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We consider a problem of finding optimal contracts in continuous time, when the agent’s actions are unobservable by the principal, who pays the agent with a one-time payoff at the end of the contract. We fully solve the case of quadratic cost and separable utility, for general utility functions. The optimal contract is, in general, a nonlinear function of the final outcome only, while in the previously solved cases, for exponential and linear utility functions, the optimal contract is linear in the final output value. In a specific example we compute, the first-best principal’s utility is infinite, while it becomes finite with hidden action, which is increasing in value of the output. In the second part of the paper we formulate a general mathematical theory for the problem. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary conditions for optimal contracts. Sufficient conditions are hard to establish, but we suggest a way to check sufficiency using non-convex optimization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a class of global optimization problems is considered. Corresponding to each local minimizer obtained, we introduced a new modified function and construct a corresponding optimization subproblem with one constraint. Then, by applying a local search method to the one-constraint optimization subproblem and using the local minimizer as the starting point, we obtain a better local optimal solution. This process is continued iteratively. A termination rule is obtained which can serve as stopping criterion for the iterating process. To demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed approach, numerical examples are solved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]