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How does a small power respond and adjust to a fluid and potentially dangerous strategic balancing by major powers generated by a territorial dispute? This paper observes that notwithstanding the major powers' mistrust, suspicion, and rivalry, such precarious stability in the South China Sea dispute is sustained by a balance-of-power system. This system is an offshoot of the small littoral states' (in this case, the Philippines') policy of engaging the external maritime powers (the United States and Japan) to counter China's heavy-handedness in dealing with this territorial row. Apprehensive of China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea, the United States and Japan are increasing their strategic involvement in the maritime territorial row. These developments have transformed the dispute into a case of conflict irresolution. To cope with China's heavy-handedness, the Philippines builds up the deterrence capability of its armed forces and forges security partnerships with the United States and Japan. The Philippines hopes that this move will ensure the maintenance of the status quo in the regional balance of power. In conclusion, the paper considers the Philippines' policy as myopic, since it overlooks the fact that the volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea might be the proverbial 'calm before the storm.' It is crucial that the Philippines puts its house in order, economically keeps pace with its more dynamic Southeast Asian neighbors, increases its defense spending, formulates a coherent national security strategy, and concentrates on building a credible armed forces to avoid free-riding on its allies, and more importantly, to enable the country to weather the approaching storm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on the South China Sea Disputes was over on July 12, 2016, with a Merits Award in Philippine favor. Beijing rejected this arbitration and abstained from submitting written and oral arguments. Taiwan actively engaged in the debate with the Philippines since July 7, 2015. Not deemed as representative of China, Taiwan was considered capable of clarifying the meaning of the U-Shaped Line it first published in 1947 when seated in Nanjing, representing China then. The biggest maritime feature in the Spratly Islands, i.e. Taiping Island (Itu Aba), has been occupied by troops from mainland China since 1946 and then from Taiwan since 1956. The legal status of Taiping Island was the key to success of Philippine Submissions. The factual information from Taiwan became vital. This paper examines Taiwan's role in this arbitration and the degree to which it could actually speak for China at such legal proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how the structural factor of asymmetry affects China's relations with a small power. As the studies of Brantly Womack suggest, asymmetry theory is conducive to deepening the understanding of China's relations with smaller countries. We argue that an examination of China–Philippines relations from 2010 to 2020 indicates that Beijing has trouble managing its ties with Manila because of the asymmetry in the nature of the relations, which originates in the power and status gaps between them. The asymmetrical structure of this bilateral interplay inclines China to underestimate and neglect the Philippines' intentions and determination to resist, which has been made especially clear in the South China Sea disputes. As a result, their relationship experienced repeated ups and downs throughout the 2010s, in particular over the maritime sovereignty issue. This study also hints at the complicated situations surrounding China where many medium-sized and small states attempt to maneuver among great powers. Without affinities with such governments in the Indo-Pacific region, it will be difficult for Beijing to achieve a peaceful rise and acquire status as a next-generation superpower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes China’s geopolitical maneuvers in the wake of the International Arbitral Court ruling over the South China Sea territorial disputes brought up by the Philippines. It finds that while the Philippines won the case in the sphere of international law, China won the geopolitical battle not only because the court does not have effective enforcement mechanisms but also because the international community lacked the will to induce significant compliance given China’s forceful rejection as a great power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The uniqueness of China's approach in the China--Philippine arbitration is demonstrated in its explication of the dash-line claim. A trend of territorialization in the dash-line claim is discernible since China deems the dash line to be one means for delineating maritime limits and for drawing a maritime boundary, namely maritime delimitation. This position and its connotation not only worry the Philippines but also all stakeholder countries. One explanation is China's reading of the relations between the law of sea and public international law, which implies that the law of the sea has been established as a unique legal regime and, thus, can be operated in an exclusive manner. This approach, which has also been dubbed 'the-land-prioritizes-the-sea' approach runs the risk of isolating the law of the sea regime from the terrain of general international law. The key lies in treating the law of the sea as a regime characterized with conditioned operational closure, so that the spirit of 'land-dominates-the-sea' can be meaningfully honoured and implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a possible revision to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in light of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to disputes over rocks and islands in the South China Sea, dispute resolution provisions under the UNCLOS in light of competing territorial claims by China and the Philippines, and UNCLOS treatment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in relation to artificial islands.

China and its neighbours are closely bound by geography. The rise of China presents new challenges and opportunities for the development of its neighbourhood relations and regional strategies. Currently, China's policy priority in its neighbourhood is active promotion of the construction of a community based on shared interests and a common destiny. The real challenge is that China's rise from a weak to a powerful state has triggered multiple and complex reactions and has required significant and profound adjustment of regional relationships. As a consequence there have been growing tensions in China's neighbourhood areas. Traditional Chinese culture sets the highest value on 'peace and harmony', commends the 'defusing' of contradictions and pursues the result of 'reconciliation'. Now that China is getting strong and is able to make choices as it wishes, the time has come for it to display its 'culture of harmony'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 2013, pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, the Philippines initiated compulsory arbitration against China in an attempt to finally settle their South China Sea disputes. Tired after years of futile negotiating and what it views as belligerent Chinese actions in the Sea, the Philippines hopes that a UN tribunal will reject China's nine-dash line and its claims of sovereignty over much of the Sea. International legal regimes are systems of choice, and China must calculate if it is in its national interest to comply with an adverse award. As an aspiring power, the political, economic, and military costs of ignoring a UN tribunal to China are high. Yet, China's strict adherence to a historic right to the Sea's waters and islands may preclude it from seeing the wisdom in complying with a UN award. Thus, the solution to peace in the South China Sea may sit outside of UNCLOS and may necessitate a freeing from UNCLOS obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U-shaped line in the South China Sea has been recently challenged in the international community and this challenge reached its climax when the Philippines presented China with a Notification and Statement of Claim under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (LOSConvention) on 22 January 2013. In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines requests the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to adjudge and declare that China's maritime claims based on the U-shaped line are contrary to the LOS Convention and invalid. Against this background, this article will analyze the issues concerning the related submissions of the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article first highlights in Part I the procedural posture of the South China Sea Arbitration (the Philippines v. China) case and the affirmative duty of the Arbitral Tribunal under Article 9 of Annex VII to the UNCLOS, faced with the absence of China, to investigate conscientiously its own jurisdiction by taking notice of all available information and materials whether or not they are submitted to the Tribunal. Part II summarizes the Philippines' claims and highlights their nature as well as the delimitation geographical framework and the delimitation situation in this matter. The Philippines “skillfully” fragments a big dispute with China into various free-standing-appearing entitlement claims and activities claims in order to conceal the sovereignty-delimitation nature of the dispute or claims. Part III discusses the jurisdictional obstacles or objections ratione temporis and ratione materiae. The dispute is outside the jurisdiction of Section 2 courts and tribunals, because it predated the entry into force of the UNCLOS with respect to China. Furthermore, the Philippines' claims are essentially land territorial sovereignty matters, not concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, or are dependent on the resolution of land territorial sovereignty claims. Part IV discusses the jurisdictional obstacles or objections based on Article 298 of the UNCLOS and China's 2006 optional exceptions declaration as well as the Philippines' related Understanding. When defragmented as they must be because of the delimitation geographical framework and/or delimitation situation, the Philippines' claims constitute one delimitation dispute with China. In any event, a dispute “concerning” the interpretation or application of the provisions on delimitation or “relating to” “delimitation” within the meaning of Article 298 has a broader scope than a delimitation dispute, however strict a reading one gives to that term. All these issues have been excluded by China from the jurisdiction of Section 2 courts and tribunals. Such a defragmentation approach must be applied by the Tribunal. In addition, the “nine dash line” claims may present disputes involving historic title or historic rights as relevant circumstances in a potential delimitation between the Philippines and China, all being excluded matters. The Philippines' Understanding may also serve to exclude this case from the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Part V summarizes the arguments made in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]