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Most of the existing studies on the international capital market are based on a segmented market approach. This approach treats the different national capital markets as separated entities, hardly related to each other. For this reason (under the assumption of market segmentation), comparable capital assets may differ in their return on different national markets. Although market segmentation enjoys a surprisingly large following, it is not the only possible interpretation of the international capital market. The alternative hypothesis, i.e., that prices of capital assets in the international capital market behave as if there is one multinational perfect capital market, should be considered. The one market hypothesis has the advantage of being consistent with much of the accepted economic theory. Also the one market hypothesis is unambiguous where market segmentation can stand for any number of specific imperfect market formations. Market segmentation is widely accepted as the only possible structure of the international capital market. Different currency areas, separated political organizations and trade barriers have been given as a priori evidence for the segmentation of the international capital market. This, however, is not necessarily the case. An examination of the behavior of capital asset prices reveals that the price behavior is consistent with the one market hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that a certain body of data can be consistent with both the one market hypothesis and any one of several specific forms of market segmentation. But as the main theme of this study is to show the validity of the one market approach to the multinational equity market, it is sufficient to show that one cannot reject the one market hypothesis with regard to this market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Share prices in the equity markets of the U.S., Great Britain, Germany and Japan do behave as if there exists one multinational equity market. Share prices in the non U.S. countries were shown to be related to and affected by the price changes in the U.S. equity market. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that share prices in each national component of the market move together in addition to the market-wide movements. The purpose of this article is to measure and describe those share-price fluctuations associated uniquely with their country of origin, and then, on the basis of those price changes to identify and estimate the country factor in share-price movements in the equity markets of Great Britain, Germany and Japan. The identification and estimation of the country factors in share-price movements are done in two levels of data. In the first stage indices of share prices are examined and in the second the country factors are estimated on the basis of a sample of individual shares.

Education has been systematically and deliberately used in both Germany and Japan to force minds of young people and adults alike into the rigid mold of Axis ideology. Since the Imperial Japanese Department of Education, through its Bureau of Thought Supervision, has dispatched "thought supervisors" to the various provinces "for inspection, for guidance and for supervision in connection with thought matters." Japan has thereby woven a net in which the intellectual powers of her people are entangled. Germany has been equally zealous. No room is left for private opinion. The life and sports of students as well as the thought and conduct of teachers are brought within the system of regimentation. The declared purpose and program it again. When this war is won, the United Nations should be able to choose whether the educational systems of the Axis countries shall be allowed to lead into another war by the continued teaching of lies and false attitudes and values, or whether they shall be compelled to mend their ways.

The war has brought new realization of the terrible consequences of international anarchy. The bankruptcy of nationalism as a system of world organization is proclaimed on every side. People are exhorted to adopt internationalism as a way of life, as though by an act of will we might create a master for the monster, rampant nationalism, which has perhaps reached its climax in modem Germany and Japan. The long, slow processes of cultural growth are disregarded, and people turn with high hope to the magic of conversion as a solution to their problems. With techniques of control developed by modem research people perhaps can increase somewhat the tempo of change but cultural growth is much more an organic than a mechanical process. They are likely to find the obstetrician's techniques are more effective than those of the inventor. They can do much to guarantee the health of the society which is giving birth to a new one, relieve somewhat the pain and anxiety which accompanies it, and prevent birth trauma but if they hurry the process too much we may produce abortion or those very traumatic experiences we seek to avoid.

This article focuses on factors responsible for a country to capture a significantly larger share of world trade in manufacturing in short time. India and Great Britain are short of arable land, relatively to population. Hence, as their national incomes rise, whether because of population growth or because of growing productivity, both need to import more food and raw materials. In recent history, four countries have captured substantial shares of world trade in manufactures over short periods. The first was Great Britain, starting at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and continuing until about 1860, during which period the volume of her exports of manufactures increased by 5.6 per cent per annum. The second country was Germany, capturing about 6 per cent of world trade between 1890 and 1913. Thirdly, the United States, which even more spectacularly captured 6 per cent between 1890 and 1899-not to mention the even larger gains resulting from two world wars. Finally, there is Japan, whose capture of 3 per cent of world trade in manufactures between 1929 and 1937 attracts special attention mainly because it occurred over a period during which the total volume of world trade contracted.