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The Russian private military company (PMC), the Wagner Group, went from being a public secret to openly fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia's war in Ukraine. By looking at Russian pro-government media discourses on PMCs, this paper argues that this development is largely made possible by a discursive shift, which happened before the war. Two basic discourses are found in the period leading up to the war – a discourse that denies the existence of Russian PMCs, and a discourse of normalization, which constructs PMCs as legitimate businesses and Russia as a great power. The two discourses previously kept the PMCs in a grey zone, allowing the Russian political elite deniability, while also taking credit for the foreign policy successes the PMCs achieved. However, this paper shows a discursive shift of recognizing PMCs as legitimate actors, which allowed for the Wagner Group to play a key role in Russia's war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the commonalities of populist mobilizations in the post-Soviet region. It identifies a salient populist cleavage between two political projects that differ fundamentally about their focal point of political action: externalist sovereigntism and internalist anti-corruption messianism. While sovereigntism takes a defensive stance repelling foreign forces hostile to "the people," anti-corruption messianism offensively tackles cronyism impeding developmental salvation for "the people." The paper reconstructs six sovereigntist and anti-corruption projects, which have unfolded across different non-democratic regimes in Russia, Armenia, and Ukraine throughout the past decade. It is argued that the conflict between sovereigntism and anti-corruption messianism relates to a twofold, distinctively post-Soviet constellation: uncertainty over conflictual geopolitical abeyance and the exasperation over social closure due to the prevalence of oligarchical patronalism. In this context, both populist projects constitute powerful strategies of solidarity-forging under conditions in which other channels of political articulation have been either blocked or exhausted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay adds to previous research of Putinism an investigation of the political thought and foreign outlooks of Russia's Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Sergei Naryshkin, with a focus on their statements between 2006 to 2020. The paper outlines Patrushev's and Naryshkin's thoughts regarding the United States, Ukraine, and the idea of multipolarity/polycentrism. We then introduce Patrushev's critique of liberal values and color revolutions, and Naryshkin's statements on the memory of World War II and Western institutions. The salience of these altogether seven topics is interpreted with reference to three classical topoi in Russian political thought: the Slavophile vs. Westerners controversy, the single-stream theory, and the civilizational paradigm. Our conclusions inform the ongoing debate on whether to conceptualize Putinism as either an ideology or a mentality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Honing in on how citizens in the former Soviet Union find themselves in an information competition over their own past, this paper explores whether and why ordinary people's perceptions of historical events and figures in their country's past are in line with a Russian-promoted narrative that highlights World War II – known as the "Great Patriotic War" in Russia and some former Soviet states – as a glorious Soviet victory and Stalin as a great leader. We draw on comparative survey data across six states and one de facto state in 2019–2020 to examine whether geopolitical or cultural proximity to Russia is associated with a more favourable view on a Russian-promoted narrative about the past. We find that closer geopolitical proximity to Russia is associated with perceiving the past in line with the Russian-promoted narrative, though the findings are less consistent when it comes to measures for closer cultural proximity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral authoritarian political systems have a hybrid nature, possessing very significant authoritarian features alongside elections that can produce openings for political change. The risks that elections pose to regimes are diminished if they can build winning coalitions involving voters beyond their core of loyal support. This paper considers how the construction of voter coalitions might be conceptualized in the Russian electoral authoritarian context, with reference to the case of the 2020 vote on constitutional reform, which was conducted with the primary aim of extending President Vladimir Putin's term in office. Using data from a national survey of Russians conducted immediately after the vote, our analysis indicates that the regime's success, even taking into account allegations of widespread fraud, was the result of its offer of additional constitutional amendments that were able to target voters beyond Putin's core support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The treatment of Jews by the state and society in Russia is an important measure of Russia's civic and political character. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that Russian Jews now enjoy the greatest freedom from antisemitism in modern Russian history. The explanation for the decline of antisemitism is found in two categories: the political and the societal. At the level of "high politics," the post-Soviet Russian state has abandoned Soviet policies that promoted or condoned the persecution and discrimination of Jews. This development was preceded and reinforced by the bottom-up growth in Russian society of a more tolerant attitude toward Jews. The first two sections of the paper explain the decline in antisemitism at elite and mass levels in Russia, underscoring mutually supportive institutional, political, and socio-cultural changes. The final part of the paper suggests that public expressions of antisemitism may re-emerge due to the weakening of the factors that have thus far restrained this prejudice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we study the effect of the internet and social media on government approval. On the one hand, the internet exposes people to independent information, which makes them possibly more critical of the government. On the other, many countries use the internet for propaganda, which might increase support for the government. We study these effects via the example of Russia. We utilize data from an existing survey: the resulting dataset contains data on 17,824 individual-level observations from 64 regions in Russia, 2010–2019. We find that more intensive internet use and access to social media are associated with a decrease in government approval. Yet, the influence of social media is more nuanced. The Russian-language homegrown network VKontakte increases public approval of the government. To partially account for self-selection bias, we use the propensity score matching method. Our results remain robust and allow us to make causal inferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over recent years, Russia's government has been expanding its presence in domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and instituting numerous regulatory revisions. However, research is inconclusive over the government's underlying economic intentions, and intervention outcomes, vis-à-vis SOEs. Likewise, it remains imprecise in relation to various characteristics of government–SOE interaction. To mitigate these issues, this paper develops a new state predation model relevant to large Russian SOEs. It argues, using the NOC (national oil company) mid-management recruitment and selection case, that SOEs are being re-oriented into centers of active regime support. Accordingly, the Russian government is prioritizing the placement of loyal clients, into NOC structures, who advance the SOEs' growing political obligations. It is also rewarding them, in a performance-curbing manner, through tolerating their inadequate economic competence and heightened engagement in corporate corruption. At the same time, non-clients, including top international talent, are experiencing diminishing recruitment numbers and opportunities. This status quo, then, is being maintained via informal (closed and procedure-less) practices, though certain formal rules support it too. Consequently, the above-outlined state predation insights are important to understanding SOE political over-embeddedness and patron–client relations in emerging market SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consistency and effectiveness of Russia's assertive foreign policy has earned Putin, both domestically and internationally, the image of a powerful and ambitious leader with a strategic plan to re-establish the Russian empire and defend Russia's core national interests. Speculation among scholars and practitioners regarding the existence of such a "strategic plan" makes Aleksandr Dugin's conspiratorial neo-Eurasianism project an especially appealing subject of research. This paper explores key ideas of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism, as described in his Foundations of Geopolitics, and tests them empirically with data from the Survey of Russian Elites: 1993–2016 using a Bayesian Structural Equation Modeling approach. Its main finding is that the theory has limited utility for understanding elites' foreign policy perceptions and therefore its influence should not be overstated. Moreover, there is no evidence that Dugin's theory is more salient in the post-Crimean period than in the pre-Crimean period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigatethe divergence in Russian public opinion between the masses and elites in terms of attitudes toward foreign countries in the post-Crimea era. To do so, we combine elite surveys conducted in Russia from 2000 to 2016 with an extensive database of Levada Center mass public opinion polling to test two competing models for explaining the observed divergence in mass and elite opinion: a demographic-driven Common Determinants model and a novel Kremlin Cueing model. More specifically, we assess the extent to which a set of demographic variables trained on a model of mass attitudes is able to predict elite attitudes. Our empirical evidence is more consistent with the predictions of the Kremlin Cueing model, indicating that, in some cases, elite opinion reacts very differently to shocks such as the Crimea crisis due to "where they sit" rather than who they are as individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses textual analysis to examine how European corporations assess sanctions in their annual reports. Using observations from a panel of almost 11,500 corporate annual reports from 2014 to 2017, we document significant cross-country variation in how firms perceive Russia-related sanctions, even after controlling for many firm-level characteristics, sectoral differences, and time trends. The cross-country differences also remain for sentiments about sanctions and contexts in which sanctions are mentioned. We also examine the role of macroeconomic linkages in explaining these differences. We show that Russia's inward and outward FDI stocks and high levels of imports and exports with Russia explain about half of the cross-country variation, leaving a nontrivial share of variation unexplained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do geopolitical orientations distinguish anti-Lukashenka protesters from non-protesters in Belarus? Employing data from an original online protest survey among 18+year-old citizens of Belarus residing in the country (MOBILISE 2020, n= 17,174) fielded 18August2020–29January2021, this paper compares protesters (n = 11,719) to non-protesters (n = 5,455) to better understand the dispositions that distinguish them. First, our logistic regression analysis finds robust evidence of polarization along geopolitical lines (with protesters preferring apro-EU and an anti-Russia orientation). Second, we show that pro-EU foreign policy preferences of protesters are neither temporally determined nor driven by the crisis, and are thus foundational among the positions held by anti-regime protesters. Third, we find that pro-EU and anti-Russia attitudes align with liberal democratic dispositions. Our study calls for the more systematic integration of foreign policy preferences into the comparative study of mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the process of renegotiation of the informal contract between the regional and federal elites of Russia after the economic crisis. We use the database of Center of Public Procedures' "Business against Corruption" to show that, after 2011, regional elites in Russia lost the pre-existing opportunity to extract rents from businesses in return for favorable election results for Vladimir Putin and United Russia. We also analyze the connection between the level of corporate raiding in various Russian regions and the political competition, tenure, and ties of their governors. We show that there are two distinct models for fighting raiding in a region: an authoritarian model for suppressing negative signals and a competitive model with the creation of a new consensus among the elites. Although both models are similar in terms of the absence of negative signals, they have very different consequences in the business context of an area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since about 2009, increasing budgetary constraints forced the Russian state to become notably less tolerant of lower-level corruption and predatory behavior by state agencies. In this paper, we argue that after a first stage of decentralized corruption and state capture during the 1990s, and a second period of decentralized corruption and business capture during the 2000s, Russia has entered a third stage of more centralized corruption since 2009. We build our argument on a detailed discussion of property rights relations in Russia, and support it with indicative quantitative data, suggesting that raiding attacks on businesses and corrupt behavior by state agencies have become less frequent and more centralized between 2009 and 2016. The sustainability of this move towards a more centralized mode of corruption remains questionable, however, mainly due to the lack of a long-term vision for the development of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates whether the economic freedom of a region drives firm performance. Despite the large number of papers about the relationship between economic freedom and growth, there is still little evidence on the role of economic freedom in the performance of individual firms. We address this gap in the literature using hierarchical linear modeling, allowing us to investigate regional differences in company-level performance. The dataset consists of information about 1,096 companies combined with the Index of Economic Freedom for Russian regions during the period 2004–2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compare three countries where public policy has explicitly sought to align incentives of employers and educational institutions around closing the gap between skill formation and labor market demand. In large, heterogeneous countries such as the United States, Russia and China, collaborative arrangements such apprenticeships and other forms of public-private partnerships can be constructed at the subnational level by building on direct, face-to-face ties across educational, business, government, and civic sectors. Drawing on existing literature as well as fieldwork studying a number of specific cases in the three countries, the paper develops a typology of such arrangements and proposes an explanation for the observed variation. It emphasizes the importance of two sets of factors: those that induce cooperation on the part of firms and schools, and those that influence the character of such partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upgrading skill formation has become an increasingly urgent task for societies facing the challenges of rapid technological change and globalization. However, reform of systems of vocational education and training (VET) poses severe challenges for aligning the interests of schools, firms, households, and governments, even in societies with relatively efficient markets for labor and education. Where market institutions are poorly developed, these challenges are particularly acute, resulting in endemic mismatches between the supply and demand of skill. Currently governments in many countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are seeking to adopt elements of the German dual education model. The Russian federal government has undertaken several initiatives designed to upgrade VET by encouraging closer cooperation of vocational schools and firms at the regional level, including the adoption of dual education programs. This paper focuses on one such project: a 2013 pilot program administered by the Russian Agency for Strategic Initiatives, to foster the development of new models of dual education. The paper compares the 13 pilot regions with regions that submitted proposals but were not selected and with all other regions along multiple economic, social, demographic, and institutional dimensions. The findings suggest hypotheses about the conditions that enabled the pilot regions to take advantage of federal policies encouraging the adoption of dual education. More generally, the paper sheds light on institutional solutions to collective action dilemmas in skill formation in transitional and developing societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As reliable and unfiltered access to Russia and Russians becomes a fraught issue for social scientists who wish to conduct surveys, focus groups, do ethnographies, or interview elite actors, the war presents scholars with an opportunity to reflect on questions of what data collection means, and on better communication between quantitative and qualitative scholars. Similarly, it forces us confront the extractive and colonial nature of knowledge production; the war reveals how social science has always relied on, but not really acknowledged, the labor of native scholars, but can no longer ignore indigenously produced work, particularly qualitative research. In this review piece, the author highlights both blind spots in the potential communication between political scientists and other social scientists, and already-existing points of connection that can be further expanded, precisely because of, not despite the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The credibility revolution transformed quantitative social sciences and was both a curse and a blessing for Russian studies. On the one hand, Russia turned out to be an attractive field for experimentalist research, which allowed Russian studies to gain unprecedented recognition in the broader disciplines. On the other hand, a focus on causal identification could have contributed to insufficient attention to potentially important topics relevant for understanding Russia and to some aspects of the Russian setting able to augment the general social science discourse. The war in Ukraine makes many causal identification designs used for studying Russia (with the exception of natural experiments) difficult or impossible to implement. It may make the return to other approaches and de-emphasizing causal identification necessary, at least to some extent. At the same time, the question remains of how the general social science disciplines will perceive such shift in focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written about the specific way in which the Russian government under President Vladimir V. Putin uses television to propagate pro-government views on domestic and international politics by influencing what is aired. This paper examines the first season of The Great Game (Bol'shaya Igra in Russian), a television talk show that appears on Russia's national television network Channel One, as an example of the government's effort to shape public opinion. A content analysis suggests The Great Game differs from the typical Russian talk show genre in that it delivers political messages without much entertainment, providing cerebral discussions of issues that nonetheless back up all nine of the core "neoconservative" concepts underlying recent Russian political strategy. This suggests that the Russian government and television executives innovate to determine how best to use television to win over skeptical citizens to the Kremlin's point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do protest movements affect electoral politics in electoral authoritarianism? Related research has usually focused on the immediate effects of protests on regime change, while longer time periods have received less attention. To address this shortcoming, this paper explores the 2017/18 presidential campaign of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny, asking how it was related to earlier contentious episodes, beginning with the countrywide protest wave of 2011/12. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative data sources, I argue that these protests affected different categories of actors differently. While they clearly provided Navalny with a boost in recognizability among the population, they were less important for mobilizing the online supporters of his 2017/18 campaign. At the same time, previous movement experience appears to have been vital for the political socialization of a significant share of Navalny's core activists. Considered together, the results attest to the importance of studying the long-term trajectories of protest in stable electoral authoritarian contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that unified oppositions present a bigger threat to dictators than divided oppositions. In this paper, we use micro-level data on opposition protests in Putin-era Russia to examine the factors that facilitate co-operation among different opposition forces. In particular, we focus on what leads so-called systemic opposition parties – those who have been granted some institutional accommodation by the regime – to join forces with non-systemic opposition forces. We propose a novel permutation-based method for analyzing protest coordination using event count data and find that coordination is most likely on issues of fundamental importance to the systemic opposition's base supporters. We also find that state co-optation reduces the extent of coordination. These findings illustrate the politically precarious position of "loyal" oppositions under autocracy; they must simultaneously show fealty to the state and maintain some measure of credibility as an opposition party that cares about its supporters' demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an experimental test of ethnic-based bias in citizens' evaluation of a political leader's decision-making across three multi-ethnic regions of the Russian Federation (Sakha, Buryatia, and Tatarstan) and one mono-ethnic region (Arkhangel'sk Oblast). With variations in the intensity of ethnic loyalties, degree of titular ethnic group assimilation, and differences in an ethnic division of labor, Russian regions present an interesting site for the investigation of these conjectures. The experiment participants read a vignette describing a decision by a local mayor and assess the decision. We randomly vary the mayor's ethnicity and policy choice. Our findings suggest that policy substance is the primary influence and dominates ethnicity when citizens evaluate public officials in three of the four regions. In the fourth region, Sakha in Northern Siberia, we provide analyses to explain the greater salience of ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze differences between Russian opinion leaders on the basis of Russian elite studies conducted in 2008, 2012 and 2016. We divide elites into two groups – supporters and opponents of official regime foreign policy – based on their attitudes toward the official governmental positions on Russian–US relations and examine their attitudes over the past decade (2008–2016). Analyzing the attitudes of elites who strongly support the official agenda versus those who are more oriented toward the West will help determine whether there has been wholesale elite consolidation around President Putin's policy agenda or whether any significant scepticism about current Russian foreign policy remains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies the model of opinion formation developed by John Zaller to the study of anti-American attitudes in the Russian elite. It examines the relative weight of political predispositions (interests, values, and experiences) versus immediately accessible "considerations" that depend on the flow of information in elite discourse. Based on survey data from 1995–2016, we find that two key political predispositions (identification as a Westernizer or Slavophile and service in the military and security agencies) are highly significant in the Yel'tsin period, when debates about Western intentions toward Russia were robust and the Kremlin's messaging was diverse. By contrast, anti-American sentiment in the elite has become more uniform in the Putin era, which we attribute to an increasingly fervent anti-American narrative on state-controlled television. In a period of clear and unequivocal messaging emanating from Kremlin-controlled media, these signals have surpassed civilizational identity and service in the force structures in importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the central claim of Natalia Forrat’s article that university support programs under Putin targeted the suppression of anti-regime student mobilization. Empirical evidence, both on the national-policy level and on the level of higher education institutions, suggests that the government introduced support programs in order to establish a research capacity at Russian flagship universities and to develop a more competitive national science system. The low level of students’ political engagement can rather be attributed to the outdated structures of student representation, inherited from the Soviet period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Center–regional relations in Putin's Russia are marked by strict hierarchies, with regional governors serving as agents to the principal–the federal center. This (authoritarian) mode of federalism allows the federal center to maintain the president's popularity, by shifting blame for policy failures from the presidency onto other federal political institutions and the regions. The article investigates how the regime reacted to the full-scale warfare against Ukraine. It theoretically elaborates on strategies of blame avoidance in personalist and federal autocracies and applies this framework to the Russian case. Using data from official documents and media reports, it demonstrates that the federal center again resorted to vertical blame-shifting, by formally and informally assigning the regional governors with several unpopular tasks, above all – casualty reporting and mobilization. The war confirmed center–regional relations as a practical venue for blame avoidance, which helps Putin's regime overcome crises, contributing to its coping resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent literature on authoritarian stability and legitimation has highlighted the role of propaganda and information control, national identity politics, participation technologies and other communication strategies autocrats use to shape public opinion. The authoritarian tool kit is, incomplete if we do not account for governance-related measures. Focusing on authoritarian social policy and contributing to the literature on the authoritarian welfare state, this study measures the political effects of unconditional and conditional cash transfers, specifically focusing on child subsidies, that the Russian government has increasingly integrated into its policy tools. Social policy and child support earn the government political dividends in terms of shoring up public support and have acquired added significance over the last few years. It is part of the current social pact that enables authoritarian resilience during Russia's war against Ukraine and that is made possible by the actions at the federal, regional, and municipal levels of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the economic and fiscal consequences of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine for subnational governments in Russia. Using annual fiscal and economic data, we study how different groups of regions have been affected by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite the Russian economy being more resilient to a sanctions shock than initially predicted, we document several important negative tendencies at the regional level, sometimes overlooked in policy discussions and the literature on economic sanctions. In this article, we present new regional data and focus on the effects of the war on overall regional tax collections in 2022–2023, as well as the dynamics of different types of regional and federal taxes. We identify several groups of "winners" (oil- and gas-extracting regions, weapons-producing regions, and the largest city-regions) and "losers" (regions that share a border with Ukraine and regions with sanctions-prone industrial specializations) and discuss the prospects of their resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explain the sources of territorial resilience in Russia. It demonstrates that the basis of territorial resilience is the "power vertical," i.e. the current model of center–regional relations. This model ensures political centralization and, consequently, political uniformity. The model is supported by several formalized institutions, including the selection of governors, the guidance and monitoring of governors by the presidential administration, and the interactions of governors with the United Russia party leadership. In addition, regional governors are included in patronage networks organized around the highest state officials and "state oligarchs." This additional informal subsystem provides center–regional relations with a flexibility that is important for maintaining resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This symposium challenges the common perception that authoritarian regimes are less resilient than democratic ones because they lack the sources of democratic resilience. We focus on Russia, a personalist authoritarian regime, which has demonstrated a surprisingly high level of resilience during its war against Ukraine. We argue that for a territorially large and diverse country such as Russia, the critical dimension of resilience is manifested in maintaining central control over the entire territory of the country during times of crisis. Contributions in this issue explore the sources and limits of Russia's territorial resilience. We argue that, while the personalist regime in Russia has demonstrated coping and adaptive dimensions of resilience, its transformative dimension remains questionable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine tests the resilience of the authoritarian regime in Russia. Most of the elites showed their commitment to the autocrat by publicly supporting the "special military operation". However, the intensity of their support has varied across the ranks. By examining Russian governors, I propose that elites vary their communicative responses to the war strategically, depending on their personal considerations and the structural characteristics of their regions. I apply text-as-data methods to analyze gubernatorial posts on the social network VKontakte in 2022–2023. I find that governors up for election, outsiders, with weaker political standing, and from poorer regions communicate more support measures for combatants and their families, and humanitarian aid to the annexed territories, when discussing the war in Ukraine. Therefore, by co-opting war-affected groups and emphasizing performance legitimacy, governors minimize the threat of anti-regime mobilization without resorting to large-scale repression and contribute to authoritarian resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explain the surprising decline in Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval rating in 2011. During the previous 10 years, Putin's rating had correlated closely with Russians' perceptions of the state of the economy. Yet the fall in his approval - from 79% in December 2010 to 63% a year later - occurred despite roughly stable economic perceptions. Comparing Levada Center polls from late 2010 and 2011, the paper explores both who (what types of respondents) grew disenchanted with Putin, and why (what issues or grievances prompted this switch). It finds that (a) the fall in support for the Kremlin - although faster among members of the "creative class," women, the rich, and residents of provincial cities - was broad-based, occurring among all social groups examined; (b) attitudes toward immigration, the West, and Russia's international status, as well as assessments of public service quality, changed little during 2011; (c) Putin's declining popularity most likely reflected stronger - not weaker - economic concerns; although the proportion judging economic performance to be poor did not increase, those who saw economic weakness became much less supportive of the Kremlin. Russians appear to have increasingly blamed their political leaders for unsatisfactory economic and political outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does inclusion in social policy programs strengthen individuals' support for redistribution, and lead to spillovers in support for future social policy programs? We study a unique dataset of 1,300 Moscow residents to estimate the effect of participating in a government-sponsored redevelopment program on preferences for redistributive social policy. Our design exploits features of the program designed to foster institutional trust by engaging citizens in the policy design process. We report a positive effect: individuals in buildings slated for redevelopment are more likely to agree that the government should reduce income differences between rich and poor, provide for the unemployed, and provide public housing. Our findings suggest that increased trust in the government is a channel through which program participation affects redistribution preferences, show how programs can be used strategically to promote a redistributive agenda, and suggest a pathway for the co-persistence of redistribution preferences and redistributive state policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on party-system dynamics in Russia by analyzing the war-related communication of the five main "systemic opposition" parties, their leaders, and three Communist MPs who initially criticized the invasion. Examining their adoption of established pro-war regime propaganda (anti-Ukrainian, anti-Western, "Z-talk") or anti-war rhetoric, we assess the extent of rhetorical convergence in the party system. Based on a dictionary analysis of over 60,000 posts between February 2021 and February 2023, we find the Communist Party to be the most proactive in its pro-war jingoism, Just Russia leader Sergey Mironov to be the clearest case of a regime mouthpiece for Z-talk, and only Yabloko to provide weak but consistent dissent, while New People and the three Communist MPs avoid both pro-war and anti-war rhetoric. Our findings indicate a functional reconfiguration of the party system, stopping short of full-fledged rhetorical harmonization toward "GDR-ization." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In times of severe international crises, the domestic public typically becomes more loyal to its government, creating a so-called "rally-'round-the-flag" effect and boosting a political leader's popularity. The bulk of research on the link between international crises and presidential popularity rates deals mostly with the experience of the US and other Western democracies. We focus on the case of Russia as a non-democratic major power. Our empirical analysis investigates whether military conflicts with Russian involvement are followed by an increase in presidential popularity during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The results of our monthly time-series estimation reveal that a boost in popularity, if there is one at all, is on average small in magnitude for less violent conflicts, whereas a substantially important increase in presidential approval ratings can be observed after international crises in which violence is a central element of conflict management from the very beginning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that the occurrence of electoral manipulation in Russia has been driven, in part, by diffusion across neighboring raions through emulation, incentives, and networks. Presumably, in Putin’s Russia all local authorities have some incentives to deliver a high number of votes to United Russia, the “party of power”. However, the perceived pressure to deliver ever higher levels of support for Putin’s party arguably increases considerably if one’s raion is located in a region marked by extraordinarily high turnout and high vote share for United Russia. Conversely, the absence of perceived competition to curry executive favor through delivering votes and networks of uncorrupted local authorities, as well as local opposition organizations working to combat electoral fraud, may help explain the absence of fraud among raions located in regions marked by clean elections. Our quantitative analyses suggest that a “neighborhood effect” – the existence of manipulated raions within a region – strongly influences the likelihood that raions are manipulated. Moreover, although results are more mixed, spatial autocorrelation analysis suggests that turnout levels in raions are influenced by the turnout in proximate raions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, we have seen uneven development in the leading advanced and emerging economies, new models of economic growth that vary from country to country, uncertain prospects for globalization and challenges of “regional globalization,” looming currency re-configurations, as well as shifting energy price dynamics and their influence on political and economic prospects of particular states. This paper discusses current challenges for social and economic policy in the context of the history of the past 30 years. With reference to Russia, it focuses on a new growth model, structural transformation (including import-substitution issues), economic dynamics, fiscal and monetary concerns, and social issues. It concludes by addressing the priorities of economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is focused on assessing the risk factors for Russian manufacturing firms posed by sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, US, and other countries in 2014. While there is an extensive literature assessing the successes and failures of international sanctions on the economies of both those imposing and targeted by sanctions on a macroeconomic level, we are more interested in trying to understand the corporate response – i.e. which firms evaluate the introduction and increasing scale of economic sanctions as a threat to their corporate strategy, and their possible reactions aimed at adjusting to a changing environment due to the geopolitical shock. Our research, based on a recent survey of manufacturing companies, provides evidence that over the last decade Russian manufacturing firms have become much more integrated into the global economy than is commonly assumed, through foreign direct investment, foreign trade (including imports of both technological equipment and raw materials and components), international partnerships, and by extensively supplying foreign companies that operate in Russia. Considering the self-selection effect of the top-performing firms in terms of foreign trade, we can state that sanctions could prove most harmful not only for the targeted firms, but for the entire population of better-performing and globalized firms involved in foreign trade with the EU and Ukraine. Thus, the impact of the sanctions on the prospects of the Russian manufacturing sector may be very strong over the medium-to-long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides the first empirical evidence of ethnic identity bias in the context of the dominant-party authoritarian electoral system in Russia's multi-ethnic republics. I run vote-choice survey experiments in Tatarstan, Buryatia, and Sakha, in which the respondents choose between the dominant United Russia candidate and a system-opposition A Just Russia candidate. First, I find that the party vote in previous elections is the best predictor of the vote and candidate evaluation in the experiment, revealing the traction of party support in Russia's electoral process. Second, titular voters demonstrate a strong preference for co-ethnic candidates regardless of the party they support. I rely on the arguments of social dominance theory to explain the prevalence of ethnic bias in voting among titular citizens of ethnic republics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bureaucratic promotion criteria create powerful incentives that shape the behavior of bureaucrats, governance, and regime legitimacy. Yet informal rules governing the functioning of the state apparatus are notoriously hard to uncover in authoritarian settings. Using a unique survey of Russian regional and municipal bureaucrats with an embedded conjoint experiment, I explore the criteria used for promotion decisions. I discover that personal connections to the future supervisor are a major favorable factor for bureaucratic promotions in Russia. For candidates with such ties, education and experience add extra advantage. Importantly, gender plays a crucial role; gender bias cannot be compensated by better education, experience, or a specific family strategy – and it is men with informal ties who drive the effect of personal connection on promotions. The study highlights the complex interaction between formal and informal criteria within Russian bureaucracy and contributes to our understanding of post-Soviet neopatrimonial politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the root causes and features of crises of the Russian economy in 2014–2015 as a combination of structural and institutional problems, as well as cyclical and external shocks. The demand-side model of economic growth based on massive windfall revenue from oil and gas exports from the 2000s is now exhausted, and the country needs to shift to a new, supply-side model of growth. Mobilization and liberalization are discussed as two key economic policy alternatives. The analysis includes historical retrospection, which provides some important lessons from economic developments in the twentieth century: the Great Depression and the period of stagflation, the Soviet industrialization debate andperestroika, and the New Economic Policy in the USSR and the contemporary modernization of China. Special attention is paid to the mechanisms of economic growth acceleration in present-day Russia. They include macroeconomic stabilization, structural and institutional reforms based on liberalization of economic activity, and guarantees of property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the tools available to the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for promoting Russian compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding pre-trial detention conditions. As cases regarding the poor treatment of prisoners in Russian pretrial detention centers continue to burden the ECHR, the Court has begun implementing alternative methods of curbing what it views as a systemic problem within the Russian prison system. Mechanisms considered include the awarding of financial damages, which has thus far been difficult to enforce, as well as the newly adopted mechanism of the pilot judgment procedure. The pilot judgment procedure presents a strong tool for the ECHR in gaining compliance from the Russian government and affecting reform within the pretrial detention system, as long as the ECHR treats Russia as an equal partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from fieldwork conducted in late 2009, this paper examines the Russian educational sphere and initiatives by the political elite to control and manipulate textbook content, testing objectives, and the structuring of curricula in order to maximize exposure to, and absorption of, its preferred narratives. Using a more detailed critical analysis of textbook content, I show that methods of discursive manipulation are used to highlight positive aspects of the Stalinist period - especially victory in World War II - while downplaying its political repression. This manipulation allows the state to both legitimize its version of Stalinist history and to perpetuate the underlying legitimizing function that version serves. In this way, the discourse implicitly justifies Putin's centralized state as the type of system that has historically produced great achievements for Russia. This article adds to the literature on the manipulation of educational content for political purposes generally, and in the case of Russia specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A team of US and Russian geographers combines field observations with satellite imagery in an examination of how major trends in Russian agriculture are manifest in one of Russia's most productive agricultural regions: Stavropol' Kray. A nationwide pattern of agricultural consolidation during the 1990s (featuring rural depopulation and a reduction in cultivated area and herd sizes upon the termination of Soviet-era subsidization levels) has had decidedly different outcomes in different parts of the vast Russian countryside. This paper - using Stavropol' as a surrogate for regions which by physical attributes, location, and human capital are best positioned to support agricultural activity - identifies a number of developments that may signal a new growth trajectory for agriculture in Russia: evolving specialization of former socialized farms in response to market conditions (in Stavropol' involving the shrinkage of animal husbandry and the release of surplus labor); increased levels of absentee (corporate) ownership of farmland in the more favorable locations; decoupling of the economic fate of large farms (success) from local municipal budgets (deficiency); and the expansion of non-Russian ethnic communities in the countryside, with attendant land use changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among analysts of China-Russia relations, it has been common to assume that bilateral rapprochement has primarily been rooted in geopolitical, security, and balance-of-power considerations. This article argues that the corresponding Realist theoretical approaches can explain some important incentives for Sino-Russian rapprochement, but struggle to account for how substantive bilateral alignment has actually become. The article posits that a particularly useful theoretical approach for examining the motives underlying Sino-Russian strategic alignment is "Omnibalancing" – a variation of balance-of-power theory that combines considerations of system-level balancing with a simultaneous focus on both leaderships' prioritization of domestic threats and regime security. Due to the increasing convergence of their authoritarian regime types, a major factor accounting for the dynamism of China-Russia strategic cooperation has been both governments' shared concern for regime survival/legitimacy, and their concrete policy cooperation in recent years has reflected their preoccupation with shoring up regime security against domestic challenges to authoritarian rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin, under the pretext of defending Russians in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, launched an all-out attack on sovereign Ukraine. Since then, Russia has violated multiple principles of just warfare. We consider the question of accountability for these crimes, outlining two scenarios: (1) the Putin regime remains in place, and (2) it is succeeded by a post-war regime that undertakes transitional justice as part of a broader effort at democratization. We review international institutions adjudicating criminal responsibility and domestic transitional justice mechanisms that eschew criminal approaches to accountability in favor of personnel policies. Combining limited purges with truth-revelation can prevent the accumulation of grievances and help rebuild a democratic culture. Although normative standards of justice might demand harsh punishment of Russian leaders by criminal tribunals, focusing on broad personnel transitional justice – purges and lustrations – carried out domestically can be conducive to long-term democratic stability in Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia has witnessed a high number of bank failures over the last two decades. Using monthly data for 2002–2020, spanning four election cycles (2004, 2008, 2012, 2018), we test the hypothesis that bank failures are less likely before presidential elections. We find that, in general, bank failures are less likely to occur in the 12 months leading up to an election. However, we do not observe that bank failures during electoral cycles are more pronounced for banks associated with greater political costs (financial troubles) than for other reasons (illegal activities). Overall, our results provide mixed evidence that political cycles matter for the occurrence of bank failures in Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of protests around the world poses challenges for authoritarian media outlets. While censoring news about protests abroad may push audiences to alternative news sources, their coverage could motivate citizens to take to the streets at home. To explore whether and how authoritarian media outlets cover foreign protests, we leverage evidence from Russia. Combining evidence from a decade of news coverage with protest-event data, we show that far from censoring news on protests abroad, authoritarian outlets afford them extensive coverage. The coverage of foreign protests, however, declines on days of large Russian protests, when the costs of encouraging mobilization are potentially greater. We also show that authoritarian media selectively use protests abroad, especially those in democracies, to convey the image of citizen activism as threatening and disorderly. Findings, which speak to research on authoritarian propaganda, have implications for scholarship on protest management and authoritarian resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effect of informal ties between judges (as represented by regional court chairpersons) and prosecutors on the repressive implementation of criminal justice in Russia in the area of fraud convictions. The authors utilize criminal law statistics of Russian regional courts for 2006-2010 to determine the alignment between chairpersons and prosecutors by measuring the length of their mutual career paths. The informal ties have a strong impact on trial outcome, which, however, changes over time. During periods of high bureaucratic risks and uncertainty, regions with a higher extent of informal ties between judges and prosecutors exhibit more repressive law enforcement. If external risks decrease, informal coalitions seem to increase the independence of the courts, insulating them from bureaucratic pressures and limiting their repressiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]