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Taking Pierpaolo Cesaroni's book La vita dei concetti as a starting point, this paper addresses the problem of the political concept within the framework of an epistemological inquiry into the epistemic status of political science. After engaging with the major theoretical implications of Cesaroni's work, whose method and design are assumed as key to examining the subject at issue, the paper proposes a schematic analysis of the general structure of the specifically political end. In the conclusive remarks, I suggest taking Aristotle's political science seriously in order to build some preliminary guidelines towards the scientific comprehension of political teleology in terms of the constitutional good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (henceforth EN). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from EN I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not taken into account in previous editions of the EN—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the EN that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages.

This paper will show how the normalization of the forms of life that governs the political anthropology of Aristotle leads to a naturalization of the social hierarchies typical of the polis of his time. Toward this end, the first part of this paper highlights how in the Politics, the realization of the rational-political nature of Man implies the necessary declension of life (zoe) toward the living well (eu zen) of the polis. Subsequently, the paper will focus on how this living well, which characterizes the political form of life (bios politikos), relates to the condition of autarkeia, conceived by Aristotle not so much in the sense of economic and material or juridical and political selfsufficiency, but rather as the teleological realization of human nature. Finally, we will show that in the Nicomachean Ethics the Stagirite conceives of the nexus between the autarkeia and happiness and the living well as an ontological prerogative exclusive to the good man (spoudaios), thereby justifying his anthropological and moral superiority over other naturally subaltern forms of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show how a teleological model of reality and knowledge can be of aid in order to understand the connection between objective knowledge and subjective experience. The separation between them seems indeed to have been established by an opposite deterministic ontological and epistemological model within modern philosophy, which does not allow to explain the subjective relevance of objective knowledge and the objective relevance of subjective experience. In order to overcome this aporetic dichotomy, the paper will underline the actuality of the Aristotelian teleological conception of knowledge and experience and its heritage especially in contemporary philosophy.

In his 2013 monograph on Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, Malcolm Wilson has shown both that Aristotle conceived of meteorological phenomena as analogous to the bodily processes of animals, and that for the Stagirite the sublunar world should not be seen as a single body, but rather as composed of many different individuals. However, Wilson did not articulate the relationship between these two theories—that is, he did not answer the following question: how is it possible for the Earth to behave like an animal if it is not a single body? This paper argues that the answer to this question lies in the Aristotelian statement about the different paschein of the Earth and animals. In fact, in the chapter of Meteorology dedicated to climatic changes (1.14), Aristotle, after comparing such changes to the maturing and ageing of living organisms, states that ‘only, in the case of the bodies of plants and animals being affected does not occur in each part separately, but it is necessary for the being to mature and decay all at once, whereas in the case of the Earth this occurs in each part separately, due to cooling and warming’ (351a.28-31). In his commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates that the difference between the changes of the Earth and those of living organisms concern the way in which these different subjects undergo affections (pathê). The concept of paschein/pathos is thus fundamental to understanding how Aristotle conceives of biological analogies, which play a key role in his meteorology: as the affections of maturing and corruption show, parallels with organic processes can be found in meteorological phenomena, but always at the level of the individual parts of the Earth. Although the sublunary world can be understood in organic terms, this world is not a ‘cosmic animal’, but rather a multiplicity of ‘regional animals’. To corroborate this thesis, this paper addresses several related questions, including: the mechanics ofenvironmental changes according to Aristotle; the differences between the regions of the Earth; the lexicon used in Meteorology to refer to the transformations of the Earth; the personal notes that Alexander adds to Aristotle’s discussion. Finally, the first modern translation of the relevant section of Alexander’s commentary is also provided here.

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Copyright of Reti Medievali is the property of Firenze University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Aristotle's broad characterization of the soul has been challenged on account of its reliance on the notion of a "potentially alive body". J. L. Ackrill famously claimed that no body can meet this description without being already actually alive. By a close inspection of both metaphysical and embryological texts, this paper argues that (1) it is embryos (and not fully-formed organic bodies) who provide the right kind of potentially alive subjects and that (2) the schematic character of the soul's common formula accounts for its seemingly intractable features. It also holds that (3) once the homonymous nature of life is brought into the picture, the κοινότατος λόγος appears unproblematic - at least for some of its most troublesome instances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the paper I discuss three theses defended by A. Kenny: (1) in antiquity up to Aspasius or to Alexander of Aphrodisias the EE was considered the most important version of Aristotle's ethical discourse; (2) the idea that the common books belonged to the one or to the other treatise; (3) the opposition between the theory of happiness of EN I and X and that of EE II and VIII. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between contemplative and active life in Cicero's last philosophical work, the De officiis. This highly studied topic in the philosopher's work and life embraces fundamental issues such as sapientia and prudentia, utilitas, and the characteristics of human nature, in its twofold and irreducible value, both descriptive and prescriptive.The second part of the paper explores how Cicero thought about these themes in connection with Aristotelian philosophy and, more specifically, with the ethical-political reflection of the Stagirite. In fact, Cicero's text contains evident references, albeit with interesting repositioning and changes, to crucial questions about contemplative and active life already posed by Aristotle, above all the role and meaning of sapientia and prudentia, notions that Cicero explicitly connects, although in a thorny process of concordia discors, with the ones of. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an historical analysis of the role of moral exemplarity in Thomas Aquinas' thought, in order to contribute to the current discussion on moral Exemplarism. First, I will argue that, by combining Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, Aquinas' ethics amounts to a peculiar exemplarist theory of the virtues. The Aristotelian emphasis on the phronimos, combined with the Neoplatonic exitus-reditus conceptual schema, results - I will argue - in an account of the degrees of virtue which grounds a form of theological exemplarism. Then, I will claim that, in order to make sense of Aristotle's own ethical dynamism, an understanding of the development of virtue by degrees is needed. By means of such an understanding, I will show that the distance separating Aquinas' and Aristotle's account of virtue development significantly reduces. Thanks to this analysis, I will finally support a model of virtue development grounded both in moral exemplarity and in an ideal of dynamic unity of the virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction summarizes the six new papers collected in Volume 1, Tome 5: Eleatic Ontology and Aristotle. The papers take a fresh look at virtually every aspect of Aristotle’s engagement with Eleaticism. They are particularly concerned with Aristotle’s responses to Parmenidean monism, the Eleatic rejection of change, and Zeno’s paradoxes. The contributions also focus on the ways in which Aristotle developed several of his own theories in metaphysics and natural science partly in reaction to Eleatic puzzles and arguments.

In a work entitled On the Generation of Animals, Aristotle remarks that “intellect (nous) alone enters from outside (thurathen)”. Interpretations of this passage as dualistic dominate the history of ideas and allow for a joining together of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on the soul. This, however, pulls against the well-known Aristotelian position that soul and body are intertwined and interdependent. The most influential interpretations thereby misrepresent Aristotle’s view on soul and lack any real engagement with his embryology. This paper seeks to extract the account of intellect (nous) in Aristotelian embryology from this interpretative background and place it within the context of his mature biological thought. A clear account of the actual import of this statement in its relevant context is given before explaining how it has been misunderstood by various interpretative traditions. The paper finishes by touching on how early commentary by Christian writers, freed as it was from the imperative to synthesise Greek philosophy, differed from those that came after. While realising that Aristotle’s position would not aid them in their explanations of the soul’s survival after death, their engagement with Aristotle’s science allowed for other aspects of theology concerning the fittingness of soul to body.

Towards the end of the fourth century CE Nemesius, bishop of Emesa in Syria, composed his treatise On Human Nature (Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου). The nature of the soul and its relation to the body are central to Nemesius’ treatment. In developing his argument, he draws not only on Christian authors but on a variety of pagan philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the great physician-cum-philosopher Galen of Pergamum. This paper examines Nemesius’ references to Aristotle’s biology in particular, focusing on a few passages in the light of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals and History of Animals as well as the doxographic tradition. The themes in question are: the status of the intellect, the scale of nature and the respective roles of the male and female in reproduction. Central questions are: Exactly which impact did Aristotle make on his thinking? Was it mediated or direct? Why does Nemesius cite Aristotle and how? Long used as a source for earlier works now lost, Nemesius’ work may provide intriguing glimpses of the intellectual culture of his time. This paper is designed to contribute to this new approach to his work.

This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective is to illustrate how the post-truth condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper hopes to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age.

This paper wants to address the Aristotelian analysis of the concept of mimesis from a social and cultural angle. It is going to show that mimesis is crucial if we want to understand why the institution of the theatre played such a crucial role in the civic educational programme of classical Athens. The paper’s argument is that the magic spell of theatrical imitation, its aesthetic machinery was exploited by the city for civic educational function. Dramas, and in particular tragedies helped to articulate the city’s political expectations from the citizens, and they achieved it with far better efficiency than any other medium of propaganda which was available in those days. It will first reconstruct the duality within the internal structure of the Aristotelian account of mimesis in Poetics: it will show both 1.) the aesthetic and 2.) the socio-cultural dimensions of his theory of civic initiation through dramatic imitation. In the second part it will compare this Greek cultural context with a similar context in Rome in the activity and writings of Cicero. Finally, the paper presents the Renaissance republican context of early modern Europe, which also connected politico-moral education with the idea of mimesis.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the transition of Aeetes from an epic to a tragic figure in the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius. The Argonautica is a generic mixture of both epic and tragic elements. On the one hand, it is an epic poem based on Homeric aesthetics. On the other hand, Apollonius differentiates himself from Homer by promoting different values through his epic. Within the Argonautica, we can distinguish a transition from an epic to a tragic poetic mode. In other words, Apollonius composes an epic that consists of many minor tragedies. Aeetes can be used as an example of this generic transition. He is supposed to be a representative of archaic epic within the Argonautica. However, although Aeetes is represented as an epic figure in the beginning of the poem, he ends up being a tragic figure, in accordance with the definition given by Aristotle in his Poetics.

The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of akrasia and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us. In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in Meno (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the Protagoras. To achieve this rapprochement between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on akrasia in Protagoras adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes. [1] “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part of the soul and is thereby doing away with passion and character…” (Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1.1. 1182 a15-26)

Written between 1321 and 1328 by one of the outstanding figures of the early Palaeologan Age, the Σημειώσεις γνωμικαί of Theodorus Metochita are a collection of 120 essays, dealing with various topics of history, philosophy, literature, which are considered to have no close parallels neither in Greek nor in Byzantine literature. This paper presents the critical edition, with Italian translation and notes, of essay 80: here, Metochita asserts that the ancient Greek philosophers wrote down models of the ideal state which had in fact been impracticable and compares them to some figures, taken from ancient history, whose laws had been successfully applied in real life. The paper focuses on defining the sources of Metochita’s statements and aims to point out that he reveals no hesitation in making intentional omissions, as well as quoting almost literal passages from the works of authors like Plutarchus and Dio Chrysostomus, in order to confirm his conclusions.

This paper considers the nature of the changes that took place in logic teaching at the University of Oxford from the beginning of the sixteenth century, when students attended university lectures on Aristotle’s texts as well as studying short works dealing with specifically medieval developments, to the beginning of the eighteenth century when teaching was centred in the colleges, the medieval developments had largely disappeared, and manuals summarizing Aristotelian logic were used. The paper also considers the reasons for these changes, including changes in English society, and the effect of humanism and the more scholarly Aristotelianism that it produced.

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This paper discusses Aristotle’s account of multivocity (πολλαχῶς/ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται) as expounded in Topics 1.15. This article argues that an inquiry into how many ways (ποσαχῶς) something is said becomes for Aristotle a tool of dialectical examination that he employs throughout his entire philosophical career: investigating the many/multiple ways (πολλαχῶς/πλεοναχῶς) something is said allows one to recognize the ambiguity of the term in question and, consequently, to construct an adequate definition of its referent. The present study reconstructs the various strategies for detecting ambiguity and discusses its different types. Subsequently, the paper accounts for why Aristotle moves so easily from words and their meanings to things and their essences. Finally, the article presents an analysis of the connection between the many ways something is said and the various categories it is predicated in. The considerations are supported by a new translation of Topics 1.15.

In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle’s De Anima. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.

O artigo trata da presença de St. Agostinho no pensamento heideggeriano. Agostinho não representa apenas uma fonte importante para a formação do jovem Heidegger (junto com a fenomenologia de Husserl e a filosofia aristotélica), mas também uma tendência fundamental, algumas vezes tácita, que Heidegger procura absorver e metabolizar em seu próprio pensamento. A interpretação das Confissões - em particular as leituras sobre memoria e temptatio no livro X e sobre o tempo no livro XI, realizadas durante o curso sobre Agostinho e o Neoplatonismo - é a oportunidade que tem Heidegger para tomar algumas decisões teóricas básicas. O homem é um "ser-aí" histórico e temporal que levanta a questão do ser, porque ele é em si mesmo esta própria questão. Enquanto para St. Agostinho o homem é o ente que pergunta diante de um Tu, no pensamento de Heidegger, a questão do homem - a pergunta que é o homem - é entregue ao "nada", porque o mistério de ser não pode mais se manifestar como uma presença. A possibilidade de uma confissão, entendida como um diálogo dramático entre o "Eu" e a presença do ser, torna-se para Heidegger o sinal de finitude do "ser-aí" e de impossibilidade do próprio ser. O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar a atenção de Heidegger (em alguns cursos e ensaios escritos no início dos anos vinte) em "salvar" a descoberta agostiniana de inquietudo, interpretando-a a partir da noção aristotélica de physis - o ente que traz consigo o princípio do movimento - como uma cinética autorreferencial da vida.The paper deals with Augustine's presence in Heidegger's thought. Indeed, Augustine is not only the main source for the young Heidegger's training (together with Husserl's phenomenology and Aristotle's philosophy), but is also the fundamental inclination, sometimes hidden, that Heidegger tries to absorb and metabolize in his own thought. The Confessions' interpretation - in particular the reading of book X on memoria and temptatio and book XI on time faced during the Lectures on Augustin and Neoplatonism - is the chance Heidegger has to make some basic theoretical decisions. Human being is nothing but an historical and temporal being-there who raises the question of being because he is in himself that question. While for Augustine the question is raised before a You, in Heidegger's thought the question of human being - i.e. the question that human being is - is handed over to "nothing", because the mystery of being can never become a presence. The possibility of a confession, as a dramatic dialogue between the I and the presence of being, becomes for Heidegger the sign of the finitude of the being-there and the impossibility of being in itself. The aim of the paper is to show Heidegger's attempt (in some lectures and articles wrote during the early Twenties) to "save" Augustine's discovery of inquietudo interpreting it on the ground of Aristotle's physis - i.e. that being which has within itself the principle of the movement - as a self-referential kinetics of life.

Aristotle’s aitiai (‘causes’) are middle terms in Aristotelian syllogisms. I argue that stating the aitia of a thing therefore amounts to re-describing this same thing in an alternative and illuminating way. This, in turn, means that a thing and its aitiai really are one and the same thing under different descriptions. The purpose of this paper is to show that this view is implied by Aristotle’s account of explanation, and that it makes more sense than one might expect.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the different uses of the analogy between phúsis and tékhne that Aristotle introduces in Physics II. I will try to show that this comparison is referred to in order to exemplify a thesis, but also for arguing or defending a specific position, i.e. it can appear as a didactic resource, but also as a premise for an argument. This is a sign of a peculiar view about the structure of the reality. For ease of presentation, firstly, I will explain the use of the analogy between phúsis and téchne in the context of the definition about what is nature. Secondly, I will present the use of this comparison in the clarification of the two senses of phúsis. Finally, I will explore the apparition of these terms in the argumentation of Physics II 8. In these passages, Aristotle defends the presence of final causes in nature.

This paper presents Aristotle’s method of understanding the first principles of natural things in the Physics I.1 and analyzes the three stages of which this method consists. In the Physics I.1, Aristotle suggests that the natural proper route which one has to follow in order to find out the first principles of natural things is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us to what is more knowable and clear by nature. In the Physics I.1, the terms καθόλου (universal) and καθ΄ ἕκαστα (particular) are not used in their usual meaning (e.g., the meaning which the same terms have in the Posterior Analytics I. 2). This paper examines the Physics I.1 in comparison with the Posterior Analytics II. 19 in order to elucidate the meaning of καθόλου in the first chapter of Aristotle’s Physics. Furthermore, it reaches the conclusion that the structure of the natural world to which we belong determines the structure and the form of our knowledge. On the one hand, natural things are composite and, on the other hand, perception is involved in the initial grasping of natural things as composites. Thus, since perceptual knowledge is more accessible to us than any other kind of knowledge it is natural to reach knowledge of simple things, i.e., of the principles, starting our inquiry with the composites.

The papers in this dossier were written within the framework of two research projects on the refutation strategies of radical adversaries in Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings. Both projects, directed by Graciela Marcos and based in the Institute of Philosophy “Dr. Alejandro Korn” (Instituto de Filosofía “Dr. Alejandro Korn”) of the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras of the Universidad de Buenos Aires, were subsidised by the Secretaría de Ciencia y Técnica of this university and by the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Técnológica (ANCyPT), to whom we would like to express our gratitude. Special thanks also to Fabián G. Mié, who, for several years, has been working on the question of dialectic in Plato and Aristotle and with whom, even if he has not formally joined our team, we have had the good fortune to exchange ideas and discuss many of the issues related to both projects. Fabián Mié’s work is therefore added to the works presented by Lucas M. Álvarez, María E. Díaz, Martín S. Forciniti, Julián Macías and Graciela E. Marcos in this dossier.

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap.

The present paper deals with eight charges that are frequently leveled against any research that focuses on the agrapha dogmata. The charges are demonstrated to be completely unfounded and, therefore, duly dismissed. In particular, it is argued here that the phrase ta legomena (so‑called) is by no means to be understood as ironic. Consequently, the article rejects the very common picture of Plato as some sort of dogma‑ tist and author of a fixed philosophical system. However, Plato’s philoso‑ phy is presented as rather ‘overt’ and ‘straightforward’ in its nature. With the situation being as it is, thorough knowledge of the agrapha dogmata is shown to be an absolute prerequisite for understanding Plato’s dialogues. The paper concludes with an observation that while investigating the issue is completely warranted and does not in any way entail any devaluation of the dialogues, Aristotle’s testimony must also be taken into account.

The ambition of this paper is to wonder whether the cathartic function of art can be efficient in the face of contemporary political violence. To sketch out an answer to this broad issue, our study begins with a presentation of the theory of the scapegoat and sacrificial violence in the work of René Girard, continues with the presentation of the function of catharsis in Aristotle’s Poetics and its implementation in a few examples of tragedies, and concludes with William Marx’s modern approach to this notion.

This paper provides an examination of a chapter from Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy (I, 47) in which Machiavelli argues that men deceive themselves in general matters more than they do in particular ones. It contends that in order to defend this claim, Machiavelli tacitly relies on a specific passage from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (I, 2 982a 24-25) which deals with the status of empirical and intellectual knowledge respectively. The passage Machiavelli uses conveyed a well-known tenet of Aristotle’s epistemology, one which was also relayed by all medieval and early modern collections of Auctoritates Aristotelis. Not only does Machiavelli appropriate Aristotle’s account, however, but also reworks it in an original way, giving it a markedly political connotation that was absent in Aristotle.

Thinking more and otherwise about Plato and Aristotle. A comparison between classical and contemporary epistemology The paper contains a particular historical and philosophical interpretation, the hermeneutic possibility of revising the traditional distinction between the founders of Western thought, Plato and Aristotle, which fits within a general thematic horizon, that of the importance of epistemology for knowing and action. The inspiration for this interpretation is offered by Popper, who thought of science as «open knowledge» useful to the «open societies», thus, by the support of the same Popperian reading of the two classical authors, as well as of a careful analysis of the Platonic and Aristotelian texts centered on the theme of the epistemology, it is possible to reinterpret the traditional way of understanding Plato and Aristotle: the first, paradoxically, would be anti-metaphysical, a friend of partial thinking, of contradiction, of the inexhaustibility of scientific research; the second on the contrary, would turn out to be rigid classifier, intuitionist, deductivist tout court.

Truth has always been a controversial subject in Aristotelian scholarship. In most cases, including some well-known passages in the Categories, De Interpretatione and Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the predicate ‘true’ for assertions, although exceptions are many and impossible to ignore. One of the most complicated cases is the concept of practical truth in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics: its entanglement with action and desire raises doubts about the possibility of its inclusion to the propositional model of truth. Nevertheless, in one of the most extensive studies on the subject, C. Olfert has tried to show that this is not only possible but also necessary. In this paper, we explain why trying to fit practical truth into the propositional model comes with insurmount­able problems. In order to overcome these problems, we focus on multiple aspects of practical syllogism and correlate them with Aristo­tle’s account of desire, happiness and the good. Identifying the role of such concepts in the specific steps of practical reasoning, we reach the conclusion that practical truth is best explained as the culmination of a well-executed practical syllogism taken as a whole, which ultimately explains why this type of syllogism demands a different approach and a different kind of truth than the theoretical one.

In this paper, I show that Aristotle’s refutation of the Eleatic argument in Physics I.8 is based on the idea that a thing at the starting point of coming to be is composite and is made up of what underlies and a priva­tion. In doing so, I clarify how the concept of accidentality as used in his solution should be understood in relation to the composite nature of what comes to be. I also suggest an explanation of why Aristotle’s discus­sion of the Eleatic dilemma in Physics I.8, unlike his discussion in the previous chapter, is not clear.

While Aristotle provides the crucial testimonies for the paradoxes of motion, topos, and the falling millet seed, surprisingly he shows almost no interest in the paradoxes of plurality. For Plato, by contrast, the plurality paradoxes seem to be the central paradoxes of Zeno and Simplicius is our primary source for those. This paper investigates why the plurality paradoxes are not examined by Aristotle and argues that a close look at the context in which Aristotle discusses Zeno holds the answer to this question.

This paper proposes an interpretation of Books V and VI of Aristotle’s Physics as being (at least partly) a reaction to Zeno’s four “arguments against motion” that Aristotle expounds and discusses in Phys. VI 9. On the basis of a detailed textual analysis of that chapter, I show that Zeno’s arguments rest on a frame of a priori notions such as part and whole, in contact, between, limit, etc., which Aristotle takes over in order to account for the inner structure (here called “the In-Between”) common to all facts of motion and change. That frame allows him to develop a specific ontology for that inner structure – although it exists only potentially according to the Aristotelian orthodoxy – because he needs such an ontology in order to vindicate the reality of motion and change.

Scholars have often seen Parmenides as entirely opposed to earlier materialistic philosophy. In this paper I argue that what is more striking in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book I is the degree of continuity that he sees between Parmenides and the material monists. I explore this coupling of Parmenides with the material monists to understand better what he takes to be distinctive and problematic with Parmenides’ monism.

This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle establishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water (Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.

This paper aims at clarifying the procedure of proofs by reductio ad impossibile in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, especially elucidating what can be taken as impossibility in such proofs. Traditional interpretation has it that the impossibility in Aristotle’s reductio proofs must be a contradiction. I argue for an alternative interpretation according to which both contrarieties and contradictions are suitable as the impossibility required by the proofs in question. I also present a definition of proof by reductio ad impossibile in accordance with the alternative interpretation.

The notion of hamartia in Aristotle’s Poetics and his moral writings refers to harmful and yet unintentional acts committed in ignorance. In the Poetics it is considered as an important feature of the best type of tragic plot and the action of many tragic characters, while relevant instances are found in both tragedy and comedy. The aim of this paper is to examine hamartia in Herondas’ mimiambs, a literary genre that draws upon the tradition of genres such as the mime, iambic poetry and drama. It is argued that mimiambs 1 and 5 show an awareness of hamartia’s usages in Aristotle and in dramatic poetry. Yet in Herondas these usages are not fully developed. They contribute instead to the elucidation of specific aspects of the characters who emerge from the mimiambs. This demonstrates Herondas’ concern with ethical norms in a world of everyday experience and his multi-faceted use of earlier philosophical discourse and literary genres.

In this paper I provide a global reading of Aristotle’s De Anima III 4 aimed at unveiling the rigorous argumentative structure of the chapter, which I show to exhibit the typical Aristotelian pattern of philosophical inquiry: a setting of the agenda of basic questions to be answered; a dialectical path to the position of a hypothesis; a derivation from it of relevant individu¬ating features of the object, some of which are already manifest and are accounted for as derivable from the hypothesis; and the emergence of aporiai that prima facie seem to invalidate the hypothesis but eventually allow for a deeper understanding of it. I attempt to reveal the speculative progression of the chapter by initially regarding the Actuality Principle as underlying his Assimilation Model of cognition (S cognizes F iff S’s cognitive principle becomes F due to a cognized object O that is F in actuality). Aristotle derives Unmixedness from not having limits of scope (Unlimitedness Asssumption), which is a manifest feature of νοῦς, from Unmixedness he derives Separability (these entail-ments are clarified through the first aporia), from Separability Spontaneity and from Spontaneity Self-thinkability of νοῦς (clarified through the second aporia). Although I examine the whole chapter, I focus specifically on the theoretical and methodological value of introducing and addressing the two aporiai.

The aim of this paper is to provide a systematical analysis of civic cults for philosophers in the Greek world as attested in literary and epigraphic sources for philosophers in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic times. It examines six philosophers and persons who were connected with philosophy: Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Athenodorus of Tarsus, Iollas of Sardis, and Pythagoras. The main focus is on questions of the historicity of the cults as well as on their argumentative setting in the context of biographical accounts of the respective persons.

In this paper I examine the testimonium of Aristotle’s Rhetoric concern­ing Diogenes the Cynic (SSR V B 184). This piece of evidence is the most ancient source of Diogenes and proves that Aristotle was familiar with his writings. I also study the testimonium on Diogenes that is hand­ed down by Theophrastus (SSR V B 172), which confirms the interest of the ancient Peripatos in this philosopher. Finally, I examine a passage of Book 1 of the Politics where Aristotle refers to the thesis on the aboli­tion of money. I argue that such a thesis could be ascribed to Diogenes. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate that several theses of political philosophy put forward by Diogenes should be considered as constitut­ing a polemical overthrow of the corresponding theses of Aristotle in Book 1 of his Politics.

This paper revaluates key moments in the court politics of Alexander the Great’s reign through the introduction of philia-networks governed by gift-exchange as a template for explaining the relationships between key participants. This approach makes it clear that Alexander initially held a passive role in the political life of his own court and was dependant on others for his succession. These dynamics shifted in the opening years of the Asian expedition as Alexander sought to break these philia-networks, building his own and surrounding his person with philoi of his own choosing.

In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both resolves some of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described there and shows how those remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks besides, as they help in the structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what is clearer and more knowable to us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, that nature exists and that natural things change—his basic starting-point for natural science. This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of “immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks must be further analyzed in terms of principles (archai) and then causes (aitia) over the course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about the natural world.[1] Such an analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition (horismos) of nature not initially available from the starting-point just mentioned (i.e., it is in need of further analysis), and which is clearer by nature.[2] It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding Aristotle’s original intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor how the Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology for natural science presented to us in 1.1. [1] An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer by nature. [2] Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source (arche) and cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-22).

In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continuity and contiguity. Next I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended bodies. I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals. Finally, I present a solution according to which Aristotle's understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a certain kind of mathematical ontology.

Some of Abraham ibn Ezra’s philosophical ideas exposed in his biblical commentaries are the same as those of Aristotle. The purpose of this article is to analyse some of the Aristotelian ideas appearing in Abraham ibn Ezra’s biblical commentaries and explain how he adapts the Aristotelian concepts to the explanation of the specific biblical verses. Ibn Ezra uses these concepts in his explanation of the structure of the Universe as found in some Psalms, the creation of the world in Genesis 1, and the origin of evil according to the book of Ecclesiastes. This paper also attempts to provide a hypothesis on how Ibn Ezra was able to apprehend Aristotelian philosophy.

This paper revisits Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on mimesis with a special emphasis on mythos as an integral part of it. I argue that the Republic’s notorious “mirror argument” is in fact ad hominem: first, Plato likely has in mind Agathon’s mirror in Aristophanes’ Thesmoforiazusae, where tragedy is construed as mimesis; second, the tongue-in-cheek claim that mirrors can reproduce invisible Hades, when read in combination with the following eschatological myth, suggests that Plato was not committed to a mirror-like view of art; third, the very omission of mythos shows that the argument is a self-consciously one-sided one, designed to caricature the artists’ own pretensions of mirror-like realism. These points reinforce Stephen Halliwell’s claim that Western aesthetics has been haunted by a «ghostly misapprehension» of Plato’s mirror. Further evidence comes from Aristotle’s “literary” (as opposed to Plato’s “sociological”) discussion: rather than to the “mirror argument”, the beginning of the Poetics points to the Phaedo as the best source of information about Plato’s views on poetry.