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In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This paradox of belief is based on an intuitively correct principle of doxastic coherence. My aim is to show that this paradox contributes to elucidating the puzzling nature of belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with a less well-known connection between Thomas Reid's conception of common sense and pragmatism. The paper starts with an exposition of the different principles of common sense one can find in Reid's writings and a discussion of their epistemic status. The main focus of the paper is on what one may call 'Reid's dilemma of common sense'. I argue that Reid's writings not only present us with a dilemma of common sense but that they also offer a way out of the dilemma, one that is pragmatist in a certain sense. I also discuss the question whether the proposed way out can work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

T. C. Chao (1888–1979) was a leading Chinese Protestant theologian renowned for his creative works of Chinese theology. Although scholars have traced significant changes and shifts in Chao's theology in the 1940s, a particular formal aspect of his mature thinking has not received the attention it deserves. Chao began to emphasise and practise a particular form of Chinese theology in the 1940s and early 1950s, namely, doctrinal or dogmatic theology. This paper traces the development of Chao's dogmatic theology and examines one representative dogmatic locus in his thinking, the doctrine of the Trinity. It argues that Chao's turn to dogmatics not only richly illuminates a crucial aspect of his mature life and thought, but also sheds light on the legacy of Andrew Walls, whose work highlights Christianity's cross-cultural diffusion and the gospel's encounter with the cultural worlds it takes root within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addresses a significant issue of our time, which pertains to the lack of connection between the scholars and their works who have paid a price politically, intellectually, and practically in their respective eras, with the contemporary seekers of knowledge. In this context, the aim of this paper is to introduce the work titled "Mecâlisü't-Tezkir" by Abdülhamid b. Bâdîs, a prominent figure known for his scholarly persona and reformist identity. The work is a compilation of the author's Qur'anic lectures, wherein he employs a distinctive methodology to interpret certain verses of the Qur'an. Through this interpretive endeavor, Ibn Bâdîs sought solutions to societal issues, such as colonialism, by drawing on the Qur'an and authentic Sunnah, and endeavored to enlighten the society accordingly. He contributed to various journals, which served as the media outlets of the time, and delivered lectures in mosques. Esteemed by many scholars, the author initiated a significant awakening movement in colonial society, placing emphasis on matters of belief, practice, and ethics. He consistently addressed the problems faced by Muslims in general and Tunisian Muslims in particular. Notably, he adopted a firm stance against ideologies that undermined the unity of Muslims, subjected them to colonial domination, and incited dogmatism. This study aims to present a comprehensive overview of the author and his work, considering various aspects [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that vice-charging, the practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice, can itself be epistemically vicious. It identifies some potential vices of vice-charging and identifies knowledge of other people as a type of knowledge that is obstructed by epistemically vicious attributions of epistemic vice. The hazards of vice-charging are illustrated by reference to the accusation that parents who hesitate to give their children the MMR triple vaccine are guilty of gullibility and dogmatism. Ethnographic and sociological research is used to make the case that this charge is, in a significant range of cases, epistemically unjust and hinders attempts to make sense of vaccine hesitancy. This epistemic injustice consists in the representation of vaccine hesitant parents as less than full epistemic agents. A case is made for a more tolerant and inclusive approach, not only to vaccine hesitancy but also to other forms of unorthodoxy or non-compliance. The primary objective in these cases should be to achieve Verstehen of seemingly alien outlooks and practices so that policy makers and practitioners in public services can more effectively educate a sceptical public about the risks of vaccine hesitancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how theories can be assessed within the epistemological viewpoint advanced by the Austrian physicist Ludwig E. Boltzmann. It builds upon, and further develops, the perspective of Boltzmann's thinking as advanced by Ribeiro and Videira [1998. "Dogmatism and Theoretical Pluralism in Modern Cosmology." Apeiron – Studies in Infinite Nature 5 (3–4): 227–234]. Boltzmann's epistemological viewpoint accepts that reality is real and proposes that reality can be described by different points of view because his main philosophical thesis states that scientific theories are images of Nature. We present the historical context that witnessed the genesis of Boltzmann's ideas and expand Ribeiro and Videira's [Ibid] perspective by arguing that later in his life Boltzmann realized the insufficiency of his thesis as justification for theoretical pluralism and avoidance of dogmatism. Consequently, his thinking went beyond epistemology, the nature of scientific knowledge, to include realism, the nature of the represented objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue for a (pro tanto)moral duty against dogmatism: I argue that the social costs of a disagreement can give those who are party to it added moral reasons to reconsider their controversial beliefs and (so) not to be dogmatic. In Sect. 1, I motivate the idea that the social costs of disagreement may give rise to reasons to reconsider our beliefs by considering intuitive examples to that effect. I suggest that some of the stock intuitions that epistemologists of disagreement have depended on to make their arguments are implicitly influenced by social costs that are salient to the disagreements in their cases. In Sect. 2, I respond to a Practical Objection to my argument that political philosophers might be keen to press. According to this objection, the social costs of disagreement do not give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism because we can adequately address those costs just by compromising on how we act on our beliefs in the context of the disagreement. In Sect. 3, I address a contrasting objection to the moral duty against dogmatism that might be pressed by epistemologists, which I term the Truth Objection. This objection points out that the social costs of disagreement do nothing to affect the strength of the evidence for or against one's contentious beliefs, and so complains that those who reconsider their beliefs just on account of the social costs of disagreement 'cave in' to social pressure in a problematic way. In the course of addressing the Truth Objection, I more carefully explain how the social costs of disagreement give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism by distinguishing between 'truth-motivated' and 'truth-indifferent' reasons for inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the factors of professional deformation of the personality of a high school teacher. The attention is paid to the increased requirements of the dynamics of global processes taking place in the modern educational space, to the personality and activities of the teacher. Observations show that the daily performance of teachers' professional duties over many years shapes habits, mindsets, and communication styles, and the individual acquires certain traits that can be considered disharmony. It was found that professional deformation is manifested in changes in the parameters of the personal characteristics of the teacher, which ultimately causes a change in functioning. Based on the theoretical analysis, the internal factors that determine the manifestation of professional deformation of the teacher's personality are identified. We analyze the most significant personal manifestations such as conservatism, rigidity, dogmatism, conformism, stereotyped thinking, lack of motivation, and frustration. The findings of this study support the idea that these factors can block the teacher's willingness to reconsider views, and cause the preservation of experience, which leads to professional deformation of personality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in recent years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I've been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little has been done to explicitly isolate what it is about emotions that bestows them with justificatory ability. The purpose of this paper is to provide a novel and thorough analysis into the prospects of phenomenology-based—or dogmatist—views of emotional justification. By surveying and rejecting various instantiations of the emotional dogmatist view, I endeavour to provide an inductive case for the conclusion that emotional phenomenology cannot be the seat of the emotions' power to immediately justify evaluative belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will discuss the significance of the idea of system as applied to academic philosophy. Firstly, I will distinguish systems from other types of totalities, such as sets, aggregates and structures, and then present a definition of system and analyse the basic constituent components of any system. I will subsequently apply the proposed idea of system and its internal modulations to philosophical systems to account for the different ways of understanding academic philosophy as systematic philosophy. To end, I will argue that the systematicity of academic philosophy does not necessarily imply any dogmatism, doctrinarism or metaphysical monism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show how Emerson provides a reworking of Kantian understandings of moral education in young children's Bildung. The article begins and ends by thinking of Emersonian self-cultivation as a form of improvisatory or wild Bildung. It explores the role of Bildung and selfcultivation in preschools through a philosophy that accounts for children's 'Wild wisdom' by letting Emerson speak to Kant. The paper argues that Kant's vision of Bildung essentially involves reason's turn upon itself and that Emerson, particularly in how he is taken up by Cavell, shows that such a turn is already present in the processes of children inheriting, learning, and improvising with language. This improvisatory outlook on moral education is contrasted with common goals of moral education prescribed in early childhood education where the Swedish Curriculum for the Preschool Lpfö 98 is used as an example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to develop relationships between the concept of classic, as postulated by the historical-critical pedagogy and the constitution of universal values. In order to achieve this end, the text was divided into three moments. In a first moment we approach the contrast between the conception of knowledge present in the historical-critical pedagogy and the hegemonic conception of knowledge. Secondly, based on the works of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), in productions by György Lukács (1885-1971) and authors with similar thoughts, such as Agnes Heller (1929-2019) and György Márkus (1934-2016), we seek to establish the relationship between the construction of universal values and the classic. And, finally, in a third moment, we analyze the educational work as a process located within the scope of school education and that is linked to the preservation of universal values condensed in the classical knowledge. We concluded that the understanding of the classic from the constitution of universal values is fundamental do understand its confirmation as a product of human activity. The condensed values in classical knowledge, beyond their sociohistorical roots, transcend towards universality. The proper understanding of this process allow us to overcome the antinomy between dogmatism and relativism, a fundamental condition for understanding the concept of classic as postulated by the historical-critical pedagogy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies fundamentalism, from the perspective of the tension between communicability and incommunicability, perceived in the religious dynamics in general. After a brief historical background on the subject, it focuses on the religious side of fundamentalism. Next, fundamentalism is approached in the context of its specific contradiction: the incommunicability of dogmatism, based on literalism, the incapacity for dialogue and extremist political actions, including terrorism, in permanent tension with the communicational need for visibility and recognition. Therefore, there is a specific communicational condition within the incommunicability of the processes of dogmatization and dialogical closure inscribed in fundamentalist phenomena. We call this a communicative propensity to promote incommunicability. Finally, religious fundamentalism is postulated as a proselytizing of legitimation, tensioning the poles between dogma and bond, by adopting, contradictorily, the radicalization of both, and testing the limits of tolerance in modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The brain has been described as very resistant to change. However, why it does this has not been fully explained. In this paper, I propose that resilience to the disruption of consolidated memory is at the heart of the brain's resistance to change, and this resilience is a consequence of its energy efficiency evolutionary adaptations. I discussed the implications of this energy efficiency adaptation on dogmatism, close-mindedness, and artificial intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In my rejoinder, I show how Brock’s and Burman’s replies to my article (Araujo, 2017) are based on a series of misunderstandings and misattributions. First, I argue that Brock ignores crucial passages of my article and my related book, and show not only that he misunderstands Wundt’s position on the introspective method, but also that his claim, according to which there is nothing new in my approach, lacks substance. Second, I argue that Burman’s text fails to make contact with the substantive thrust of my paper, and that his appeal to contextualism is vague and does not address the substantive questions I raise. Finally, I conclude that Brock’s rejection of my proposal, as well as his misunderstandings and misattributions, derives from a kind of methodological dogmatism, against which the best medicine is methodological pluralism, and that Burman’s worries are unjustified and can be avoided by a careful reading of my paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers authorial intent in relation to Genesis 1, and suggests that it is not the primary objective of the author to fix the age of the earth. When Scripture is understood as God's accommodated word to us, to remain non-dogmatic on something the author is not choosing to speak on, in no way undermines the doctrine of inerrancy. The paper then considers the history of biblical interpretation in relation to the author's intention in Genesis 1. It is noted that the rise of modern geology did little to change the predominant non-dogmatism, and that the forceful insistence on six literal solar days is a relatively recent phenomenon in response to the atheistic outworking of Darwinian evolution. The overall aim of the paper is to show that a dogmatic adherence to any particular age is not necessary in order to defend a high view of Scripture and picks the wrong fight against scientific naturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a study of the impact of Romano-Germanic doctrines on Latin American tax law and, in particular, its influence on the thinking of Chilean authors, distinguishing those discussions that can be incorporated into the current debate, from those that can only be considered as a historical antecedent. Starting from the coherent and systematic analysis of the main Roman-Germanic doctrines, the way they were recognized in Latin America will be established first. Then, the influence that they have generated in ancient Chilean authors and of later generations will be analyzed, determining the presence of dogmatic schools or the elaboration of studies that try to organize an ordered body of knowledge. Following the above, the expected results are centered on establishing that the Roman-Germanic doctrines were not recognized in Latin America regarding their methodological differences, having an impact on the argumentative criteria of the new generations of Chilean authors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature-namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and the Moorean position of dogmatism. The approach developed in this article is, accordingly, ecumenical in that it allows us to embrace two positions that are widely considered to be incompatible. The paper further argues that the Moorean Puzzle can be resolved by noting the relevant distinctions and our insensitivity towards them: once we carefully tease apart the different senses of 'justified' and 'evidence' involved, the bewilderment caused by Moore's anti-sceptical strategy subsides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses Jim Bugental's scholar-practitioner work as means of guiding clients to reinvigorate their existential identities. It explores literature spanning Bugental's career, arguing that existential-humanistic psychotherapy, a term he coined, is a powerful means to aid clients in manoeuvring the course of their lives because of its focus on universal existential concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In a recent decade, research linking personality and character traits with educational and professional attainment led to a push for incorporating character and personality assessments into school curricula. This trend is exemplified in the partnership between positive psychology and character education, where grit, a personality/character trait denoting perseverance and passion for long‐term goals, represents one of the rapidly accepted, yet controversial, concepts. In this paper, the author conducts a critical literature review of grit, situating the construct in a larger historical context of personality testing and character education reform. The author argues that the construct validation practices employed by grit researchers create an epistemological climate where character studies and character education threaten to become yet another population sorting mechanism instead of advancing human agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social knowledge is more dynamic than natural science. A full recognition of this character is the precondition for upholding the validity of statements in social knowledge. In order to maintain the validity of such statements and to avoid the metamorphosis of social knowledge into other theoretical constructs, this paper, based on referring to the ideal type of social knowledge, aims to describe and explain three processes whereby social knowledge is metamorphosed into theoretical dogmatism, theoretical alienation, and theoretical slavery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This theoretical paper presents the results of an investigation on some peculiarities or premises of the rationale that is prevalent in Administration, and particularly in so-called strategic administration: modern rationality. This investigation is prompted by the problems and limits that this rationale brings to science, as well as the consequences that its adversary, identified with the post-modern proposal, also brings, starting with a questioning of the statute of knowledge itself. The first, by conceiving knowledge as a representation, makes an arbitrary distinction between the world and language, in which on one side we have the world as it is, and on the other, its image, captured by thought and expressed through language. The second, less affected by any certainty, casts in doubt concepts like reality, objectivity and totality by stating that they are the result of an historical and socially localized discourse and, as such, are precarious. This is a criticism that puts under suspicion, through powerful arguments, a whole modern theoretical tradition that is over-confident in itself, but that ends up proving to be timid in indicating new paths. Thus, an unpleasant and disturbing void appears, for we have on one side a now debilitated modern discourse, and on the other, a post-modern option taking refuge in silence or in the polyphony that ends up being just as inconvenient. These are alternatives that do not satisfy the demands of scientific knowledge, and in particular, knowledge of organizations, demanding from those that act in this field that they face this issue. It is a battle that is taken up in this paper, as it defends as the more appropriate a pragmatic concept of rationality that sees meaning as coming from the use of the language, thereby avoiding both modern dogmatism and post-modern relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of 'intimations of openness' (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P's probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P's subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Quentin Meillassoux, one of the principal aims of speculative philosophy “must be the immanent inscription of values in being.” In this regard, the return to speculation in contemporary philosophy is in many ways a deeply ethical project. This “inscription of values” can only be successful, however, if it can somehow assert an absolute ethical value without, on the one hand, resorting to the kind of dogmatism laid to rest by the Kantian critique; or, on the other, by falling into some form of ethical relativism incapable of grounding universal ethical judgments. Unfortunately, too many of these attempts have failed. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to explore the structure and failures of two such attempts through an analysis of the ethical projects of Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux, respectively; and then, secondly, to show how both of these thinkers, and the project of speculative ethics in general, could benefit by turning to the work of F.W.J. Schelling on the concept of good and evil as absolute ethical values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The notion of ‘sufficiency consciousness’ is a way of life to be adopted towards attitude change in a world that craves for absolutist secularity and religious dogmatism. The paper explores aspects of sufficiency that could promote material development, and as such require a total attitude change and behaviour remodification of public life. It is obvious that performance-driven targets, accelerated growth, investment and prosperity-driven agenda by market forces alone would lead to a skewed understanding of both the notion of sufficiency and material development. Hence, a proposition for value-based sense of material development, ethical buying and consumption have all become survival strategies for civil society groups and organisations to effect change from within. In the Buddhist scheme of thought, two significant core concepts of wisdom and compassion impact on social change and behaviour. Developing non-material values generated by wisdom and compassion are proposed as a lifelong pursuit in understanding human tendencies such as greed, clinging, and craving to amass wealth and excessive indulgence. Such an approach and an analysis evoke a sense of sufficiency alongside appropriate and sustainable material development. The use of certain economic indexes and other technical data in the paper indicate and symbolise the extent to which material progress is emphasised over and above the non-material. A possible development of an index such as Gross National Happiness (GNH) as proposed by the Thai specialists is included as an alternative to the sole-material-progress-based data discourses. Cultivating oneself with compassion juxtaposed by wisdom challenges all to uphold goodness as part of being human. Opposition to such a view of life and a way of life is problematic in the light of the current phenomena of theatrical performance of violence to redress grievances as well as limitless confidence in economic growth and greedy investment plans. It is a value-laden counterpoint to the zero tolerance that can address the larger socio-political issue of the alterity1 that both help to understand what actually sufficiency means in the array material development. Wisdom becomes a guide to action with compassion, while compassion expands the capacity of wisdom to understand the part and the whole. It is in this interplay of value-tracking that one is able to realise the importance of human activity that can evolve checks and balances, which are imperative to measure material development and social progress. ‘Sufficiency consciousness’ and material development are healthy, vibrant and adaptive aspects for civil society groups as well as other institutions to participate critically in ‘religious affairs’ in a ‘secular realm’ with what life offers. The non-material basis of wisdom and compassion offers a wholesome view of ‘sufficiency consciousness’, which is fundamental to material development, economic activity, political governance, institutional arrangements and campaign strategies, for civil society groups to achieve their potential. Wisdom steers compassion while compassion transforms wisdom in those engaged in human activity, which is both about ‘here’ and the ‘not yet’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the 'Cases' section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is to cast doubt on that suggestion. More generally, the aim of my paper is to give a reasonably full account of the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, and then to give a serious discussion of some of the epistemological issues that are raised by real world religious disagreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first part of this paper traces back to Plotinus a strategy applied by Augustine and Descartes whereby sceptical arguments are used to set aside sensualist forms of dogmatic philosophy, clearing the way for a dogmatism independent of sense-perception which is 'self-authenticating' and thus immune to, and even proven by, sceptical doubt. It is argued that Plotinus already uses this strategy in the opening chapters of Enneads V 5 and V 3. The second part of the paper argues that Plotinus' account of how the ineffable One is said (we do not actually say the One, but merely express our own affections) is inspired by the structure of sceptic discourse (the sceptic does not say things as they are, but merely expresses personal affections). Finally, similarities and differences between sceptic discourse about things and Plotinian discourse about the ineffable are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I examine the ground and validity of Peirce's claim that 'belief has no place in science'. Contrary to the general view, such a claim should not be understood as merely an overreaction to William James' thesis that there can be legitimate non-evidential reasons to believe. For Peirce, believing that something is the case implies, at least when believing takes a certain form, a kind of dogmatism incompatible with the proper conduct of inquiry towards truth. In this paper, I examine two ways in which Peirce argues for the 'no belief in science' thesis. I first discuss 'his claim that belief is incompatible with the 'Will to Learn'. Peirce argues that believing that pin such a way that one does not have any real doubts about whether pimplies that one has a dogmatic attitude vis-à-vis possible future evidence that not- p; I claim that this anticipates the line of reasoning that supports Kripke's 'paradox of dogmatism'. After having indicated how they can both be resisted, I examine a second way- which seems to have been overlooked in Peirce scholarship-in which the founder of pragmatism argues for the 'no belief in science' thesis. Peirce often relates this thesis to his view of abduction and the nature of explanatory hypotheses: the conclusion of an abductive inference is not, and should not be, the belief that a given explanatory hypothesis H is true, probably true, or likely to be true, but rather that H is such that it is a possible explanation of fact F. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the 'defeasibility problem'. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call 'phenomenal intentionalism'. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having 'phenomenal' or 'looks contents': contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diversity in psychology is a problematic issue which has been present in this discipline from its beginnings. a large part of the literature understands diversity as a generator of crisis and, therefore, poses the necessity of developing approaches to overcome it.it is along this line where those approaches which seek the unification of psychology are located. The main goal of the present paper consisted in describing three recognized approaches which seek to unify psychology, their ways for conceptualizing diversity, and the criticism they have received. Considering the analysis of these approaches and of the objections they received, a strong rejection from their detractors can be noticed. Most of the available literature indicates that the pretention of unification does not enjoy yet a consolidated agreed acceptance. it is concluded that, to promote the fruitful unfolding and advancement of psychology, it is convenient to take every necessary course of action on eliminate dogmatic and scholastic diversity and to strengthen integrated and dialogical diversity, where rational and critical dialogue and team work prevail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After reviewing research by Roof, Mol and Kaill, this paper examines relationships among the following explanatory variables theological conservatism, localism, authoritarianism/dogmatism, and civil liberalism. Using data drawn from members of three Protestant denominations in Australia, it is found that, of these four variables, theological conservatism is the best predictor of frequency of church attendance, degree of involvement in other church activities, views about ecumenism, attitudes to change in church structures and practices, and moral conservatism But the other three explanatory variables are each more useful than theological conservatism in predicting degree of concern for social justice and degree of approval for church activism on social, political and economic issues The four explanatory variables are all fairly weak predictors of political-economic conservatism. It is argued that the affects attributed to localism, authoritarianism/dogmatism or lack of civil liberalism can be explained by a more general concept, breadth of perspective Modifications to Roof's theory are suggested it is hypothesized that at least among Protestant church members, the impact of breadth of perspective decreases, and the salience of theological orientation increases, as the proportion of the total population which regularly participates in church-oriented religion decreases.
This paper provides a critique and extension of studies undertaken by Roof (1976 and 1978), Mol (1969 and 1971) and Kaill (1971). Each of these studies deals inter alia with the relative importance of theological orientation and of some other variable in the explanation or prediction of church members' attitudes and behaviors.
It is clear that Roof's theory needs considerable qualification in the light of the data reviewed in the present paper. In particular, I would now hypothesize that at least among Protestant church members,[6] the impact of breadth of perspective decreases, and the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Of Spirit, Jacques Derrida claims that Heidegger's attempted deconstruction of metaphysical anthropocentrism remains anthropocentric and, as such, is inherently authoritarian. This paper takes up these charges to engage with whether Derrida is justified in coming to this conclusion. To do so, it briefly outlines Heidegger's critique of anthropocentrism and subsequent re-thinking of human being in line with the question of being, before suggesting that Derrida is correct to suggest that Heidegger's thinking remains anthropocentric. It then engages with whether Heidegger's defence of this continued anthropocentrism is authoritarian by engaging with the nature of what it is to be authoritarian. By engaging with three senses of authoritarianism, termed authoritarian in the sense of the author, sovereign, and dogmatic, it suggests that, while Heidegger can indeed be thought of as being authoritarian in the senses of the author and sovereign so too can Derrida, and, indeed, by pointing to passages whereby Derrida links the sovereign author to democracy, I show that, on Derrida's terms, it is possible to conclude that Heidegger's thinking is inherently democratic. I then engage with the third sense of authoritarian, authoritarian in the sense of the dogmatic, and by discussing the relationship between being and time, the nature of provisionality in Heidegger's thinking, highlighting a number of statements he makes on animality that confirm this provisionality, and pointing to the openness inherent to meditative thinking, conclude that, while Derrida is correct to maintain that Heidegger's thinking is anthropocentric and can be thought of as being authoritarian in the senses of authorship and sovereignty, it is not authoritarian in the sense of the dogmatic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Jim Pryor's dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn't rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. If this were true, the rational acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these objections don't get off the ground because they assume that our experiences and our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite. I suggest that the answer turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine the priors of hypotheses and conjectures on the grounds of their extra-empirical virtues. If the Bayesian can do so, the thesis that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite is probably false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for the following three claims. First, the Agrippan mode from disagreement does not play a secondary role in inducing suspension of judgment. Second, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the criteria of justification underlying the Five Modes of Agrippa, which nonetheless does not prevent him from non-doxastically assenting to them. And third, some recent objections to Agrippan Pyrrhonism raised by analytic epistemologists and experimental philosophers fail to appreciate the Pyrrhonist's ad hominem style of argumentation and the real challenge posed by the mode from disagreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of 'self-criticism', in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence allows Reid and Peirce a way out of the dilemma between dogmatism and skepticism regarding the justification of such principles, insofar as they are epistemically, and not solely practically, justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experiences-visual, emotional, or otherwise-play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences' distinctive phenomenology, i.e. 'what it is like' to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences' etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather than etiology. Proponents of the challenge argue that cognitively penetrated visual experiences can fail to provide the usual justification because they have improper etiologies. However, extant arguments for the challenge's key claims are subject to formidable objections. In this paper, I present the challenge's key claims, raise objections to previous attempts to establish them, and then offer a novel argument in support of the challenge. My argument relies on an analogy between cognitively penetrated visual and emotional experiences. I argue that some emotional experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their improper etiologies and conclude that analogous cognitively penetrated visual experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their etiologies, as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

he paper analyzes the methodological approach of the Bulgarian philosopher Assen Ignatow toward the reality of socialist society in his book „Grief and Urge of Time“ (1968). The dichotomy between the ideal and the actual practice in society, between the Marxist philosophy and the dogmatic communist ideology, between the ideal man and the real man is emphasized. The differences and the continuities between philosophical ideas, developed in this book and in later important works of Ignatow, are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of an increasing scientisation of political processes, epistemic communities have been identified as a unique category of social actors, who exclusively rely on their knowledge resources to shape the preferences of decision-makers. Whereas most authors expect that an expert-driven policy process facilitates the implementation of technically complex policies, critical scholars hint to an evolving technocracy, whose scientific dogmatism may end up in policies that aggravate social problems. In this paper, these countervailing assumptions are empirically assessed for the epistemic community on biodiversity and its role in Brazil and India. At least in this case, it seems that the impact experts' influence depends on the configuration of the policy arena. If experts are institutionally compelled to debate their positions with potential critics, the members of an epistemic community seem to engage in a rather deliberative discourse that widens the policy space for all stakeholders involved. Under the conditions of an elitist closure, however, policy experts seem to adapt to the preferences of the most powerful actors but refrain from any critical self-reflection that might seriously challenge their own convictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This brief research is an effort to analyze one of the most disturbing modern phenomena: fundamentalism without borders and without nationality. The analysis reviews the interrelations of fundamentalism with so me topical concepts such as security and development, as well as its extraordinary forms extremism and social terrorism. Understandably, this study cannot be exhaustive due to the natural dynamics of the phenomenon, which is growing to menacing proportions, covers different territories and communities, and continues to change its typological forms. This conclusion can also be drawn in view of the appearance of numerous articles, monographs, papers that compose its profile. I hope this text will be one of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different theoretical perspectives have been developed within the psychology framework for the analysis of the authoritarian phenomenon. They constituted some of the background lines of what would afterwards be considered as the field of Political Psychology. The first approach takes place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century's, along with group psychology, where authoritarianism is studied as an emergent behavior of crowds. Subsequently, developments in authoritarian personality suggest a change in the analysis axes by studying the phenomenon in an intra-individual way. A third perspective arises with the cognitive approach, represented by the concept of dogmatism, which emphasized the study of beliefs and the way in which individuals defend them. Parallel to this approach, advances in the field of Experimental Psychology on obedience, account for the situation in the authoritarian phenomenon. Later on, the study of authoritarian personality is taken up once more with the concept of right-wing authoritarianism, which is defined as the individual differences in the covariation of three attitudinal clusters (authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism). Finally, the most recent perspective for the study of the phenomenon suggests rethinking rightwing authoritarianism as an intergroup phenomenon, since its three attitudinal clusters account for a group phenomenon, plus a personality trait. The main objective of this paper is to critically review each of the six perspectives which have approached the study of authoritarianism as psycho-political phenomena, showing its peculiarities as well as its differences so as to finally consider which of those are still acceptable alternatives for the interpretation of this phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A role of religion in the post-communistic society of Serbia is quite intense. New ambient circumstances brought up a need for re-evangelization, and for that reason the beginning of the nineties can be interpreted as a process of revitalization of the Orthodox faith and an affirmation of its social role. Although the largest number believe that religion is a true carrier of cultural and national identity of the Serbian people, and that without its role, the Serbian people could not withstand challenges of the epoch of the modern civilization, there are still those who think that the religious system has a predominant role and who demand its marginalization for the sake of stronger secularization. In relation to this, the Belgrade Cultural Center, with financial support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation from Berlin, conducted an empirical research of the social relevance of religion in Serbia. In this paper, we will give a special attention to indicators of religious dogmatism, which, contrary to indicators of religious self-identification, indicate an alarming situation in the area of understanding dogmatic questions of one's own faith; among those, the most important questions are questions related to God, Resurrection, Heaven and Hell, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the main features of a model of legal dogmatics that aims to give solutions for hard cases. It does not present a history of legal thought. Rather it attempts to provide a conceptual reconstruction of normative intuitions based on the realist tradition - including realists, and precursors of and heirs to those realists - in the light of ethical consequentialism. To that end I propose four different types of arguments. First, I present a set of criticisms that advocates of the technological model of dogmatics direct against argumentativist and formalistic dogmatics, that seem to assume consequentialist theses. Second, I lay out a series of quotes in which the defenders of the technological model refer to the best consequences as an argument about the rightness of solutions for hard cases. Third, I point out that ethical consequentialism offers the best way to understand some of the meta-ethical claims of sceptical type put forth by these authors. Fourth, I claim that, although there is no conceptual connection between reductionist empiricism and consequentialist ethics, if the former is adopted it would be more consistent to adopt the latter as well. Finally, some tasks that the technological dogmatics should develop are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules of scientific method. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

José Alejandro Fuerte, M.A. The Plants of Power. Heading Toward an Idea of Philosophical School. The outline of this paper is: I) Dogmatism and skepticism in the field of experience with plants of power. II) Development of a critical stance in this field. III) The idea of a philosophical-psychological school. In my discussion I will draw mainly on certain aphorisms from the Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus, the "Obscure." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: His qualities as a clinician and the publication in 1909 of his book, written with his mentor Paul Sérieux, “Reasoning madnesses. Misinterpretative delusional states”, brought Joseph Capgras considerable fame and in the 1930s his ward in Sainte-Anne Hospital in Paris was particularly sought after (one of his residents was Henri Ellenberger who regarded him as his favourite teacher). Howewer, if the name of Capgras is known all over the world, it is because of his description in 1923 of the “syndrome d’illusion des sosies” which now bears his name. Although the isolation of the “Capgras''s syndrome” can be understood according to the initial model represented by the “Misinterpretative delusional states”, Capgras attached far more importance to psychogenesis and phenomena which were, in his opinion, neurologically defective in appearance only. An honourable man in his time, enemy of all dogmatism, Joseph Capgras published many papers on erotomania and showed himself to be a determined adversary of the ideas defended by his famous colleague Clérambault. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form 'Do I know p?' in bad faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and the role he allocated to grammar (in his sense of the term) in philosophy changed between the Big Typescript and the Philosophical Investigations. It is also held that some of the grammatical propositions Wittgenstein asserted prior to his writing of the Philosophical Investigations are theses, doctrines, opinions or dogmatism, which he abandoned by 1936/37. The purpose of this paper is to show these claims to be misunderstandings and misinterpretations. On all important matters, his conception of grammar and of grammatical investigations, of grammatical statements or propositions and of grammatical clarification did not change between the Big Typescript and the Investigations. Grammatical propositions (e.g. the meaning of a word is its use; a sample in an ostensive definition belongs to the means of representation; belief is not a mental state) are no more theses, doctrines or opinions than is 'a bachelor is an unmarried man.' Nor are they in any way dogmatic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modernity has always blamed the authority of tradition for hindering emancipation while at the same time affirming, for fear of abstraction, the creative energies of traditions. Can the Enlightenment's abstract universal character be overcome without succumbing to the dogmatism of the appeal to Tradition? Paul Ricoeur's philosophical project aims at surpassing this opposition by forging the concept of living tradition in which history and universal find a new articulation. This paper brings to light the originality of the dynamic relationship between present and past elaborated in Ricoeur's philosophical hermeneutics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]