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Recently a new approach to political economy has been consolidated. The political analysis of transaction costs is an attempt to solve some of the problems which arise in economic theories of public policy. This paper deals with the notions of transaction costs, institutional efficiency, governance structures and commitment value; and defines political interchange as political contracts. Political transactions have high transaction costs and the efficiency of the "political market" requires a democratic system with institutions that favour reasoned decisions and prevents democratic delegation from becoming abdication. This article surveys literature with a transaction cost perspective and shows that it has been very useful for the theoretical explanation of the role of political agents and the evolution of rules that guide their interaction. The main challenge is to provide empirical evidence to the theoretical proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to present the main differences between New Institutional Economics, NIE, and Original Institutional Economics, OIE, and to question some of the proposals that call for the gap between the two approaches to be bridge. This does not preclude the possibilities of a dialogue. Without ignoring some important theoretical developments in North's work, the author claims that NIE is a school that operates in the periphery of the neoclassical economics paradigm, and shares its ontological and methodological foundations; however these are very different from the evolutionary (Darwinian) economics of Thorstein Veblen. Though the task of integrating the OIE and NIE seems impossible following the road of eclecticism, a dialogue between them could open new perspectives and enrich institutional economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Space, geography and territorial organization have gained importance in recent studies on economical and political development. This reveals a (re)territorialization of the theoretical approaches of development. This paper systematically studies new theories of economic growth, analysis of State transformation, neoinstitutionalist approaches and the environmental perspective. Though these theories come from different disciplines, they converge in a new paradigm of development. In this new approach, the territory is not considered a receptacle-perimeter of productive activities and sociopolitical process, but as an explanatory element of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the main problems of the theory of games as a tool of economic analysis. It also points out the new perspectives of the solution concepts including their context and finally it presents some comments regarding the future of the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that credit is important has gained importance in the contemporary macroeconomic theory. However, almost all the models that explicitly include financial variables in their explanation of economic behaviour continue to differentiate between the monetary and the real economy in the long run. This paper proposes a relationship between credit restrictions and financial crisis based on postkeynesian theory. In this context, credit rationalization appears as a natural phenomenon in modern capitalist economies, and not as a result of the bankers' voluntary action will or their imperfect information due to the confidentiality of investors' knowledge. Financial crisis are endogenous, but they can be prevented by the correct behaviour of the economic institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper, which is part of a broader research project, is to analyse the fluctuations of output in a framework of imperfect competition based on the stylised facts. We conclude that these movements can be originated by supply or demand shocks, or simply by the adjustment of the economy when goods or labor markets are not balanced because of price and wages rigidities. On the other hand, it justifies the Keynesian argument related to government interference in cases where the economy cannot overcome a recessive stage on its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows how some of the most important concepts of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) can be expressed in terms of Implementation Theory (IT). First, it explains some of the expressions used by the NIE, such as institutions, transaction costs, property rights and methodological individualism. Afterwards, it gives a wide definition of the IT in order to establish correspondences between both theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has recently been a resurgence of interest in how institutions affect economic performance. A review of this literature reveals that the concept of an 'institution' means different things to different scholars, both within economics and across the social sciences. This paper discusses what factors unify the different definitions of institutions, and develops a concept of institutions useful for the analysis of economic performance, and economic growth in particular. Specifically, it develops the notion of institutions as standard 'social technologies'. Economic growth results from the co-evolution of physical and social technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticizes multicausal and penal impunity explanations of violence and crime. It shows the analytical limits of identifying state and social institutional failure with objective causes of violence. But also highlights that impunity indicators cannot be confused with impunity itself. After showing those limits, it proposes an alternative approach based on two central facts that have been ignored: organized crime nature and the breakdown of colombian justice and security systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows the relevance of Popper's Rationality Principle (RP) for the appraisal of the impressive mass work emerging, in recent years, in the fields of rationality, learning, evolutionary games and behavioral economic theory. In contradistinction to the well-known rigid criteria of the falsacionist Popper, the RP covers a large and diverse spectrum of behaviors compatible with the minimal idea of 'acting in accordance with the situation'. Its relevance to understand the formation of social conventions or how agents learn 'to play Nash equilibrium' is argued at length here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what circumstances is it necessary or convenient for an agent to rely on habits and rules? This paper focuses on the types of decision situation giving rise to their use. Even optimisation requires the development of rules, and for this reason mainstream economics cannot legitimately ignore these questions. It argues that habits and rules are ubiquitous in human activity, presents a new taxonomy and analyses seven types of decision situations classified according to the type of information problem involved. Neither neoclassical nor behavioural economics can provide a complete account of the bases of habits or rules in these cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes theoretical models and empirical evidence concerning the political economy of public finances. It emphasizes political and institutional issues that influence different levels of public debt and fiscal deficits in countries and subnational entities with similar economic performance, and describes fiscal contract relationships between governors and voters using principal-agent theory. It then applies methods of experimental economics and game theory to evaluate how these relationships contribute to debt accumulation and fiscal unbalances, in a laboratory experiment in which participants act as agents (governors) and then as principals (voters). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the debate regarding national government debt. It asks if government should excise public debt through inflation or pay it as it was stipulated, and argues that, from an economic and social point of view, what is desirable is the just fulfillment of State obligations. First section describes the evolution of national government finances over the last ten years. Second section shows different simulations to analyze the determinants of interest payments. Final section examines proposals that seek to reduce public debt though monetary emission and discusses some of its possible consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The criminality rate in Colombia (crime/population) grew rapidly between the middle seventies and eighties, since then it had shown a declination, but the country still observes high indices of criminality, mostly in homicides and kidnapping. In a similar way defense, security and justice spending have grown. This paper will present some reasons that explain, from an economic point of view, the growth of these spending, the conditions that make it increase or decrease in an optimal way and which establish a complementary relation (marginal) between the magnitude and the efficiency of these spending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay analyzes liberal explanations of social order. Throughout exposition, Ovejero suggests the convenience of reviewing two central insights of liberalism, related with the way that the "problem" of social order is stated and its "solution" through the market. The "problem" is based on the unsustainable idea of presocial individuals inherent to liberalism. The article develops some arguments that shows why it has no sense to ask for the foundation of social order in that way. It supports that sociability can not be chosen, as the language can no be chosen either, in other words sociability can not be explained as a result of exchange or bargaining among individuals. The paper analyzes too the alternatives to explain the existence of social cement: passions, in terms of emotions and instincts, as the central basis that explains the way in which personal interests and the market would guarantee the social order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a comparison between Adam Smith and David Ricardo's treatments of poverty in a capitalist society. The comparison focus on the different arguments they use to relate poverty to inequality and institutional realities. The discussion points out the life experiences of each author and their intellectual interests, taking into account that poverty was one of the most pressing social problems faced by England between the 18th and 19th century. Smith associates poverty with the stability of social order; while Ricardo postulates that poverty is a function of the distributive struggle and the forces of population growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper parts from the work developed by Sen about metaorders and metapreferences to explain illegality as a rational problem. After showing the scope of this categories, the author exposes some limits of the benefit cost analysis of illegality. He continues suggesting that the concept of metapreferences contributes to understanding the fuzzy space that exists between legal and illegal frontiers, and between legitimacy and illegitimacy. González point out the necessity of a more detailed analysis of the way in which beliefs and desires shape individual and social preferences, if we don't want to fall in simplistic explanations of illegality based on an arbitrary criteria of the good. He concludes too that the inconsistency of metapreferences can explain why more expenditures in security and justice don't result in a reduction of impunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an interpretation of John Locke's theory of political society. After reviewing the differences between Locke's and Hobbes' ideas of individual, government and the importance of a rational discussion about the construction of political society, the article shows the role of individual freedom and consent as basis for explaining the situation of men in political society. The analysis of Locke's social contract shows how the creation of government is the outcome of the search for economic efficiency, because it permits the reduction of transaction costs or what Locke calls "the inconveniences of the state of nature". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to point out and to correct some mistakes of the conventional theory of imperfect competition based on partial equilibrium analysis. It extends to imperfect competition the classical model of general equilibrium, signalling the interconnections between individual prices and between these and macroeconomic aggregates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]