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Everything that comes in, eventually goes out. One way or another. This paper will look into eating and defecating practices among rebels in Colombia, in particular, the FARC-EP. I will argue that these practices, despite being daily occurrences, have been overlooked in conflict studies. I will argue that eating practices in particular reinforced emotional bonds within the organization and fostered micro-solidarity. At the same time, eating and defecating practices reflected and reinforced, at once, organizational practices and ideological commitments of the rebels – particularly gender equality and collectivism. This paper, by focusing on cherished everyday activities which are deeply human, both biological and social, is a call to re-humanise this field of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of micro-level violence make various claims to universality: namely, that there are patterns of violence in civil wars that are observable across time and space. The analysis of rebel violence against civilians constitutes one of the enduring themes of these studies. By evaluating the actions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) during the latter half of the Colombian civil war, this paper demonstrates that the claims of micro-level studies are unable to account for FARC's violence against civilians. In response, this study provides an alternative framework for understanding FARC's violence. Informed by the theories of Carl von Clausewitz it is possible to comprehend the logic of FARC's violence against civilians within a strategic framework that aimed to advance the movement's political goals. However, it also illustrates that FARC was influenced heavily by its involvement in the drugs trade. The main findings are a) that whilst FARC's acts of violence may have contained similarities to that of other drugs cartels FARC did not become a narco-guerrilla organization, b) the case of FARC demonstrates that ultimately there are no reproducible patterns in war, micro-level or otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The civil conflict in Colombia has gained attention in part for the inclusion of women in rebel forces and peace negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Scholarship has often explained the FARC's decision to mobilize women as both an ideological and tactical move, designed to increase the ranks of the organization and signal commitment to leftist principles. In this paper, I argue that the incorporation of women into Colombia's civil war is better understood by viewing the country's various leftist armed movements (including the ELN, EPL, and M-19) through a comparative framework. By applying the theoretical concept of outbidding, I argue that the mobilization and expansion of women's roles in Colombian armed groups was in fact an intersubjective process, driven by competition among leftist movements existing in a crowded marketplace. In contrast to alternative explanations that focus on mobilization as an elite-driven process, I argue that the outbidding dynamic exposes agency among women recruited to these groups and demonstrates the potential for women to create strategic openings in times of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the 'rebels-turned-narcos' premise, increasing involvement in the illicit drug industry causes insurgent groups to lose sight of their political aims, as they shift their focus to profit-making. The (former) Colombian rebel group, the FARC-EP, became a paragon for this idea. Drawing on primary research, we argue that the FARC-EP's involvement in the illicit drug economy was itself political. Their involvement included governance activities, which are by their very nature political. Furthermore, these activities formed part of the FARC-EP's political project, aimed at ensuring the reproduction of the peasant smallholder economy. Our argument challenges the rebels-turned-narcos premise more broadly by showing why involvement in the illicit drug economy, on its own, is insufficient evidence to posit the depoliticization of an insurgent group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Establishing peace in Colombia has been an enigma escaping the best intentions of some presidents. The causes of this riddle are multiple. Some attributed it to the nature of the state-making process led by a fractured elite compounded with the state limited resources in a country with one of the most complex topographies in the world. This article tackles part of this puzzle, particularly the inability of any fraction of the elite to establish its hegemonic vision over the others and hence to pacify the polity. It explores why previous presidents who attempted to find a peaceful settlement of its long armed conflict failed and why and how did President Juan Manuel Santos succeed. Against the backdrop of a fragmented hegemony, I analyze two core areas that have received scant attention in the literature, which are essential to understand the previous failures. The role of the United States in the Colombian conflict and the excessive autonomy of Colombia military institution vis-à-vis the executive in conducting the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between armed rebels and local civilians is among the least understood aspects of insurgency. This article posits a novel theory, the rebels' resource curse, to argue that the interaction between rebel groups and local communities can be traced to the availability of revenue-generating resources. The theory is developed using a case study comparison approach to critically analyze how access to revenue-generating resources among the Naxalites in India and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia affect these insurgent-civilian interactions. The theory proposes that insurgents face a resource curse similar to that faced by states. Rather than resource wealth contributing to greater social engagement and fruitful insurgent-civilian interactions, it appears to precipitate isolationist, and even exploitative and violent relations between insurgents and local civilian populations. Conversely, resource scarcity predicts a greater degree of social integration and cohesion between civilians and insurgents. The framework of the rebels' resource curse can also be applied productively to other insurgent groups, enhancing our understanding of the social realities of insurgency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Belligerent nonstate actors including terrorist organizations often exploit illicit economies to fund their activities. In Colombia numerous belligerent groups are involved in illegal narcotics markets. For more than 20 years, the Colombian government has responded with targeted eradication of illicit crops, intending to undermine the groups' sources of revenue while simultaneously disrupting the illicit drug economy. Despite its duration, this policy's effect on guerrilla violence remains unclear. Examining the potential for violent backlash to these tactics, this research note assesses the impact of aerial coca crop eradication in Colombia from 2004–2005 on domestic Colombian guerrilla kidnappings, assassinations, and terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Illegal organizations, like mafia syndicates, gangs, and insurgencies, are often highly cohesive and hostile toward the outside world. Such groups cultivate a particular form of “anti-social” capital, which relies on ingroup bonding and limits outgroup bridging for the purpose of commissioning illicit acts. We argue that experiences within the group leave members with varying intensities of anti-social capital, and that higher intensities lead to significantly weaker relationships with political institutions and civil society, even many years after they exit the group. We test this theory using survey data from 1,485 former members of insurgent and paramilitary groups in Colombia, along with insights from 68 qualitative interviews. We find strong evidence that anti-social capital has individually varying and sticky effects on former members. These effects are pervasive and intense, and exhibit surprising and counterintuitive properties: former members of pro-state militia with higher levels of anti-social capital are systematically less likely to trust political institutions, while members of peasant-based insurgent groups with high levels of anti-social capital are less likely to participate in their communities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]