Search

This paper examines the various impacts of contemporary globalization on national security, with special reference to the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China and its security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper adheres to a sectoral approach to the study of globalization-security interconnections and adopts a broadly based definition of security pertaining to the case study in question that encompasses economic, technological and defense security. The analysis of the subject matter is grounded in evidence collected in more than 140 interviews with chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data. On sectoral migration, the paper argues that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the development of the indigenous Chinese chip industry. It has been discovered that some Taiwanese non-state chip actors have violated government regulations in the process of spearheading the migration, and some have even forged business ties with their PRC counterparts associated with the PLA. As for the ensuing security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved, although long-term strategic repercussions are paramount. The depth and scope of the continuous sectoral migration in years to come will determine the level of economic security risks faced by the US and Taiwan. Long-term technological and defense security repercussions need to take into account two important elements at play: technological change in the sector (increasing commercial-to-military spin-on and dual-use nature of the chip technology), and the PRC dual-track (economic and defense) grand strategy behind its resolve to upgrade its indigenous chip capability. Four pertinent aspects are analyzed: (a) concerns over the PRC chip industrial base, its contribution to the PLA modernization and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour; (b) technology-related misgivings over the trustworthy supplies of chips for the US and Taiwanese military end uses, as well as the shrinking "chip gap"; (c) fear of denial of chip supply due to foreign dependency; (d) dubious implementation of export control policies at the unilateral and the multilateral level that exacerbate some of the above security repercussions. The concluding section elucidates how the case study helps to show the impact of globalization on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. To sum up, the study offers a fresh look at the complex security repercussions of the globalization of a strategic industry that occurs in a politically sensitive region in world politics today. It not only helps us disentangle an important policy issue, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the globalization-security interconnections in international relations today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A hallmark of political-economic leadership in the world economy is ample and privileged access to sources of energy. A relatively inexpensive energy source is critical to literally fueling technological and economic growth that outpaces, for a time, the rest of the world. The Dutch had peat, the British had coal, and the United States had petroleum. What should we expect next? The question is particularly compelling if we are in the early days of a political-economic transition with China possibly surpassing the United States at some point in the century. Or will the United States preserve its lead with the aid of the advent of a newly heralded period of energy independence? The potential compounding of transitions - both energy and political-economic - draw attention to energy supply and access questions. Answers about energy transitions may provide major clues to the future shape of systemic leadership transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese government censorship of social media constitutes the largest selective suppression of human communication in the history of the world. Although existing systematic research on the subject has revealed a great deal, it is based on passive, observational methods, with well known inferential limitations. We attempt to generate more robust causal and descriptive inferences through participation and experimentation. For causal inferences, we conduct a large scale randomized experimental study by creating accounts on numerous social media sites spread throughout the country, submitting different randomly assigned types of social media texts, and detecting from a network of computers all over the world which types are censored. Then, for descriptive inferences, we supplement the current approach of confidential interviews by setting up our own social media site in China, contracting with Chinese firms to install the same censoring technologies as existing sites, and reverse engineering how it all works. Our results offer unambiguous support for, and clarification of, the emerging view that criticism of the state, its leaders, and their policies are routinely published whereas posts with collective action potential are much more likely to be censored. We are also able to clarify the internal mechanisms of the Chinese censorship apparatus and show that local social media sites have far more flexibility than was previously understood in how (but not what) they censor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the economic and technological progress of China since 1979. The official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, said that the space scientists should be held as a model of professionalism for all of society. China's space program highlights the ability to mobilize economic, technological and human resources.

International relations specialists should reconsider how they approach science and technology issues. While the globalization of scientific and technological innovation already draws the field's attention, scholars should also take note of empirical and theoretical work that points to the enduring local specificity of scientific practice. Developments in science studies and research on science in China suggest the need to re-examine how international relations theory has addressed these issues. In researching and theorizing the role of scientists and technologists in international relations, scholars in this field could benefit from insights in science studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]