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This paper analyzes the foreword to the Science of Logic (WdL) from 1812. It answers the following questions: what is WdL about? What is the logic in the Science of Logic? Is the term "logic" just a substitute for "metaphysics" or, rather, is WdL the inception of a completely new discipline, quite different from metaphysics in the traditional sense? I reach the conclusion that, in WdL, logic is the development of the concept expressed as social freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper puts forward an interpretation of three decisive dreams that shook Descartes taking as a starting point what Heidegger called another beginning of philosophy in horror (das Erschrecken). On the one hand, it will be shown how Descartes's nightmares opened the possibility of an initial way of thinking. On the other hand, it will be discussed how Descartes recoils from this possibility. By linking the hidden dimension of being to the demonic realm, Descartes seeked refuge in a calculating thought based on a truthful God who guarantees the availability of being. The analysis of dreams proposed here seeks to draw attention to a background that will help explain what Descartes is seeking refuge from when he builds his scientific structure and what avenues remain open in the subsoil of his thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has two specific goals. The first is to demonstrate that the theorem in Metaphysics T 9, 1051a24-27 is not equivalent to Euclid's Proposition 32 of book I (which contradicts some Aristotelian commentators, such as W. D. Ross, J. L. Heiberg, and T. L. Heith). Agreeing with Henry Mendell's analysis, I argue that the two theorems are not equivalent, but I offer different reasons for such divergence: I propose a pedagogical-philosophical reason for the Aristotelian theorem being shorter than the Euclidean one (and the previous Aristotelian versions). Aristotle wants to emphasize the deductive procedure as a satisfactory method to discover scientific knowledge. The second objective, opposing some consensus about geometrical deductions/theorems in Aristotle, is to briefly propose that the theorem, exactly as we found it in Metaphysics and without any emendation to the text (therefore opposing Henry Mendell's suggested amendments), allows the ancient philosopher to demonstrate that universal mathematical knowledge is in potence in geometrical figures. This tentatively proves that Aristotle emphasizes that geometrical deduction is sufficient to actualize mathematical knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the notion of being according to Maurice Nédoncelle. Firstly, I explain this French personalist philosopher's general concept of human interrelationship, after which I present a general idea of Nédoncelle's metaphysics. Then, I discuss his conception of being as a transcendental relation. I claim that Nédoncelle's conception of being is coherent with personalist claims about the nature of the person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant's moral philosophy intends to be an articulated project between metaphysics of morals and practical anthropology. In the works in which he undertakes the task of grounding his metaphysics of morals, namely, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant insists that he borrows nothing from anthropology to support this grounding, whereas in his two other most important practical writings, the Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant applies his metaphysics of morals to anthropology. By discussing Kant's idea that empirical happiness is an essential end for every human being, and that his metaphysics of morals is just incoherent without denying rationality and freedom to every sensible incentive, this paper problematizes the possibility of the articulated project of Kant's moral philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present a translation and analysis of Metaphysics a 1, 993 b 23-31 to subsequently show how Alexander of Aphrodisias's interpretation of said passage led medieval philosophers to attribute a doctrine of creation to Aristotle. For Alexander, those things that are most true and those beings that are in the highest degree, about which Aristotle speaks in Met. a 1, a passage that originally addressed the relationship between the premises and conclusions of demonstrations, are the unmoved movers, which have a relationship of imitation or participation with the things that depend on them. In Averroes, who favors the Neoplatonic notion of perfection, the causality of the unmoved mover becomes an efficient causality in its fullest sense: an explanation not only of the movement of the heavens, but of their being and that of all things. Thus, he implicitly presents Aristotle as a monotheistic and creationist philosopher. Thomas Aquinas, using the notions of "being by essence" and "being by participation" and deriving a notion of "always being" from that of "always being true", also transforms the unmoved mover into a true creator and explicitly points out the reasons for his interpretation in the text of Aristotle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]