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The Commission for Africa (CFA) and its report launched on 11 March 2005 has been described as a significant global development initiative and, from the British perspective, as one of the most complicated processes in public policy making seen in recent times. It sought to mobilize and reconfigure global power and in particular to shape global thinking and actions on development policy towards Africa. However, the CFA (and the G8 Gleneagles Summit, whose agenda it sought to influence) were silent on one of today's political, diplomatic and development challenges—Zimbabwe. Cynics would say that, if it could not handle this issue, it has nothing to offer on Africa. This paper argues that, despite this apparent silence on and marginalization of Zimbabwe, the CFA process was pregnant with issues Zimbabwean, and that it adopted and succeeded in using what one may call ‘President Mbeki's principle of silent diplomacy on Zimbabwe’, only to lose the plot at the last minute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 18 December 1965, a little over a month after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Algeria broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, in protest at the Labour Government's decision not to use force against the white minority government in Salisbury. On one level, the diplomatic break seemed of secondary importance, and by the time relations resumed in April 1968, there had been no significant change in Britain's or Algeria's position on Rhodesia. However, as this article argues, the management of Britain's relations with Algeria between 1965 and 1968 sheds important light on the place and views of Africa in Labour and diplomatic circles, at a time of decolonisation, of a second, unsuccessful, application to the EEC and of the creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The article focuses on four areas of policy in turn: the place of Rhodesia in Anglo-Algerian relations; the influence of Labour contacts on the management of relations with Algeria; the influence of the crisis on Britain's relations with the French in Africa and the impact of Franco-British exchanges on the evolution of British views and interests; and finally, the shifting place of Algeria in British diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Zimbabwean government at the turn of the 2000 New Millennium received widespread ostracization by some sections of the international community particularly the West. As a fairly small state and weak vis-à-vis its erstwhile adversaries who are powerful, the clear expectation based on conventional wisdom is that the regime would collapse instantly. For Zimbabwe the course of events did not turn as expected. On the contrary, emerging has been the ability of Zimbabwe to influence the international community not only those in the developing world but also the Western world itself for support largely through diplomatic efforts. The regime has stood the test of time and has not altered its behavior in the international system; its objectives have remained the same confronting its adversaries. The paper therefore, seeks to analyze the ways through which the regime has been able to use diplomacy as a tool in international relations to achieve its objective in the face of a heavy onslaught by the powerful section of the international community. In essence, the paper will largely provide the basis through which weak states in the developing world can successfully use diplomacy to achieve their foreign policy objectives in the face of the powerful global actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the extent to which South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe under the Mbeki administration was shaped by economic and commercial considerations. Given the extensive involvement and growing influence of the South African business sector in Zimbabwe, the potential link between the South African government's policy stance towards Zimbabwe and South Africa's commercial interests in Zimbabwe is intuitively appealing. This paper argues, however, that although South African firms have exploited the commercial opportunities that have emerged from the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, it is not clear from the available evidence if commercial interests have been a primary consideration in South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe. It concludes that the Mbeki government's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe was not principally shaped by economic objectives, but was instead driven predominantly by political and ideological concerns, which related closely to perceptions about South Africa's role on the African continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continuing crisis over Zimbabwe raises a variety of issues of considerable interest to both the theorist and the practitioner of foreign policy: the merits or otherwise of contemporary attempts at state classification; the utility and morality of intervention in a state's internal affairs by economic or military means; the notion of hegemony; the assumptions underpinning African diplomacy; the incentives and constraints attendant on South Africa's foreign policy. In attempting to explain South Africa's role in the Zimbabwean crisis this paper will—where appropriate—make reference to these theoretical concerns on the assumption that the interaction between South Africa and Zimbabwe provides some revealing insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Considering the prolonged delays in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the uncertainty surrounding the date of its next elections, Zimbabwe continues to be an important topic of conversation and debate in the southern African region. Contemporary analysis has primarily focused on official state and regional intergovernmental responses to Zimbabwe over the past decade. In contrast, this article highlights the important steps taken by various other nonstate actors to prevent conflict and solve the political crisis. Based on the theories of preventive diplomacy and multi-track diplomacy presented by Michael Lund and Kumar Rupesinghe, respectively, this article examines the significant contributions made by the United Nations, citizen groups in the form of civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups, civil society both within and outside Zimbabwe, and financial institutions during 2000 and 2009. After reflecting on the preventive diplomacy efforts of multi-track actors regarding the conflict in Zimbabwe, the article concludes that not only has multi-track diplomacy impacted governmental and regional policy, but, combined with other efforts, it has also resulted in the signing of the GPA. This examination of multi-track diplomacy contributes to a more complete and accurate depiction of preventive diplomacy responses to the Zimbabwe conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By the mid-1960s the arrangements for intra-Commonwealth representation between its sovereign member states were well established. The racial tension engendered by the problem of Rhodesian independence threatened the continued existence of the Commonwealth, but the conventions of Commonwealth diplomatic representation made the problem more difficult to manage. This article examines how Rhodesian attitudes towards the Commonwealth and the exclusion of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference ruled out the possibility of multilateral diplomatic engagement. Opportunities to influence the Rhodesian Government were therefore restricted to bilateral exchanges, but the mechanisms for such diplomatic representation, though technically correct in terms of Commonwealth relations, were limited and inadequate. This historical case study therefore confirms the necessity for sufficient representation between sovereign states and other international actors, but demonstrates that the parties to such a diplomatic relationship can conceive the functions of representation in different terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Oxford Zimbabwe Research Day in 2005 began with a debate between Hasu Patel and Stephen Chan, both academics with direct involvement in Zimbabwean diplomacy or Commonwealth diplomacy concerned with Zimbabwe. The two debated the pros and cons of Zimbabwean foreign policy, both in its original and more recent manifestations—and how the latter represents a domestic policy that is highly contentious. Hasu Patel began first; Stephen Chan replied; Professor Patel made a further intervention and Professor Chan made a final statement. Although their debate, or conversation, has been revised and rewritten for this issue, it remains faithful to the themes, structure and progress of debate of the original. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports that the expulsion of 18 senior members of the Congress of South African Trade Union's from Zimbabwe in early February 2005 has triggered a protests among South African civil society organizations, church groups and youth organizations riled by the African National Congress'(ANC) policy of quiet diplomacy. Formulation of plans to mobilize mass-based protests in South Africa against the Mugabe regime; Decision by Zimbabwe's opposition Movement for Democratic Change to participate in parliamentary elections on March 31, 2005; Rift between Cosatu and the ANC.