history, religion had a monopoly on meaning, truth, and values. But from the nineteenth century onwards and with relativism gaining more popularity, this began to change, leaving most people divided into two main camps: those who believe in the existence of objective meaning and truth and those who maintain that such concepts simply do not exist. The resulting impossibility of finding shared meaning is very problematic, especially when it comes to intercultural communication. In fact, to speak of communication is to speak of common meaning. In this paper, I attempt to provide a definition for intercultural communication, explore the issue of shared meaning, and propose a culture-free approach to the latter--one that is based on reverting to an axiomatic understanding of the notion of meaning. My aim is to conclude that the failure of both dogmatism and relativism to sustain intercultural communication should not be interpreted pessimistically. Quite the opposite, it should be viewed as an opportunity to investigate other promising alternatives, mainly Sam Harris's science of morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Phainomena is the property of Phenomenological Society of Ljubljana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight—by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study—a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian (Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006a) as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments at play on both sides of this dogmatism/conservativism debate do not line up with epistemic relativism nor do they line up with absolutism, at least as Boghossian articulates this position. What this case study reveals is the need in metaepistemological option space for the recognition of a weaker and less tendentious form of absolutism, what we call "environment relativism". On this view, epistemic principles are knowable, objective, and they can serve as the basis of particular epistemic evaluations, but their validity is relative to the wider global environment in which they are applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in recent years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I've been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little has been done to explicitly isolate what it is about emotions that bestows them with justificatory ability. The purpose of this paper is to provide a novel and thorough analysis into the prospects of phenomenology-based—or dogmatist—views of emotional justification. By surveying and rejecting various instantiations of the emotional dogmatist view, I endeavour to provide an inductive case for the conclusion that emotional phenomenology cannot be the seat of the emotions' power to immediately justify evaluative belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)