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In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (henceforth EN). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from EN I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not taken into account in previous editions of the EN—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the EN that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages.

In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.

This paper sets out to analyze Proclus’ exegesis of Socrates’ suggestion in Parmenides 132d1-3 that Forms stand fixed as patterns (παραδείγματα), as it were, in the nature, with the other things being images and likenesses of them. Proclus’ analysis of the notion of being pattern reveals the impact of the Aristotelian conception of the form as paradigm on his views, as we can infer from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Simplicius’ explanation of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian form. Whereas Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias refute the efficient causality of the Platonic Forms and support that μέθεξις is just a metaphor, Syrianus, Proclus and Asclepius defend the Platonic theory, and specifically Proclus, who brings to the fore the multilateral role of the Forms as patterns with regard to the secondary things of this realm.[1] [1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium Platonicum XII: Plato’s Parmenides, organized by the International Plato Society, Paris, 15-19 July 2019.

In a work entitled On the Generation of Animals, Aristotle remarks that “intellect (nous) alone enters from outside (thurathen)”. Interpretations of this passage as dualistic dominate the history of ideas and allow for a joining together of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on the soul. This, however, pulls against the well-known Aristotelian position that soul and body are intertwined and interdependent. The most influential interpretations thereby misrepresent Aristotle’s view on soul and lack any real engagement with his embryology. This paper seeks to extract the account of intellect (nous) in Aristotelian embryology from this interpretative background and place it within the context of his mature biological thought. A clear account of the actual import of this statement in its relevant context is given before explaining how it has been misunderstood by various interpretative traditions. The paper finishes by touching on how early commentary by Christian writers, freed as it was from the imperative to synthesise Greek philosophy, differed from those that came after. While realising that Aristotle’s position would not aid them in their explanations of the soul’s survival after death, their engagement with Aristotle’s science allowed for other aspects of theology concerning the fittingness of soul to body.

In a seminal essay from 1967, historian Lynn White, Jr., argues that the profound cause of today’s environmental crisis is the anthropocentric perspective, embedded in the Christian “roots” of Western tradition, which assigns an intrinsic value to human beings solely. Though White’s thesis relies on a specific tradition – the so-called “dominant anthropocentric reading” of Genesis – the idea that anthropocentrism provides the ideological basis for the exploitation of nature has proven tenacious, and even today is the ground assumption of the historical and philosophical debate on environmental issues. This paper investigates the possible impact on this debate of a different kind of anthropocentrism: Aristotle’s philosophy of biology. The topic is controversial, since it involves opposing traditions of interpretations; for the purpose of the present paper, the dominant anthropocentric reading of Gen. 1.28 will be analyzed, and the relevant passages from Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium, showing his commitment to a more sophisticated anthropocentric perspective, will be reviewed.

Towards the end of the fourth century CE Nemesius, bishop of Emesa in Syria, composed his treatise On Human Nature (Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου). The nature of the soul and its relation to the body are central to Nemesius’ treatment. In developing his argument, he draws not only on Christian authors but on a variety of pagan philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the great physician-cum-philosopher Galen of Pergamum. This paper examines Nemesius’ references to Aristotle’s biology in particular, focusing on a few passages in the light of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals and History of Animals as well as the doxographic tradition. The themes in question are: the status of the intellect, the scale of nature and the respective roles of the male and female in reproduction. Central questions are: Exactly which impact did Aristotle make on his thinking? Was it mediated or direct? Why does Nemesius cite Aristotle and how? Long used as a source for earlier works now lost, Nemesius’ work may provide intriguing glimpses of the intellectual culture of his time. This paper is designed to contribute to this new approach to his work.

This paper analyses the argumentative strategy of the ninth chapter of the treatise De Interpretatione in the light of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The subject of the ‘future events’ developed in chapter IX brings up themes that are proper not only to philosophical thought, but also to political practice, forensic rhetoric, deliberative rhetoric and even tragic poetry. In this paper, it is argued that Aristotle uses the dialectical method and certain rhetorical techniques to touch the various discussions related to the subject addressed. He erects a hypothetical adversary and a thesis to refute, condensing some positions that were probably scattered in the most diverse textual and oratory sources of his time. Moreover, he builds the thesis of his hypothetical opponent from premises established in previous chapters of his own treatise. With this, he can simulate the defense of his opponent's thesis before demolishing it. Thus, according to the hypothesis defended here, the philosopher does not in fact commit himself to the arguments presented between 18a35 and 18b25, but only simulates the defense of the reasoning which he will soon refute. In addition, it is also concluded that chapter IX is part of the argumentative chain of the treatise, having as a peculiar characteristic, not the theme or nature of the arguments exposed, but the rhetorical method it employs.

Lucian’s Hermotimus, despite its first appearances of being a merely skeptical, even sophistical discrediting of philosophy, is better read as a powerful protreptic defense of the endeavor, whose key ancient intertext is Plato's Republic. To make this case, the paper involves three parts. In part i, we examine the metaphilosophical framing of the Hermotimus’s exchange between the eponymous hero, aged about 60 (§48) and Lucian’s favored interlocutor, Lycinus. We show that Lucian accepts that philosophy is intended to be an elevated way of life cultivating wisdom and virtue, at the same time as he is concerned at how readily this pursuit can devolve into a hybristic, sectarian endeavor, in which pupils identify uncritically with instructors who do not match their words with their deeds. In part ii., we address the central elenchus and the action of the Hermotimus, the patient work by Lycinus to undermine Hermotimus’ dogmatic self-conceit, by refuting the different solutions he offers to the paradox involved in his having chosen a particular philosophical orientation, Stoicism, as a novice without philosophical training. Part iii. excavates the positive vision of philosophy that the action of the dialogue shows, highlighting the five key places in Hermotimus wherein Lycinus offers us entirely unironic visions of what philosophy at it best could be, in contrast to what it has become in Hermotimus or his teachers: or, as Lycinus heralds it, a kind of Ariadne’s thread out of the maze of Hermotimus’ paradox (§68).

In this paper, I aim to explore the structure of the exercise in the second part of the Parmenides. In analyzing the transitional section, I claim that in addition to diairesis, there is another method of division, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus. On this basis, I explain how Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses, in which the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same and those of the nonpaired hypotheses differ. In closing, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato’s use of chiasmus.

The aim of this paper is to explain why Thrasymachus, upon first appearing in Republic I, prohibits Socrates from defining justice as what is good. I argue that Thrasymachus views such definitions as equivocal, since he conceives of the good as relative: what is good must be good for someone. This relative conception of the good makes Thrasymachus similar to the sight-lovers, who believe in good things, which are relatively good, but deny the existence of the good itself, which is absolutely good. Understanding Thrasymachus as a sight-lover permits an illuminating reframing of his outlook and his significance for the larger project of the Republic.

The aim of this paper is to study a set of three issues related to the understanding of partial justice and partial injustice as character dispositions, namely the distinctive circumstance of action, the emotion involved therein and the pleasure or pain following it. Those points are treated in a relatively obscure way by Aristotle, especially in comparison with their treatment in the expositions of other character virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Building on the expression ‘capacity towards the other’ (δύναμις ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον), the paper highlights the interpersonal nature of the circumstances of just and unjust actions, and points how such nature is directly related to notions such as ‘profit’ (κέρδος) or ‘getting more’(πλεονεκτεῖν) as well as to the unusual conception of excess, defect and intermediacy in Nicomachean Ethics Book V. The interpersonal nature of just and unjust actions works also as the starting-point for the interpretation both of the pleasure briefly mentioned in 1130b4 as characterizing the greedy person and of the emotion involved in acting justly or greedy, which is mentioned in an extremely elliptical way in 1130b1-2: the paper argues, on the one hand, that the pleasure felt in acting justly or unjustly concerns not only the goods that are the object of just or unjust interactions, but also the way such interactions affect the people involved; on the other hand, it argues that the emotion actuated in just or unjust interactions relates to the agent’s concern or lack of concern with the good of those people.

The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizes his students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance on theory, and his insistence on adding training? This paper argues that this tension can be resolved through an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis).

In this paper, I contend that the standard interpretation of the Republic, according to which “the city of pigs” (CP) is an entirely deficient precursor to the one ideally just state, Kallipolis, is untenable. In the vital respect of unity, which for Plato is the defining condition of virtue in the soul and the city, CP is equally if not more just than Kallipolis. In part 1, I outline CP in terms of what I contend are the three organizing principles that secure its unity (“trade specialization”; “right size”; and “modesty”), before proceeding to defend this unity from some typical criticisms. The aim is to show that CP is unified and hence just, which allows us to make sense of why Socrates describes it as “complete” (telea), “true” (alêthinê), and “healthy” (hugiês), despite Glaucon’s protestations. To do so, I will have to first argue against objections from those who interpret CP as a suggestio falsi, or an exercise in playful irony, sketched only to establish the need for Kallipolis. In part 2, I then proceed to show that although Kallipolis is in certain respects superior to CP, it suffers from structural disunity relating to its heretofore unnoticed or downplayed geographical and social scissions—scissions that are requisite and unavoidable for its very organization. As such, Socrates tacitly suggests, I contend, that these scissions mark a disunity that results from reneging CP’s third organizing principle: the “modesty” principle. When Socrates, on his interlocutors’ demands, expands CP by allowing in items and conditions of luxury that provoke pleonexia (greed or covetousness) thus giving birth to the “feverish city,” he leads us to see the necessity of a kind of set-up in Kallipolis with a socially and geographically disparate class of guardians that is saturated by disunity. The overall argument of this paper is that Socrates takes us on a dialectical journey, leading us to see that unity and hence justice in each city depends upon each citizen doing her job and no more than her job (i.e., the principle of trade specialization) (433A-B). Both CP and Kallipolis are sketched for this heuristic purpose—to allow us to see this vision of justice. Socrates’ point in taking us on the dialectical journey, I contend, is to enable us to realize not just what justice is but what inhibits or threatens justice—namely, luxury, or more precisely wealth. CP is not a good model to allow us to see this, but this does not render it a suggestio falsi or an unrealistic false start. Indeed, on my reading, Socrates is not only serious when he dubs the city of pigs true and healthy, but we have to take these pronouncements seriously in order to properly accompany him on the journey and properly see his vision of political justice and injustice.

The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of akrasia and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us. In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in Meno (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the Protagoras. To achieve this rapprochement between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on akrasia in Protagoras adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes. [1] “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part of the soul and is thereby doing away with passion and character…” (Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1.1. 1182 a15-26)

The paper examines closer the notion expressed by the word amēkhaníē in DK 6. 5. In his analysis of problematic of knowledge Parmenides alerts about amekhaníē of mortals, a word generally translated with `lack of resources` or ‘perplexity’, a kind of problem that drives the thinking astray. Scholars point out in many passages of the poem the opposition between imperfect mortals and the eidóta phōta of DK 1. 3, the wise man. However, as much as I know, nobody noticed that, if mortals have a lack of resources, the goddess is teaching exactly how to fix it with a kind of method given through her precepts, which are an authentic mēchané. The paper shows that this is the genuine didactic aim of Parmenides, as he says in 1.28-30, i.e., to point out where is the error of mortals and how the wise man fixes it. Starting from a reinterpretation of 1.29 and following with the analysis of fr. 6, the paper shows that the method of fr. 2 is indeed the mēchané that can do that. Although the word is not present in the poem, it is one of its main topics. It seems (by the extant fragments) Parmenides had no clear word to call his mēchané, a psychological cognitive tool we call today principle of non-contradiction.

In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle’s De Anima. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.

In the Symposium of Plato, Socrates reports that Diotima once described to him a process of initiation by which a lover rises from desiring one beautiful body to catching sight of what seems to be the Platonic form of beauty. Scholars have debated whether the lover is to make this ascent by a rational process or a non-rational one, or by both working either in concert or independently. This paper argues that love leads and guides a process in this initiation that necessarily involves rational activity. No teaching is necessary or appropriate, so that the process is an example of learning without being taught. The philosophical insight that results is life-changing, but it does not amount to the kind of knowledge that would fully satisfy a Socratic seeker after knowledge.

In De partibus animalium A1, Aristotle presents —in a darker than usual way— decisive details of the methodology he devised for his science of nature. His indications seem to point the path along which Aristotelian biology should travel. However, numerous textual and systematic difficulties have given rise to a number of conflicting interpretations, in the context of a vigorous stream of philosophical research and debate since the last third of the last century. In this stream of studies, Michael of Ephesus’s commentary on PA and his views on the subject remain relatively ignored. A complex multiplicity of factors seems to support the lack of sufficient consensus among leading contemporary specialists to explicitly consider those contributions. The purpose of this paper is to examine several of these factors and, based on the evidence provided by little explored aspects of Michael’s texts, to offer arguments in favor of that consensus against a number of alternatives. I shall argue that the contributions of this late commentator deserve to be considered —mutatis mutandis— as seriously as it is done with the main ancient Greek commentaries; in particular, in the philosophical studies of those who are currently interested in that methodology or are engaged in Aristotelian biology.

In Ennead III.5 On Love, Plotinus' discussion of erôs is underlined by Plato’s discourse on love in the Symposium and the Phaedrus.[1] Plotinus conceives erôs as a purified power, which directs the soul to the intelligible realm of beauty and the world of the Forms.[2] Modern scholarship considers the Plotinian erôs as an ascending power that is always directed to the higher realm of the Forms and never to the lower perceptible realm. Throughout the Enneads, the soul is described as purely and originally an intelligible entity in all its manifestations and expressions (ex. Ennead IV.8).[3] Plotinus particularly supports a dual aspect theory of the soul, in which the homogenous psychē consists of two interrelated aspects - a higher intelligible part related to Intellect, and a lower perceptible part related to the sensible bodies (Caluori, 2015; Remes, 2007; Stamatellos, 2013; Stern-Gillet, 2009). However, limited attention has been paid to the intelligible aspects of the soul's desire in Plotinus' conception of erôs. In this context, this paper aims to revisit the view that Plotinus completely refuted the desire of the physical bodies, and consequently refuted erôs as a power directed to the lower perceptible realm (Ferwerda, 1965; Friedländer, 1964; Hadot, 1963; Wallis, 1995). It is argued that in light of the soul's intelligibility, desire also has an intelligible aspect when it is directed, along with the power of love, to the earthly realm and thus the true intelligible beauty of the perceptible bodies is recognized. [1] Hereafter, all quotations from Plotinus’ Enneads will solely refer to Armstrong’s (1966-1988) translations. [2] See Bertozzi (2012, 2021); Tatarkiewicz (1980); Wallis (1995); Wiitala (2013), Vasilakis (2021). [3] For Plotinus’ theory of the soul, see his treatises in Ennead IV. Also see Blumenthal (1971) and Caluori (2015).

Aristotle’s aitiai (‘causes’) are middle terms in Aristotelian syllogisms. I argue that stating the aitia of a thing therefore amounts to re-describing this same thing in an alternative and illuminating way. This, in turn, means that a thing and its aitiai really are one and the same thing under different descriptions. The purpose of this paper is to show that this view is implied by Aristotle’s account of explanation, and that it makes more sense than one might expect.

This paper evaluates the arguments presented regarding the interpretation of false pleasures in Plato’s Philebus during the past 50 years. As the central axis of the debate is the concept of propositional attitude, I will tell the story of the propositional interpretation of the passage to show how and why it was constructed to become seemingly obvious, irrefutable, and even Platonic in its origin. Besides this, the paper raises the following problems for the propositional interpretation: (i) if it has textual basis and (ii) if it is necessary to understand the passage or if it is an obstacle and should be abandoned so that the Platonic text could be read in a non-anachronistic way.

The main concern of this paper is the problem of method in De Caelo (Book 2 and some related treatises), which has been recently invigorated by the supposition of Aristotle’s acceptance of two standards of justification. Whereas the φυσικῶς argument comes close to demonstrative knowledge, the εὐλόγως argument relies on more general assumptions and allegedly points towards argumentative justification (sometimes associated with dialectic). With a view to better understanding how empirical criteria for theories, teleological principles, and the resolution of difficulties are laid down to provide as much causal explanations as possible, we take side here in the debate about the very purpose of Aristotle’s using of justification by argument in scientific contexts. Our main claim is that although only reasonable proofs can be worked out in empirically underdetermined domains, this in no way amounts to endorsing an alternative to the norms of inquiry Aristotle upholds in natural science.

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap.

In this paper, I explore the Presocratic antecedents of the Stoic theory of conflagration and argue that, even though three central theses of this theory have solid antecedents in Presocratic physics, the logical connection between them is a Stoic innovation. I label the Presocratics who hold these theses ‘Anaximandreans’ and include in this group Anaximander himself , Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, and reveal that Anaximenes, Democritus and Antiphon share with them central meteorological and cosmological assumptions.

Even though rejecting the notion of void, Aristotle considers it a crucial theme in his discussion about motion. That becomes evident when we find four chapters of Physics 4 dedicated to the discussion and refutation of the void. In this paper, I set on an exploratory search for the reasons that moved Aristotle to discuss the idea of void as a container (ἀγγεῖον) in Phys. 4.6 213a15-19, unearthing a series of terms and notions used by previous thinkers that may have led Aristotle to formulate such conception. Special attention is given to Democritus, who, with his theory of atoms and void, is clearly the main target of Aristotle’s criticism of the void. I conclude that the notion of void as a container is not at all strange to ancient thinkers, and that its reconstitution by Aristotle is everything but trivial and simplistic, inasmuch as the Democritean notion of void he intends to refute is everything but trivial and simplistic.

This paper gathers from Didymus’ exegetical works (in particular from the lessons on the book of Psalms and on the Ecclesiastes) all significant testimonies concerning his knowledge of natural sciences and his anthropological doctrine. Based on these materials I will briefly discuss their possible sources, trying to answer following questions: a) What kind of Aristotelian doctrines can we recognise in Didymus’ statements concerning cosmology, biology and anthropology? b) Is there sufficient evidence to conclude that he had, beside the Organon, also a direct knowledge of other Aristotelian works? c) How important are methods and doctrines coming from Aristotle for Didymus’ exegetical practice?

Book 1 of Plato’s Laws, and particularly the image of the puppet introduced near its end, has been traditionally interpreted as presenting the moral psychology model that underlies the educational system delineated by the Athenian Stranger, which construes virtue as consonance between the non–rational and the rational elements of the soul. But a different and competing conception of virtue looms large in Laws 1, virtue as victory of the best part of the soul in psychic conflict. This paper argues that the Athenian’s conception of education as the correct conformation of originally conflicting psychic forces requires the simultaneous presence of the harmony and the conflict models of virtue in Laws 1. Education is in turn defined by calculation, the rational activity which persuasively leads the conflicting non–rational forces towards a consonant reciprocal rapport. By strategically developing his understanding of education and calculation in Laws 1, the Athenian shows how the harmony model of virtue overcomes the conflict model, while at the same time recognising that there is some truth to the conflict model after all and integrating it within the harmony model.

This paper aims at clarifying the procedure of proofs by reductio ad impossibile in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, especially elucidating what can be taken as impossibility in such proofs. Traditional interpretation has it that the impossibility in Aristotle’s reductio proofs must be a contradiction. I argue for an alternative interpretation according to which both contrarieties and contradictions are suitable as the impossibility required by the proofs in question. I also present a definition of proof by reductio ad impossibile in accordance with the alternative interpretation.

In the first part of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle introduces an argument for fatalism that he obviously does not subscribe to. Readers of the chapter wonder how Aristotle replies to that argument. In this paper I claim that the main basis of his reply is the principle of equimodality stated in 19a33 (“statements are true in the same way as the actual things are”). I defend that this principle should be interpreted in the most straightforward way, as saying that the modality with which any statement is true is the same as the modality with which the actual things referred to in the statement are what they are. This entails that something is (or will be) necessarily such and such only if the statement saying that it is (or will be) such and such is necessarily true. By applying this principle to Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of non-necessary things – those that happen as chance has it and those that happen for the most part (hôs epi to poly) in one way rather than another –, one should conclude that, because these things are contingent, statements about them can only be contingently true.

Since Antiquity, the meaning and purpose of Aristotle’s sea-battle argument have been highly controversial. On the so-called traditional interpretation of De Interpretatione 9, the argument is intended to prove that not every statement is always true or false on the assumption deemed evident that facts may occur contingently in our sublunar world. In this paper I argue that this interpretation is for many reasons much more plausible than any of its competitors, so that its correctness is worthy at least of moral certainty. In particular, I contend that it can coexist in perfect logical harmony with a moderately charitable reading of Aristotle’s texts that at first glance it seems to confute. As a matter of fact, I contend that it is faithful to Aristotle’s view of logical laws as consequent upon the metaphysical structure of reality.

This paper uses Aristophanes' Lysistrata to draw out the central violent tension of the weaving paradigm in Plato's Statesman. In the Lysistrata, weaving is offered as a metaphor for a tyrannical refashioning of the polis. In strikingly similar terms, the Eleatic Stranger of the Statesman proposes weaving as a metaphor for the best form of government. What is laughed off in the play, the characters of Plato's dialogue seem to take seriously. Through a comparative reading, I argue that the interpretations of the Statesman that take weaving as a paradigm for the best government of state, not only miss the comedy in the Stranger's discussion of statesmanship, but also the tragic allusions to tyranny. Furthermore, by drawing out the dialogue’s resonance with comedy, I conclude that the weaving paradigm succeeds in giving us a means for identifying tyranny in the Statesman; even when tyranny appears dressed up in a political science ostensibly formulated with the best of intentions.

The present paper aims at examining the characteristics that determine the essential nature of the homogeneous bodies in Aristotle, from an analysis of Meteorology IV.12, which would at the same time establish a certain relationship with other treatises of natural philosophy and also in particular with books VII and VIII of Metaphysics. With this investigation, I will delineate a certain line of argument that goes against a reading perspective considered as traditional, with certain interpretive variants, according to which Aristotle would have adopted the idea of ​​a universal teleology, in the general sense that all natural bodies would be generated for a specific goal, or for a natural purpose. According to a certain view, linked to this perspective, the teleological character of functional type of vital activities, notably expressed by the compositional arrangement of the non-homogeneous parts in the living being's complexion, would be somehow involved in the constitution of the homogeneous bodies considered in themselves and for themselves. In contrast to such a view, I will examine, in a precise way, to what extent the homogeneous bodies would comprise a certain formal factor directly involved in the characterization of their constitutional particularities, taking into account a comparative examination with other kinds of natural compositions, namely, elemental aggregates and living organisms. Thus, through this examination, I will explore the question of whether, in function of this formal factor, such bodies could present some teleological character trait, distinct from the functional type, characteristic of organic-animate constitutions.

In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both resolves some of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described there and shows how those remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks besides, as they help in the structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what is clearer and more knowable to us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, that nature exists and that natural things change—his basic starting-point for natural science. This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of “immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks must be further analyzed in terms of principles (archai) and then causes (aitia) over the course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about the natural world.[1] Such an analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition (horismos) of nature not initially available from the starting-point just mentioned (i.e., it is in need of further analysis), and which is clearer by nature.[2] It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding Aristotle’s original intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor how the Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology for natural science presented to us in 1.1. [1] An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer by nature. [2] Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source (arche) and cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-22).

Charioteering as a metaphor for correct and balanced thinking has been written about since Homer. The Iliad presents the divine charioteering model as exemplified by Hera and Athena and examines how the fate of mortal charioteers including Antilokhos, Patroklos and Achilles is determined based on their ability to adhere to this model. Authors as diverse as Plato, Proclus, Pindar and Euripides build upon the divine charioteering model as they show examples of charioteers who, in varying degrees, follow this model. This paper will demonstrate that heroes who veer from the model of equilibrium and moderation provided by the gods, violate justice [dikē] with their hubris and incur agony [agōn] from the divinity they antagonize.

In this paper I argue that Seneca’s philosophy is a form of therapy and that one of its main concerns is the transformation of one’s life through time control. Aristotelian tradition lies in the idea that philosophy is, in its highest aspect, an abstract form of knowledge. Seneca, on the other hand, is an inheritor of a long tradition that takes philosophy as mind or soul therapy and bases its structure in a practical approach. Epicurus, for instance, goes as far as to declare that “empty is the word of the philosopher by whom no human suffering is treated”. Even if Seneca doesn’t despise the theoretical principles that support the construction of a philosophical system, he builds, in his Letters to Lucilius, a strong therapeutic praxis whose purpose is to heal one’s mind and life. The upmost and fundamental step is providing the pupil with different ways of earning back time deprivation. Time seems to be, in a certain sense, the essential matter of Seneca’s philosophy. Time control, for him, is a kind of self-control that would make it possible to match a simple existence and a meaningful life. Therefore, Seneca’s opening letter to Lucile aims exclusively to identify how one loses time and why it’s essential to take control of it.

One issue of contention amongst scholars of the Republic is whether Thrasymachus initially espouses a conventionalist account of justice, according to which just actions are merely those which are lawful; required, or at least allowed, by the laws passed by the ruler of the state. A further question is then whether his initial conceptions of rulers and laws are positivist ones, such that to be a ruler or law of a state is simply determined by the state’s constitution (or indeed by the ruler’s ability to enforce obedience). At 340c Thrasymachus effectively rejects such positivism by placing a condition on being a ruler that one should be exercising the art of ruling and on being a law that it should work to the ruler’s interest. Some have maintained that this works to clarify his initial account and so shows that he was never a positivist about rulers and laws. In this paper I argue against such an understanding of Thrasymachus’ argument and explore the problems which beset the position he is, on my reading, forced into by Socrates’ objection to his opening claim that justice is what is in the interest of the stronger and the argument he first gives to support it.

In the Phaedo, to explain why the philosopher lives in the unusually ascetic way he does, Socrates explains what someone realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul and how he changes his behavior on the basis of this information. This paper considers the conception of belief the character uses in this explanation and whether it is the same as the conception Michael Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to have held and that the Stoics much later incorporated into their doctrine of practice.

Enneads I: 8.14 poses significant problems for scholars working in the Plotinian secondary literature. In that passage, Plotinus gives the impression that the body and not the soul is causally responsible for vice. The difficulty is that in many other sections of the same text, Plotinus makes it abundantly clear that the body, as matter, is a mere privation of being and therefore represents the lowest rung on the proverbial metaphysical ladder. A crucial aspect to Plotinus's emanationism, however, is that lower levels of a metaphysical hierarchy cannot causally influence higher ones and, thus, there is an inconsistency in the Egyptian's magnum opus, or so it would seem. Scholars have sought to work through this paradox by positing that Plotinus is a "paleolithic Platonist" or Socratic. The advantage of this approach is that one may be able to resolve the tension by invoking Socrates's eliminativist solution to the problem of weakness of will, as found in The Protagoras. In the following article, I argue that such attempts are not wrong-headed just underdetermined. They take up the standard reading of Socratic moral intellectualism, namely the "informational" interpretation and, therefore, fail to render a coherent view of Plotinus's moral philosophy. The following paper, in contrast, utilizes a new reading of intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and Smith, which, when subtended with a "powers approach" to causality, resolves the aforementioned, problematic passage of Enneads.

In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continuity and contiguity. Next I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended bodies. I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals. Finally, I present a solution according to which Aristotle's understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a certain kind of mathematical ontology.

This papers intends to show that Aristotle's theory on the political nature of man implies a specific difference in relation to other animals and that this does not arise from his understanding of human beings as naturally vulnerable animals that would seek in political life an artifice to redress their insufficiency or individual vulnerability to live. The qualitative difference of human beings in relation to other animals - including political species, such as bees or ants - drives them to an equally specific type of life, whose foundation obeys values that ca be universalized. The political application of these values does not correspond to what is done in the domestic sphere, nor does it correspond to the mere transposition to a quantitatively superior community, because the universality of political values is extracted from what is understood by human beings as necessary for the realization of man as man, not man as an element of nature.

In this paper, I identify two distinct positions on the nature of the body in Plato’s dialogues. One view, which I call the pessimistic view, holds that the body is evil and as such represents an obstacle to one’s epistemic and moral development. Another view, which I call the optimistic view, holds that the body is not itself either evil or good, but rather is capable of becoming either. The two views are, I argue, incompatible. Worse still, each view is individually incompatible with other claims that Plato is eager to advance in some dialogues. The pessimistic view, I argue, is (and is portrayed by Plato as being) incompatible with the thesis that one who has knowledge will not err. The optimistic view is incompatible with the thesis that no one errs willingly. Here I consider a number of passages in Plato’s dialogues where the nature of the body is featured, but focus particularly on passages from the Timaeus and Laws, which explicitly endorse the pessimistic and optimistic views, respectively. Plato’s views of the body, I suggest, have far reaching implications for his views on the sources of moral error and the power of knowledge in guiding right action.

At EN 1158a22-27, Aristotle argues that the virtuous man will pursue friendships with pleasant people, but not with people who are useful to him. Ideally, he adds, these friends should, despite being pleasant, also be good, since then the good man would have all the goods of friendship.The dominant problem with this passage is that the good man desires his friends to be pleasant; or, put it otherwise, that he desires pleasant friends. This idea, however, stands on the opposite side of Aristotle’s axiological hierarchy where the virtuous man desires, first and foremost, the good both as a goal in his life as a whole and in his friends, in particular. Pleasure is valuable in Aristotle’s ethics, but it only comes second to virtue and the good. In the present paper I will defend Aristotle by arguing that he may justify the argument of this passage without though jeopardizing his axiological hierarchy. To this purpose, I will provide the following reasons: (1) Character friendship is ideal for the virtuous agent. But, character friendships take place extremely rarely. The reason for this is that it is unusual for two people to have reached the same level of highly developed moral goodness. Therefore, it is rather unlikely for a good man to meet and befriend another agent as good as he is. (2) If (1) is true then if the good man does not want to remain friendless he must pursue friendships which are valuable, yet not the most valuable in Aristotle’s axiological hierarchy. In this section, I will argue that this desire derives, largely, from the good man’s social and political nature. By this I mean that he desires, by nature, to share his life with others, and especially with friends. But this is merely the initial spark that impels the agent to pursue other forms of friendship than the one that occurs between good people. (3) In this third section I will illustrate how it is likely for the good man to desire pleasant friends without this fact influencing his axiological hierarchy. I will suggest that the virtuous agent does not consider pleasant just anyone. He values others as pleasant only if he recognizes in them at least some good habits of character which are manifested by the activities that they have chosen to take part in, such as athletic activities, music, theater, and other cultured activities. The difference though between the VA and his friend rests on why each one of them values these activities, and, also, each one’s attitude towards these activities. On the one hand, the virtuous agent values them as being worthy of doing, and as being part of the good life and eudaimonia. But he does not deviate from attributing value to virtuous activity more highly than anything else. His friend, on the other hand, enjoys them for being what they are in that they fulfill his life as such, in the sense that he engages in one, or more, of these activities more devotedly than the good man. And this dissimilarity between the two friends with regard to the reason that they value these activities is also evident in their attitude towards them. Namely, while the VA will not engage in them with excess, his pleasant friend probably will; and this reflects the differences between them concerning their moral characters as well.

This paper discusses the three ancient commentaries on Book E of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that have been handed down to us. It aims to demonstrate the fundamental part played by their particular interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrines in the birth of the traditional interpretation of his Metaphysics, according to which all the books comprising the work were written as a function of Book Λ, containing the well-known doctrine of the unmoved mover. Among the main elements supporting this assumption there is Aristotle’s distinction between three types of science - the theoretical, the practical and the productive - and his claiming the primacy of metaphysics as a theological science. According to the ancient commentators, the remainder of Book E would belong to the unitary project of the Metaphysics, since it would indicate what is not encompassed in the object of metaphysics. This would mean that Aristotle’s treatment of accidental being, being as truth and not-being as falsity, and being potentially and actually would take on a negative function. The theological interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics thus retains its ultimate foundations in premises contained in the Aristotelian text itself

Plato’s Charmides is a narrated dialogue. In this paper, I will argue that the literary device of narration plays an interesting and resourceful role in advancing the philosophical aims and ideas presented in the text. In particular, it exposes the inner workings of the souls of the dialogue’s characters, thus enabling us, the readers, to judge whether the inner and outer projections of each character cohere. One of the most important definitions of sophrosune suggested in the Charmides is that moderation is self-knowledge, which is expressed in a strong correlation between what one feels and thinks and their actions. I will argue that the narration of the dialogue aids and exemplifies the philosophical lesson it teaches about sophrosune, even if the suggested definition of the virtue is formally rejected.

Há várias décadas, tem tido grande aceitação a tese segundo a qual a dialética constitui o marco metodológico fundamental da filosofia prática de Aristóteles. Essa tese tem sido associada à muito discutida passagem metodológica de Ética Nicomaqueia VII 1, 1145b2-7. Com efeito, a leitura tradicional de tal passagem extrai dela um procedimento assentado sobre o exame de aporias obtidas a partir de um conjunto de endoxa ou “opiniões reputáveis”. Em virtude de estar integralmente voltado a endoxa e de seu caráter diaporemático, o procedimento assim compreendido pode ser associado à dialética que forma o foco dos Tópicos. Neste trabalho, pretendo examinar as limitações da interpretação tradicional e propor uma alternativa de leitura para a passagem metodológica de EN VII 1. Na leitura proposta, a passagem deixa de ter uma conexão fundamental com a dialética. Disso não se segue que procedimentos dialéticos não tenham qualquer papel no método da filosofia prática de Aristóteles. No entanto, na leitura proposta a passagem de EN VII 1 deixa de fornecer a base para a tese segundo a qual tal método é fundamentalmente de natureza dialética. For the last decades, the thesis according to which dialectic provides the core methodological standard for Aristotle’s practical philosophy has had wide acceptance. This thesis has been associated to the much-discussed methodological passage of Nicomachean Ethics VII 1, 1145b2-7. As a matter of fact, the traditional reading of that passage finds in it a procedure that is based on the survey of aporiai that have been drawn from a set of endoxa or “reputable opinions”. As the procedure so understood is thoroughly focused on endoxa and in virtue of its diaporematic approach, it can be related to dialectic as it is discussed in the Topics. In this paper, I intend to address the limitations of the traditional interpretation and put forward an alternative reading for the methodological passage of Nicomachean Ethics VII 1. In the proposed reading, the passage does not have a tight connection with dialectic. From this it does not follow that dialectical procedures play no role in the method of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. However, in the proposed reading the passage of NE VII 1 no longer provides the basis for the thesis that such method is to be understood as being fundamentally dialectical in its nature.

The influence of Plato’s thought on his most important disciple does not raise doubts. In spite of that, it is not so easy to identify precise elements which reveal such an authority, especially in the field of ontology. On the contrary, appearances show metaphysical systems distinct enough to initiate, in the course of history, opposite philosophical currents. Even so, Plato’s influence on Aristotle is undeniable with respect to the question of the nature of knowledge. About this topic, the Stagirite uses not only an important part of the vocabulary found in some Platonic dialogues, but he also refers to realities very similar to those presented by his Master. The main object of this paper is precisely to highlight such correspondence between our protagonists regarding the issue of the essence of knowledge. To reach this objective, we begin our analysis by examining Plato’s Theaetetus, in which significant explanation on this subject are found. The study of two other dialogues completes our analysis since they add new information. Afterwards, we investigate Aristotle’s Categories, in which there are important data on the question of the nature of knowledge. At last, we complete our study by analysing in De anima some metaphysical elements essential for our subject.

At the beginning of Plato’s Apology Socrates says: καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει (20b8-c1). In this text we find the syntactic phenomenon known as “oblique optative”, but coordinated with another verb in indicative mood. The only coincidence regarding this use of the optative is that the main verb has to be a past tense. But there is little coincidence around the semantic reasons for this use of the optative. In the present paper we will try to show the specific semantics of the oblique optative and its importance for the interpretation of the text.

In Metaphysics Γ 4-6 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed not just to denying the PNC, but also to asserting its contrary. In this paper, I offer an analysis of this commitment. I try to show that Aristotle is working with a specific idea in mind: a Protagoreanism ontologically linked to the flux doctrine, as Plato suggested in Theaetetus 152-160.

This paper argues that we can make best sense of four key passages as well as the Philebus as a whole by rejecting the “orthodox” view that forms exist separately from particulars as determinate entities in their own right and accepting the “unorthodox” view that forms exist within particulars as their limiting and unifying measures and the ousiai of their geneseis.

O argumento do Terceiro Homem presente no Parmênides constitui uma formidável objeção à teoria das Ideias, e, como se sabe, Platão não nos legou uma resposta explícita para esta dificuldade. Nas últimas décadas o argumento foi esmiuçado por comentadores, tornando-se comum subdividi-lo em algumas etapas lógicas: os princípios da autopredicação, não-identidade e “um sobre muitos”. Dado que o regresso infinito provenha do encadeamento dos três princípios referidos, quem pretenda afirmar que o argumento não constitui uma objeção definitiva à teoria das Ideias não pode aceitar que estes três princípios integrem, conjuntamente, a filosofia de Platão. Diante deste quadro, empreendemos neste trabalho um exame crítico das contribuições de alguns eminentes platonistas para o problema em questão. The Third Man Argument found in the Parmenides is a formidable objection to the Theory of Forms, and it is well known that Plato left us no explicit answer to it. In recent decades the argument was scrutinized by commentators, becoming commonplace to divide it into some logical steps: the principles of self-predication, non-identity and “one over many”. Since the infinite regress arises from the combination of these three principles, those who want to defend that the argument is not a definitive objection to the Theory of Forms cannot accept that these three principles integrate Plato’s philosophy simultaneously. As such, in this paper we undertake a critical examination of the contributions of some leading Platonists regarding the problem at hand.