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In this paper I argue that dispositionalism is the metaphysical theory that can best contribute to the construction of a metaphysical model for Molecular Gastronomy. Molecular Gastronomy is better explained if physical and chemical theories, which lie at the heart of Molecular Gastronomy, and cooking phenomena in general are described in terms of dispositions. This is the reason why trying to construct a metaphysical model for Molecular Gastronomy by using a dispositional metaphysics is a challenge worth taking on. I will thus explore what happens when we bring dispositions in the kitchen, and so the intersection between food, science and metaphysics. The main aim of the paper is then to pave the way toward the development of a metaphysical model for the physical and the chemical aspects behind Molecular Gastronomy. In the first section, I will briefly reconstruct the history of Molecular Gastronomy, give a definition of it and outline its program. In the second section, I will describe the version of dispositionalism that I adopt in this paper. In the third section, I will sketch a dispositional model for Molecular Gastronomy by relying on two case studies. In the fourth and final section I will draw my conclusions and raise some issues deserving further investigation.

Este artigo discute a relação entre ética e estética na filosofia de Jean-François Lyotard. Influenciado por Wittgenstein, Lyotard argumenta que a cultura contemporânea é caracterizada por vários jogos de linguagem localmente legitimados, o que impossibilitaria o uso de uma linguagem universal e unificadora. De acordo com Lyotard, metanarrativas tais como a autonomia do sujeito oprimiriam a diversidade. Por causa disso, as metanarrativas deveriam ser substituídas pelos vários jogos. Assim, o artigo também pretende mostrar que essa caracterização de pós-modernidade abrange uma posição ética cética e relativista que torna impraticável uma análise crítica da cultura. Uma das consequências disso é a associação entre a filosofia pós-moderna e a defesa das sociedades capitalistas. [This paper discusses the relation between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Jean-François Lyotard. Influenced by Wittgenstein, Lyotard argues that contemporary culture is characterized by several locally legitimated language games, which would precludes the use of a universal and unifying language. According to Lyotard, metanarratives such as the autonomous subject could oppress diversity. Because of this, the metanarratives should be replaced by several games. The paper also intends to show that this characterization of postmodernity embraces a skeptical and relativist ethic conception that makes impractical a critical analysis of culture. One consequence of this is the link between postmodern philosophy and defense of capitalist societies.]

This paper discusses Rudolf Carnap’s 1929 conferences at the Bauhaus school of art, design and architecture in the context of Otto Neurath’s utopianism. The conferences enable us to understand Carnap’s proposals of logical construction as part of some modernist cultural movements of Central Europe in early 20th Century. Utopias play a significant role in Neurath’s Philosophy of Social Science, as they can be compared to models of social technology. Carnap’s conferences aim at showing that the Bauhaus shared a world-conception with the Vienna Circle, group of which Carnap and Neurath were members. This paper argues that this common world-conception can be understood as a utopia, as a proposal of intervention in society, and that Carnap’s conferences were an invitation to join such utopia. This paper not only performs an exercise of historical reconstruction of Philosophy of Science, but it also shows reflexions on some problems of Social Science and technology. [Neste artigo se discutem as conferências de Rudolf Carnap, em 1929, na Bauhaus, escola de arte, design e arquitetura, no contexto do utopianismo de Otto Neurath. As conferências nos permitem compreender as propostas de Carnap relativas à construção lógica como parte de alguns movimentos culturais modernistas na Europa Central do início do século XX. Utopias desempenham um papel significativo na filosofia das ciências sociais de Neurath, sendo comparáveis a modelos de tecnologia social. As conferências de Carnap objetivam mostrar que a Bauhaus e o Círculo de Viena, grupo de que Carnap e Neurath eram membros, compartilhavam uma concepção de mundo. Argumenta-se neste artigo que essa compartilhada concepção de mundo pode ser entendida como uma utopia, como uma proposta de intervenção na sociedade, e que as conferências de Carnap foram um convite para integração a essa utopia. O artigo não realiza apenas um exercício de reconstrução histórica da filosofia da ciência, mas também apresenta reflexões acerca de alguns problemas de ciências e tecnologias sociais.]

A critical social theory for what and whom? This question is the key for this paper in order to problematize relationships and the dependence relating sociological theory, political praxis and strong institutionalism. The paper’s central argument is that the Western sociological tradition in the 20th century assumed a systemic understanding of society as epistemological-political basis of its constitution, legitimation and political influence, which led to strong institutionalism, that is, the correlation and self-justification between social sciences and political institutions, so that scientifical-political institutions become overlapped in relation to political praxis of social movements, as neutral and impartial regarding class struggle, depoliticizing social systems’ constitution, legitimation and evolution. The paper’s second central argument is that a critical social theory for the constitution and crisis of contemporary Western modernization must abandon the defense of and connection with strong institutionalism, supporting social movements in their epistemological-political criticism to social systems’ technicization and autonomization. [uma teoria social crítica para quê/para quem? Esta questão é a chave-de-leitura que o artigo usa com o objetivo de problematizar as relações e a dependência entre teoria sociológica, práxis política e institucionalismo forte. O argumento central do artigo consiste em que a tradição sociológica ocidental no século XX assumiu uma compreensão sistêmica de sociedade enquanto base epistemológico-política para sua constituição, legitimação e influência política, o que levou ao institucionalismo forte, isto é, à correlação e à autojustificação entre ciências sociais e instituições políticas, de modo que instituições científico-políticas tornam-se sobrepostas à práxis política dos movimentos sociais, bem como neutras e imparciais em relação às lutas de classe, despolitizando a constituição, a legitimação e a evolução dos sistemas sociais. Assim, o segundo argumento central do artigo consiste em que uma teoria social crítica para o estudo da constituição e da crise da modernização ocidental contemporânea deve abandonar sua defesa e sua conexão com o institucionalismo forte, auxiliando movimentos sociais em sua crítica epistemológico-política à tecnicização e à autonomização dos sistemas sociais]

In this paper, I put under scrutiny the arguments put forward by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI.9. The paper has two main parts. In the first, I examine the NE VI.9’s first part where Aristotle develops the concept of good deliberation, offering its definition in 1142b27-28. In the second, I examine the connection between good deliberation and phronesis, and, then, discuss the vexata quæstio about if the lines 1142b31-33 might be read as introducing the claim that phronesis provides moral ends. [Neste artigo, analiso pormenorizadamente os argumentos apresentados por Aristóteles em Ética a Nicômaco (EN) VI.9. O artigo é dividido em duas partes principais. Na primeira, abordo a primeira parte de EN VI.9 onde Aristóteles desenvolve a noção de boa deliberação, culminando com a apresentação da sua definição em 1142b27-28. Na segunda, abordo a conexão entre boa deliberação e phronesis e discuto a vexata quaestio de se as linhas 1142b31-33 podem ser lidas como introduzindo a tese de que a phronesis fornece os fins morais]

This paper retraces two crucial displacements in the history of the notion of the “performative” in Derrida’s thought, and the effects of this notion in his attempt to rethink the contours of ethical and political action, and of the “subject” of this action. First, Judith Butler’s distinctive appropriation of the notion of “iterability” employed by Derrida to describe the performative force of writing, and of language in general. And second, Derrida’s own re-modulation of the notion of the “performative”, in his late reflections on the aporetic structure of “decision” through which he attempts to reflect on the breach between “justice” and “normativity”. Through an examination of the differences at stake in these two possible trajectories for thinking the “performativity” of language and selfhood the paper tries to show, first, the connection between Derrida’s early analysis of “writing” and his late reflections on the gap between “justice” and normativity; and second, it attempts in a rather preliminary way to understand why Derrida, in his attempt to re-think ethical and political action in this way, re-opens a certain “religious” register constitutive of this action, a register, we suggest, connected to the problem of affectivity.

This paper retraces two crucial displacements in the history of the notion of the “performative” in Derrida’s thought, and the effects of this notion in his attempt to rethink the contours of ethical and political action, and of the “subject” of this action. First, Judith Butler’s distinctive appropriation of the notion of “iterability” employed by Derrida to describe the performative force of writing, and of language in general. And second, Derrida’s own re-modulation of the notion of the “performative”, in his late reflections on the aporetic structure of “decision” through which he attempts to reflect on the breach between “justice” and “normativity”. Through an examination of the differences at stake in these two possible trajectories for thinking the “performativity” of language and selfhood the paper tries to show, first, the connection between Derrida’s early analysis of “writing” and his late reflections on the gap between “justice” and normativity; and second, it attempts in a rather preliminary way to understand why Derrida, in his attempt to re-think ethical and political action in this way, re-opens a certain “religious” register constitutive of this action, a register, we suggest, connected to the problem of affectivity.

This paper considers and distinguishes two objections which ordinarily are thought to oppose a realistic conception of ethics: G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s law. After having presented both objections, having developed their presuppositions and consequences and having answered each of them, the paper concludes that it is possible to hold today a realistic conception of ethics. It is structured in the style of a disputed question, divided in six articles.

A main area of Hans Blumenberg’s works, the history of science, has received little attention, in particular Blumenberg’s history of astronomy. Since 1955 Blumenberg [1920-1996] had undertaken a research on Copernican astronomy, and published many papers during the 50’s and 60’s, later put together in Die kopernikanische Wende [1965]. Blumenberg had also prepared preliminary studies on Galileo Galilei’s Sidereus Nuncius and Cusa’s De coniecturis. All this work will culminate in Blumenberg’s monumental Die genesis der kopernikanischen Welt [1975] and his posthumous book Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne [1997]. The aim of this paper is to undertake a review on this neglected area of Blumenberg’s works. We will focus on the Heideggerian background in Blumenberg’s history of astronomy. Our thesis is that in Blumenberg’s history of astronomy we can find a metaphysics of existence in a Heideggerian way, as astronomical existential paradigms.

Taking for granted that Marx’s economic theory enjoys a scientific status and, furthermore, that it installed a real Copernican revolution in sociology, the present paper explores the possibility of deriving a system of law deserving the name of “scientific” in so far as it would be in keeping with the theses of the latter scientific theory. In this context, the paper argues against a claim recently sustained by Fernández Liria and Alegre Zahonero, for whom a system of right compatible with Marx’s theory would be compatible, too, with the classic juridical formulations conceived during the Enlightenment. The main reason why this paper testifies against such compatibility is that the enlightened concepts of “equality”, “liberty” and “autonomy” count with the individual as the realm for their juridical application. However, Marx’s subject matter being the social means of production (and not the individuals’ production of value), we conclude that the only juridical subject that could justifiably be derived from his economic investigation would be the “social class”. Finally, the paper suggests that the only way a scientific system of law could grant a juridical status to the individual would be by taking into account the other theory that also installed a Copernican revolution in the social sciences, though this time in the field of psychology: Freud’s psychoanalysis. Key words: Copernican revolution, science, scientific

This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models.

The paper examines a recent proposal of substitution of classic (normative) philosophy of science by a post-positivist and pluralistic axiology governed by aesthetic or formal values. The author of the paper proposes a different set of values that can enconpass not only “internal” values, but is also open to the examination of the ethical limits of tecnoscience and the principles that can govern scientific development in oru “risk societies”, which depends heavily on the general evolution of science.

This paper presents a reflection about the way in which Kant treats Future in his work, its possibility and conditions. First, I will present a résumé of the principal ideas on this task in his works Dreams os a Spirit Seer and The Conflict of the Faculties , published in 1766 and 1798. In the thirty years between both, Kant wrote his Critical Philosophy. We will see that the problem of the possibility of the speech about Future was always present on his works, and it didn’t change in the deep sense other themes did. Secondly, I will outline the most important ideas of that first part in an Antinomy and I will complete the paper with other relevant considerations in the Critique of the pure Reason. In that way I will try to offer a solution to our principal task: Is it possible to talk with Kant about knowledge refered to the Future?.

This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models.

In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, such as those of the Gettier type.

O presente artigo pretende demonstrar como a Física foi imprescindível para o sistema filosófico estoico, o que permitiu a sua utilização na Antiguidade como fundamento de todo o pensamento do Pórtico. Objetiva-se inferir tal papel preponderante reservado à Física estoica mediante a análise de alguns dos seus principais temas, tais como a Ontologia corporalista que a informa e as noções de lógos, deus e mistura total, concluindo-se o texto com uma breve exposição da teoria das conflagrações.The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Physics played a vital role in the development of the Stoic Philosophy System and allowed its use in ancient times as a basic element of the whole Portico's thought. This paper also intends to infer the significance of that role played by Stoic Physics, analyzing some of its main themes - the Ontology of the bodies, used, for instance, as an information source; and the notions of lógos, god and general mixture. Finally, the article provides a brief explanation of the conflagration theory.

This paper analyses the recent debate between J. Habermas and C. Lafont on discourse ethics. The aim is to show that Lafont’s proposal of a realist interpretation of discourse ethics must face several problems which are difficult to resolve from within the theoretical frame of discourse ethics. First of all, the paper sets out how Lafont’s position extends to the field of practical reason some important objections against Habermas’s consensus theory of truth. Subsequently Lafont’s arguments in support of moral realism are criticised, and the paper concludes with an analysis of the difference between rational agreements and compromises of interests from a procedural point of view.

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap.

While Aristotle provides the crucial testimonies for the paradoxes of motion, topos, and the falling millet seed, surprisingly he shows almost no interest in the paradoxes of plurality. For Plato, by contrast, the plurality paradoxes seem to be the central paradoxes of Zeno and Simplicius is our primary source for those. This paper investigates why the plurality paradoxes are not examined by Aristotle and argues that a close look at the context in which Aristotle discusses Zeno holds the answer to this question.

In the beginning of 1980’s Michel Foucault lectured on «παρρησία» at the Collège de France. Foucault’s lectures have become an important new way to interpret the parrhesía notion, from the political and philosophical point of view. Basically, Foucault distinguishes between a political parrhesía of democratic nature and a philosophical parrhesía whose origin can be traced to Plato. In this paper I focus my analysis on the political parrhesía, and I try to prove that Foucault’s definition of this concept is not in accordance with the Democratic Thinking of Ancient Athens. According to Foucault, parrhesía is a «une parole d’au-dessus», a discourse spoken from above. However, an alternative interpretation of ancient sources can prove that in reality the parrhesía is a discourse spoken from below. Contrary to what Foucault maintains, the works of Euripides, Demosthenes, Isocrates, and other authors contribute toward finding a popular root in the parrhesía, that it should be defined as the dignity of the popular speech.

This paper focuses on the role affectivity plays in the so-called young Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology. After establishing in the introduction the close connection existing between affectivity and facticity, I take the notion of movedness (Bewegtheit) of factical life as my main guiding thread. Firstly, I explain the peculiar meaning this notion has in young Heidegger’s philosophy. Secondly, I analyze the double “basic movedness” (Grundbewegtheit) of love and hate as being the intentional matrix of curare (Bekümmerung) according to the Heideggerian interpretation of Augustine’s Confessions during the summer semester lecture course in 1921. Thirdly, I consider the double movedness of pathos and Befindlichkeit as laid out in the summer semester lecture course in 1924, called Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. And, finally, I elucidate the “Logic of the Heart” behind the hermeneutics of facticity as jointly articulating both the New Testament tradition of affectus (Augustine) and the Greek tradition of pathos (Aristotle).

This paper aims to tackle Arendt’s thinking in connection with our current knowledge on the history of Greece, in order to examine the philosopher’s interpretation of the Greek world – a special emphasis will be placed on the concepts of action, nomos and freedom, as well as on the importance of the agora’s political space. Furthermore, I intend to put into question those readings that attribute a kind of naïve hellenophilia to Arendt, also pointing out the limitations that she herself observed within the political approach of the polis. I argue that Arendt does not find, in Ancient Greece, any of the resorts that can counterbalance action and which she considers necessary in order for it to avoid falling into hybris, such as: forgiving, promise and authority. Finally, I claim that the Roman concept of lex, due to its relational dimension, is closer to her account of politics than the Greek concept of nomos.

ABSTRACT This paper aims at exposing a strategy to organize the debate around physicalism. Our starting point (following Stoljar 2010) is the pre-philosophical notion of physicalism, which is typically formulated in the form of slogans. Indeed, philosophers debating metaphysics have paradigmatically introduced the subject with aid of slogans such as “there is nothing over and above the physical”, “once every physical aspect of the world is settled, every other aspect will follow”, “physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical”. These ideas are very intuitive but they are, of course, far from being a satisfactory metaphysical conception of Physicalism. For that end, we will begin with the definition of physicalism as the thesis that everything is physical, following Stoljar, we should be able to respond to one central question: how to interpret the physicalist claim that everything in physical.

The present paper focuses on some aspects of the Neoplatonist literary-metaphysical theory, which has clearly been expressed in the anony­mous Prolegomena to Plato’s philosophy and further confirmed in Proclus’ exegesis of the Timaeus. Thus, this contribution, examines and compares several passages from the Prolegomena and from Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus with a view to showing that it is legiti­mate to speak of a certain cosmogony of the Platonic dialogue that is analogous to that of the macrocosm. Moreover, the analogy between macrocosm and microcosm makes it possible to further investigate the similarity between the λόγος-ζῷον of the Demiurge and that of Timaeus, on the one hand, and the reality which the λόγος expresses, on the other. This similarity turns out to be both structural/morphological and content-related/semantic. Thus, by combining the natural and theo­logical science, the analysis of the “generation” of the macrocosm and microcosm brings out the strongly analogical nature of Plato’s dialogues, which is particularly visible in the Timaeus.

Fabian Freyenhagen, muito recentemente, propôs a tese de que a Teoria Crítica estaria condenada a deixar de fundamentar seus critérios de julgamento da sociedade. Para ele, Horkheimer teria, em seu famoso ensaio “Teoria Tradicional e Teoria Crítica”, publicado há oitenta anos, fundado uma ortodoxia teórico-crítica impermeável a programas de fundamentação. Neste artigo, trata-se de contrapor à tese de Freyenhagen uma interpretação diferente de “Teoria Tradicional e Teoria Crítica”, uma que não exclui, de antemão e definitivamente, a necessidade teórico-crítica de fundamentação. Além disso, trata-se de delinear três razões pelas quais a Teoria Crítica pode vir a requerer que seus critérios sejam fundamentados. [Fabian Freyenhagen, in a very recent essay, sustains the thesis that Critical Theory would be condemned to refrain from justifying its criteria of judgement of society. According to him, Horkheimer, in his famous essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”, published eighty years ago, would have established a critical-theoretical orthodoxy impermeable to any programme of justification. In this paper, I object to Freyenhagen’s thesis by articulating a different interpretation of “Traditional and Critical Theory”, one that does not exclude the critical-theoretical need for justification. Furthermore, I outline three reasons why Critical Theory might require justification.]

In this paper, I intend to evaluate if Michael Smith’s account in support of a substantive convergence among agents’ idealized desires is compelling enough to show us that such agreement would be possible. Smith claims that moral argument tends to elicit moral agreement among agents’ opinions and that this gives us a reason to believe that there would be a convergence in desires under conditions of full rationality. He maintains that the best explanation of that historical tendency is our substantive convergence upon a set of extremely unobvious a priori moral truths. However, I think he fails to provide us with any convincing reason to expect that a substantive convergence would be attained. I argue Smith’s consensus on moral issues is less probable than disagreement if there is no normative standard for the correctness of the desires we would want ourselves to have in conditions of full rationality. If my argument succeeds it follows that Smith’s account is a sort of error theory of normative reasons, rather than a realistic one. [Neste artigo, pretendo avaliar se a abordagem de Michael Smith apoiando uma convergência substantiva entre os desejos idealizados dos agentes é convincente a ponto de nos mostrar que tal acordo seria possível. Smith afirma que a discussão moral tende a gerar acordo moral entre as opiniões dos agentes e que isso nos dá uma boa razão para acreditarmos que haverá uma convergência em desejos sob condições de racionalidade plena. Ele defende que a melhor explicação dessa tendência histórica é nossa convergência substantiva a respeito de um conjunto de verdades morais a priori pouco óbvias. Contudo, penso que ele falha em oferecer qualquer razão convincente para esperarmos que uma convergência substantiva seria alcançada. Argumento que o consenso de Smith sobre questões morais é menos provável do que o desacordo caso não haja nenhum padrão normativo de correção dos desejos que esperaríamos ter em condições de racionalidade plena. Se meu argumento é bem-sucedido, segue-se que a abordagem de Smith é um tipo teoria do erro de razões normativas, ao invés de um tipo de teoria realista.]

Neste artigo, abordamos o problema do “silêncio epistemológico” de Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) após 1953. Bachelard era um escritor prolífico: entre 1927 e 1953, concluiu 13 livros sobre epistemologia – cerca de um livro a cada 14 meses. Todavia, em certo momento deixou de publicar obras sobre o tema, embora tivesse continuado a escrever sobre a imaginação poética. Michel Vadée e Olival Freire notam o problema e indicam caminhos possíveis, mas deixam sua solução em aberto. Mais especificamente, Freire sugere que a questão pode estar relacionada a uma importante tomada de posição de Louis de Broglie, que, em 1952, rompe com a interpretação de Copenhagen (adotada por Bachelard), propondo uma teoria que admite uma solução não probabilista para a teoria quântica. Essa reviravolta por parte do mais importante físico francês pode ter abalado o espírito de Bachelard. Acreditamos ter encontrado, em um artigo de Bachelard publicado em 1957, elementos que permitem resolver a questão. [In this paper, we address the problem of Gaston Bachelard’s (1884-1962) “epistemological silence” after 1953. Bachelard was a prolific writer: between 1927 and 1953, he completed 13 books on epistemology ‒ about one book every 14 months. However, at one point he stopped publishing works on the subject, although he continued to write about the poetic imagination. Michel Vadée and Olival Freire note the problem and point out possible paths, but leave their solution open. More specifically, Freire suggests that the issue may be related to an important position taken by Louis de Broglie, who, in 1952, breaks with the Copenhagen interpretation (adopted by Bachelard), proposing a theory that admits a non-probabilistic solution for Quantum theory. This turnaround by the most important French physicist may have shaken Bachelard's spirit. We believe we have found, in an article by Bachelard published in 1957, elements that allow us to resolve the issue.]

Este trabalho tem como objetivo fornecer uma aplicação do hexágono lógico aos conceitos metafísicos de razão e de causalidade. Após uma breve apresentação da abordagem de Blanché, passa-se à construção das estruturas geométricas. Primeiramente, são apresentadas duas tríades – razão lógica, acaso, causa; razão, não-causa, non sequitur. Em seguida, apresenta-se o hexágono lógico como a díade das duas primeiras estruturas. Conclui-se que o hexágono lógico é uma estrutura capaz de organizar sistematicamente os conceitos de razão e de causalidade. [This paper aims to show an application of the logical hexagon to the metaphysical concepts of reason and causality. After a brief presentation of Blanché’s approach, we proceed to build the geometrical structures. First, we show two triads – logical reason, chance, cause; reason, non-cause, non sequitur. Then we present the logical hexagon as a dyad built out of the first two structures. We conclude that the logical hexagon is able to organize the concepts of reason and causality in a systematic way.]

Retomando uma leitura política e social da Carta a d’Alembert proposta por Bento Prado Jr. e Luiz Roberto Salinas Fortes, este artigo busca estender e desdobrar algumas importantes implicações desta tradição de leitura: investigar uma reflexão econômica e os desenvolvimentos de uma economia política associada aos espetáculos, conforme apresentada na Carta. Afinal, contestando uma específica concepção de espetáculo defendida pelos enciclopedistas, Rousseau, sublinhando o caráter político presente nos debates sobre a atividade teatral, incessantemente se atenta para o contexto social e econômico no qual uma peça se insere. Neste contexto, considerando-se ainda a oposição que a Carta apresenta contra etnocentrismo dos philosophes, pretendemos analisar como então é desenvolvida uma crítica à ociosidade – ou uma apologia ao trabalho – que tem em vista fortalecer os argumentos dirigidos contra o teatro parisiense. Exploraremos, portanto, os aspectos de economia política que compõem a argumentação de Rousseau ao longo do texto. [Resuming a political and social reading on the Letter to d’Alembert proposed by Bento Prado Jr. and Luiz Roberto Salinas Fortes, this paper aims to further important consequences carried out by this tradition: to analyze an economic reflection and the developments of political economy thoughts associated with the theatre, as presented in Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert. Challenging a specific conception of spectacles advocated by the encyclopedists, Rousseau, highlighting the political character present in the discussions on the theatrical activity, draws attention to the social context in which a play takes place. In this context, and considering the opposition that the Letter presents against the philosophes’ ethnocentrism, we aim to analyze how a critique of idleness – or a praise of labor – is developed, with a view to strengthen the arguments pointed against the Parisian theatre. Most of all, we will seek to highlight the political and economic aspects that make up Rousseau’s arguments.]

The scholastic scientific diagram of the 13th century has a main component: the translations of Aristotle treatises. In this way Boethius’ works are highly significant both for his translations of Greek terms and for fixing a precise lexicology that allows us to interpret it. These records were enriched with meaningful translations and comments that began to spread in the 12th century and the following ones of the 13th century. However, Thomas Aquinas’ scientific view shows this tradition and enhances a certain understanding of the Aristotelian texts. On this basis the following paper analyzes the notion of ‘dignitates’ on the thomistic opera omnia, because this is one of the terms which sets up the scientific scheme of Aristotelian root, with the objective to show its place, its meaning and its scope in the order of sciences.

Apresenta-se a tese da ressemantização do conceito de fundamento em Adorno (1903–1969). Através de análise bibliográfica e teórica, pretende-se demonstrar como é possível pensar a fundamentação numa filosofia marcada, essencialmente, pelo fracasso do projeto iluminista recente. [This paper presents the thesis of the resemantization of the concept of foundation in Adorno (1903-1969). Through bibliographical and theoretical analysis, it is intended to demonstrate how it is possible to think the foundation in a philosophy marked, essentially, by the failure of recent Enlightenment project.]

O projeto da teoria crítica da sociedade tem sido definido de diferentes modos, a partir de sua gênese, de sua metodologia ou de sua história institucional. O presente artigo analisa cada uma destas possibilidades e sugere uma alternativa a elas, a saber, a de que a teoria crítica pode ser entendida como a tentativa de desdobrar um problema: o da divisão e da compartimentação do trabalho científico então em curso. Esta alternativa também permite compreender de outra forma a ruptura operada pela guinada epistêmica do final da década de 60. [The project of the critical theory of society has been defined in different ways: through the description of its genesis, of its methodology or of its institutional history. This paper analyzes each of these possibilities and suggests an alternative to them, namely, that critical theory can be understood as the attempt to deal with a problem: that of the ongoing division and compartmentalization of scientific work. This alternative also makes it possible to understand in another way the rupture operated by the epistemic turn of the late 1960s.]

Dans cet article, j’analyse les idées principales de la théorie de la démocratie délibérative de Jürgen Habermas. Le philosophe allemand développe une conception procédurale et discursive de la légitimité démocratique selon lequel une décision est légitime et juste seulement dans la mesure où elle est fondée sur des raisons publiques résultant d'un processus de délibération inclusive et équitable, à laquelle tous les les citoyens peuvent participer et dans lequel ils sont en condition de coopérer librement. Cette conception de la démocratie est présenté comme une alternative aux conceptions républicaines traditionnelles de la démocratie, qui postulent un intérêt général transcendant de représentants élus par rapport aux points de vue des citoyens ordinaires, et les conceptions libérales, qui construisent cumulativement l'intérêt général comme simple addition ou négociation entre les différents intérêts. Notre thèse principale est que la légitimité démocratique dépend d'un processus de formation de la volonté (non pas d’une volonté pré-formé, c’est à dire anterieur à le débat public).[In this paper, I analyze the main ideias of the Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative theory of democracy. The german philosopher develops a procedural and discursive notion of democratic legitimity according to which the decision is legitimate and therefore correct only in the moment that it is grounded on public reasons which are resulting of an inclusive and fair procedure of deliberation, to which all citizens can participante and in which they cooperate freely. Such notion of democracy appears as an alternative to traditional republican notions of democracy which postulate a general interest of the elects ones regarding to the interests of the common citizens, as an alternative to the liberal notions of democracy which construct in a cumulative way the general interest as a simple addition or negotiation among different particular interests. Our main argument is that democratic legitimity depends of a formative process of the will (and not of the pre-formed wills which are previous to the public debate.]

Without doubt, the principle of least action is a fundamental principle in classical mechanics. Contemporary physicists, however, consider the PLA as a purely mathematical principle – even an axiom which they cannot completely justify. Such an account stands in sharp contrast with the historical meaning of the PLA. When the principle was introduced in the 1740s, by Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, its meaning was much more versatile. For Maupertuis the principle of least action signified that nature is thrifty or economical in all its actions, i.e., that nature avoids to do anything unnecessary. Maupertuis understood the principle in teleological terms and even considered the principle as an expression of God’s wisdom. It has been correctly pointed out by historians that Maupertuis in his later years moved towards a more speculative and metaphysical approach, whereas his contemporary Euler and later Lagrange, wanted to avoid such theological and metaphysical implications and frame the PLA (in line with contemporary standards) in purely mathematical terms. Such readings, however, have had the unintended side-effect that they lose out of sight the question how the mathematical and metaphysical aspect of the principle of least action fit together within Maupertuis’ own work. Investigating if and how the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the PLA are compatible within Maupertuis’ thought will be the main goal of this paper.

Este ensayo atiende al momento seguramente más ambicioso de la historia de la filosofía: la conversión, en el seno del Idealismo Alemán del modus exponendi de aquélla, primero en Crítica (Kant), luego en Doctrina (Fichte), en Sistema (Schelling), y finalmente en Ciencia (Hegel), al mismo tiempo que, en el modus componendi, la Metafísica se transfigura en Lógica. Ello supone, contra una interpretación manualística ya apenas seguida, no abandono o menosprecio por parte de Hegel de las ciencias experimentales, sino al contrario: una minuciosa utilización de las mismas como origen, condición y material de elaboración del propio desarrollo lógico, de manera que, mientras el plano de la exposición (el methodus) permanece relativamente fijo, el de la composición, mediado por la Realphilosophie, se modifica y altera al ritmo de las teorías y los acontecimientos del día de los hombres, como si su “peso” fuera dejando una huella en el reino lógico de las sombras. [This paper examines the probably most ambitious moment of the history of philosophy: the transformation, at the center of the German Idealism, of Philosophy into Critique (Kant), Doctrine (Fichte), System (Schelling) and finally Science (Hegel), as regards the philosophical modus exponendi, and simultaneously the transfiguration of Metaphysics into Logic, in its modus componendi. Rejecting the old-fashioned handbook interpretations, I claim these transformations do not make Hegel neglect or contempt the experimental sciences. On the contrary, they prove he meticulously used the experimental sciences as origin, condition and elaboration material of the logical development, so that while the exposition level (methodus) remains relatively firm, the composition level, mediated by the Realphilosophie, is modified and altered according to the human theories and the human daily events, as if its "weight" left its traces in the logical realm of shadows.]

The paper is treating the theme of a Kantian turning-point in the philosophical hermeneutics of H.- G. Gadamer based on of the harmonic relationship between metaphysics and science in Kantian philosophy from the point of view of the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. The philosophical work of Kant had such an influence on Gadamer that without exaggerating we can talk about the Kantian turning-point in Gadamerian hermeneutics. Grondin, a former student of Gadamer, is talking about Kantian turning-point on the field of aesthetics, but in reality Kantian turning-point means much more than a mere change in the reception of the concept of judgement. It is a discovery of harmonical relationship between the beauty and the moral, between the reason and the sensitivity, between the modern sciences and the metaphysical tradition in the Kantian philosophy, made by Gadamer. This is what we call the Kantian turning-point in Gadamerian hermeneutics.

In this paper, I identify two distinct positions on the nature of the body in Plato’s dialogues. One view, which I call the pessimistic view, holds that the body is evil and as such represents an obstacle to one’s epistemic and moral development. Another view, which I call the optimistic view, holds that the body is not itself either evil or good, but rather is capable of becoming either. The two views are, I argue, incompatible. Worse still, each view is individually incompatible with other claims that Plato is eager to advance in some dialogues. The pessimistic view, I argue, is (and is portrayed by Plato as being) incompatible with the thesis that one who has knowledge will not err. The optimistic view is incompatible with the thesis that no one errs willingly. Here I consider a number of passages in Plato’s dialogues where the nature of the body is featured, but focus particularly on passages from the Timaeus and Laws, which explicitly endorse the pessimistic and optimistic views, respectively. Plato’s views of the body, I suggest, have far reaching implications for his views on the sources of moral error and the power of knowledge in guiding right action.

This paper discusses the three ancient commentaries on Book E of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that have been handed down to us. It aims to demonstrate the fundamental part played by their particular interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrines in the birth of the traditional interpretation of his Metaphysics, according to which all the books comprising the work were written as a function of Book Λ, containing the well-known doctrine of the unmoved mover. Among the main elements supporting this assumption there is Aristotle’s distinction between three types of science - the theoretical, the practical and the productive - and his claiming the primacy of metaphysics as a theological science. According to the ancient commentators, the remainder of Book E would belong to the unitary project of the Metaphysics, since it would indicate what is not encompassed in the object of metaphysics. This would mean that Aristotle’s treatment of accidental being, being as truth and not-being as falsity, and being potentially and actually would take on a negative function. The theological interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics thus retains its ultimate foundations in premises contained in the Aristotelian text itself

In order to examine whether the usual identification of neoliberal ideas with an ideological discourse is valid, this paper starts off with an analysis of what Marx terms commodity fetishism in Capital, based on which a certain sense of the concept of ideology may be inferred which would result in its being both true and false. In order to determine whether this definition of ideology may be applied to neoliberal theory, we look at its fundamental features and how they continue with or break away from economic liberalism as studied in Michel Foucault’s Birth of biopolitics. Attention is later moved to the characteristics detected by David Harvey in the socalled flexible accumulation as the latest stage of capitalism which coincides with the political implementation of neoliberal doctrine. At the end of the road travelled, it is hypothesised that this theory would be a form of ideology containing a dimension of both truth and falsehood, in line with Marx’s thought.

This paper will focus on the issue of whether it is plausible to think about a human right to be assisted in dying. The right to be assisted in dying cannot be considered just a right of non-interference. It is better understood as a claim right because it demands assistance and positive actions. I will argue that the principles of individual autonomy and Kant’s notion of dignity taken independently cannot be considered plausible justification for the human right to be assisted in dying. Griffin’s personhood account points out that principles of liberty, minimum provision and autonomy must be taken together to justify human rights. Based on his theory, I will argue that a person with a terminal disease who was aware of her imminent death or who suffered from an intractable, incurable, irreversible disease may waive the right to life and choose death. Therefore, the right to life would not restrict the human right to be assisted in dying and a state that allowed the practice of assisted dying would not be disrespecting the human right to life. This article will defend that the personhood account is able to protect vulnerable people from making decisions under pressure and avoid the slippery slope objection.

In this paper I discuss one of the most significant strategies in Spinoza’s theoretical approach against those that entrave its understanding in a very powerful way. As well as Descartes, Spinoza uses the inmediate or unreflexive experience for developing his conception of free will or the distinction between body and soul, but he does so in order to prove that the experience is useful to demonstrate some purely anti-Cartesian thesis that express the core principles of Spinozism.

In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic, and some objections to which this might give rise.

Many authors have hoped to understand the indicative conditional construction in everyday language by means of what are usually called conditional probabilities. Other authors have hoped to make sense of conditional probabilities in terms of the absolute probabilities of conditional statements. Although all such hopes were disappointed by the triviality theorems of Lewis (1976), there have been copious subsequent attempts both to rescue CCCP (the conditional construal of conditional probability) and to extend and to intensify the arguments against it. In this paper it will be shown that triviality is avoidable if the probability function is replaced by an alternative generalization of the deducibility relation, the measure of deductive dependence of Miller and Popper (1986). It will be suggested further that this alternative way of orchestrating conditionals is nicely in harmony with the test proposed in Ramsey (1931), and also with the idea that it is not the truth value of a conditional statement that is of primary concern but its assertability or acceptability.

In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic, and some objections to which this might give rise.

In this paper we investigate the relations between possibility, imagination and conception. We develop a theory according to which these three notions are compatible but independent. This means in particular that none of these notions reduces to another one and that there are things which are: (1) imaginable but neither possible nor conceivable; (2) conceivable but neither possible nor imaginable; (3) possible but neither imaginable nor conceivable. We first explain our methodology: structuralism, equilibrium between norm and description, prototypical examples. And then we proceed.

Many authors have hoped to understand the indicative conditional construction in everyday language by means of what are usually called conditional probabilities. Other authors have hoped to make sense of conditional probabilities in terms of the absolute probabilities of conditional statements. Although all such hopes were disappointed by the triviality theorems of Lewis (1976), there have been copious subsequent attempts both to rescue CCCP (the conditional construal of conditional probability) and to extend and to intensify the arguments against it. In this paper it will be shown that triviality is avoidable if the probability function is replaced by an alternative generalization of the deducibility relation, the measure of deductive dependence of Miller and Popper (1986). It will be suggested further that this alternative way of orchestrating conditionals is nicely in harmony with the test proposed in Ramsey (1931), and also with the idea that it is not the truth value of a conditional statement that is of primary concern but its assertability or acceptability.

In this paper we investigate the relations between possibility, imagination and conception. We develop a theory according to which these three notions are compatible but independent. This means in particular that none of these notions reduces to another one and that there are things which are: (1) imaginable but neither possible nor conceivable; (2) conceivable but neither possible nor imaginable; (3) possible but neither imaginable nor conceivable. We first explain our methodology: structuralism, equilibrium between norm and description, prototypical examples. And then we proceed.

In the debate between literalism and contextualism in semantics, Kent Bach’s project is often taken to stand on the latter side of the divide. In this paper I argue this is a misleading assumption and justify it by contrasting Bach’s assessment of the theoretical eliminability of minimal propositions arguably expressed by well-formed sentences with standard minimalist views, and by further contrasting his account of the division of interpretative processes ascribable to the semantics and pragmatics of a language with a parallel analysis carried out by the most radical opponent to semantic minimalism, i.e., by occasionalism. If my analysis proves right, the sum of its conclusions amounts to a refusal of Bach’s main dichotomies.

In the debate between literalism and contextualism in semantics, Kent Bach’s project is often taken to stand on the latter side of the divide. In this paper I argue this is a misleading assumption and justify it by contrasting Bach’s assessment of the theoretical eliminability of minimal propositions arguably expressed by well-formed sentences with standard minimalist views, and by further contrasting his account of the division of interpretative processes ascribable to the semantics and pragmatics of a language with a parallel analysis carried out by the most radical opponent to semantic minimalism, i.e., by occasionalism. If my analysis proves right, the sum of its conclusions amounts to a refusal of Bach’s main dichotomies.

The aim of this paper is to examine how the Greek motto γνῶθι σεαυτόν plays a central role in Plato’s philosophy in order to show how ethics and knowledge go hand in hand in his model of παιδεία. The question of self-knowledge is a practical and theoretical task in life which is developed implicitly in his dialogues, it is for this reason that i examine some passages of the Charmides, Alcibiades I, Phaedo and Republic in order to show how Plato discovers the human interiority (Phaedo) and how self-knowledge is refined and articulated with the tripartition of the soul in the Republic.