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Drawing evidence from existing archives, parliamentary proceedings, presidential speeches, newspaper reports and oral testimonies, this paper demonstrates the extent to which Malawi sustained diplomatic relations with Taiwan and China from 1961 to 2014, within the broader context of southern Africa. While trade dictated the diplomatic choice of the so-called 'two Chinas', individual leadership styles as well as domestic politics remained the decisive factors. However, the paper argues that the process was dynamic, complex and highly contested – and that the broader idiographic context of southern Africa mattered. For while local circumstances created the need for diplomatic relations, it was the international political economy that acted as the impetus behind the establishment and shifting sustenance of the relationships. In making this argument, the study draws attention to how global forces interacted historically with local political economies within southern Africa to shape discourses of diplomacy as well as how economic challenges forced states to make compromises – including undermining human rights – in the making of these diplomatic relations over the last two generations in post-independence Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the extent to which South Africa utilises positive economic statecraft to promote human rights in the region – that is, the degree to which it mobilises its economic engagement to affect a desirable political outcome in its foreign engagements in Southern Africa. The country's reaction to crises in Zimbabwe and Swaziland over the past 20 years is a strong indicator of the limits of South Africa's statecraft in this regard. These engagements highlight the inevitable clash between the country's principled preference for ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of sovereign states and its constitutional mandate to respect and promote human rights. Despite eschewing the role of ‘regional hegemon’, there is an expectation that South Africa will play an integral role in securing regional stability. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the country chooses to approach resolving regional challenges with a co-ordinated political and economic approach. This paper argues that, to be more effective in spreading a progressive regional agenda that encourages democracy, governance and human rights, South Africa needs to incorporate a stronger element of positive economic statecraft in its foreign policy implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As questions concerning international development climb the international agenda, so countries find themselves drawn into a burgeoning number of negotiations on issues ranging from the future shape and direction of the post-2015 development agenda to ‘aid effectiveness’ and international development cooperation. Moving from the position of a ‘beneficiary’ state in the traditional donor–recipient aid hierarchy, South Africa is looking to define its own niche within the wider development diplomacy context as a development partner. This paper provides an assessment of South Africa's evolving approach towards international development cooperation, with a particular focus on trilateral development cooperation, and what this means for Pretoria's foreign policy in bridging the divide between developed and developing country positions within the international development regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With South Africa having declared itself a developmental state, this paper posits that if a developmental state is one that drives development, then the foreign policy of such a state should pursue development as one of its most important goals. Similarly the diplomatic corps of such a state should prioritise economic, commercial, para- and public diplomacy as drivers of diplomacy. In answering the question, ‘What should be the foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state?’, the authors, through an exploratory approach, seek to analyse how well the state has fared in achieving this objective. To be a successful developmental state, a strategic capacity should exist and a clear strategic conception of the state's national interest should be formulated. Old paradigms about the role and functions of the diplomatic corps are challenged and a meritocratic diplomatic corps is strongly advocated to support the state's declared developmental goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the extent to which South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe under the Mbeki administration was shaped by economic and commercial considerations. Given the extensive involvement and growing influence of the South African business sector in Zimbabwe, the potential link between the South African government's policy stance towards Zimbabwe and South Africa's commercial interests in Zimbabwe is intuitively appealing. This paper argues, however, that although South African firms have exploited the commercial opportunities that have emerged from the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, it is not clear from the available evidence if commercial interests have been a primary consideration in South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe. It concludes that the Mbeki government's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe was not principally shaped by economic objectives, but was instead driven predominantly by political and ideological concerns, which related closely to perceptions about South Africa's role on the African continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continuing crisis over Zimbabwe raises a variety of issues of considerable interest to both the theorist and the practitioner of foreign policy: the merits or otherwise of contemporary attempts at state classification; the utility and morality of intervention in a state's internal affairs by economic or military means; the notion of hegemony; the assumptions underpinning African diplomacy; the incentives and constraints attendant on South Africa's foreign policy. In attempting to explain South Africa's role in the Zimbabwean crisis this paper will—where appropriate—make reference to these theoretical concerns on the assumption that the interaction between South Africa and Zimbabwe provides some revealing insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of sub-state diplomacy, defined as the transnational linkages of sub-national governments, in bridging the gap between foreign policy and the domestic development agenda in South Africa. It argues that, as territorial sub-state actors, provinces and municipalities are strategically positioned to use their international relations to make foreign policy more responsive to domestic socio-economic priorities. In the South African case, however, this potential is yet to be fully realised, mainly because of institutional fragmentation of the foreign policy apparatus, but also owing to enduring challenges in the foreign activities of sub-national governments. The article concludes by making the case for a new diplomatic paradigm in South Africa, one that actively promotes and harnesses the foreign activities and capacities of different national stakeholders, including those of sub-national governments, in the interest of the domestic development agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa has since 1994 actively participated in multilateral parliamentary diplomacy through inter-parliamentary institutions (IPIs). This article considers parliamentary diplomacy as an instrument of soft power and interrogates the soft power impact of agenda-setting in the context of IPIs. The qualitative analysis of various parliamentary records and other document sources reveals agenda-setting actions by Parliament that can be understood as instruments of soft power that hold positive implications for the state. Challenges to potential soft power gains were also identified. The research was enriched with primary perspectives from interviewed parliamentary members and officials who have consistently served as South African delegates to IPIs. The study provides insights for members of parliament and other policymakers on the merits and modalities of employing agenda-setting within multilateral parliamentary diplomacy as a soft power tool of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During World War II, Baron Otto von Strahl, a German career diplomat and trader, became one of South Africa's most important intelligence assets in the fight against Nazi infiltration. But he died indigent, an immigrant to the United States of America, because the German post-war authorities refused to recognise him as a Nazi opponent. Many decades after his death historians have begun to praise him as a resistance fighter, though ignoring certain ambiguities in his activities in South Africa. Von Strahl had denounced fellow Germans as dangerous Nazis without any tangible evidence, bringing about their internment by the South African authorities. Based on archival research in South Africa, Namibia, and Germany, this article exposes a paradox in von Strahl's activities for South Africa: as an undoubted expert of South Africa's infiltration by Nazi envoys and their propaganda, he focused on the German population, which constituted a relatively minor threat to the country's stability, but he ignored the menace coming from pro-Nazi radical Afrikaner movements. His role has been exaggerated by those who accused him of treason during and after the war in Germany, whilst both his accusers and post-war defenders neglected his pro-Jewish attitude as the main motivation for switching sides in 1939. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does South Africa view international alliances? International relations (IR) scholars have been debating the end of alliances and the relevance of the alliance paradigm itself. South Africa presents an excellent test case for advancing these debates for three reasons. First, it has been committed to nonalignment yet engages in close and complex inter-state collaborations. Second, debates about the alliance paradigm have largely taken place in, and focused on, the Global North. And third, there is a gap in South African scholarship on this subject. This article examines the South African understanding of alliances through a systematic study of its academic and policy landscape including an analysis of 285 articles from South Africa's five most highly ranked IR journals and key policy documents produced during the post-apartheid period. The article outlines how alliances are conceptualized and operationalized. It finds that the alliance concept in South Africa departs from the traditional understanding in the Global North: alliances are often driven by mutually shared political and developmental objectives rather than an external security threat. These objectives, combined with a perception of new economic opportunities, have led to an increase in the importance of South Africa's strategic partnerships with rising powers, and reinforced its multi-alignment diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1995, South Africa was in a special position. It was: a new party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the first country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, led by a charismatic leader, and seen as a champion of disarmament principles. Yet South Africa's new leaders were also interested in affirming their position within the Non-Aligned Movement, which was adamantly opposed to the NPT's indefinite extension. Why, then, did South Africa decide to support the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995? Existing scholarship has ascribed too much credit to pressure from the United States, overlooking domestic debates in South Africa and the bifurcation between professional diplomats and political elites. This article, building on new archival sources and in-depth oral-history interviews with major actors, demonstrates that South African diplomats opposed indefinite extension while South African policy elites allocated little attention to the topic until late in the game. The findings contribute to our understanding of South Africa's norm entrepreneurship, as well as the politics of global nonproliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The behavioural model comprises a major theoretical tradition in the field of middle powers since it identifies the distinct behavioural patterns in the diplomacy of these states. Its relevance, however, has been questioned since it continues to rely on older definitions of middle power behaviour and places emphasis on diplomatic preferences rather than influence. To strengthen the relevance of the behavioural model, this article proposes an additional distinctive category that prioritises ideational influence and entrepreneurial effectiveness as key prerequisites for identifying middle powers. The article examines the cases of Brazil and South Africa to argue that states classified as middle powers must not only pursue the diplomatic preferences and strategies that comprise middle power internationalism, but also display the capacity to advance and secure their preferred outcomes at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Just as apartheid was ending, South Africa’s foreign relations witnessed a massive expansion. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs that was to manage this change found itself undergoing institutional transformations of both personnel and ideology. Studies on South African foreign policy have mostly neglected this transformation, which has had a considerable influence on the content and direction of South African foreign policy. In discussing this seldom-studied issue, this analysis unearths the discussions and debates that took place between various stakeholders to bring about transformation in the Department. In doing so, it argues that two different cultures of diplomacy came together in forming the new Department of Foreign Affairs. These cultures have had a significant impact on the thrust and direction of post-apartheid South Africa foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Framed by the 5th BRICS Summit in South Africa in March 2013, this analysis examines economic ‘South-South’ linkages on a company level. A qualitative case study focuses on a small number of private corporations operating in the South African mining and minerals sector. It looks at their reactions to increasingly competitive markets in the regions of Southern and West Africa, thus on their agency, defined as the ability to act in complex uncertainty. Findings present how the South African cases' engagements with strategically selected partner companies from the other BRICS economies can succeed. This contribution attempts to examine entrepreneurial rationale that can be taken as anecdotal evidence of a new ‘economic diplomacy’ at corporate level. The examples illustrate how agency enables certain adaptations of strategies for creating competitive synergies from collaboration with new actors from the other BRICS economies in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Thabo Mbeki's presidency was credited with bringing vision and substance to South Africa's foreign policy through the emphasis of the African agenda. He has continued his prominent diplomatic role since the end of his official terms in office. This article examines the post-presidency of Mbeki in the context of Africa's ‘second-wave’ of democracy, which has created the opportunity for a number of former presidents and prime ministers to continue to play a meaningful role in public life after leaving office. The article also examines Mbeki's activities since leaving office, and their interaction with South African foreign policy, and with his own role in the governing ANC since being recalled from the Presidency by the party. The conclusion draws together the findings and considers Mbeki's lasting contribution to Africa's international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the dilemma facing Tambo in one of the most testing of times for the ANC. It explores the context and events that led to human rights abuses in the MK camps during the early 1980s in the face of serious and sustained attacks by the apartheid government. Some commentators have questioned the nature of Tambo's response to this dark side of the ANC in exile. Based on extensive interviews over a number of years as well as an evaluation of the recent sequence of largely biographical literature on exile, the article examines the dilemma of reconciling the ANC's commitment to human rights, with the increasingly mutinous behaviour of a number of MK soldiers in the Angolan camps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Middle Powers are generally understood to perform diplomatic functions of constructive engagement and consensus-building to facilitate agreement in international negotiations. Middle Powers may, however, adopt more confrontational roles, especially when their accommodative functions become deficient. Whilst theoretical perspectives on Middle Powers account for such roles, limited empirical evidence has been provided to explore the conditions under which they revert to combative diplomacy. This article contributes to this area by examining the role of South Africa in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. During this period, South Africa shifted to a more confrontational approach epitomised by the heightening of its public diplomacy against developed countries and its co-leadership of the G-20 coalition of developing countries. The Cancun Ministerial collapse reflected both the possibilities and limitations of combative diplomacy as South Africa enhanced its international prestige but failed to extract any meaningful concessions, whilst triggering the threat of diplomatic retaliation by the major trading powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emerging global order is challenging multilateralism in the sense that power is becoming situational: centres of gravity are overlapping and transient, and the transnational interdependence that characterises this 'polypolar' world challenges small and great powers alike. Emerging powers are forming a 'new middle', straddling the North-South divide with dynamic new multilateral formations, and prioritising economic self-interest. South Africa is at risk of being relegated to a new global periphery if it gives priority to political solidarity with the global South rather than economic pragmatism in its multilateral strategies. Its comparative advantage in the diplomatic arena is its middle power credentials. If it rationalizes its multilateralism to focus on diplomatic niche areas it can enhance its political influence in global governance institutions, despite its small economic stature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the prospects for a clearly articulated economic diplomacy approach in South Africa's foreign policy. It argues that while South Africa's foreign policy has been to a considerable extent normatively grounded, it has failed to develop a coherent economic diplomacy that is based on focused and distinctly expressed priorities. This is a crucial gap that limits the country's ability to respond to regional and global changes, in particular those posed by emerging powers. The article identifies a number of gaps in South Africa's foreign policy approach and highlights its oblivion to global developments and geopolitical dynamics in the African continent. It sets out possible policy outlines for developing a clearer and stronger economic diplomacy. The building blocks for such an approach include the identification of strategic foreign policy priorities; greater institutional co-operation among agencies dealing with economic and foreign policy development; synergies between corporate strategies and government's foreign policy objectives; and the need for South Africa to develop a stronger leadership ambition in the African continent, both to contribute to Africa's development and to pursue its own economic interests. This ambition will require awareness of South Africa's own limitations, thus focusing the better part of its foreign policy on a limited set of countries that match strategic priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa is planning to create a development assistance agency at a time of growing consensus that traditional aid practices need fundamental change. The profusion of bilateral, multilateral and private aid agencies has created an inefficient system that ensnares recipients in a complex web of regulation and time-consuming consultation that distracts the attention of recipient country staff and undermines the ability of developing countries to develop their own priorities. These faults, widely observed since the 1970s, persist because they are reinforced by powerful but perverse incentives operating at the diplomatic, organisational, staff and recipient government levels. Political pressures within donor countries prioritise diplomatic goals over developmental ones and persistently attempt to finesse rather than genuinely resolve conflicting goals. Confronted with a multiplicity of donors, each with its own complex rules, aid-dependent recipient countries frequently surrender planning initiative to donors and find themselves with an incoherent mix of disparate projects. Avoiding the mistakes of traditional donors and ensuring that South Africa becomes part of the solution rather than a new contributor to the problem will require careful attention to the design and management of South Africa's new aid agency. It needs particular attention to well-designed monitoring and evaluation systems, significant in-house research capacity, well-crafted enabling laws, systems to focus aid in a few productive areas, and efforts to identify and confront the perverse incentives that many aid agencies have preferred to ignore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to consolidate its strategic bilateral relations developed in Africa over the past 14 years, South Africa must choose five key 'hubs' (regional powers) in each of Africa's five sub-regions. In addition, South Africa should pick two additional 'spokes' (influential actors) in each sub-region. These 15 strategic partners can increase South Africa's engagement on the continent in the areas of diplomacy, conflict management, and trade relations. South Africa's bilateral relations would thus resemble a gigantic bicycle, with five hubs and ten spokes. The five hubs are Mozambique, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Algeria. The ten spokes would be Zimbabwe, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Tanzania, Egypt and Libya. It is around these countries that South Africa can build solid strategic bilateral relationships in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines South Africa's role in the United Nations Security Council in 2007-2008. This issue is highlighted as a highpoint in post-apartheid South Africa's diplomacy, which developed from its role of peacemaking and institution building in Africa, as part of the continent's renewal. Faced with the constraints of a hegemonic world and declined global multilateralism, especially after 9/11, South Africa used its moral power to leverage its own sovereignty and that of weaker states. In doing so, it pushed hard for regionalism, devoting its presidential terms in the council in March 2007 and April 2008 to strengthening the linkages between the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) structures. However, from the outset South Africa's voting patterns in the council - from Myanmar to Zimbabwe - revealed the palpable tension between the politics of solidarity and sovereignty on the one hand, and human rights on the other. The article traces South Africa's quest for sovereignty to the struggle against apartheid in the UN and regional structures of the erstwhile Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It further examines South Africa's efforts to implement its vision of the world emerging from this legacy after 1994, culminating in the battle for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Although Pretoria failed to secure a permanent seat, its election to the council as a non-permanent member provided it with the opportunity to implement its vision. While the principled approach to UN diplomacy has expanded the space for its own sovereignty and that of Africa, it has at the same time increased tension with the world's superpower, particularly over the war on terror and Zimbabwe. Recent xenophobic attacks on African migrants in South Africa have, on the other hand, cast some dark clouds on President Thabo Mbeki's acknowledged leading advocacy for the African Renaissance project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of 9/11 surely of great significance is the reassertion of the South – North divide as a defining axis of the international system. In this context the emergence of a coterie of Southern countries actively challenging the position and assumptions of the leading states of the North is an especially significant event. The activism on the part of three middle-income developing countries in particular—South Africa, Brazil and India—has resulted in the creation of a ‘trilateralist’ diplomatic partnership, itself a reflection of broader transformations across the developing world in the wake of globalisation. This article will examine the rise of the co-operative strategy known as ‘trilateralism’ by regional leaders within the South. Specifically it will look at the relationship between emerging regional powers in the context of multilateralism, as well as at the formulation and implementation of trilateralism. As with previous co-operative efforts in the developing world, the prospects of success are rooted in overlapping domestic, regional and international influences on South African, Brazilian and Indian foreign policies. The article will conclude with an assessment of these influences over the trilateral agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an article about working as a South African foreign service officer or career diplomat. Functions of diplomats; Overview of the region's diplomacy; Lessons in life learned from the experience.

Analyzes the contribution of Sam Ramsamy to South Africa's isolation from and return to international sport. Definition of sports diplomacy; Influence of sport's contribution to the end of apartheid; Expansion of protest against apartheid in sport; Guidelines and preconditions required to gain international sporting acceptance.

South African diplomacy went through four broad phases in the period from 1990 to early 1999, and their identification is the starting point for an examination of the role of the 'new' South Africa's foreign policy. Earliest signs of a new foreign policy were the negotiated settlement of the Namibian dispute in the late 1980s and the termination of South Africa's nuclear deterrence programme which opened up the prospect of closer collaboration in Africa and admission to global efforts to stem proliferation. The rapid pace of change meant that, by the time the Government of National Unity assumed power in 1994, some of the African National Council's foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives have been overtaken. After 1994 the priority shifted to Africa, the southern hemisphere and the Non-Aligned Movement, and to universal moral and humanitarian issues. The author reviews the consistency of policy in subsequent years, South African initiatives on Nigeria, Libya and Lesotho, and the adoption of a new set of priorities in the early part of 1999. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]