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In this article Patrick Duggan interrogates The Paper Birds' 2010 production Others to explore the political and ethical implications of embodying the (verbatim) texts of others. Built from a six-month exchange of letters between the company and a prisoner, a celebrity (a very non-committal Heather Mills, apparently), and an Iranian artist, Others fuses live music with verbatim and physical theatre texts to investigate the ‘otherness’ of women from vastly divergent cultural contexts. With equal measures of humour and honesty the performance deconstructs these voices both to highlight their particular concerns and problems and to interrogate larger issues relating to ‘others’ with whom we have conscious or unconscious contact. The ethical implications of continuing or discontinuing the correspondences with the three women are explored, and trauma and embodiment theories are used alongside Lévinasian and Russellian theories of ethics to ask what an encounter with such others might teach us about ourselves, about the traumatized other and about the ethics of encounter within performance texts. Patrick Duggan is Lecturer in Theatre and Performance Studies at the University of Exeter. A practising director, he has also taught extensively in the UK and Ireland as well as in Germany and the United States. He is author of Trauma-Tragedy: Symptoms of Contemporary Performance (Manchester University Press, 2012) and co-edited Reverberations: Britishness, Aesthetics and Small-Scale Theatres (Intellect, 2013) and a special issue of the journal Performance Research ‘On Trauma’ (Taylor and Francis, 2011). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the unpredictability and instability of fieldwork as a method for data collection. As the pandemic prompted unprecedented political dynamism and social and economic disruptions at both domestic and global levels, in-person fieldwork became challenging, if even possible, in the two years following March 2020. While scholars are again using traditional fieldwork methods, we have seen an increased use of digital tools to conduct research remotely since the pandemic due to international travel bans and social distancing measures. Although not yet widely discussed, these new approaches pose new ethical questions as understandings of both our "fields" and "homes" evolve. In this paper, we stress the need for scholars to reconsider how we conceive of our ethical obligations in situations wherein we have conducted research without ever physically accessing our field sites or interacting in person with our participants. We particularly urge researchers to re-evaluate their ethical responsibilities around transparency and replicability in the dissemination and publication of findings when engaging in fieldwork "from home." These considerations were necessary prior to 2020 but are especially relevant within the context of the pandemic as scholars enter new field sites remotely or return to those previously visited in person. As a result, this paper starts a critical conversation about ethical practices in remote and digital fieldwork, which will continue to prove significant as digital and remote methods are used for data collection in a post-pandemic world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information about appointments and changes made to the editorial staff of "Ageing & Society." Statistics about the increase in the number of papers submitted for review and publication in the journal are discussed and two special issues published in August and November of 2009 are noted. The article also discussed how the Royal Society of Medicine in London, England requires speakers to disclose to audiences any financial or other relationship that represents a competing interest. The article offers guidelines to help avoid redundant publications.

Recent theories of negative freedom see it as a value-neutral concept; the definition of freedom should not be in terms of specific moral values. Specifically, preferences or desires do not enter into the definition of freedom. If preferences should so enter then Berlin's problem that a person may enhance their freedom by changing their preferences emerges. This paper demonstrates that such a preference-free conception brings its own counter-intuitive problems. It concludes that these problems might be avoided if the description of the constraints which specify an agent's lack of freedom include the intentions of those who constrain the agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the special issue on "Business Ethics Quarterly Special Issue on: Exploring Important Thinkers to Generate New Theory in Business Ethics" in which the editor discusses business ethics as a hybrid discipline built on the conceptual resources of several fields including moral and political philosophy, economics and social psychology. It states that the editorial team seeks papers that demonstrate how a well-known thinker in a field can contribute to business ethics.

Cartesian pictures of the human self and act-centred understandings of ethics dominate modern thought. Throughout his work, Herbert McCabe challenges these, and as such remains an important resource for philosophical and theological ethics. This paper lays out McCabe's philosophical anthropology, showing how he draws on Wittgenstein to revive a Thomist account of the human person. It then shows how this anthropology feeds into a philosophical ethics, focused on human flourishing and the possibility of life being meaningful. This, in turn, underwrites a theological ethics, according to which the human person flourishes ultimately through graced participation in the divine life. The paper concludes with a discussion of McCabe's account of faith as participation in the divine self-knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question that this paper tries to answer is Q: "Can good academic bioethics be done without commitment to moral theory?" It is argued that the answer to Q is an unequivocal "Yes" for most of what we could call "critical bioethics," that is, the kind of bioethics work that primarily criticizes positions or arguments already in the literature or put forward by policymakers. The answer is also "Yes" for much of empirical bioethics. The second part of the paper then provides an analysis of Q in relation to "constructive bioethics," that is, bioethics work aimed at providing an argument for a particular position. In this part, it is argued that a number of the approaches or methods used that initially look like they involve no commitment to moral theory, nevertheless, involve such a commitment. This is shown to be the case for reflective equilibrium, mid-level theory, the use of theory fragments, and argument by analogy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports our analysis of the ELSI Virtual Forum: 30 Years of the Genome: Integrating and Applying ELSI Research, an online meeting of scholars focused on the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of genetics and genomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of solitary confinement (SC) is established within the literature as a common occurrence of torture within the prison system, and many international and national human rights organizations have called for its abolition. A somewhat more contentious topic in the literature is the practice of force feeding (FF) of hunger-striking prisoners. The paper aims to make a case against FF by establishing a parity argument that states the following: If SC is considered an immoral practice (and indeed it should be), it should follow that FF is morally impermissible as well. In conclusion, this paper will argue that FF of hunger-striking prisoners is a violation of their fundamental moral rights and constitutes cruel and inhumane treatment and, therefore, should be abolished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Requests by patients for providers of specific demographic backgrounds pose an ongoing challenge for hospitals, policymakers, and ethicists. These requests may stem from a wide variety of motivations; some may be consistent with broader societal values, although many others may reflect prejudices inconsistent with justice, equity, and decency. This paper proposes a taxonomy designed to assist healthcare institutions in addressing such cases in a consistent and equitable manner. The paper then reviews a range of ethical and logistical challenges raised by such requests and proposed guidance to consider when reviewing and responding to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing upon John Rawl's framework in The Law of Peoples, this paper argues that MNEs have a responsibility to promote well-ordered social and political institutions in host countries that lack them. This responsibility is grounded in a negative duty not to cause harm. In addition to addressing the objection that promoting well-ordered institutions represents unjustified interference by MNEs, the paper provides guidance for managers of MNEs operating in host countries that lack just institutions. The paper argues for understanding corporate responsibility in relation to the specific institutional environment in which MNEs operate.

This paper discusses two opposing views about the relation between artificial intelligence (AI) and human intelligence: on the one hand, a worry that heavy reliance on AI technologies might make people less intelligent and, on the other, a hope that AI technologies might serve as a form of cognitive enhancement. The worry relates to the notion that if we hand over too many intelligence-requiring tasks to AI technologies, we might end up with fewer opportunities to train our own intelligence. Concerning AI as a potential form of cognitive enhancement, the paper explores two possibilities: (1) AI as extending—and thereby enhancing—people's minds, and (2) AI as enabling people to behave in artificially intelligent ways. That is, using AI technologies might enable people to behave as if they have been cognitively enhanced. The paper considers such enhancements both on the level of individuals and on the level of groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Greater public awareness of the occurrence of sexual assault has led to the creation of mobile phone apps designed to facilitate consent between sexual partners. These apps exhibit serious practical shortcomings in realistic contexts; however, in this paper I consider the hypothetical case in which these practical shortcomings are absent. The prospect of this viable consent app creates an interesting challenge for consequentialism – one that is comparable to the objection that the theory justifies killing innocent persons to prevent large numbers of less serious harms like experiencing brief, painful headaches. I outline and reject the most straightforward way for consequentialists to address this challenge, and I argue that the empirical calculations at stake reveal something rarely appreciated: consequentialists ought to sometimes favour reinforcing deontological constraints in common-sense morality rather than seeking to undermine them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as 'bad enough' beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as 'bad enough'. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes up Axel Honneth's suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth's idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch's idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes under consideration a piece by Roger Crisp in which he questions what the problem of moral luck can teach us about COVID-19 lockdown rule-breakers. Taking the position that although such rule-breakers might seem to be new examples of moral luck, Crisp ends up denying the existence of moral luck and argues that moral luck is an outdated notion in so far as it relies on other questionable aspects of morality, that is, retributivist punishment and blame. Although the author agrees with Crisp that pandemic rule-breaker cases are putative examples of resultant moral luck, he proposes that Crisp has misconstrued what moral luck is and the paper examines in detail what he sees as the numerous problems with Crisp's claims. The author concludes that Crisp's analysis of pandemic rule-breaking does not shed any new light on the moral luck debate, and the difficult questions of luck, moral responsibility, and desert are not so easily resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports our analysis of the ELSI Virtual Forum: 30Years of the Genome: Integrating and Applying ELSI Research, an online meeting of scholars focused on the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of genetics and genomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Puritanical morality regulates a range of seemingly insignificant behaviors, including those involving human sexuality. A sizable portion of the latter particularly burdens women, who are held responsible for the moral conduct of men. In my paper, I show that these norms have not necessarily served to evolve cooperation, but to subjugate and eliminate women from public life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the existing definition of pandemics is not nuanced enough, because it is predicated solely on the criterion of spread, rather than on the criteria of spread and severity. This definitional challenge is what I call 'the conflation problem': there is a conflation of two different realities of global health, namely global health emergencies (i.e., severe communicable diseases that spread across borders) and nonemergencies (i.e., communicable or noncommunicable diseases that spread across borders and that may be severe). To put this argument forth, this paper begins by discussing the existing and internationally accepted definition of pandemics, its requirements, as well as its strengths (section 1). Section 2 then considers the problem with the standard definition of pandemics (i.e., the conflation problem) and some examples of it. Finally, section 3 evaluates some practical implications of the conflation problem to then explore conceptual clarity as the adequate solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: Treatment seeking for gender dysphoria (GD) has increased manifold in western countries. This has led to increased interest on evidence-base of treatments, but also discussions related to human rights, identity politics, gender-related structures, and medicalization. Combining these discourses into coherent health policy is difficult. Health technology assessment (HTA) is the golden standard for assessing whether a medical intervention should be included in a health system. A comprehensive HTA should include medical, safety, and cost-utility perspectives, but often also ethical, societal, organizational, and legal concerns. Still, ethics is often omitted in practice. This paper aims to demonstrate how integrated ethical analysis influenced a HTA of complex and controversial topics like GD.Methods: A HTA of medical treatments of GD was conducted using integrated ethical analysis based on the EUnetHTA-model. This integrates ethical thinking into the whole HTA, explicitly analyses ethical topics, and balances arguments using several ethical theories.Results: Integrating ethics had a significant impact on the HTA process and recommendations. It influenced how the HTA was planned and executed, emphasized autonomy and justice when creating the recommendations, and helped the workgroup to understand the complexity of combining different stakeholders' discourses. Tensions between scientific evidence, expectations, and values became explicit.Conclusions: Comprehensive HTA provides an important, integrative approach to considering complex and controversial topics in health systems. HTA emphasizes multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder approach but simultaneously forces a pragmatic, results-oriented, and evidence-based approach on all argumentation. Ethical analysis can facilitate interactions between stakeholders, bridge different discourses, and help formulate widely acceptable guidelines and policy decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the extent to which the voluntary adoption of codes of conduct by multinational corporations (MNCs) renders MNCs accountable for the performance of actions specified in a code of conduct. In particular, the paper examines the ways in which codes of conduct coordinate the expectations of relevant parties with regard to the provision of assistance by MNCs on grounds of rescue or justice. The paper argues that this coordinative role of codes of conduct renders MNCs more accountable for the performance of actions specified in a code of conduct than they would be without a code of conduct. This interpretation of the significance of codes of conduct is contrasted with the view that codes of conduct render MNCs accountable for performing actions specified in a code of conduct by grounding contractual obligations for the performance of such actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pressure on mental health services has not gone unremarked and is of widespread concern in England and Wales. This can have implications when a bed is being sought for a patient who has undergone a Mental Health Act assessment and is deemed to meet the criteria for being formally admitted to hospital. Once the 24 h period for assessment under section 136 of the Act has lapsed, the ongoing detention of the patient can lead to a legal grey area. Through a fictional example this paper examines the relevant case law and statute that may be used to continue the detention and explores the ethical problems that this may cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will ask whether the legal status presently afforded to nonhuman animals ought to influence regulatory debates concerning human cerebral organoids. The New York Courts recently refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Happy the Elephant as she was property rather than a legal person while at the same time accepting that she is a moral patient deserving of rights protection. An undesirable situation has therefore arisen in which the law holds a being with moral status to be incapable of benefitting from legal redress due to their legal status as property. The author argues that this is something that we ought to avoid when designing the regulatory framework which will govern the use of human cerebral organoids. Yet, a difference exists in that, whereas the judges already accept Happy is a moral patient, there is presently no consensus around the moral status of organoids. This paper will consider whether human cerebral organoids have passed the moral threshold of sentience. If they have, or are close to doing so, regulators ought to consider their legal status in advance so as to ensure that adequate limitations are placed on this usage so as to avoid unethical practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nudges – light-touch interventions aimed to help people achieve socially desirable outcomes – can take place without individuals being aware of them. It would seem to be ethically superior to tell individuals that they are being nudged, encouraging them to be aware of the reasons for the official interest in their behaviours. Aided by internal reflection, individuals may make informed choices whether to go along with officially-preferred options or not. In general, this paper adopts this line of argument, justifying self-awareness from the liberal belief in autonomy of the person. However, awareness and/or reflection are not always necessarily ethically superior to passivity, as in cases where manipulation is also present with information provision, when there is framing of deliberative exercises, and where there is harm done to others due to reflectively-driven actions. Most of the time self-awareness is to be preferred, but not always. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate around whether novel beings should be legally recognized as legitimate rights holders is one that has produced a vast amount of commentary. This paper contributes to this discourse by shifting the normative focus of moral rights away from criteria possessed by the novel beings in question, and back toward the criterion upon which we ourselves are able to make legitimate rights claims. It draws heavily on the moral writing of Alan Gewirth's identification of noumenal agency as the source of all legitimate rights claims. Taking Gewirthian ethical rationalism as providing a universally applicable hypothetical imperative which binds all agents to comply with its requirements, the paper argues that it is at least morally desirable that any legal system should recognize the moral rights claims of all agents as equally legitimate. By extension, it is at least morally desirable that the status of legal personhood should be granted by a legal system to all novel beings who are noumenal agents, insofar as this status is necessary for rights' legal recognition. Having established the desirability of this extension, the paper closes with an examination of recent cases involving both biological and nonbiological novel beings in order to assess their conformity with the desirable approach outlined above. The paper demonstrates that such recognition is conceptually possible, thus requiring us to move beyond the current anthropocentricity of legal systems and recognize the legitimate moral claim for legal personhood for all novel beings who possess noumenal agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the dominant economic approach to environmental policy, environmental goods are conceptualised as forms of capital that provide services for human well-being. These services are assigned a monetary value to be weighed against the values of other goods and services. David Wiggins has offered a set of arguments against central assumptions about the nature of well-being, practical reason and ethical deliberation that underpin this dominant economic approach. In this paper I outline these arguments and consider their implications for understanding ethical demands across generations. The paper focuses, in particular, on their implications for understanding the nature and requirements of sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The marketing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages (hereafter: food) high in fats, salt and/or sugar (HFSS) has been strongly implicated in the rising levels of childhood obesity worldwide. Multiple ethical concerns arise from the practice of exposing children to such marketing and efforts to monitor and restrict it through regulatory policies. There is considerable evidence that exposure to powerful food marketing messages affects children's food behaviours in ways that are detrimental to good dietary health. Children are particularly vulnerable to being exploited and deceived by food marketing messages based on their cognitive and developmental immaturity. HFSS food marketing also affects numerous child rights enshrined within the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (of which the UK is a signatory) including the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. The debate has become somewhat polarised between the public health community's evidence-based assertion that all marketing is inherently exploitative and the rebuttal from food and marketing industry stakeholders that provided the marketing is 'accurate and truthful' and there is no ethical need to regulate. This polarisation is reflected in the complexity of policymaking decisions regarding the rationale for mandatory government-led policies or industry self-regulation. There are also ethical considerations inherent in the monitoring of children's food marketing exposure, particularly in the digital sphere, by researchers for the purposes of informing policy design, scope and implementation. This review paper will explore the latest evidence on these issues and consider the implications for public health research, policy, and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dementia within the criminal system, from arrest through incarceration, has been largely ignored. While the health system has begun grappling with the chronic conditions that will accompany an aging society, the criminal system has yet to meaningfully respond. Dementia is a clinical syndrome characterized by impairment in cognitive domains (memory, executive function, visuospatial). Additionally, dementia often includes behavioral symptoms that increase the likelihood that an individual's actions may violate social norms and in some circumstances be deemed criminal. Prior studies have established criminal behavior as a trend among individuals living with dementia. Yet, the criminal system has yet to establish protections for individuals who commit a crime while impaired by dementia. This paper will report on an empirical study to evaluate the treatment of persons with dementia within the criminal justice system. We will report on interviews with attorneys (n=15) regarding their experience and perspective on the treatment of persons with dementia post-arrest. In the paper, we will explore topics identified through these interviews including pre-trial release, competency, placement (housing), criminal liability determination, sentencing, and post-conviction release. We will highlight key findings including the lack of a systematic screening process for dementia post-arrest, placement is a significant challenge, attorneys' lack of training on dementia to be able to understand how the disease could impact decision-making, and the two legal mechanisms available to divert miss the mark given their focus on psychiatric populations. We will use these data and findings to argue for a research and policy agenda to address a gap in legal policies to appropriately manage persons with dementia post-arrest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defence of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will examine the Supreme Court of the United States' (SCOTUS) arguments in the majority decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, and I will show how some of those arguments are flawed. Primarily, I will show that the right to bodily autonomy is a well-established right, both in the courts and in societal practices, and that the right to an abortion should be understood as an example of the right to bodily autonomy or bodily integrity. Second, I will examine the justices' arguments that viability is not a reasonable place to restrict abortion access, in contrast to both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey , and will offer arguments that defend viability as a valid point to limit abortion access. Third, I will highlight some politicians' goals to enact a federal ban on abortion, and show how the attempt to pass Personhood Amendments is a pathway for doing so. The upshot of this essay to is show how the SCOTUS decision is flawed, and how granting personhood to "potential life" has consequences that extend beyond abortion access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her paper, "The cost of conscience: Kant on conscience and conscientious objection," Jeanette Kennett argues that a Kantian view of conscientious objection in medicine would bar physicians from refusing to perform certain practices based on conscience. I offer a response in the following manner: First, I reconstruct her main argument; second, I present a more accurate picture of Kant's view of conscience. I conclude that, given a Kantian framework, a physician should be allowed to refuse to perform practices that break the moral law and, thus, refuse practices that violate her conscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical generalisation. In this paper, I show that Moss's account of legal proof crucially depends on a moral norm called the rule of consideration. I argue that we have a number of reasons to be sceptical of this rule. Once we reject the rule, it is not clear that Moss's account of legal proof is either plausible or attractive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her important and well-known discussion "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," Mary Anne Warren regrets that "it is not possible to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman's right to obtain an abortion without showing that the fetus is not a human being, in the morally relevant sense." Unlike some more cautious philosophers, Warren thinks that we can definitively demonstrate that the fetus is not a person. In this paper, Warren's argument is critically examined with a focus especially on the question of the foundation and the boundaries of the moral community. The fundamental thesis of the paper is that Warren's approach is flawed for at least four reasons: (1) that being a person is not as obviously central to having full moral rights as Warren assumes, (2) that her exclusivism regarding moral status has dubious moral consequences independent of the abortion issue, (3) that it is not clear that a fetus is not a person, even on Warren's own criteria, and (4) her criteria for personhood are themselves suspect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the relation between medical ethics (ME) and common morality (CM), professional norms, and moral philosophy. It proceeds by analyzing two recent book-length critical analyses of this relationship by Bob Baker in "The Structure of Moral Revolutions—Studies of Changes in the Morality of Abortion, Death, and the Bioethics Revolution" and Rosamond Rhodes in "The Trusted Doctor—Medical Ethics and Professionalism." It argues that despite the strengths of these critical arguments, there is nevertheless a relationship between ME, understood as the professional ethics of the healthcare professions, and both CM and moral philosophy. It also argues that ME cannot and should not be understood purely as the internally developed professional norms of the medical or healthcare professions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Engagement in health research is increasingly practised worldwide. Yet many questions remain under debate in the ethics field about its contribution to health research and these debates have largely not been informed by those who have been engaged in health research. This paper addresses the following key questions: what should the ethical goals of engagement in health research be and how should it be performed? Qualitative data were generated by interviewing 22 people with lived experience, members of the public, and engagement managers about power sharing in health research. Thematic analysis of study data identified the following five themes: the value of engagement in research, ideal engagement, tokenistic engagement, terms to describe those engaged, and engagement roles in research. The paper presents that data and then considers what insights it offers for what engagement should look like—its ethical goals and approach—according to those being engaged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After briefly sketching common-morality principlism, as presented in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, this paper responds to two recent sets of challenges to this framework. The first challenge claims that medical ethics is autonomous and unique and thus not a form of, or justified or guided by, a common morality or by any external morality or moral theory. The second challenge denies that there is a common morality and insists that futile efforts to develop common-morality approaches to bioethics limit diversity and prevent needed moral change. This paper argues that these two critiques fundamentally fail because they significantly misunderstand their target and because their proposed alternatives have major deficiencies and encounter insurmountable problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship in philosophy of science and technology has shown that scientific and technological decision making are laden with values, including values of a social, political, and/or ethical character. This paper examines the role of value judgments in the design of machine-learning (ML) systems generally and in recidivism-prediction algorithms specifically. Drawing on work on inductive and epistemic risk, the paper argues that ML systems are value laden in ways similar to human decision making, because the development and design of ML systems requires human decisions that involve tradeoffs that reflect values. In many cases, these decisions have significant—and, in some cases, disparate—downstream impacts on human lives. After examining an influential court decision regarding the use of proprietary recidivism-prediction algorithms in criminal sentencing, Wisconsin v. Loomis, the paper provides three recommendations for the use of ML in penal systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition.1 We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions.2 In particular, they argue for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP).3 In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is estimated that electroconvulsive therapy is still administered to approximately a million people a year. It involves passing enough electric current through the human brain, eight to twelve times, to cause convulsions, in the hope of somehow alleviating emotional suffering, primarily depression. There have only ever been 11 placebo-controlled studies (where general anaesthesia is administered but the electric shock is withheld), all of which were pre-1986, had very small sample sizes and were seriously methodologically flawed. Five of these studies found no difference between the two groups at the end of treatment, four found ECT produced better outcomes for some patients, and two produced mixed results, including one where psychiatrists' ratings produced a difference, but the ratings of nurses and patients did not. In the 80 years since the first ECT no studies have found any evidence that ECT is better than placebo beyond the end of treatment. Nevertheless, all five meta-analyses relying on these studies have somehow concluded that ECT is more effective than placebo despite the studies' multiple failings. Meanwhile, evidence of persistent or permanent memory loss in 12% to 55% of patients has accumulated. Attempts to highlight this failure of ECT proponents to provide robust evidence that their treatment is effective and safe are routinely dismissed, diminished, denied and denounced. This paper responds to one such attempt, by Drs Meechan, Laws, Young, McLoughlin and Jauhar, to discredit two systematic reviews of the eleven pre-1986 studies, in 2010 and 2019, the latter of which also reviewed five meta-analyses that had ignored the studies' failings. The criticisms and claims of the recent crtiique of the two systematic reviews are examined in detail, by the first author of both reviews, for accuracy, relevance and logic. The critique is found to include multiple errors, misrepresentations, omissions, inconsistencies and logical flaws. It is concluded that Meechan et al. fail to make a fact-based, coherent argument against suspending ECT pending a series of large, carefully designed placebo-controlled studies to establish whether ECT does have any beneficial effects against which to weigh the significant established adverse effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health technology assessment (HTA) aims, through empirical analysis, to shed light on the value of health technologies (O'Rourke et al. [2020, International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 36, 187-90]). HTA is, then, where facts and values meet. But how, where, and when do facts and values meet in HTA? Currently, HTA is usually portrayed as a sequential process, starting with empirical analysis (assessment), followed by a deliberation on the implications of the findings for a judgment of a health technology's value (appraisal). In this paper, we will argue that in HTA, empirical analysis and normative inquiry are much more closely entwined. In fact, as we hope to show, normative commitments act as an indispensable guide for the collection and interpretation of empirical evidence. Drawing on policy sciences, we will suggest a concrete methodology that can help HTA practitioners to integrate empirical analysis and normative inquiry in a transparent way. The proposed methodology can be conceived as a concrete means for conducting a scoping exercise in HTA. Moreover, it offers a distinct way of giving stakeholders a structural and constructive role in HTA. This paper outlines the approach developed by the values in doing assessments of health technologies project, a project funded by the Erasmus+ program (contract number 2018-1-NL01-KA203-038960), which is the European Union's program to support education, training, youth, and sport in Europe. The project has resulted in an E-learning course, an accompanying handbook, and a consensus statement, all freely available from the project's website www.validatehta.eu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent issue of the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield published a paper entitled, "The Duty to Protect, Abortion, and Organ Donation." They argued that a prohibition on abortion is morally equivalent to a positive mandate for parents to donate organs to their children and that opponents of abortion must be prepared to accept these mandates to remain consistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a response from Richard Rorty to three authors who wrote criticisms of his paper "Is Philosophy Relevant to Applied Ethics?" Rorty reexamines the historicist argument against Platonism that was outlined in his paper. Rorty explains how his view of the inevitable historicity of human life differs from that of Daryl Koehn. Rorty outlines the many places where he agrees with Patricia Werhane's views and where the two of them see things differently. Rorty believes that moral progress can only be made when we take issue with long-established customs.

This paper is a further development of two previous pieces of work (Moore 2002, 2005) in which modern virtue ethics, and in particular MacIntyre's (1983) related notions of "practice" and "institution," have been explored in the context of business. It first introduces and defines the concept of corporate character and seeks to establish why it is important. It then reviews MacIntyre's virtues-practice-institution schema and the implications of this at the level of the institution in question--the corporation--and argues that the concept of corporate character follows from, but is a novel development of, MacIntyre's schema. The paper contrasts corporate character and virtues with the more familiar concepts of corporate culture and values. The constitutive and substantive elements of corporate character, including the essential corporate virtues, are then drawn out and illustrated with reference to the cases explored in Koehn (1998). Finally, the paper acknowledges and counters a specific criticism of this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Poor research integrity is increasingly recognised as a serious problem in science. We outline some evidence for this claim and introduce the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCPsych) journals' Research Integrity Group, which has been created to address this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]