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This paper deals with the reception of the Foucauldian notion of governmentality in Roberto Esposito's thought by taking into account the Italian translation of Foucault's lectures of 1977 and 1978 at the Collège de France. First, the different contexts of reception of these lectures are presented, in particular the Anglo-Saxon studies of governmentality and the crisis of Italian Marxism in the late 1970s. Secondly, Foucault's position in his courses of these years is analyzed from the perspective of the opposition between Machiavellianism and anti-Machiavellianism, precisely in view of the Italian reception. Finally, this paper analyses the reception of the notion of governmentality by Roberto Esposito in his 1980 work La politica e la storia. The paper shows the importance of this early reception of Foucault's lessons regarding the formation of the Italian biopolitical current and its specificities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyze Hegel's interpretation of Plato's political philosophy (specially the Republic) in certain passages of two specific works: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts and Die Vorlesungen über Platon. I consider two axes of analysis: private property and subjective freedom. The main goal of the paper is to describe the relationship that Hegel establishes with Plato, or at least with the Republic. I show that this dialogue presents nuances with respect to the two axes mentioned and that these nuances imply differences of analysis regarding the Hegelian reading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clinical judgement has become a central topic in both medicine and the philosophy since the 1960s. With the development of evidence-based medicine in the 1990s, clinical judgment is expected to be more sensitive to the needs and preferences of patients in the face of threats from positivist approaches that are considered to neglect individuality. This paper addresses this problem in the light of a philosophy of medicine that is more sensitive to the historical components of epistemology, ontology, and ethics. The analysis is directed to the 19th century in order to elucidate the tensions about the place of medical knowledge and the commitment, for the sake of professional improvement, to provide clinical judgment with new methods. This trip to the past is useful to understand the current transformations in the field of medicine, especially the way in which they help constitute new types of patients, new types of professional ethos, and new forms of relationship between these actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is motivated by the problem of collective responsibility for the actions committed by our ancestors and by the question about the legitimacy of demands for forgiveness. Turning to the conceptual universe of Hannah Arendt, this argues for the exercise of the capacity for judgment as a catalyst for both the demand for forgiveness and collective responsibility. Forgiveness is thus presented not only as a moral category but as fundamentally political one, essential for reconciling with what has happened and for looking to the future with hope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a systematic and doxographical reconstruction of the phenomena of delay and lateness in Martin Heidegger's thought between 1919 and 1930. In the first section, we trace the ambiguities that permeate the nominalization and formalization of delay in order to thematize immediately after the disruptive structure of four modes of delay understood as constitutive within Heidegger's early work. We account for the way in which delay carries an illuminating potential that phenomenologically ensures the evidencing of the constituent dimension. In the second section, we descend to the immanent transformations of Heidegger's philosophy in order to account for two possibilities of philosophy's self-understanding on the basis of delay and lateness, precisely from two modes of relation with the constituent dimension of the appearing: on the one hand, a mode marked by crepuscular lateness, and on the other hand, an executive mode based on auroral delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I interpret the first four sections of Human, All Too Human I to argue that Nietzsche's philosophy has diagnostic and therapeutic ambitions. In the first section, I show that his philosophy is psychological. In the second section, I illustrate the descriptive psychology of Nietzsche's philosophy, for which metaphysical doctrines rest on psychological misunderstandings and highly valued sensations and conceptions are based on selfish motives and mistakes of reason. In the third section, I argue that Nietzsche's philosophy is also medical and intellectualist: his inquiry into human psychology allows him, first, to diagnose two types of illnesses, one caused by scientific knowledge (existential illness) and the other caused by metaphysical doctrines (nervous illness), and second, to cure both types of diseases by eliminating their causes with this same scientific knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first part of this paper explains the praxeological interpretation of the noological concept of act. The second part describes Antonio González Fernández's criticisms of that notion. His objection consists in pointing out that acts cannot be considered real things, but only the arising of these. From this observation on noology, González Fernández not only gives rise to his praxeology (also known as hiparqueology), but also his philosophical system begins to be questioned for not explaining what acts are, in the world of facts, beyond the assumption that they are there, despite being invisible. In the third and last section, some hypotheses are presented to address objections to the praxeological concept of act, such as the one mentioned above and the apparent circularities and possible contradictions within the praxeological system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although some have attempted to rethink the subject of technology from the perspective of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy, there hast not yet been a direct dialogue with the transhumanist position. In this paper, we propose a new approach, understood as a criticism, from the thought of Kierkegaard to transhumanism and its concept of singularity. We, first, analyze the way in which transhumanists understand the concept of singularity and what its limitations are; then, with the help of Kierkegaard's philosophy, we argue that the only possible and real singularity is the human person as a primordial relationship, source of anguish and freedom, sin and love, and spirit. We also argue that this relationship cannot be reproduced by any artificial creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I claim that the distinction between "philosophy" and "spirituality" can be a key for understanding Foucault's work, assuming that his philosophy and historical thought do possess a "spiritual dimension." For this purpose, I analyze the figures of transgression and pensée du dehors of the archaeological period, the figures of resistance and criticism as reflexive indocility of the genealogical period, and the fold of the ethical period. I determine whether they can be considered a spiritual dimension that promotes être autrement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present the step from isomorphism to isodynamism in Gilbert Simondon's philosophy. For this, I first explain the isomorphism argument and some of its implications and critiques. Then, I discuss some elements of Simondon's individuation theory regarding being and becoming. Lastly, I analyze this change from isomorphism to isodynamism and I offer examples of some possible derivations of isodynamism. Basically, this process involves a change in perspective, from structural similarity to operational analogy--for example, between different levels of being (physicochemical, biological and psychosocial). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I inquire into the notion of background in the philosophy of Charles Taylor and seek to complement it with reflections made by Hubert Dreyfus. This notion aims to counteract the cognitive representationalism that Descartes's thought tremendously promoted and that has been largely perpetuated by modern epistemology. Representationalism, for Taylor, makes us open to anthropologies based on ontologies of disengagement (dualism and mechanistic monism), an imprint which decisively influenced modern and contemporary philosophy despite the efforts of different schools of thought that claim to have overcome it. For Dreyfus, the notion of background is linked to our social practices, and Heidegger's controversial "the One" (das Man) is its privileged place of transmission; it is also that which would definitively collapse the Cartesian representationalist legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the foreword to the Science of Logic (WdL) from 1812. It answers the following questions: what is WdL about? What is the logic in the Science of Logic? Is the term "logic" just a substitute for "metaphysics" or, rather, is WdL the inception of a completely new discipline, quite different from metaphysics in the traditional sense? I reach the conclusion that, in WdL, logic is the development of the concept expressed as social freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to describe F. H. Jacobi's critique of transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of affection and the thing in itself. This critique attributes to Kant's thought an idealism incompatible with any notion of realism. Jacobi's interpretation, however, rests on an ignorance of the methodological-transcendental nature not only of the terminology involved in the problem of affection, but of the whole Kantian reflection about knowledge. The exegetical model of the two aspects view has provided instruments that allowed for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the problem of affection and put in evidence the methodological mistake present in Jacobi's critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to examine and respond to Leibniz's objection to E1p2 and E1p5. The objection is well known: it is false, according to Leibniz, that two substances of different attributes have nothing in common (i. e., E1p2) and, consequently, that in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same attribute (i. e., E1p5). Here I claim that E1p2, and therefore E1p5, resist Leibniz's objection. To do so, I first address the meaning and function of E1p2 in order to determine two possible contexts in which the demonstration is valid: the context delimited by the Cartesian doctrine of the principal attribute, and the scholastic context of the logical doctrine of essential diversity. Second, I examine Leibniz's objection, by which I determine more precisely the epistemic framework of both E1p2d and Leibniz's objection. Third, I propose a critical analysis of Leibniz's objection to show that, although this objection has some semblance of validity, if we consider only what Spinoza stated in the definitions and axioms prior to E1p2, it entails a contradiction. Finally, I indicate the most difficult point in the proof of E1p2 in order to propose a small rectification that renders it immune to Leibniz's objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My aim in this paper is to examine some of the distinctive facets of human action in Spinoza's philosophy and show their intrinsic connection with each other. By analyzing in detail how Spinoza addresses different aspects of human action in his main work, the Ethics, it is possible to notice that for him free human agency implies two interrelated features: on the one hand, the adequate knowledge of the causes that determine it, and, on the other hand, a growing capacity to impact with greater power the scenarios in which it takes place. Thus, in contrast with quietist and passive readings, I show in the following that the two aforementioned characteristics are part of the Spinozian philosophical conception of agency as such. By pursuing this line of thought, it is also possible to establish a link--not always noticed in the secondary literature--with some of the central lines of thought contained in the Theological-Political Treatise. In discussing these theses, I advance the idea that the Spinozian conception of human agency involves a serious readjustment of the metaphysical vision of the agent, a change in her conduct and ethical practices, and an altogether different conception of politics and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of classicism is one of the most used categories in the world of the arts and of philosophical aesthetics. However, the variety of its uses has caused the term to present difficulties of interpretation and ambiguities to those who study classicist art or literature. This paper intends to introduce some clarity and distinctness in the discussion about the idea of classicism. To do this, we first deal with the questions that concern its historical genesis, dissociating it from the similar, but essentially different, concept of the classical. Second, we offer a characterization of its structure through a systematization of its four main senses as they are commonly used in the bibliography on the subject. In this way, classicism presents itself to us as the problem of articulating the different philosophical conceptualizations that have been adopted about the classical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper puts forward an interpretation of three decisive dreams that shook Descartes taking as a starting point what Heidegger called another beginning of philosophy in horror (das Erschrecken). On the one hand, it will be shown how Descartes's nightmares opened the possibility of an initial way of thinking. On the other hand, it will be discussed how Descartes recoils from this possibility. By linking the hidden dimension of being to the demonic realm, Descartes seeked refuge in a calculating thought based on a truthful God who guarantees the availability of being. The analysis of dreams proposed here seeks to draw attention to a background that will help explain what Descartes is seeking refuge from when he builds his scientific structure and what avenues remain open in the subsoil of his thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper clarifies Gilbert Simondon's notion of information by presenting the historical-epistemological context from which it emerges, as well as the solutions it presents to the conceptual problems of the time. I give special attention to the conceptualizations proposed by cybernetics, information theory, and biology. In addition, the conceptual changes of Simondon's notion of information are analyzed in accordance to three of the main moments of his thought (classified by Juan Manuel Heredia): a) 1944-1958, b) 1959-1968, and c) 1968-1983. This gives a fuller sense to the meaning of information in Simondon's work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I address the dispute between normativism and descriptivism by focusing on the arbitration problem. For this, I propose to take into account the discussion on the collapse problem that has taken place recently in the philosophy of logic. My proposal maintains, on the one hand, that human reasoning, as a social practice, is an essentially regulated activity and, on the other hand, that formal systems of reference in the psychology of reasoning are the result of various processes of reflective equilibrium. This makes it possible to defend the normative role of formal systems as a standard for human reasoning. Furthermore, I argue that the adequacy of a formal system is marked by the specific contexts of reasoning. Thus, I defend normative pluralism regarding formal systems of inference within the framework of empirical studies on human reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]