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AbstractDespite a clear and common threat from North Korea, why has the security cooperation between Japan and South Korea been less developed than the security cooperation between Australia and Japan? This paper explains this puzzle by focusing on policymakers’ perceptions of the rise of China. The paper concludes that, not only historical issues between Japan and South Korea, but different threat perceptions of China between Australia, Japan, and South Korea can best explain why Australia-Japan security cooperation has developed more than Japan-South Korea security cooperation in terms of the degree of institutionalization and the scope of cooperation. Throughout the post-Cold War era, Australian and Japanese policymakers were increasingly concerned about the rise of Chinese power and influence. This has ultimately led Tokyo and Canberra to strengthen their bilateral and trilateral cooperation with the United States as a means of hedging or balancing against the rise of China. On the other hand, South Korean policymakers were less concerned about China and more concerned about North Korean threat. Indeed, some Korean policymakers understood China as the indispensable power to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, many Korean policymaker were reluctant to enhance security cooperation with Japan in areas beyond Northeast Asia. However, with rapidly changing security environments and the intensifying U.S.-Sino rivalry, as well as deteriorating relations with China, Korean policymakers’ perceptions of China have become increasingly closer to those of Australia and Japan. Accordingly, there has been growing momentum for stronger security cooperation between Japan and South Korea not only in Northeast Asia, but also in broader Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'China threat' has been identified as an important driver of Japan's security agenda and discourse. The threat posed by China has been discussed either as a given factor determining the trajectory of Tokyo's security approach, as a product of identity construction, or as an expression of securitizing processes that facilitate institutional and policy change. This paper contributes to this debate by offering an alternative explanation of the process through which the Abe government constructed China as a threat. Building on securitization theory, the paper examines the modes and strategies employed by the Abe Administration to successfully securitize China. The paper argues that, while Beijing was labeled a 'concern' rather than an 'existential threat,' it was still securitized through a process of securitization that involves an association with those domains in which China engages assertively, namely the maritime commons. The paper suggests calling this type of securitizing pattern 'transversal securitization' and explores how this indirect strategy allowed the Abe government to pragmatically pursue its objectives both domestically and at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contrasts agricultural protection of Japan and Korea with the West and identifies major differences between them. It characterizes agricultural protection of Japan and Korea (net heavy food importers) as "tariff-based and scarcity-sensitive" aimed at promoting survival and the West (net food exporters) as "subsidy-based and surplus-inducing" aimed at enhancing farm income. We then identify factors underlying the coevolution and divergence in the extent of agricultural trade liberalization between Japan and Korea since the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Korea accepted deep cuts in agricultural tariffs in bilateral FTAs with the US and EU during the 2000s while Japan continued to protect farm interests by concluding low levels of FTAs with politically sensitive products excluded from tariff concessions. The two countries' stances reversed since 2013 with Japan becoming proactive in pursuing high levels of FTAs with major agricultural exporting countries and Korea decelerating its opening of agricultural markets. To explain such divergences, this paper develops a political economy framework in which the incumbent political leadership would consider both national interests and sectoral (farm as import competing industries and business/manufacturing as exporting industries) special interests. Our analysis shows that President Roh (2002–2007)'s embracing of neoliberal paradigm in formulating foreign trade policies that would promote national interests underlies the unprecedented level of agricultural trade liberalization in Korea during the 2000s, while Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's determination not to be outcompeted by the rising China and Korea's ambitious FTA strategies underlies Japan's proactive bilateral and mega-FTA drives since 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has historically been a major player within the Indo-Pacific region due to its rapid post-war economic expansion, technological advancement, massive overseas development aid as well as its cultural outreach. As the Indo-Pacific today is marred with various challenges in the form of maritime and energy security, border conflicts, booming population, developing economies, and rising carbon emissions, among others. The region requires a multipolar balance of power wherein nations can lead by example and concerted action towards creating a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future for an extensively dynamic Indo-Pacific. This paper focuses on one of the critical variables of the region, i.e., the energy sector, and attempts to place Japan's role and contribution to the region's ongoing energy transitions. The extent and means through which Japan can propel itself and the region towards a just transition with the help of regional and international cooperation have been analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's shift to balancing through the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in 2003 is not solely accounted for by the structural incentives in conventional realism. Rather, it is because of a dynamic interaction of the structure and domestic politics, which is more nuancedly captured by neoclassical realism. This paper posits that the concept of 'vested interests' such as economic ones, and not necessarily leaders' perception of threat, plays a crucial role as a hidden driver of Japan's remilitarisation regarding BMD. The existing literature does not accurately capture 'how' Japan chose the option of BMD as a means of balancing, 'why' Japan shifted to balance and 'when' it completes the shift and begins balancing. Therefore, by supplementing the existing realist paradigms, the paper intends to establish a theoretical bridge between structure and foreign policy outcome with unit-level variables, the value of which lie in the level of maintenance of theoretical rigour with strong explanatory power. The paper contributes to the substantive debate on why, when and how Japan's shift occurred to begin balancing from its previous behaviour, with further contributions to a broader theoretical debate on how a major state responds to a rising power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the notion of state security inform national approaches to managing cross-border in-migration in the increasingly interconnected but volatile Northeast Asian region? This paper explores this question by focusing on the intermestic politics of labor importation. Specifically, it theorizes the multidimensionality and multifunctionality of security fears that inform Japan's and Taiwan's approaches to the admission of low-skilled foreign workers. The paper proposes a comprehensive conceptual framework that explicates these relationships and argues that Northeast Asian labor importation regimes were formed at the intersection of a threefold logic of state security. Whereas economic security acted as an enabling (inclusionary) factor in both Japan and Taiwan and motivated the acceptance of foreign workers, internal security in Japan and external security in Taiwan acted as constraining (exclusionary) factors, which directly and distinctively conditioned the resulting policies. Moreover, ever since their inception in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the divergent policy regimes have been interlocked in these economic-internal and economic-external dynamics of state security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the striking similarities in strategic environment of Japan and South Korea, US deterrence through nonproliferation policy toward the two allies varied in terms of its measures applied: reward-based deterrence and threat-based deterrence. Using the critical junctures framework, this paper argues that 1) domestic structural circumstances of divided with idealist bias or unified with realist bias in two allies led to different local responses to US policy that signalled the level of credibility of US security guarantee; 2) intermediaries that played a critical role in promoting mutual trust and confidence have influenced the credibility and confidence on intra-alliance level; 3) this credibility and confidence had shaped the direction of the US deterrence strategy of reward-based deterrence for Japan and threat-based deterrence for South Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-regional free trade agreements (FTAs) have flourished in East Asia since the late 1990s. Japan and Korea were at the forefront of this trend. Nevertheless, most policymakers' preferences orbited around region-oriented FTAs out of reluctance to make a sudden policy shift away from their conventional emphasis on World Trade Organization-based multilateral negotiations. The trend continued in Japan throughout the 2000s. In contrast, Korea took a sharp turn toward a cross-regional strategy in 2003. By the mid-2010s, this had created a significant gap in the two countries' overall FTA partner choices. What caused policymakers' ideas in the two countries to diverge from their initial focus on region-oriented FTAs? This paper focuses on the conditions that enabled policymakers' ideas to explain the divergence by developing the contextual‒dynamic framework of FTA policies. At the dynamic level, individuals are more likely to emerge with new ideas when their expertise comes from outside the decision-making body, accompanied by their social qualities and power. Contextual conditions should also be met: the trade policy environment should reciprocate agent-level qualities to create a supportive atmosphere for policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent domestic constructivist studies characterize Japanese security policy as a serious anomaly to realism and a crucial case vindicating their approach to the larger study of world politics. The present paper challenges this view. It advances a postclassical realist interpretation of Japan's core security policy in the past quarter century. Japan's military doctrine expressed in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is consistent with postclassical realism's predictions, as opposed to neorealism's predictions, which focus on the dynamics of the regional security dilemma and the question of financial burden resulting from military build-up. In addition, postclassical realism offers a more compelling theoretical guide for understanding Japan's core security policy than defensive realism or mercantile realism. This paper backs up its argument with the empirical evidence that Takuya Kubo, the author of the NDPO, himself intentionally based the NDPO on a postclassical realist line of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary international security, some powers try to challenge the status quo through gradual, sub-threshold expansion without resorting to the explicit use of force. Examples of such sub-threshold challenges can be seen in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Eastern Europe. They are now referred to as 'gray zone' or 'hybrid threat'. For a long time deterrence theory, a core component of strategic studies, has largely neglected such sub-threshold challenges. The exceptional part of that is empirical school's findings, including fait accompli, limited probe, and controlled pressure. They perfectly match with the current threats and help developing conceptual framework to deter these kind of threats. Based on these findings, this paper attempted to illustrate three principles for gray zone deterrence: combination of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, mobilization of the whole government assets, and keeping open the window to escalation and analyze, Japan's efforts to develop conceptual framework for gray zone deterrence. Since Japan's efforts to develop conceptual framework of gray zone deterrence dates further back than other part of the world, as the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010, a case study on Japan would provide useful insights for gray zone deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May-June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security 'risk community' as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US-Japan and US-EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US-Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent financial reforms in Japan and elsewhere in Asia represent, for various authors, a fundamental shift in financial governance and in state–business relations in the region. The old ‘developmental’ state in East Asia has supposedly made way for a neoliberal ‘regulatory’ state, with its emphases on agency independence and the non-discretionary enforcement of rules. I show in this paper that this interpretation exaggerates the extent of the transformation in the important case of Japan. Although the outward institutional forms of economic governance in Japan, as with many Asian developing countries, has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s, discretion still remains at the core of economic and financial policy. In the area of Japanese banking regulation and supervision, I show how this highly discretionary application and enforcement has been consistent with domestic political pressures. The result is a substantial divergence between superficial convergence upon international regulatory standards and underlying behaviour. I also give reasons why globalization does not mean that this hybrid regulatory model is unsustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the evolution of APEC and the rejection of Japan's 1997 AMF proposal reflect a failure of Japanese and US leadership. Not only have the two countries failed to exercise either individual or shared regional leadership. Instead, both have used their considerable structural power negatively to block the other's proposals for regional collective action, rather than positively to exercise leadership. After developing the concepts of leadership and blocking power, the paper provides case studies of the APEC and AMF. It concludes that if a post-hegemonic US no longer has the willingness and/or the ability to undertake collective action single-handedly, and if in a post-Cold War world neither the US nor Japan has sufficient incentives to bridge their differences and sacrifice some interests to achieve a unified stance, then continued stalemate and under-supply of regional collective goods can be expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan's robust bilateralism on issues of external and internal security and discusses a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements that have sprung up in the 1990s. Asian-Pacific multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned collectively held norm in either Tokyo or any of the major capitals in the Asia-Pacific. What matters instead are political practices shaped by a strong tradition of bilateralism and, only very recently, by an incipient multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers theoretical justifications and empirical evidence for the claim that multinational firms employ strategic alliances to defuse protectionist threats in their export markets (Cowhey and Aronson 1993). Strategic alliances can be an effective response when tariff-jumping foreign direct investment (FDI) does not diffuse protectionism in the host country. Although tariff-jumping FDI creates new allies (such as workers) in the host country, it does not offer any benefits to host country firms, which, as a result, will continue to press for protection. If multinational firms expect the host country government to give in to such protectionist pressure, they may turn to strategic alliances which, unlike FDI, give direct benefits to host country producers. On receiving such benefits, host country producers are expected to moderate their protectionist demands. The paper finds empirical support for this theory in the alliances of Japanese semiconductor finns in the late 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1990s, Japanese views of China were relatively positive. In the 2000s, however, views of China have deteriorated markedly and China has increasingly come to be seen as ‘anti-Japanese’. How can these developments, which took place despite increased economic interdependence, be understood? One seemingly obvious explanation is the occurrence of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents in China since the mid-2000s. I suggest that these incidents per se do not fully explain the puzzle. Protests against other countries occasionally occur and may influence public opinion. Nonetheless, the interpretation of such events arguably determines their significance. Demonstrations may be seen as legitimate or spontaneous. If understood as denying recognition of an actor's self-identity, the causes of such incidents are likely to have considerably deeper and more severe consequences than what would otherwise be the case. Through an analysis of Japanese parliamentary debates and newspaper editorials, the paper demonstrates that the Chinese government has come to be seen as denying Japan's self-identity as a peaceful state that has provided China with substantial amounts of official development aid (ODA) during the post-war era. This is mainly because China teaches patriotic education, which is viewed as the root cause of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents. China, then, is not regarded as ‘anti-Japanese’ merely because of protests against Japan and attacks on Japanese material interests but for denying a key component of Japan's self-image. Moreover, the analysis shows that explicit Chinese statements recognising Japan's self-identity have been highly praised in Japan. The article concludes that if China recognises Japan's self-understanding of its identity as peaceful, Japan is more likely to stick to this identity and act accordingly whereas Chinese denials of it might empower Japanese actors who seek to move away from this identity and ‘normalise’ Japan, for example, by revising the pacifist Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite having the highest level of public debt in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), higher than Greece or Italy, Japan has one of the lowest aggregate tax burdens of the advanced industrial democracies. This paper asks why Japan, once described as a strong developmental state, has had such a weak extractive capacity, an inability to raise revenues to confront deficits and public debt? In contrast to the existing explanations that focus on political institutions, partisan preferences, or economic globalization, this article argues that Japan's ‘tax–welfare mix’ – the combination of taxes and redistributive welfare polices – undermined the state's long-term capacity to secure adequate tax revenue. More than just a source of revenue, taxes can be used directly to achieve redistributive goals, such as targeting low taxes and exemptions to specific groups. This study shows how Japan's tax–welfare mix diminished its extractive capacity through three mechanisms: the political lock-in of a redistributive social bargain struck around low taxes, the timing and sequencing of its tax policy and welfare development, and the erosion of public trust, which undermined tax consent. Beyond offering a new theory of extractive capacity, the tax–welfare mix explains aspects of Japan's tax structure that defy existing explanations and contributes to our understanding of the capitalist development state by highlighting the redistributive political function of tax policy and its long-term impact on state capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Many studies of Japan’s soft power are premised on the ‘affective’ dimensions of itskawaiipop culture that generate liking or interest. While entirely warranted, emphasising cultural attraction does not do sufficient justice to the multi-faceted foundations of Japanese soft power. Neither does it recognise other components of Joseph Nye’s soft power framework stressing the ‘normative’ appeal of policies that reflect global norms. This article investigates the ‘normative’ dimensions of Japan’s soft power on climate change, and whether it translates into international influence, as Nye predicted. The first section examines the Cabinet’s 2010New Growth Strategy,identifying a potential source of ‘normative’ soft power in its self-proclaimed desire to reinvent Japan as a ‘trouble-shooting nation on global issues’, specifically environmental challenges. Next, it analyses how Japanese entities (government, corporations, and NGOs) can transmit ‘normative’ soft power, and obstacles encountered. These transmission mechanisms include ‘Cool Earth Partnership’ programmes, the ‘Future City Initiative’ and the values-based Satoyama Initiative. The final section addresses conceptual implications that arise, and assesses whether Japan’s ‘normative’ soft power has paid dividends. Drawing from literature on pioneer states and external reviews of Japan’s alignment with key climate norms, the paper suggests that Japan’s normative soft power is lacking in driving agendas at global climate forums. At a pragmatic problem-solving level, however, Japan is increasingly perceived as an attractive source of transferable solutions, reflecting climate norms such as developing eco-friendly technologies and providing assistance to help vulnerable countries mitigate climate change [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Japanese government and business sector have long seen opportunities in making environmental protection a core feature of industrial policy. The ‘green’ economic diplomacy-effort, which materialized in the late 1980s and largely builds on targeted domestic innovation policies, is now entering new ground. Assessing recent developments in the railway, nuclear power generation, water, and next-generation automobile industries, this paper analyses how and why the Japanese government uses ‘green’ environmental and energy technology in relations with emerging and developed countries. Public-private partnerships are strengthened, and semi-governmental institutions and individual politicians take up new roles. Adhering to comprehensive security traditions, Japan's policies aim to contribute to the national interest both in terms of economic prosperity and political stability. Primary objectives are the quest for new markets abroad, resources security, and securing cooperative relations with other countries. Adjustment to shifting global power balances, domestic politics, and climate change challenges also play a role, while ‘hard’ security issues are barely considered. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The global financial crisis of 2008-09 presented a critical challenge to East Asian regional financial cooperation. Over a decade of efforts to reduce regional vulnerability to financial crisis and contagion were confronted with the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. The results for East Asia were mixed. On the one hand, no economies were forced to submit to IMF-led bailouts, as had happened so painfully in 1997-98. On the other hand, the most highly-developed component of the project of ASEAN+3 financial regionalism - the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which set up a system of emergency liquidity provision - appeared irrelevant, as the central banks of South Korea and Singapore prioritized the establishment of new swap agreements with the United States as a means of ensuring dollar liquidity instead of relying on their Chiang Mai partners. Nonetheless, in May 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed to a substantial expansion and 'multilateralization' of the initiative. This paper critically addresses whether CMI has been transformed into an 'Asian Monetary Fund' and argues that the events of 2008-10 make substantial additional movement in that direction unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a reinterpretation of Japan's responses toward China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue. It is generally taken for granted that Japan's official responses to China's pressure over the issue are determined by the personality of individual leaders, the emergence of Japanese conservative nationalism and the calculations of Japan's national interests with regard to China's strategic role. With the examination of two cases during the Koizumi and Abe administrations between 2001 and 2007, this paper offers an alternative interpretation by highlighting the rationality of individual political actors and the primacy of domestic political survival. The article suggests domestic political legitimacy of individual leaders is a vital factor that affects Japan's official responses to China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional financial arrangements and monetary integration in East Asia and Europe have made considerable progress in recent years. This paper discusses whether governments in both regions, Japan and Germany as the most advanced regional economies in particular, can use the new dynamics as levers to raise their status vis-à-vis the United States. It will be argued that activities are defensive rather than offensive, aiming at protecting the respective region from financial risk. Japan, in particular, would find it difficult to raise its status vis-à-vis the United States significantly by promoting regional financial and monetary integration, principal reasons being actor heterogeneity, the role of China, hesitation to bear burden and risk, and the historical legacy of a bank-oriented system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 2005 UNESCO produced its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. This was largely a response to the worries of countries, especially in Europe and not least of which France, which feared the damaging effects to their cultures if trade in entertainment products remained too one-sided. Generally the argument of this paper is that while initial tensions between the United States and Europe were motivated by the usual commercial concerns, Europeans were increasingly worried about the cultural impact of this commerce. The Japanese, however, have not been nearly so concerned as the Europeans about becoming 'Americanized'. This lack of tension between the United States and Japan in the area of film and television is due to several factors. First, there is a complementarity between American entertainment and the Japanese electronics industry. Second, the Japanese are major players in some aspects of the entertainment industry, most especially in the area of animation, and they are especially influential in Asia. Finally, issues of cultural conflict between the United States and Japan are simply less salient to Tokyo than those which characterize Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines interactions among the United States, Japan and the European Union over steel trade disputes with particular interest in Japan's reactions to the disputes. For this objective, this paper establishes an analytical framework that takes into account bilateral, international, and domestic factors in formulating a state's external policy and relations. It was found that the special relationship with the United States still impinged on Japan's reactions to steel trade disputes, but its influence has gradually declined. Moreover, growing familiarity with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and practices and collaboration with other countries enabled Tokyo to expand its policy options to handle steel trade conflicts with Washington. Significantly, Japan formally adopted seemingly bold measures to cope with the US steel safeguard action, but the measures' substantial influence on the US government was limited compared with those adopted by the European Union. Weak policy coordination among ministries prevented Japan from formulating strategic and effective measures in managing steel trade disputes with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The integrated system of political-economic relations that has prevailed in the Pacific since the September 1951 treaty of peace with Japan, known here as the San Francisco System, is distinctive in comparison with subregional systems elsewhere in the world. This paper outlines key defining features, such as (1) a dense network of bilateral alliances; (2) an absence of multilateral security structures; (3) strong asymmetry in alliance relations, both in security and economics; (4) special precedence to Japan; and (5) liberal trade access to American markets, coupled with relatively limited development assistance. After contrasting this system to analogous arrangements elsewhere, especially in the Atlantic, it explores both the origins and the prognosis of this remarkably durable political-economic entity. Complementary domestic political-economic interests on both sides of the Pacific, reinforcing a brilliant original Japan-centric design by John Foster Dulles, account for persistence, it is argued, while forces for change center on the dynamic emerging role of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits the conceptualisation of (regional) order in International Relations (IR) theory to illuminate key aspects of Japan's order-building role in the Indo-Pacific. The framework is based upon a multi-dimensional understanding of regional order-building allowing for an examination of Japan's vision for a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) policy 'vision', the challenges it faces as a secondary power, and its conduct as an emerging entrepreneurial power in the Indo-Pacific. The article's central argument is that Japan's order-building should be understood in the context of the country's deeper strategic situation and, in particular, its position as a secondary, but still highly influential, power. This has implications for understanding Japan's approach to international order and how it might deploy norm entrepreneurship in shaping the new Indo-Pacific order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has featured prominently in The Pacific Review (TPR) since the journal's inception; and the very first issue in 1988 was essentially a Japan special issue with four out of six articles devoted to considering the implications of the country's then seemingly relentless rise as a regional and increasingly global power. Thereafter, TPR has carefully documented Japan's changing international pathway, forming indispensable reading for all Japan experts. TPR has always been distinguished by a rare ability to question the conventional wisdom on the study of Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Japan is commonly regarded as a strong proponent of the existing liberal international order championed by the US in the Indo-Pacific, sometimes it has been half-hearted in opposing a Sino-centric order and been rather supportive of Chinese diplomacy. In particular, it has to some degree supported the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by Beijing, effectively offered its endorsement to the international legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without problematizing human rights issues, and severely restricted the enhancement of its own defense capabilities. These policies have been shaped by pro-China individuals and groups who hold privileged positions inside the government, and their privileged positions have been determined by haphazard domestic political factors which have little to do with Sino-Japanese relations. This means that, although on the surface Japan may seem to have rationally calculated its international strategic interests and implemented hedging as a coherent strategy amid Sino-US rivalries, its implementation of what seems to be a hedging strategy has actually been incidental. Its policy has turned out to resemble what has been regarded by International Relations (IR) theorists as a hedging strategy, due to haphazard domestic political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the new millennium, Japan found a renewed interest in infrastructure investment and engaged in this policy issue with diplomatic initiatives and external partnerships with due attention to China's geo-economic presence. In formulating strategies for infrastructure investment, Japan has presented and disseminated a specific idea of 'quality infrastructure' as a principal component of its external infrastructure push. This article seeks to trace the evolution of Japan's ideational principles for quality infrastructure and elucidate policy motivation, policy objective, and external influence. It argues that Japan's advocacy of quality infrastructure derived from domestic impetus to expand infrastructure exports and external impetus to compete against China's infrastructural push through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Japan advocated quality infrastructure as a strategic tool to pursue multiple policy objectives that shifted from justifying Japanese infrastructural push to using as means to check and accommodate the BRI, and to legitimising common governance principles for infrastructure investment. In relations to external influence, Japan's persistence in norm-setting encouraged China to incorporate normative principles first at business dialogues and then embed common governance principles in its policy approach to infrastructure investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's increasingly active economic diplomacy in recent years has often been deeply linked to its geostrategic interests. Japan is said to be watching this development with alarm. Analysts have often claimed that this has resulted in Sino-Japanese rivalry, where the Japanese see any gains made by China in zero-sum terms, and make concerted efforts to counter China's growing influence. This article, however, is critical of such views. While elements of rivalry may indeed be visible in some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be premature to apply this perspective to economic statecraft, which is inherently multifaceted. This article claims that too much attention has been paid to the strategic aspects of Chinese economic statecraft at the expense of economic/commercial ones that could foster cooperative relations between Beijing and Tokyo. It argues that Japan does not hold a monolithic view that Chinese diplomatic activities in the economic realm are an axiomatic threat to Japanese security interests, and it remains premature to say that Japan and China are 'rivals' in the realm of economic statecraft. Future analysis in this area needs to pay greater attention to the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in strategic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses wedge strategies in the context of Russo-Japanese relations. In particular, it looks at how both countries have sought to generate a dis-alignment in the opposing side, preventing further steps toward the consolidation of potentially threatening partnerships: the US-Japan alliance for Russia, and the Russia-China entente for Japan. After identifying the respective goals of Russia and Japan, the article examines the conditions that enable the success of wedge strategies. Looking at the case of Russia-Japan relations from 2012 to 2020, the article argues that a strategy constituted of a mix of positive economic and political incentives and a limited amount of coercion can succeed in producing a degree of dis-alignment in the opposing camp. Russia's strategy seems to be more productive than Japan's since Moscow has managed to minimize the effect of sanctions imposed by Japan and it has reduced political differences to mostly bilateral and regional issues. A greater level of cooperation with established partners for both Russia and Japan, and limited costs of wedging strategies, have resulted in dis-alignment but not a reversal of existing alignments. The article also indicates that in this case credibility issues do not fundamentally affect the degree of success of wedge strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an ongoing debate about how (or through what mechanisms) global environmental norms have influenced domestic political debates that give rise to green policy choices. In particular, effective international environmental cooperation between transnational and domestic NGOs has been recognized as a key to successful environmental movements. In this regard, the central question guiding research on the politics of environmental norms is, under what condition(s) transnational cooperation among NGOs would be more likely to be sustained so as to achieve its goals. This article proposes that one of the mechanisms missing from the debate is a bottom-up approach through which transnational cooperation can be forged by the initiation of domestic NGOs. Drawing on social movement literature, it is hypothesized that domestic environmental NGOs with more resources, challenging ideologies, and more contentious modes of protest to dominant paradigms is more likely to nurture, develop, and sustain effective transnational cooperation for environmental norms. The validity of this hypothesis is demonstrated through the examination of wetland reclamation projects in Japan and Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores changes in Japan's conception of and policy toward security multilateralism 1 in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War with special reference to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It makes the observation that notwithstanding Japan's active role behind the establishment of the ARF in the early 1990s and continuing public expression of strong support for Asia-Pacific security multilateralism since that time, in actuality, Japan's enthusiasm for it has dwindled from the late 1990s onwards. This article argues that this has been due primarily to Japan's disappointing experiences in the ARF, evinced by its abortive efforts to promote meaningful cooperative security measures and the failings of multilateral security diplomacy in addressing its security concerns. Consequently, Japan's conception of regional security multilateralism has shifted from an optimistic liberal to a more pessimistic realist perspective from which the ARF can, at best, be seen as a venue contributing only to a minimal level of confidence building among regional countries or, to put it more cynically, ‘a talking shop’. This has made Japan's ARF policy more tentative and less energetic. Japan's enthusiasm has also been diluted by a number of internal and external constraints on ARF policy, including US misgivings about Japan's tilt toward regional security multilateralism, its domestic organizational limitations, growing dissent within the Japanese government over the value of security multilateralism, the lack of political support for bureaucratic initiatives and the unexpected frictions between bilateral and multilateral security approaches in Japan's overall security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an increasing proliferation of bilateral strategic partnerships in and beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Yet such a partnership between Japan and New Zealand is underexplored. The central aim of this article is to fill the gap. This article first clarifies the definition of, and then provides an analytical framework for, a 'strategic partnership'. The article then analyses how these countries laid the foundation of their strategic partnership and how they have since built upon that foundation. In the implementation process of the strategic partnership, this article examines three elements: 1) the consolidation of their strategic partnership in official documents; 2) the institutionalisation of regular meetings; and 3) participation in defence and security exercises. Although the Japan-New Zealand strategic partnership is still in the early stages, this article argues that it has the potential to grow further given bipartisan support and positive perceptions in civil society in both countries. This article also analyses three factors that exert an impact on the development of their strategic partnership: China's continued assertive maritime presence, the rejuvenation of the US-New Zealand bilateral relationship, and Japan and New Zealand's ongoing commitment to the South Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Official development assistance (ODA) constitutes one of Japan's most important foreign policy instruments as it builds Japan's global network and supports allies in the Southeast Asian region and beyond. In the context of a rising China and an increasingly severe fiscal and demographic situation at home, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) promulgated a domestic-oriented legitimation campaign featuring a popular anime character rebranded as 'ODA-man' to increase public understanding of and support for Japan's ODA. Drawing on interpretivist analysis of performances at a development cooperation promotion festival, anime videos on the MOFA YouTube channel and interviews and examining the use of rhetorical strategies, this article provides an in-depth study of the promotion of one of the central instruments in Japan's foreign policy repertoire. Though he comes off as goofy and benign, ODA-man's messages are serious ones that reproduce dominant economic and security narratives about Japan and the world. Analysis points to both innovation and path dependency in Japan's foreign policy repertoire; while ODA-man may be new the story he is telling, and the way that he is performing it, is very much familiar. The article further illuminates important trends in the public legitimation of foreign policy in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In popular narratives, intellectual and media analysts believe the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan is a contestation for potential hydrocarbon reserves and other maritime rights which are per se divisible, but nationalism – particularly on China side – and relative power change between the two competing claimants make these territories increasingly indivisible and the dispute war-prone. Based on a review over People's Daily's coverage of the disputes and other secondary information, this article reveals a different scenario by highlighting the political meanings of disputed territories for national cohesion and regime self-preservation. It finds, Beijing's strategic moves in the disputes are influenced by its efforts at different occasions to de-legitimate Republic of China at Taiwan and defend its core interests – namely Taiwan and the "One-China" principle, to appease the patriotism in Hong Kong and facilitate the latter's stable reversion to China in 1990s, and what is more, to rally popular support at home. In addition, Beijing's Diaoyu/Senkaku strategy did not follow a carefully calculated path, but was mostly reactive to the contingencies and ultimately took shape through the incremental accumulation of previous policies and behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do conservative nationalists in Japan continuously seek to revise the constitution despite the past failures, and what is the likelihood of successful revision and its impact on Japan's norm of pacifism and its use of force? The article offers an analytical framework for the issue based on national pride and national security, and argues that the ‘revisionists’ seek to create a new national identity, one that infuses a greater sense of national pride among the public and enables the exercise of collective self-defense, thereby removing Japan's postwar psychological and institutional limitations on nationalism and military activities. The LDP's 2012 draft is most explicit and ambitious in this regard, with the current revision attempt under Abe having the highest chance of success since the 1950s. Successful revision would significantly expand Japan's security activities, particularly within the framework of the US-Japan Security Alliance, and entail the end of Japan's unique postwar institutionalized pacifism, although the norm of pacifism will linger on as a constitutional principle. For a smoother return to the international military scene, the Japanese government must distance itself from historical revisionism and utilize its enhanced military role to promote regional public goods rather than merely protecting its narrow national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative form of alignment represents an effort by Tokyo, and other US-allies, to ‘decenter’ their respective security policies from their erstwhile over-dependence on Washington. By examining the nature, purpose, and dynamics of strategic partnerships more closely, and investigating the empirical case of Australia, we can gain a greater appreciation of their significance both to Japan's evolving security policy and the broader role they play in the Asia Pacific security landscape. The article argues that Australia has been the most significant and successful of Japan's new strategic partnerships to date, has therefore come to represent the template for other new alignments, and hence provides a yardstick against which their effectiveness can be measured. It concludes that while the strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy - ostensibly independent of the US-alliance - closer inspection reveals how this relationship remains fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the cold war the United States was overwhelmingly central in Japan's security policy. Japan hosted US bases and the Self-Defense Forces held joint exercises with the US military, even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan essentially refused even to discuss security with its neighbors. Special exceptions were made for the United States in otherwise sweeping policies, such as the exception for the United States in Tokyo's ban on weapons exports and co-development. Since the end of the cold war, Japan's security policy has undergone a little noticed transformation: it has steadily moved away from being centered on the United States as its sole security partner. Tokyo has initiated bilateral security dialogues with its Asian neighbors and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as a supplement to the US alliance. Japan has begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. Paradoxically these changes have occurred even as the US-Japan alliance has strengthened. The articles in this special issue examine these new security ties with states and multilateral organizations, and other changes in policy that have made the United States less ‘special,’ such as by allowing arms exports to other actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing challenges of environment and sustainable development stretch across scales of geographic space and require action at multiple levels of jurisdictions, such as individual level, community level, national level, and global level. Multilevel governance and cross-scale coordination will open up opportunities for a variety of stakeholders to participate in decision-making. While potentially increasing the capacity of governance, the cross-scale and multilevel approaches may face a difficulty in policy coordination created by the plurality of stakeholders and be attended with organizational complexity. This article will examine the potential of subnational participation to make a policy choice, mediated by local governments, to be congruent with global strategies and national mandates in a consistent way. To this end, it will bring a new perspective to Kitakyushu City's experience in Japan as a heuristic test case study. My claim is that subnational actors occupy a strategic position to straddle the division between state and society, between the center and the periphery, and between the domestic and the foreign so they can act as an intermediate agent in reconnecting local action with national policy and turning global strategies into local action for problem solving. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article focuses on the export of infrastructure systems as Japan's foreign economic policy that is unique in terms of diplomatic goals and means. It seeks to address how and why the Japanese government has strengthened commitments to expanding infrastructure exports to major Asian countries. This article argues that the Japanese government took advantage of developmental means of state-led initiative and institutionalised government-business collaboration in sustaining the export of infrastructure systems. It also contends that the Japanese government pursued, in the infrastructure export initiative, twin goals of creating a new growth engine to revitalise the Japanese economy and strengthening strategic links with Asian countries to balance China's regional influence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Domestic and international contests explain the transformation of Japan's foreign aid programme begun in the early 1950s. Through contests between domestic players, Japan has streamlined its aid processes by introducing institutional innovations, accommodating new actors in aid policy and delivery, and responding more sensitively to public opinion and independent advice. At the international level, contests have come from the Development Assistance Committee/Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the USA, and China. Through these contests, Japan has emerged as a more rounded aid donor. Its new aid model blends Western principles with concepts of ‘self-help’, favouring large infrastructure projects that serve both Japan's and recipient countries’ interests. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The nature of food risk in Japan has undergone a qualitative change in recent years. This article synthesises insights from psychology, economics, and political science into an interdisciplinary risk approach to show how international relations impact consumer decisions in Japan by outlining how food risks are constructed and framed within existing narrative frameworks. To this end, the article employs two case studies: thegyōzaincident in 2008, when poisoned dumplings imported from China caused ten people to fall ill, and contaminated beef incident in 2011, in which five people died and dozens more were hospitalised after consuming raw beef tainted due to industrial negligence. These cases are analysed in the context of Japan's low rate of food self-sufficiency, deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations and the ‘China threat theory’, and perceptions of food safety. The article shows how, despite suffering recent major domestic food contamination incidents and lethal domestic food terrorism, Japanese food is perceived as safe and healthy whereas imported food, and especially Chinese food, is perceived as dangerous and unhealthy. This is exemplified in the domestic response to the two cases: thegyōzaincident led to a national outcry, mass hysteria, and calls for a ban on Chinese food imports. Conversely, the raw beef contamination incident – the deadliest case of food contamination in Japan since the 1990s – saw a far more mixed response, as industry, media, and consumers called for the government to allow individuals to take on self-responsibility to mediate their own risks regarding (domestically produced Japanese) food. The article concludes by pointing out that, while behavioural sciences can tell us important things about risk, the political and international context must also be considered. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since 1945, the United States (US) has served as a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism. Both sides argued that the US was an arrogant hegemon that unjustly robbed Japan of its autonomy, and prevented Japan from achieving its own ideal national identity. Both sides frequently demanded that Japan should be more ‘resolute’ and resist unfair demands emanating from the US. In recent years, however, both camps are increasingly using the same rhetoric to criticise the Japanese government's China policy. China is also being depicted as an overbearing state that unfairly browbeats Japan into making diplomatic concessions. Given the similarities between the portrayal of China and the US, has China now become a nationalist focal point forboththe Japanese Left and Right? Utilising constructivist insights, this article seeks to shed light on this question, by examining how the Japanese Right and Left portray China, and explores the implications for Japan's China policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]