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In the past decades, neoliberalism has permeated (foreign) language education, as has been discussed by critical research in the fields of: curriculum theory, applied linguistics, discourse analysis, language policy, language assessment, to name a few. Despite the fact that research on foreign language education and neoliberalism is certainly growing, less attention has been paid to actual "ways out" or alternatives to neoliberal foreign language education. This introductory paper delineates the domain and scope of the present Special Issue entitled "Alternatives to Neoliberal Foreign Language Education." The paper critically discusses three discourses/processes that are key to understanding the effects of neoliberalism in language education worldwide: "language as skill," "standardization and profit," and "devaluing education." Then, it moves to briefly introduce each of the four remaining papers, which critically discuss alternatives to neoliberal foreign language education in different countries. The full issue hopes to contribute to critical research in the field of foreign language education and neoliberalism but, more importantly, to the search for feasible alternatives that help us move from "negative critique" of the current situation of foreign language education to actual "praxis" with a view to transforming it.

This paper questions the apparent hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia and highlights its discursive construction. It explores the centrality of 'Muslimness' in both countries' discourses and how it both shapes and is shaped by their opposition. At the same time, it seeks to uncover how these discourses construct a specific regional and 'Muslim' dynamic. To do so, the paper draws on theories from both security and nationalism studies. The application of the theoretical framework was carried out over the 2010-2020 period through a discourse analysis of both primary and secondary sources. It is highlighted that Saudi Arabia resorts to a sectarian perspective, merging the 'Muslim' category with a 'Sunni' one, while Iran eludes the sectarian dimension and centers on the struggle against oppression and 'arrogant powers.' The paper concludes that, in the struggle over the definition of 'Muslimness,' both parties invest this label with different, but not opposing, attributes. While Saudi speeches express a closed and exclusive 'identity' defined by their understanding of religion and in direct opposition to Shias, Iranian speeches express an inclusive 'identity' based on 'Muslimness,' which is largely defined by the struggle against oppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an innovative approach to visual analysis in the Middle East. It addresses a fundamental problem in the fields of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Securitization Theory (ST): they largely ignore the visual. This project develops a methodology for visual analysis. Its utility is demonstrated through an examination of a Saudi propaganda video, entitled "Saudi Strike Force Video." When observing the Saudi‐Iranian rivalry on social media, there is a prevalence of visceral visual propaganda. Thus, the need for the construction of a systematic model for its analysis is important in addressing this conceptual gap. CDA and ST are aligned on an essential belief that discourse is a power‐laden process, and that to affect change, scholars must attempt to understand its production, articulation, and impact. Yet, both of these approaches tend to focus on the written and spoken word, negating the importance of the visual. This paper contends that the visual is equally power‐laden, having a profound effect as a tool of propaganda [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how Maldives' close ties with Saudi Arabia have affected its relations with other countries from Middle East Asia. Following the footsteps of Saudi Arabia, Maldives severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 and with Qatar in 2017. The paper discusses the economic investments Riyadh has made to develop civic infrastructure in the island nation. However, more than diplomatic ties and economic investments, close relations between Malé and Riyadh have affected the Island state's society. There is a spread of religious obstructionism in Maldivian society, for which several outside scholars and Maldivians blame Saudi Arabia. Finally, the paper briefly discusses Maldives' ties with Middle East countries other than Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the twenty-first century, the centers of power have become more widespread, resulting in increased interdependence and shared interests across national borders. This has led to significant political and security challenges, which have altered the nature of threats and required continuous responses from leaders in the political, economic, and military arenas. There is a growing agreement that the dominant strategic paradigm is moving away from the Western model of dominance and influence toward a more diverse era of "multipolarity." The Middle East lies at the crossroads of many of these changes, while global superpowers jockey for political influence across the region. The relationship between two of the Middle East's leading powers, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, reveals a complex interplay of small states, regional powers, great powers, rival sectarian organizations, and proxy groups. This paper will investigate how Saudi Arabia and Iran are adjusting their foreign policy and alliances in response to the changing global power dynamics and what those adjustments could mean for the future of the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This qualitative study aims to analyze the impact of Saudi-Israel relations on the Middle East. The study also focused on the reaction of Arab countries to their bilateral ties and incidents that have arisen in the Middle East as a direct result of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The deteriorating condition of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia wreaked havoc throughout the region. The United States plays a pivotal role in the politics of the Middle East; therefore, a nation that is willing to operate as the United States' right hand was sorely needed in the region. Israel, a country that is not recognized on a global scale, has set up shop in that vacated seat. Together, they aid proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which contributes to instability in the region. The only thing that could diminish the damage would be a concerted effort by Muslim states against Israel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The multiple hard power engagements of the aspiring Middle East powers (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran) in Yemen are self-evident. However, the disposition of foreign interference in Yemen is multifaced. Current research papers have primarily focused on using hard power military or economic tools, but soft power tools were left behind. Therefore, this article explores soft power’s nature influencing the countries above assert towards the Yemeni population. It focused on three ostensibly distinct areas of soft power – education, religion, and media – within each particular analysis since those three areas are key elements of the Saudi and Iranian soft-power toolkit. Multiple religious, educational, and media tools towards Yemen were detected in each case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been unfolding over a long period, influencing the politics and conflicts in the Middle East. The dynamics, content, and form of the rivalry have changed dramatically following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Sectarianism is frequently seen as the constitutive element of the conflict between the two countries. This paper brings a new light into the literature on the nature of the evolving Saudi–Iran rivalry. Specifically, it explains Saudi Arabia's ideational balancing and threat perception against Iran by highlighting the ontological security narratives under which the Saudi–Iran rivalry evolves. In doing so, it draws on the fatwas (i.e., religious opinions), issued by Saudi scholars, as an empirical object of investigation, and explores how they constitute and reconstitute Saudi Arabia's ontological security narratives. In this way, this work critically explains the ontological security regime in Saudi Arabia and the nature of the political struggle and antagonism between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Security Strategies Journal / Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi is the property of Strategic Research Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Sleep health inequalities represent an increasing public health concern. Among multiple determinants affecting sleep health, there is people's socioeconomic status (SES), and no systematic review on the relationship between SES and sleep health has been previously conducted in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Following the Prisma protocol, ten articles were selected. Findings revealed that the combined number of participants was N = 37,455 participants, including 73.23% of children and adolescents (n = 27,670) and 26.77% of adults (n = 10,026). The smallest sample was N = 715 and the larger was N = 13,486. In all these studies, sleep variables were assessed using self-reported questionnaires. The studies conducted in Iran assessed the risk of obstructive sleep apnea (OSA), while those in Saudi Arabia were interested in sleep duration, nap time, bedtime, rise time and insomnia. The studies performed on adult populations in Iran and Saudi Arabia concluded that there is no significant association between SES determinants and sleep components in adult populations. One study in Iran found a significant association between parent's low SES and children and adolescent insomnia; and one study in Saudi Arabia found a significant association between the father's education and the longer sleep duration of their children. More longitudinal studies are necessary to establish a causal relationship between public health policies and sleep health inequalities. An extension of the investigation to more sleep disturbances is required to cover the entirety of sleep health inequalities in Iran and Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Deng Xiaoping's opening-up policy and drive for economic modernisation and reform in the late 1970s, and especially since China's foreign energy requirements skyrocketed in 1993, Beijing's interests in the Persian Gulf have grown immensely. A staple of its regional policy has been an insistence on cultivating relations with all states, something that has necessitated a careful balancing act between regional rivals, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. This article examines China's strategy to balance relations with these two states, especially during periods of tension, such as following the 2019 drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, something that Riyadh accused Iran of masterminding. Following an examination of this strategy, the article explores Saudi attempts to coax Beijing away from Tehran and Saudi perceptions of Sino-Iranian relations through the lens of the 2021 25-year agreement between China and Iran, questioning whether Sino-Iranian relations are a bone of contention in Sino-Saudi relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2011, Saudi foreign policy has shifted from its traditional position of self‐restraint and reliance on soft power to an assertive and adventurous one that prioritizes expanding security alliances and use of force. Particularly, after the advent of King Salman to power, the Kingdom experienced various turning points in its foreign policymaking such as its pursuit of increased military engagement in the post‐Arab Spring countries, its normalization of relations with Israel and adopting a new armament program. This unusual shift in the Saudi foreign policymaking inevitably raises the question: "What led Riyadh to adopt policies that completely broke away from its traditional position?." A closer look at the recent developments unfolding in the region since the Arab uprisings reveals that the Saudi foreign policy decisions are primarily guided by its perceived threat from Iran. Against this backdrop, this article first investigates why Saudi Arabia views Iran as the biggest threat to its survival. Second, it analyzes the new Saudi foreign policy orientation and its implications in light of balance of threat theory. Finally, the article looks into how the change in the US administration and the end of unconditional US support to Saudi Arabia influenced the Kingdom's discourse and tone vis a vis Iran. The article mainly proposes that Saudi Arabia's increasing threat perception from Iran sheds light on the Kingdom's reasoning and motivation behind its more proactive and assertive policies while the Kingdom's discourse and policymaking is heavily restricted by the ambivalence in the US posture in the Middle East and particularly its stance toward Riyadh's policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]