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This paper considers the extent to which South Africa utilises positive economic statecraft to promote human rights in the region – that is, the degree to which it mobilises its economic engagement to affect a desirable political outcome in its foreign engagements in Southern Africa. The country's reaction to crises in Zimbabwe and Swaziland over the past 20 years is a strong indicator of the limits of South Africa's statecraft in this regard. These engagements highlight the inevitable clash between the country's principled preference for ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of sovereign states and its constitutional mandate to respect and promote human rights. Despite eschewing the role of ‘regional hegemon’, there is an expectation that South Africa will play an integral role in securing regional stability. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the country chooses to approach resolving regional challenges with a co-ordinated political and economic approach. This paper argues that, to be more effective in spreading a progressive regional agenda that encourages democracy, governance and human rights, South Africa needs to incorporate a stronger element of positive economic statecraft in its foreign policy implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As questions concerning international development climb the international agenda, so countries find themselves drawn into a burgeoning number of negotiations on issues ranging from the future shape and direction of the post-2015 development agenda to ‘aid effectiveness’ and international development cooperation. Moving from the position of a ‘beneficiary’ state in the traditional donor–recipient aid hierarchy, South Africa is looking to define its own niche within the wider development diplomacy context as a development partner. This paper provides an assessment of South Africa's evolving approach towards international development cooperation, with a particular focus on trilateral development cooperation, and what this means for Pretoria's foreign policy in bridging the divide between developed and developing country positions within the international development regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With South Africa having declared itself a developmental state, this paper posits that if a developmental state is one that drives development, then the foreign policy of such a state should pursue development as one of its most important goals. Similarly the diplomatic corps of such a state should prioritise economic, commercial, para- and public diplomacy as drivers of diplomacy. In answering the question, ‘What should be the foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state?’, the authors, through an exploratory approach, seek to analyse how well the state has fared in achieving this objective. To be a successful developmental state, a strategic capacity should exist and a clear strategic conception of the state's national interest should be formulated. Old paradigms about the role and functions of the diplomatic corps are challenged and a meritocratic diplomatic corps is strongly advocated to support the state's declared developmental goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the extent to which South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe under the Mbeki administration was shaped by economic and commercial considerations. Given the extensive involvement and growing influence of the South African business sector in Zimbabwe, the potential link between the South African government's policy stance towards Zimbabwe and South Africa's commercial interests in Zimbabwe is intuitively appealing. This paper argues, however, that although South African firms have exploited the commercial opportunities that have emerged from the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, it is not clear from the available evidence if commercial interests have been a primary consideration in South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe. It concludes that the Mbeki government's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe was not principally shaped by economic objectives, but was instead driven predominantly by political and ideological concerns, which related closely to perceptions about South Africa's role on the African continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of sub-state diplomacy, defined as the transnational linkages of sub-national governments, in bridging the gap between foreign policy and the domestic development agenda in South Africa. It argues that, as territorial sub-state actors, provinces and municipalities are strategically positioned to use their international relations to make foreign policy more responsive to domestic socio-economic priorities. In the South African case, however, this potential is yet to be fully realised, mainly because of institutional fragmentation of the foreign policy apparatus, but also owing to enduring challenges in the foreign activities of sub-national governments. The article concludes by making the case for a new diplomatic paradigm in South Africa, one that actively promotes and harnesses the foreign activities and capacities of different national stakeholders, including those of sub-national governments, in the interest of the domestic development agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa has since 1994 actively participated in multilateral parliamentary diplomacy through inter-parliamentary institutions (IPIs). This article considers parliamentary diplomacy as an instrument of soft power and interrogates the soft power impact of agenda-setting in the context of IPIs. The qualitative analysis of various parliamentary records and other document sources reveals agenda-setting actions by Parliament that can be understood as instruments of soft power that hold positive implications for the state. Challenges to potential soft power gains were also identified. The research was enriched with primary perspectives from interviewed parliamentary members and officials who have consistently served as South African delegates to IPIs. The study provides insights for members of parliament and other policymakers on the merits and modalities of employing agenda-setting within multilateral parliamentary diplomacy as a soft power tool of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Framed by the 5th BRICS Summit in South Africa in March 2013, this analysis examines economic ‘South-South’ linkages on a company level. A qualitative case study focuses on a small number of private corporations operating in the South African mining and minerals sector. It looks at their reactions to increasingly competitive markets in the regions of Southern and West Africa, thus on their agency, defined as the ability to act in complex uncertainty. Findings present how the South African cases' engagements with strategically selected partner companies from the other BRICS economies can succeed. This contribution attempts to examine entrepreneurial rationale that can be taken as anecdotal evidence of a new ‘economic diplomacy’ at corporate level. The examples illustrate how agency enables certain adaptations of strategies for creating competitive synergies from collaboration with new actors from the other BRICS economies in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Thabo Mbeki's presidency was credited with bringing vision and substance to South Africa's foreign policy through the emphasis of the African agenda. He has continued his prominent diplomatic role since the end of his official terms in office. This article examines the post-presidency of Mbeki in the context of Africa's ‘second-wave’ of democracy, which has created the opportunity for a number of former presidents and prime ministers to continue to play a meaningful role in public life after leaving office. The article also examines Mbeki's activities since leaving office, and their interaction with South African foreign policy, and with his own role in the governing ANC since being recalled from the Presidency by the party. The conclusion draws together the findings and considers Mbeki's lasting contribution to Africa's international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the prospects for a clearly articulated economic diplomacy approach in South Africa's foreign policy. It argues that while South Africa's foreign policy has been to a considerable extent normatively grounded, it has failed to develop a coherent economic diplomacy that is based on focused and distinctly expressed priorities. This is a crucial gap that limits the country's ability to respond to regional and global changes, in particular those posed by emerging powers. The article identifies a number of gaps in South Africa's foreign policy approach and highlights its oblivion to global developments and geopolitical dynamics in the African continent. It sets out possible policy outlines for developing a clearer and stronger economic diplomacy. The building blocks for such an approach include the identification of strategic foreign policy priorities; greater institutional co-operation among agencies dealing with economic and foreign policy development; synergies between corporate strategies and government's foreign policy objectives; and the need for South Africa to develop a stronger leadership ambition in the African continent, both to contribute to Africa's development and to pursue its own economic interests. This ambition will require awareness of South Africa's own limitations, thus focusing the better part of its foreign policy on a limited set of countries that match strategic priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa is planning to create a development assistance agency at a time of growing consensus that traditional aid practices need fundamental change. The profusion of bilateral, multilateral and private aid agencies has created an inefficient system that ensnares recipients in a complex web of regulation and time-consuming consultation that distracts the attention of recipient country staff and undermines the ability of developing countries to develop their own priorities. These faults, widely observed since the 1970s, persist because they are reinforced by powerful but perverse incentives operating at the diplomatic, organisational, staff and recipient government levels. Political pressures within donor countries prioritise diplomatic goals over developmental ones and persistently attempt to finesse rather than genuinely resolve conflicting goals. Confronted with a multiplicity of donors, each with its own complex rules, aid-dependent recipient countries frequently surrender planning initiative to donors and find themselves with an incoherent mix of disparate projects. Avoiding the mistakes of traditional donors and ensuring that South Africa becomes part of the solution rather than a new contributor to the problem will require careful attention to the design and management of South Africa's new aid agency. It needs particular attention to well-designed monitoring and evaluation systems, significant in-house research capacity, well-crafted enabling laws, systems to focus aid in a few productive areas, and efforts to identify and confront the perverse incentives that many aid agencies have preferred to ignore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to consolidate its strategic bilateral relations developed in Africa over the past 14 years, South Africa must choose five key 'hubs' (regional powers) in each of Africa's five sub-regions. In addition, South Africa should pick two additional 'spokes' (influential actors) in each sub-region. These 15 strategic partners can increase South Africa's engagement on the continent in the areas of diplomacy, conflict management, and trade relations. South Africa's bilateral relations would thus resemble a gigantic bicycle, with five hubs and ten spokes. The five hubs are Mozambique, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Algeria. The ten spokes would be Zimbabwe, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Tanzania, Egypt and Libya. It is around these countries that South Africa can build solid strategic bilateral relationships in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]